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ABSTRACT
This is a comparative study of strategy formation in Irish complex
organisations. Four organisations were chosen for study which are
representative of the four main types of organisation to be found in
the Irish economy,a state agency,a public limited company,a state-owned
entreprise and a producer cooperative. The approach taken in this
research is multi-level and contextual,an approach which is still very
rare in organisational studies. Insight is sought through intensive,
longitudinal study of the four organisations over their whole life
histories. The central thrust of the inquiry is the empirical
examination of how situational context and autonomous organisational
behaviour influence organisational strategy and of how these two
elements interact. The context - strategy formation link,in particular,
is under-explored in the strategy literature. The small national
context facilitates the development of a multi-level perspective on
the interaction of situational context and organisational action
that includes the national,industry and organisational levels of
analysis. It also throws the context-organisation interrelationship
into greater relief than would be possible through using a similar .
research design in a much larger national context.
The empirical analysis identifies SITUATIONAL CONTEXT,ORGANISATIONAL
LEADERS and ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY as the three main elements
in strategy formation. It isolates and empirically analyses FIVE
important CONTEXTUAL FACTORS that shape strategy,and provides a
greater elaboration of the contextual influences on organisational
action than that to be found in much of the organisational literature,
where the environment of organisations tends to be viewed as
homogeneous and residual. It also reveals that the contextual influences
on organisational action often arise from INTER-LINKING PROCESSES OF
SOCIAL VOLITION across multiple levels of social and economic structure
and it examines the nature of these processes. In this way the study
goes beyond the predominant conception of contextual influences
as 'impersonal forces', a perspective on situational context that also
predominates in the organisational literature. The study also provides
a FRESH PERSPECTIVE ON the role of LEADERSHIP in strategy formation.
It deflects attention away from the predominant pre-occupation
in the leadership literature with the personality and personal
attributes of the leader. Leadership effectiveness is also seen
to be related to the ongoing processual dynamics of leading(i.e. to
ongoing performance and the maintenance of credibility over time) and to
the nature of the historical challenge presented to individual leaders
by situational context and organisational history. A classification of
leaders in terms of their historical roles is developed and offered as a
useful way of organising future research into the leadership phenomenon.
The study then develops,from the data and the analysis,a model
of organisational development,based on the concept of ORGANISATIONAL
CAREER,which is more existential and less deterministic than that
based on the life cycle analogy. These insights are finally synthesised
into A RELATIONAL MODEL OF STRATEGY FORMATION and the study ends
with an assessment of the utility of this model,and of the related
findings, for future research and practice.
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1PART ONE
OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK
2CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This is a comparative study of strategy formation in four Irish complex
organisations. But why study strategy formation and why,other than as a
matter of logistical convenience for the researcher,study the phenomenon
in Irish organisations?
The strategy field - origins and current issues
The question of how strategy is,or should be,formed in organisations has
engaged some of the most formidable academic talents for well over two
two decades now with no sign of interest waning. Ansoff,Andrews,Hickson,
Mintzberg,Pennings,Pettigrew,Porter,and Quinn,to mention but a few of
the more prominent,have all had a long involvement with the field of
strategy research and continue to be actively interested in it.
Yet,even in the face of this sustained concentration of considerable
academic fire power,the strategy field still offers much scope for
further research.There has indeed been "enormous progress in the theory
and practical technology of strategic management" as Ansoff(1987) has
pointed out in the preface to his recently revised classic,'Corporate
Strategy'. Yet,much remains to be done and the strategy field continues
to fascinate researchers and to provide a wide and diverse research
agenda,as is clearly evident from the published proceedings of two very
recent state-of-the-field research conferences,organised and edited by
Pennings(1985) and Pettigrew(1987a).
The strategy field continues to fascinate and to challenge researchers
because its central concern is with top level management and policy
making in both the private and public arenas. As such the field has
drawn to it researchers from a wide range of disciplines,each bringing
with them their own special prespectives and research concerns. The
strategy field,by the very nature of its central concern,is therefore
inherently multi-disciplinary. Furthermore,the concept itself is
synthetic and open to multiple definitions and uses. For example,some
study strategy as a masterplan which is conceived prior to action.
Others see strategy as the pattern which is manifest in a stream of
3actions. Still others see strategy as essentially a socially constructed
post-rationalisation for actions taken,an interpretative sense-making
exercise after the event. The sheer utility of the concept for studying
a range of phenomena and the multi-disciplinary interest in strategy
have made integration in the field difficult to date. As late as 1985
Pennings(1985;xi) could justifiably characterise the state of the
strategy field,after over two decades of development in organisational
studies and much longer in the case of public policy studies,as "fairly
disjointed",with the "integral theoretical and empirical literature. .not
very well developed" ,with "no well-specified models" and with "pertinent
contributions show(ing) little cumulative character". While,as Ansoff
has claimed,much had been accomplished by the mid-80's,much more,as
Pennings argued,still remained to be done.
Historically,strategy first entered the organisational field as a
concept directed at practitioners. Sloan's(1963) personal history of
his years at General Motors is one of the classic strategy books in
organisation studies and like all classics the value of the insight
provided in it only seems to increase with time. Sloan's achievement at
General Motors was seen to be a forceful and dramatic illustration of
the utility of applying a concept akin to military strategy to the
complex task of managing the total entreprise. Ansoff(1965;10),in
another classic,used the concept to identify the 'strategic' decision as
a unique kind of choice problem not adequately addressed by management
scientists up to then,and to provide a normative "practical method for
strategic decision making within the firm". It was Andrews(1971) and
his colleagues the Harvard Business School that first recognised in the
emergent notion of strategy a concept with the potential around which to
build an analytical framework for the teaching of general management. As
used by them for this purpose "the idea of corporate strategy (was) a
simple practitioner's theory. .a kind of Everyman's conceptual scheme
made for use in real life in unstructured,complex and unique
situations"(Christensen et a1,1987;ix).
The adoption of the concept as a framework for teaching general
management by such a prestigious institution soon gave rise to
considerable research interest in the area. It helped to mark out
the area of strategy as a distinct field in organisational studies
4which was worthy of considerable theoretical and empirical research
effort in its own right. Moreover,the framework used by the Harvard
academics provided an analytical distinction between strategy
formulation and strategy implementation. Strategy formulation was
conceived primarily as an analytical activity and strategy
implementation as an administrative one. Formulation was primarily
concerned with the content of strategy,implementation with the
administrative process. The content-process distinction gave rise to two
largely distinct research traditions in the strategy field. Content
theorists have continued to show little interest in process. Likewise,
while process researchers have long since widened their interests to
include the process by which strategies are chosen as well as
implemented, they have remained much more pre-occupied with the process
of strategy than with the content,with the how of strategy rather than
with the what. The content-process split has been exascerbated by the
fact that the two research streams have tended to attract the attention
of researchers with different backgrounds. Economists and management
scientists have been more attracted to content studies while process
research has tended to attract most interest from organisation
theorists ,behavioural scientists ,political scientists and,more lately,
cultural anthropologists. From the earliest beginnings of strategy
research to the present there has,as Pennings(1985;xi) as noted,been
little "communication" between content and process researchers and few
attempts at any integration of these two research perspectives.
If the strategy field has been for too long been divided by the
process-content dichotomy,the wider field of organisational studies has
likewise been for too long divided by dominant perspectives that have
been either over-voluntarist or over-deterministic in world view.
So strong is this dichotomy that it has been used by a number of recent
reviewers as a primary basis on which to distinguish and classify the
main research streams in organisational studies that take the
organisation as a whole as their primary unit of analysis(Burell&Morgan,
1979; Pfeffer,1982; Astley & Van De Ven,1983). Whereas the
process-content division is mainly just a 'division of labour',
the voluntarist-determinist dichotomy is one of competing 'world views'
about the locus of control over organisational action. At one extreme
organisational action is seen as purposive and goal-directed; at the
5other it is seen as largely externally constrained and environmentally
determined. The first gives pre-eminence to the autonomy of
organisational action; the second gives pre-eminence to context. The
strategy field, including both content and process research,has tended
to be over-voluntarist in its world view right up to the present and to
underestimate the importance of context in shaping organisational
action.
The current need and oportunity in strategy research
The forgoing brief review of the development of the strategy field
indicates not only that there is abundant need for further research
efforts in the area of strategy but also points to what the major needs
are and where the fruitful oportunities lie. In a sentence,there is a
pressing need for more integrative approaches to the empirical and
theoretical study of strategy than those which have predominated up to
now.
What general features should a more integrative approach have? The
previous brief discussion of the sources of division which fragment
the strategy field itself,and which tend to parochialise it in the wider
scheme of organisational studies generally,indicate the type of new
departures that are likely to be most productive. Firstly a more
integrative approach should avoid the extreme voluntarism that
characterises much of strategy research and give more attention to the
contextual influences that shape strategy. Secondly,a more integrative
approach should try to understand how the process and content of
strategy are linked to each other and how both are linked to the wider
context within which organisational strategies are formed. Finally,a
more integrative approach must try to be more eclectic and
multi-disciplinary in the perspective that it brings to the empirical
inquiry and mode of analysis.
The pioneering work in redirecting strategy research into more
integrative and eclectic modes of inquiry has already begun. The first
major milestone, in this regard was Mintzberg's(1978) distinction of
strategy FORMATION from strategy FORMULATION.This provided an important
integrative concept through which to conceptually link process with
6content. More recently Pettigrew(1985) has been foremost in leading
strategy research into a greater awareness of the importance of context,
along with process,in the determination of content. As yet contextual
studies of strategy formation,along the lines advocated and carried out
by Pettigrew,are still a rarity in strategy research and the question of
how and in what way context influences,and is influenced by,
organisational strategy is still not well understood. Yet,Porter(1980)
has very successfully demonstrated the utility to strategists of paying
greater attention to the structuring effects of context,particularly of
industry organisation. However,his normative work was aimed directly at
practitioners and such questions as how industry organisation and
organisational strategy actually come to affect each other in reality
and whether industry structure is the prime contextual factor in the
determination of organisational strategy remain to be empirically
examined.
This present study aims to build on the efforts and insights of
Mintzberg, Porter and Pettigrew. Using the voluntarism-determinism
dichotomy as its basic theme it sets out to explore how context and
autonomous organisational behaviour both influence strategy formation
and how they interrelate. This is the central underlying theme and
thrust of the inquiry.
The Irish context
Carrying out this study in an Irish context offers two significant
benefits. Firstly,it facilitates the examination of the context-
organisation interrelationship and its effects on strategy formation at
multiple levels of analysis and multi-level empirical examinations
of the context-organisation interaction are still extremely rare in
organisational studies(Pettigrew,1987a;6). Context,when viewed from the
organisational level of analysis tends to be viewed as over-impersonal
and to affect strategic choice largely through the mechanism of its
selective perception by organisational decision-makers. This provides
only a limited understanding of the ways in which context and the
organisation affect each other. This study tries to overcome these
limitations by seeking to develop a national,industry and firm
7perspective on the strategic development of the organisations chosen for
empirical examination. Studying organisations in a relatively small
national context helps to make the development and provision of such a
multi-level perspective in a single study a quite feasible proposition.
To facilitate the development of a national level perspective a short
political,economic and socio-cultural history of modern Ireland is
presented as a stand alone element of the empirical data. The industry
and firm perspectives are developed and presented together within the
four case narratives that comprise the rest of the empirical data.
The second major advantage of the Irish context is that it helps to
throw the context-organisation interaction into greater relief than
would be possible by studying strategy formation in a much larger
national context. Organisations of around 1000-2000 employees,such as
those chosen for empirical study in this project,are large organisations
in an Irish national context. Yet,their internal organisational,or what
Pettigrew(1985;48) has referred to as their 'inner', contexts,are much
less elaborate and complex than for organisations with the same relative
level of national importance in much larger economies like the UK or the
US. The small Irish national context therefore allows the context-
organisation interaction to be studied with comparatively less
obfuscation from internal organisational elaboration and complexity than
would be possible in larger national contexts.
The plan of the dissertation
Having briefly introduced the overall topic and main underlying theme of
the research the remaining task of this first chapter is to provide the
reader with a guide to the dissertation's overall structure and
contents.
The dissertation is organised into four parts. Part one covers chapters
1 to 3. Following this introduction,chapter 2 contains a more detailed
review of the literature relevant to the central theme of this research
from which the conceptual ,framework for the study is developed. A set of
8specific research questions for the study are then identified. Chapter 3
goes on to discuss the methodology,to describe the method of approach
and to explain the basis for the selection of the case sites. It brings
the first part of the disseration to a close.
Part two of the dissertation contains the empirical data and covers
chapters 4 to 8 inclusive. Chapter 4 is the study's historical treatment
the national context in its own terms,at a national level of analysis.
It is a brief political,social and economic history of modern Ireland.
Its perspective is that of the majority tradition on the island of
Ireland,what is now known as the constitutional nationalist tradition.
This is the national level perspective that is most relevant to a
contextual understanding of the development of the organisations in this
study. Chapters 5 to 8 contain the four case narratives. These
narratives are written to provide both an industry level perspective and
an organisational level perspective on the strategic development of the
organisations under study.
In part three the empirical data is analysed and the major analytical
categories for subsequent synthesis are developed from the data. This
part covers chapters 9 and 10. Chapter 9 analytically isolates and
empirically examines the main contextual forces that shaped strategy in
the organisations under study. This is followed in chapter 10 with an
empirical examination of autonomous organisational action and its
impact on strategy formation in the organisations under study. In this
part of the dissertation the voluntarist-determinist debate is avoided
for the time being as initial insight is sought by analysing
the same empirical data sequentially and independently through first
a determinist(Chp 9),and then through a voluntarist(Chp10),perspective.
(This approach was inspired by that first taken by Allison(1971) and
used to such great effect in his classic study of decision making in
Cuban Missile Crisis.)
Part four contains the synthesis and conclusion and covers chapters 11
to 13. In chapter 11 the empirical findings emerging from the analysis
in part three are related to the two central themes which formed the
basis for the conceptual framework for the study as developed in chapter
2. These central themes allow the character of the strategy formation
9process to be further explored and the study's contribution to the
fuller understanding of strategy formation to be highlighted and
examined. In chapter 12 the empirical and conceptual perspectives that
have emerged in this research are applied to the broader question of the
whole life histories of organisations. An existential model of
organisational development is then derived based on the concept of
organisational career. The career analogy is presented as both
empirically valid with respect to the data and theoretically consistent
with the overall conceptual framework for strategy formation and
organisational development developed in this study. The last chapter,
chapter 13,is a final synthesis and summary of the research. In this
chapter the concepts that emerged in parts 3 and 4 are synthesised into
a relational model of strategy formation which incorporates the concept
of organisational career. Then,the main contributions of the research
are briefly summarised and their utility evaluated. Finally,the
dissertation ends with an assessment of the major implications of the
findings for future research and practice.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the previous chapter the central focus and themes of this research
project were introduced in overview and the need for an integrative
contextual approach to the study of strategy formation outlined.
In this chapter the overall conceptual framework for the study is
developed and the specific research questions that have guided the
empirical inquiry are identified.
The chapter begins by briefly defining what the concept of strategy
formation will be taken to mean in this study. Then a detailed review of
the relevant literature is carried out in order to examine the current
conceptions about the general character of strategy formation in complex
organisations. This review is organised around two emergent themes which
then become central to this research,one contextual and the other
historical. The contextual theme is the voluntarism-determinism theme
whose centrality has already be discussed in the previous chapter. The
second theme is the theme of historical patterning,of continuity and
change in strategy formation. This theme provides a powerful analytical
focus for examining the historical interplay between contextual
influence and organisational volition on the formation of strategy.
These two themes taken together are a recognition that contextual
influence and organisational volition can both be historical forces for
change or continuity in organisational strategy.
The literature review,as indicated above, reveals that much of
the previous research in the field of organisational studies that is
relevant to the question of how strategy forms in organisations can be
classed as either voluntarist or determinist in 'world view'. These
perspectives are widely assumed to mutually exclusive and have given
rise to the largely independent research traditions that characterise
organisational studies at the organisational level of analysis. Neither
world view is implicitly assumed in this study. Rather the voluntarism-
determinism question,as mentioned already,is .taken to be a central
analytical theme in this research and this must be reflected in the
conceptual framework that is developed to help guide the empirical
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inquiry. By taking the organisation's life history as the unit of
analysis,to include the time dimension,an analytical blending of the two
perspectives becomes possible which allows the general character of
strategy formation in organisations to be more fully explored than would
be possible by locating the study within one or other of these world
views. Following on from the literature review,then,a conceptual
framework for the study is developed and explained. Consistent with the
two major themes discussed above,this perspective will be both
contextual and historical. In short,the historical pattern of
formation,continuity and change in organisational strategy is the effect
to be explained.Contextual influences and organisational volition are
both independent and interdependent causal factors whose general
character and modes of influence are not to be implicitly assumed but
are problematic and need to to be more fully explored.
Strategy Formation in Complex Organisations 
If strategy is defined as patterns in organisational action as Mintzberg
and his co-workers have done,then the process by which strategy is
formed becomes an important focus for research(Mintzberg,1978;
Mintzberg & Waters,1985). Research into the process by which
strategy forms in organisations can,in turn,contribute to a fuller
understanding of the way in which organisations interact with their
environments.
If we were to take a snapshot of any complex organisation we can detect
its operant strategy empirically in the observable,and relatively
enduring,pattern or emphasis in its major activities. The pattern in
the application of certain technologies,the serving of certain markets,
the production of certain products, the development of certain skills
and the accounting to certain claimants,etc.,reveal in the round the
distinctive posture of the organisation in relation to its
environment. Its operant strategy,then,is manifest in the pattern of
its major activities. Emphasis is manifest in,among other things,the
relative deployment of resources to the major activities. However the
full profile of an organisation's operant strategy can only be revealed
when attention is also paid to areas of non-action. Strategy is as much
about what organisations do not do as about what they do. Competitive
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strategy,for example,can only be fully revealed by contrast with the
activities of competitors. Strategy,therefore,for the purposes of this
study is defined as patterns in organisational action and non-action.
Any attempt at a more precise definition is deliberately avoided because
as Ansoff(1979;42) has pointed out,strategy is a "synthetic concept in
the sense that strategies ascribed to organisations are frequently not
perceived or made explicit by the managers who pursue them".
To carry out empirical research on the question of how strategy forms
in organisations it is necessary to develop a conceptual framework
within which to guide the inquiry and the subsequent analysis of the
empirical data. A review of the relevant literature will be the starting
point from which the development of this framework will proceed and it
is to this that we now turn.
Literature Review
Any study of a process such as strategy formation in complex
organisations will come up against two fundamental and competing
perspectives on organisational action within an overall environment.
At one extreme organisational action is seen as rational,purposive and
goal-directed. At the other,action is seen as externally constrained and
environmentally determined. This voluntarism -v- determinism dichotomy
has provided recent reviewers of organisational analysis with a
useful dimension along which to classify research efforts to date that
take the organisation as a whole as the level of analysis(Burell&Morgan,
1979; Pfeffer,1982),and Astley & Van De Ven(1983) have highlighted it
as one of the central debates in .organisation theory. Among and within
the major fields that treat the organisation as their level of analysis
the locus of control over the destiny of the organisation is a central
concern.
Locus of Influence over Strategy Formation
The strategy field developed initially with a strong voluntarist
orientation. This is clearly reflected in the paradigm of process which
came to early prominence in the strategy field and which is still
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dominant.As presented by Andrews(1971) this model depicts strategy
formation in organisations as a two stage process.First there is
purposive 'formulation' ,an essentially analytical and conceptual stage.
This is followed by 'implementation' ,a mainly administrative stage. The
process at each stage was conceived to be under the control of the
organisational leader as the 'architect of purpose'and Bourgeois &
Brodwin(1984) have somewhat aptly styled this as the "Commander Model"
to underline its debt to the military concept of strategy. Most of the
research on strategy since the area was first identified as a discipline
in its own right for teaching and research has been concentrated on the
content of strategy rather than on the process by which it is formed.The
extensive work on the PIMS database,initiated by Schoeffler et al(1974)
to uncover the 'laws' of the marketplace; the 'experience curve' and
'business portfolio matrix' concepts of the Henderson(1973) and the
Boston Consulting Group;and more recently Porter's(1980,1985)
concepts of 'generic strategies' and 'value chain' are all normative
and addressed implicitly at the organisational leader as the formulator
of strategy.They suggest what the pattern of organisational action
should be on the assumption that the formation of this pattern is a
matter of the leader's will,intellect and administrative skill.
The dominant paradigm in the strategy field,the formulation-
implementation model,is strongly rooted in the linear-rational tradition
in decision theory.The strategy formulation stage determines the content
of strategy and is conceived to be essentially a decision-making
process. Simon's(1955,1956) seminal contribution,the concept of
bounded-rationality,has not deflected the main stream of decision
theorists from this rational-linear paradigm. In the wake of Simon's
work many decision theorists have focused on the constraints to
optimisation implied in bounded-rationality and have directed their
research efforts towards pushing back these constraints on the
condition of comprehensive rationality,or towards mitigating their
effects for specific decision situations.
At its ideal,the decision content or outcome from a rational-linear
decision process should be objective,unbiased and independent of the
social process that produces it. Organisations are conceived as social
instruments with an objective function or superordinate purpose and the
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goal of decision making research is to develop improved normative models
that move decision content progressively closer to optimisation. The
goals and objectives of organisational actors,whether sub-units or
individuals,and their attempts to achieve these within the overall
context of decision are seen to be 'unwanted noise' that should be
reduced or screened out by the improved decision methods to be developed
from further research. For many decisions that are classed as
operating(Ansoff,1965;18), the conditions for optimisation can be
approached quite closely and linear-rational decision models can be used
quite successfully. Strategic choice,however,typically involves
uncertainty about future consequences and uncertainty about future
preferences(March,1978). The first uncertainty suggests an inherent
historical dimension,and the second an inherent political dimension,
to the process of strategic choice.
While most research in the strategy area has concentrated on content
there has developed,in parallel,an important stream of research on the
process of choice which is more descriptive of empirical reality and
more inductive in its conceptualisation of choice processes than the
linear-rational tradition. In this research stream the content of a
choice process is seen to depend on the social,political and historical
process that produces it. Choice content is not simply a matter of
rational-analytical formulation. It emerges as the outcome of a social
process. The process theories of choice tradition has its roots in Cyert
and March's(1963) work on a 'behavioural theory of the firm'. In this
tradition the social process of choice reflects the structural context
(i.e.the organisation structure ,resource allocation system,motivation
and reward system,and information system,etc..) within which it takes
place(Bower,1970).The process also reflects bureaucratic politics and
momentum(Allison,1971),the assymetrical horizontal distribution of power
and influence(Hickson et a1,1971:Hinings et a1,1974),the distribution of
control over vital information flows(Pettigrew, 1972),and the historical
chance encounter of 'solutions' and 'problems'(Cohen et a1,1972),among
other things.In strategic choice processes the organisation often begins
"with little understanding of the decision situation it faces or the
route to its solution,an only vague idea of what the solution might be
and how it will be evaluated when it is developed"(Mintzberg et
a1,1975;9) and the character of the decision process,itself,reflects the
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inherent novelty,complexity, cleavage and open-endedness in the decision
situation(Mintzberg et a1,1975: Astley et a1,1982:Hickson et a1,1986).
Process theories of choice are still primarily voluntarist in
orientation.The locus of control is still conceived to be largely
within the organisation,though usually much less concentrated in the
organisational leader than is assumed in the linear-rational model.
The strategy field,as we have seen,has been dominated by a strong
voluntarist perspective.Organisation Theory,on the other hand,has a
strong determinist tradition. Much of the pioneering work in
organisation theory concentrated on seeking out the determinants of
organisation structure. Woodward(1965,1970),Pugh et al(1969),and
Perrow(1970) were prominent in advancing the view that structure is
largely determined by the type and complexity of the technology.
Burns & Stalker(1961) and Lawrence & Lorsch(1967) were at much the same
time demonstrating the important link between organisation structure and
the nature of the organisation's task environment. While the
contingencies of technology and task environment were being
independently explored Katz and Kahn(1966) imported into organisational
analysis the Open Systems Model that was first elaborated in the natural
sciences by Bertalanffy(1950) to distinguish biological from physical
systems. The Open Systems Model provided an integrating conceptual
framework for the contingency theorists which served towards
unifying the field(Perrow,1973;11).In this model organisations were
conceptualised as socio-technical systems located within,and in constant
interaction through permeable boundaries with,a suprasystem or
environment. Contingency theory has developed,since the early 1970's,
largely as the "applied arm" of the Open Systems Model. Its fundamental
tenet is that technology and environment are the key contingencies that
determine organisational action. Organisations must continually adapt to
the imperatives of technology and environment in order to secure their
survival.More recently a population-ecology perspective on organisation-
environment has been advanced(Hannan&Freeman,1977: Aldrich,1979) in
which the capacity of many organisations to adapt to environmental
change has been questioned because of the various internal and external
'inertial pressures' on organisations that make such adaptation
difficult.The population ecology perspective views the relationship
between organisation and environment to be akin to natural selection,an
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even more deterministic perspective than contingency theory.
While the strategy field reflects a strong voluntarist orientation and
the field of organisation theory contains a predominant determinist
tradition,the voluntarist-determinist question is a central dichotomy
not only between these fields but also within them. The industrial
organisation tradition in the economics field has tended to emphasise
the primacy of industry structure in the determination of organisational
strategy(see Porter,1981:for a review and critique of this perspective).
This tradition also views the 'invisible hand' of the market economy
as the primary regulator of organisational action in a capitalist
economic environment. However Chandler(1977) has shown that retained
earnings far outstrips fresh capital as the primary source of funding
for the development and expansion of large US business and concludes
that the 'visible hand' of managerial capitalists has replaced the
'invisible hand' of the capital markets as the basic mechanism for
resource allocation in Western economies.The concentration of capital
and the development of self-perpetuating managerial hierarchies,so
evident in many industries,is a consequence of market failure as
Williamson(1975)points out,and where this happens the locus of control
over organisational action will tend to shift from environment towards
the organisation. However,Galbraith(1963,1984) has argued that
such a tendency towards the concentration of economic power within
organisations usually evokes a countervailing tendency in the
environment of the organisation which would seem to suggest that there
is a contexual dynamic in the relationship between organisational
control and environmental determinism. More recently Caves(1980) and
Porter(1980,1981) have advanced an approach to industry organisation
which emphasises that the relationship between industry organisation and
strategy is bi-directional,not uni-direction as in the classical
industry organisation tradition.
Within the field of organisational theory,on the other hand,
Thompson(1967;99) did not accept the over-determinism that
characterised the then emerging contingency approaches and remarked that
"technology and task environment seldom completely determine how
organisations act. When the immutable facts of organisational life have
been faced and the contingencies spelled out,organisations have
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organisations act. When the immutable facts of organisational life have
been faced and the contingencies spelled out,organisations have
choices". In addition,Child(1972;15) reviewed the case for all the
contingent determinants,i.e. size,technology,and environment,and yet
remained convinced that "strategic choice is (a) critical variable
in a theory of organisations" which was being,but should not be,
ignored by contingency theorists. More recently Astley(1985;239) has
rejected the over-determinism of the 'population ecology' model and
advanced in its place a more integrative 'community ecology' perspective
in which organisational variability is seen not simply as the product of
evolution but as the central dynamic of change and where "chance,
fortuity, oportunism, and choice are the dominant factors determining
the direction in which the evolution progresses". The voluntarism-
determinism debate,then,is still alive and well in organisation theory
with some scholars(Hambrick,1981:Hrebiniak & Joyce,1985) arguing that
strategy and environment are,in fact,independent variables while others
(Mintzberg et a1,1975:Mintzberg & Waters,1985) prefer to view managerial
will and environmental imperative as two opposite poles of the same
variable in relation to the formation of strategy. Where there does
appear to be some convergence,explicitly or implicitly,is towards the
view that environmental imperatives,such as they exist,are contextually
variable.
It seems clear from this review of the relevant literature so far
that the question of the locus of control over organisational action
remains problematic and under-explored. Is strategy formation driven
primarily by organisational volition or by contextual influence. The
relevant literature is divided on this question though most studies at
the organisational level of analysis implicitly assume an answer,whether
voluntarist or determinist,for the purposes of their own inquiries. The
question itself is rarely studied as a basic problem that is seen to be
worthy of empirical investigation in its own right. This question of the
locus of control over strategy formation will be an important analytical
theme for this empirical study. The clear implication is that for this
study the voluntarism-determinism issue is taken to be a question of
degree rather than dichotomy. What has also emerged from the review
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is that the content and process streams,the two primary research streams
in the strategy field to date,are both dominated by the voluntarist
world view. The importance of context in shaping strategy is still
under-explored empirically. The questions of how and in what way
context shapes strategy will be of central concern in this research.
When the voluntarism-determinism issue is taken to be one of degree
rather than dichotomy,as is suggested here,then an integrative summary
of the relevant literature reviewed so far provides the following
insights on which to base the conceptual framework for this research.
Strategy formation in organisations is sometimes driven,and the content
of strategy shaped,primarily by forces internal to the organisation. The
role of leadership will vary with organisational context,in some some
cases directly formulating the content of strategy,in other cases
exerting its influence on the shape that strategy takes more indirectly
through the management of the context and process of formation. At other
times the process of strategy formation and the content of the outcome
are influenced primarily by factors external to the organisation,and
part of its environment or situational context. The conceptual framework
for this study should,therefore,take into account all three of these
dimensions in the formation of strategy,i.e. organisational leadership
organisational context,and situational context. As the remainder of this
literature review will show it should also include a fourth dimension,
the dimension of time.
Continuity and change in strategy formation - the time dimension
While most of the early research in the strategy field concentrated on
issues of content and choice,a more recent development has been the
increasing interest and activity in issues of process and change.
Ansoff(1979) relates this development to the historical change in the
shape of the strategic problem. According to him the distinguishing
feature of strategy is that it is about transformation. The strategic
problem in the 50's and 60's was concerned mainly with how best to
transform the firm at the boundaries of its relationship with the market
environment to achieve the best possible product-market match. Since
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then the business environment has become increasingly more complex and
turbulent. As a consequence the strategic problem has been enlarged and
complicated to include concern with strategic resource scarcity and with
"internal configuration and capabilities" and their transformation.
Concern with the internal transformation of organisations has
traditionally been the preserve of the organisation development field.
At about the same time that Andrews(1971) was developing the concept of
strategy as the basis for a theory of general management in business
policy, the new field of organisational development emerged in the
behavioural science area. The initial focus was on the question of how
to implement planned change in order to improve organisational
effectiveness. Organisational development was specifically concerned
with "planned..organisationwide change managed "from the top"(Beckhard,
1969;9).Its early conceptual linkage to the then predominant two stage
strategy paradigm was primarily to the question of how to implement a
pre-formulated strategic initiative successfully and this continues
to be the case(Nadler & Tushman,1979;1982). A particular focus has been
the issue of how to overcome resistance to the changes in organisation
structure,resource allocation pattern, and reward system that are often
needed to support a new strategic departure(Kotter&Schlesinger,1979).
The inertial forces(Hannan&Freeman,1977) to be overcome in introducing
a major change in company strategy typically involve,in the first
instance,many tangible commitments in the form of specialised assets and
skills ,buildings and fixtures in certain geographical locations for
operations,and commitments to an array of commercial relationships
involving employees,suppliers,customers,financiers and the like,which
may be contractual or customary.However there are also less tangible but
equally significant inertial forces which are psychological,political
and cultural in nature.For example,Staw(1976) has shown that individuals
face psychological difficulties in disengaging from a chosen course of
action and may actually escalate their commitment in the face of initial
setback. Yet Brunnson(1982) has argued that psychological commitment to
chosen courses of action is a vital element in getting things done.
Also,organisations are career systems and political systems as well as
hierarchical systems of authority and control(Burns,1963),and Madison et
al(1980) have found that changes to organisation structure,career
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assignments and resource allocation were the three issues most
associated with political activity in their study of 30 organisations.
However,human behaviour in organisations cannot be fully understood in
psychological and political terms alone.Organisations are also cultures
with their own distinct norms,values and beliefs(Pettigrew,1979; Deal&
Kennedy,1982). As organisations form strategies and continue to work
them,they become institutionalised into the shared customs and ideation
systems of the organisation members. Strategic change then poses a
challenge to the existing ideology and customary patterns of behaviour
that characterise existing strategy and represent considerable cultural
forces for continuity(Brunnson,1982; Pettigrew,1985).
In the 1980's the interest of organisational behaviouralists in the
strategy question has moved on from this pre-occupation with how the
political and cultural natures of organisations affect resistance to
change. Political and cultural issues are no longer viewed in terms of
implementation alone. With the nature of the strategic problem having
shifted to focus on the internal transformation of organisations the
analytical and empirical distinction between the process of strategic
change and the content begins to break down. Where once organisations
were concerned with the implementation of planned, preformulated,
strategic changes,now they are trying to understand how to
institutionalise the very process of change itself.This is seen as the
key to strategic responsiveness and oportunism in an uncertain,
increasingly competitive and fast changing environment.Recent research
on strategic change has focused on the question of how the natural
political and cultural processes within organisations can be harnessed
by organisational actors,at different levels within the organisation,to
transform their organisations(Kanter,1983; Bourgeois & Brodwin,1984;
Pettigrew,1985).
Strategy formation,then,is about processes of choice and change where
the strategy at time Tn is itself an important determinant for the
strategy that will be formed at time Tn+1. Are there predetermined
patterns to the development of organisations over time or is their
historical development an essentially ideosyncratic process?
Chandler(1962) discerned a four phase growth pattern in the historical
development of large US entreprises.It was essentially an inductive
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model of strategic behaviour in which the propositions 'structure
follows strategy' and 'strategy follows structure' are both subsumed.
Chandler did not anticipate turning points to growth or the possibility
of periods of stability and retrenchment in organisational strategies.
Kimberley and Miles(1980),in contrast, saw organisations as having life
cycles with distinguishable phases of birth early development,growth,
maturity and decline. While the Chandler and Kimberley & Miles studies
both identify distinguishable phases in organisational development they
have little to say about the process by which organisations move from
from one phase to another or about the timing and proximate causes of
such changes. The more process oriented literature tends to fall into
two camps. Some (Braybrooke & Lindblom,1963; Quinn,1980) see the process
of organisational development over time as one of continuous and
logical incremental adaptation. Others see it in terms of successive
periods of continuity and change(Mintzberg,1978 ;Pettigrew,1985) with
change coming in revolutionary bursts after period of incremental
evolution(Miller&Friesen,1980; Miller,1982) and usually in response
to an externally induced crisis(Starbuck et a1,1978; Romanelli&Tushman,
1983).
The foregoing literature review on the time dimension in strategy
formation has strongly indicated the importance of historical 'formed'
strategy as an important influence on the formation of strategy in its
own right. This should be included with the other three factors,
situational context,organisational leadership and organisational context
in the overall conceptualisation of strategy formation in this study.
The question of how historically formed strategy affects the formation
of future strategy is itself an important question for empirical
examination. Research on this issue has only recently taken some
important new departures and many interesting issues remain to more
fully examined. Are historical forces mainly forces of inertia and are
they really 'inert' as the population ecology researchers seem to imply?
Or are they active,rather than merely inert,forces for continuity as the
more recent work of Brunnson(1982) and Pettigrew(1985) would tend to
indicate? And are they always forces for continuity or does historically
formed strategy often contain the seeds of its own transformation?
Moreover,the literature review has clearly indicated that the broader
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question of the historical patterning of organisational development over
the life histories of organisations remains unresolved and in itself
raises some interesting questions. Do organisations,as they develop,
always follow predictable patterns as the Chandler and organisational
life cycle models tend to suggest? And from a different though related
angle, is the historical pattern of strategy formation one of logical-
incrementalism as Quinn suggests or does it follow cyclical patterns of
revolution and evolution as more recent research tends to indicate? The
questions of how organisational history shapes strategy and how
strategy formation is patterned over the life histories of organisations
still pose many unresolved problems and will be important concerns in
this research.
The Conceptual Framework
All the important elements that will make up the conceptual framework
for this research have been identified from the foregoing literature
review. Strategy formation is conceived here as an historical process in
which the base line for future strategic departures is the current
strategy of the organisation. Strategy formation is influenced by forces
in the situational context of the organisation and by forces within
the organisation itself.It may be pre-planned or it may emerge from
organisational processes,particularly change processes. Before
summarising these elements and describing their relationship within the
overall framework it is necessary to discuss briefly the perspective
taken in this study with respect to organisational action and to
environmental intervention.
A multi-level contextualist perspective
The perspective on organisational action taken in this study is
contextualist. The underlying notion is that organisations both actively
shape and are constrained by their wider context. Viewed in this way the
voluntarist-determinist dichotomy is avoided. The question of
voluntarism or determinism in organisational action becomes one of
degree which in itself is a reflection of the context within which
organisational actors find themselves and of their own capacity for
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action within that context.Pfeffer & Salancik(1978,1) in an early
example of the application of a contextual mode of analysis to
organisational action set forth the basic tenet that "to understand the
behaviour of an organisation you must understand the context of that
behaviour" while observing pointedly that "much of the literature on
organisations still does not recognise the importance of context".
Later Crozier & Friedberg(1980;76),in their advocation of a
contextualist mode of analysis,warned against "a unilateral conception
of environmental influences,which neglects or ignores the fact that the
organisation can 'play' with the 'requirements' and constraints imposed
by the environment,and even manipulate them in its turn". This view of
organisational action within and on a situational context is implicit in
the Porter(1980,30) framework on competitive strategy.
Pettigrew(1985;37) gives more explicit emphasis to the bi-lateral
relationship between organisational action and context "by
conceptualising structure and context not just as a barrier to action
but as essentially involved in its production" and by demonstrating how
"aspects of structure and context are mobilised and activated by actors
and groups as they seek to obtain outcomes that are important to them".
Sir Michael Edwardes(1981),in his submission to the Conference Board
conference on the theme of 'External Influences on Strategic Management'
reflected the view of action-context interplay being presented here when
he said that:
"It is fast becoming essential to be outward-looking,to get in amongst
these so-called external influences and thereby bring about beneficial
change,instead of acting defensively and accepting the environment as
immutable".
But what are the main external influences,how do they come to be
reflected in the content of strategy,and how are they influenced by
organisational action?
The pioneering research into the organisation-environment
relationship was largely concerned with the question of if,and how,
organisational structural variational could be explained in terms of
variation in the environment of the organisation. Environments were
described in terms of their stability and complexity(Emery&Trist,1965;
Burns&Stalker,1966; Lawrence&Lorsch,1967) and related to such internal
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The pioneering research into the organisation-environment
relationship was largely concerned with the question of if,and how,
organisational structural variational could be explained in terms of
variation in the environment of the organisation. Environments were
described in terms of their stability and complexity(Emery&Trist,1965;
Burns&Stalker,1966; Lawrence&Lorsch,1967) and related to such internal
structural features as the degree of bureaucratisation and
centralisation. This line of research,which gave rise to the
large structural-contingency tradition in organisational analysis,
was not designed to provide descriptive insight into the process of
organisation-environment interaction. A perspective on action such as
the one proposed above moves the description of the process of
organisation-environment interaction to centre stage. Abstract
descriptors of environment like stability and complexity are inadequate
for this type of analysis.
For this study Bower's(1970) term 'situational context' is preferred to
the term 'environment' because it connotes something that is more finite
and immediate in relation to an organisation than 'environment' ,which is
often portrayed in the open systems model as the universe external to
the organisation.Furthermore organisations are considered to be part of
their own situational context in that they can affect the contextual
'rules' which influence their actions(Crozier&Friedberg,1980; Porter,
1980). The situational contexts of organisations are seen to consist
primarily of social(Berger&Luckmann,1966) rather than natural objects.
These social objects include other social actors,individuals and
organisations,and the wider social systems in which they and the focal
organisation are partially or wholly embedded. In other words,the causal
texture of the situational context of organisations is itself composed
of social action in context. If the prevalent tendency in organisational
studies to conceive of situational context in largely impersonal terms
is to be avoided,and a richer understanding of the influence of context
on strategy is to be sought,then the conceptual framework must
incorporate a multi-level perspective on context. It must account for
the processes of volition and social action in the situational contexts
of organisations that can have an important influence on strategy
formation.
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The conceptual framework must also provide for the many and various
ways in which the situational context comes to exert its influence
over organisational action. Prior research shows that situational
context can affect organisational outcomes both directly and
indirectly through processes of negotiation(Murray,1978),processes of
enactment and selective attention(Weick,1969),through resource
dependency(Pfeffer&Salancik,1978),competitive forces emergent from
industry evolution(Porter,1980),the development of industry recipies,
norms,shared perceptions and 'understandings'(Stigler,1964; Grinyer &
Spender,1979; Huff,1982),adaptive learning(Argyris&Schon,1978),and
isomorphism with dominant values institutionalised in the wider social
system(Meyer&Rowan,1977),among others. The reader will no doubt note
that most of those referred to above can be classed as organisational
researchers and theorists. Strategy research,in the main,has paid little
attention to date to the question of how context influences and is
influenced by strategy.
In short,and in somewhat more formal terms,the multi-level contextualist
perspective on context-organisation interaction being taken in this
study seeks to analytically blend the voluntarist perspective of social
action theory with the determinism of the structuralist tradition. In
doing this it is effectively bringing back to organisational analysis
what Mills has called the 'classic tradition' of social science inquiry.
"Social science deals with problems of biography,of history and of
their intersections within social structures. .these three-biography,
history,society- are the coordinate points of the proper study of
man. .(the) classic tradition"(Mills,1970;159).
Strategy formation - the conceptual framework
The conceptual framework for this study of strategy formation can now
be described. It is summarised in the figure 2.1 below. Strategy
formation in this conceptual framework is seen to be located in the
interrelation and interaction between key organisational actors,
their organisational context and the situational context in which the
organisation is embedded. The situational context of the organisation is
composed mainly of other social actors,individuals and organisations,
ORGANISATION
LIFE HISTORY
- continuity
and change
in strategy
(macro level
of analysis)
SITUATIONAL
CONTEXT
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strategy formation and the way in which the legacy of past strategy is
transmitted through time in the physical,social and cultural systems of
the organisation. The organisational actors included in the framework
are those individuals or groups,internal to the organisation,that have
responsibility for the management of the total entreprise.
time
Figure 2.1 - The conceptual framework.
In this framework strategy is seen to be formed and changed over the
lifetime of the organisation. How this happens is the central problem
of empirical and theoretical interest in this study. In the conceptual
framework the key influences on strategy formation are seen to be
situational context and autonomous organistional action. The framework
implicitly treats the voluntarism-determinism question as one of degree
rather than of dichotomy. It is consistent with,and conceptually
accomodates,the integrative perspective on strategy formation that was
developed earlier from the literature review. This perspective saw
strategy formation in organisations as sometimes driven and shaped
primarily by context,at other times by autonomous organisational
action. It also saw the role of key organisational actors as varying
with organisational context,in some cases directly formulating the
content of strategy,at other times shaping the content more indirectly
through the management of the organisational context and of the process.
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The conceptual framework is contextual,multi-level and historical. It
assigns a central role to situational context in the shaping of
strategy. It does not implicitly assume a mode of process in the
interaction between environment and organisation,or ignore process
altogether as much of the deterministic literature in organisational
studies tends to do. Rather,it sees the question of how situational
context shapes strategy as a central problem for empirical
investigation. Also,it sees situational context as inherently
heterogeneous. This highlights a further question for empirical study,
the question of what specific features of situational context,or
contextual elements,have the most effect on the formation of strategy
The framework is multi-level. It recognises that context tends to shape
organisational outcomes according to its own rhythm or logic which
cannot be fully understood through an organisational level of analysis
alone.
The framework is also historical. It recognises that the contextual
forces that shape strategy can only be understood in historical
perspective and that the rythm and logic of situational context is a
temporal one. It also recognises that the forces for continuity and
change in organisational strategy come from within,as well as outside,of
the organisation. It recognises, moreover,that current organisational
context reflects and embodies already formed strategy and that
historically formed strategy is an important determinant in future
strategy formation. It treats the whole life history as the unit of
analysis and the historical patterning of organisational strategy as
the effect to be explained. Within this holistic unit of analysis a
smaller unit of information is chosen,the discrete phase or episode in
the organisation's strategic history. It is only through the work of
analysing and analytically connecting these smaller episodic unities of
organisational history with each other and with the larger unities of
historical punctuation that characterise the macro level of analysis
that the full character of the strategy formation process can be
explored.
In sum,situational context,organisational context and organisational
actors are conceived to be the three key elements in strategy formation.
They are the ultimate sources of the historical patterning of
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organisational strategy. Yet,their relationship with each other as
conceived here is neither uni-directional nor linear. The process of
strategy formation involves a complex interplay between these elements.
In seeing a rythm or logic in the situational context that tends to
shape strategy,the framework does have a definite deterministic leaning.
However,it is in seeing this as a temporal rhythm or logic,and not as
one flowing from some eternal causes,that the framework comes to
analytically blend the determinist and voluntarist perspectives and to
view this dynamically as a question of degree rather than of dichotomy.
This dynamic is seen to apply at both the macro and organisational
levels of analysis. The central dynamic in strategy formation is
therefore seen here to involve a complex interplay between social
volition and temporal systemic determinism at multiple levels of social
structure.
Multiple modes of analysis
The emphasis in the use of this contextualist framework for the
empirical investigation of strategy formation will be on the
understanding of organisational action from a knowledge of its meaning
in context.This will involve an interpretative,subjectivist approach to
the empirical analysis. The model of man that is taken to underly his
social action in organisations,and in their situational contexts,is
taken to be man whose behaviour is explicable in political,economic
and cultural terms.
Organisations are political economies(Zald,1970) within larger Political
Economies. They are coalitions(March,1962) of stakeholders or claimants
(Schol1,1981). Political behaviour arises within organisations "at the
group level from the division of work..and at the individual level from
associated career,reward and status systems"(Pettigrew,1977;81). Power
is vertically and horizontally differentiated(Hickson et a1,1971). It
may be mobilised overtly or covertly(Hardy&Pettigrew,1984) and can be
mobilised indirectly and subtly through the structuring properties of
context on behaviour(Bachrach&Baratz,1962: Lukes,1974). Political
behaviour at the organisational level arises as organisations seek
greater autonomy within their situational contexts(Thompson,1967:
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Pfeffer&Salancik,1978: Porter,1980). Organisations are also cooperative
systems designed to generate benefits from the use of limited resources.
Resource scarcity elicits economic behaviour. Satisfactory economic
performance is a minimum condition for maintaining the support of a
viable coalition and superior economic performance a source of power for
the organisation in relation to its situational context(Galbraith,1984).
Human behaviour is also subject to many cultural influences. Cultural
analysis is concerned with "the predominant role that custom
plays in experience and belief"(Benedict,1935;1) and the important
normative effect of shared values on individual behaviour in social
systems(Deal&Kennedy,1982;21). It is concerned with organisations as
socially constructed realities and emphasises their social character
as networks of meaning(Smircich,1983).Organisations are to be viewed as
systems of domination,signification and legitimation(Riley,1983) where
the "political management of meaning" through processes of legitimation
and de-legitimation is the processual linkage between political and
cultural analyisis of behaviour(Pettigrew,1985;44).Shared norms,values
and beliefs both arise within,and are imported into,organisations. A
plurality of cultural influences affect the behaviour of organisational
actors. The technology and domain of the organisation are themselves
important sources of normative influences(Riley,1983). The professional
training and association of organisational members is another strong and
distinct cultural influence(Wilensky,1964: Chamot,1976). The distinctive
values that have developed and become institutionalised within the
organisation over time are yet further important cultural elements. In
addition the geographical location of organisational operations opens
the organisation as a social system to strong regional cultural
influences.
In short,the study of strategy formation "is inherently multi-
disciplinary" and requires an "eclectic" analytical approach,
involving multiple modes of analysis,to be more fully explored
and understood(Pennings,1985;28).
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The research questions 
Having developed the conceptual framework for this empirical study of
strategy formation and described the model of man that will underly
the interpretative analysis of the data,the remaining task of this
chapter is to specify the research questions that were used to guide
the inquiry.
In the conceptual framework,developed from the literature review,three
central causal elements of strategy formation were identified as
situational context, organisational actors ,and organisational context.
The fourth causal element,the historical patterning of sequence and
consequence,was also included. The effect to be related to these causal
elements,if a full understanding of strategy formation is to be gained,
is the continuity and change in organisational strategy over the life
history of the organisations in the study. Furthermore,the framework
avoids implicitly assuming a voluntarist or a determinist perspective on
organisational action. It incorporates the voluntarism-determinism issue
as one of degree rather than dichotomy. In this it sees the locus of
control over strategy formation as historically and contextually
variable between the organisation and its situational context.
Within this overall conceptual framework the following questions were
used to guide this empirical study of strategy formation.
At a substantive level the literature review clearly indicated
the need for further empirical study of the following questions.
(i) What are the main factors in the situational context of
organisations that shape strategy formation and in what way do
they affect it?
(ii) What are the main factors internal to the organisation that
shape strategy formation and in what way do they affect it?
(iii) How do these situational contextual influences and
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organisation-based influences interplay in the formation of
strategy? Does the locus of control over strategy formation
vary over context and history as the framework provides for? If
so how does it vary and why?
(iv) What patterns or phases,if any,are discernable in
organisational strategy over the life histories of the
organisations in the study? How are they explained and
connected?
At a more conceptual level the central concern will be to assess the
utility of the framework itself and its potential for elaboration
into a more comprehensive model of strategy formation through the
empirical findings of this and future research. In particular the
the study will address itself to the following questions:
(v) What does this empirical research,carried on within the
framework developed here,contribute towards a fuller
understanding of the processes of strategy formation and
transformation in general? How does it illuminate our current
understanding of how organisational strategy is formed? How
does it extend this understanding?
More generally, comparative longitudinal research into the process of
interaction between organisations and their situational contexts is
still very rare(Pettigrew,1985;9) and the contextual factors that shape
strategy are particularly under-explored because of the strategy field's
traditional concerns with process and content at the expense of context.
Rarer still is research into this interaction that is multi-level in
perspective(Pettigrew,1987a;6). This empirical study will try to go some
way towards helping to redress these deficiencies in strategy studies.
Studying strategy formation in an Irish context potentially yields two
particular advantages in this regard,as reviewed already in the previous
chapter. It facilitates a multi-level empirical examination of strategy
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formation and it helps to throw the context-organisation interaction
into greater relief,with less obfuscation from internal organisational
elaboration and complexity that would be possible by studying strategy
formation in much larger national contexts.
This chapter has developed the conceptual framework for this research.
It has also described the underlying model of man to be used in the
analysis of the empirical data and has specified the main research
questions that will be used to guide the inquiry. The next chapter
goes on to describe the research method and to discuss the overall
methodological approach of the study.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD
This research is concerned with the study of the interaction between
organisational actors,their organisational contexts and the situational
contexts of their organisations. Its main object is to examine how these
three variables interact over time and across organisation types in
the formation of strategy. This is the central relationship in the
conceptual framework that was developed for this study in the
previous chapter. The present chapter goes on to discuss how this
relationship was actually investigated empirically. The chapter first
discusses the overall methodological approach and then moves on to
describe the main features of method used to carry out this study.
The nature of the subject and the nature of the research problem were
the main considerations in the choice of appropriate methodology.
A central theme to emerge from the literature review in the previous
chapter was that most research into field of strategy has tended to be
either over-deterministic or over-voluntarist in its view of the
organisation in its context. Both extremes were rejected here in favour
of a newer,emergent,contextualist position(Crozier & Friedberg,1980:
Pettigrew,1985) in which the structuring effects of context are
recognised but within which considerable scope for voluntarist action
remains. How context structures action and how actors manage and often
exploit and manipulate context are central issues to be explored.
Examining strategy formation through this contextual perspective involves
collecting data on the changing context of organisations and on the
interaction of organisation and context over time. This calls for a
longitudinal-processual approach(Pettigrew,1979;570) in which the
organisation and the social system of which it is a part are "profitably
explored" as "continuing system(s) with a past,a present and a future".
It calls for a "fined-grained"(Harrigan,1983;399) methodology which is
capable of "captur(ing) the complexities of corporate strategy". It
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requires fairly "thick description"(Sanday,1979;533) of context at
multiple levels of analysis,richly described in historical
perspective(Pettigrew,1985;1987) so that organisational action can be
properly situated and its "meaning" properly understood in its own terms
in the context of the time(Silverman,1970;129).
The overall research approach was to seek a greater understanding of the
phenomenon of strategy formation in complex organisations through rich
description followed largely by inductive analysis. It was closely akin
to what Mintzberg has called a "strategy of direct research". The
essence of this approach,as outlined by Mintzberg(1979;588-9) himself,is
that it is "research based on description and induction instead of
implicit or explicit prescription and deduction". It relies on "simple,
inelegant,as opposed to 'rigourous' methods of data collection". It
seeks to measure "many elements in real organisational terms,supported
by anecdotes" rather than just a few statistically manipulatable
surrogates measured in "perceptual terms from a distance" and it seeks
to synthesise these elements into meaningful "clusters" or patterns
as we try to extend our knowledge and understanding of the subject
matter "instead of the analysis of pairs of variables as continuous
relationships"
The methodological debate in organisational analysis which for long
questioned the validity and theoretical utility of such descriptive-
inductive research has happily died down. Van Mannen(1979) and others
have now long since "reclaim(ed) qualitative methods" for organisational
research and reaffirmed Mill's(1970;135)position that "for the classic
social scientist, neither method nor theory is an autonomous domain;
methods are methods for some range of problems and theories are
theories of some range of phenomena". The strategy area,in particular,
offers legitimate scope for,and indeed calls out for,a variety of
research approaches because of the inherently "eclectic" and
"interdisciplinary" nature of the field. As Pennings(1985;33-4) has
has stated in his recent review:
"Research in strategic decision making..should draw very heavily from
conjectures as they have been developed by abstract efforts as in game
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theory,(and) from rich descriptions as they have been provided by
anthropologists and other scientists who excel in documenting
decision-making activities at a level of phenomenological concreteness
and reality that seemingly defies any infusion of abstract and
artificial conjectures"
The process of carrying out 'direct research' and the way in which
knowledge and understanding can be advanced through this method are best
discussed in terms of what Mills(1970;134) would call the intellectual
craft skills involved. For Mills the classic social analyst "has avoided
any rigid set of procedures" and has "sought to develop and use in his
work the sociological imagination". The classic analyst "has not been
inhibited by method and technique" and his "has been the way of the
intellectual craftsman". Pettigrew(1985;53) has also taken up
this theme of social research as essentially a craft activity:
"Contrary to the way the practice of research is often taught and
written up,the activity of research is clearly a social and not merely
a rationally contrived act...the reality of scientific activity has
its artistic and subjective sides. .research (is) a craft process and
not merely the application of a formal set of techniques and rules".
And Glaser and Straus(1968) have provided the now classic intellectual
craftsman's guide to the development of theory that is "grounded" in the
empirical data,using a general method of inductive comparative analysis.
The essential craft skills involved in inductive research have been
described by Mintzberg(1979;584-5) and are of two types. The first skill
is "detective work" which involves the "tracking down of patterns,
consistencies" and "search(ing) through a phenomenon looking for
order,following one lead to another" though this process of detection
itself "is not neat". The second skill is "the creative leap" which
involves some generalising beyond the data because "every theory
requires that creative leap,however small,that breaking away from the
expected to describe something new". In sum,according to Mintzberg,"no
matter what the state of a field,whether it is new or mature,all of its
interesting research explores" and "peripheral vision,poking around in
relevant places (and) a good dose of creativity..(is) what makes good
research,and always has,in all fields". This loosening of the demand for
so-called 'rigour' in research methodology,however,does not in
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any way release the researcher from the requirement to be efficient and
systematic and to explore with a direction and a purpose. Neither does
it release him/her in any way from what Mills(1970;141) has called "the
firm and consistent practice of the ethics of scholarship" and above
all from the responsibility to present the work in such a way "that it
is open at every step to the checking up by others". The procedural
mechanics of methodology,however crude or sophisticated,always remain
subsidiary to the "the skill of researchers" and "their integrity" and
any process of empirical measurement in social research must always be
one of "honest recording and informed judgement"(Brooke,1984;144).
The research method and its history
The initial focus for this research into strategy formation was the
resource allocation process in organisations. Resource allocation
patterns were felt to provide a tangible measure of operant strategy.
It was felt that focusing on the internal process by which these
patterns came into being and came to be changed would give valuable
insight into the process linkages between strategic intent and strategy
formation in organisations. Variation across organisation types
was sought to add external validity to the research and its potential
findings and to provide more oportunity for interesting patterns to
to emerge,which is the primary goal in exploratory research.
Case site selection and access
In all,four organisations were selected for intensive descriptive case
analysis. The four organisations were chosen to represent each of the
four main types of organisation to be found in the overall Irish
national economic structure. The four organisations were An Foras
Taluntais(AFT),a state agency for agricultural research; Irish
Distillers Group(IDG), a commercial public company; Comhlucht Siuicre
Eireann Teoranta(CSET),the state-owned sugar entreprise; and Golden Vale
Cooperative Society,a large dairy producer cooperative. A common link
between the four was their relationship to the agricultural sector of
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the economy which provided the researcher with some 'economy of scope'
in the task of trying to develop an understanding of the wider context
of these organisations. All four were Irish indigeneous organisations
with responsibility for strategy in all cases located in Ireland.
One of the reasons why indepth comparative case analysis methodologies
are fairly rare in organisational studies is the difficulty in
acquiring the kind of access that this type of research requires.
The demands of descriptive/inductive research,based on intensive case
analysis required very high quality access to the organisations
under empirical investigation(Pettigrew,1985;xiv). The researcher
negotiated this access by approaching the chief executives of each of
the four organisations through personal correspondence,backed up by
personal references in nearly all cases. The personal references
reassured the chief executives about the bona fides of the researcher.
They also reassured the chief executives about the researcher's
competence to carry out a programme of personal interviewing within
their organisations that would provide worthwhile research output while
causing minimal disruption or hurt to the companies in question.
Both of these reassurances were important in ultimately gaining access
of the quality required and the maintainence of that access could at no
time be taken for granted as the study progressed. The researcher's
ability to maintain the trust and confidence of the focal organisations
was an ongoing requirement for the successful completion of the project.
Organisations,and individuals within them,have been hurt in the past
through the selective extraction and use of research data by editors
and journalists more concerned with 'news' value than with the
advancement of knowledge. Reassurances about the researcher's ability to
handle sensitive and confidential material,and certain mutually agreed
controls on the use of the research data in articles for the popular
press or business magazines were important considerations in securing
access. Furthermore,as most organisational development specialists are
fully aware,the carrying out of any series of indepth interviews with
a variety of executives across the different hierarchical levels and
sub-units ot an organisation has to conducted with care. It represents
a form of intervention into an organisation which can have unintended
consequences that can ramify way beyond the limited objectives of the
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researcher to acquire valuable and apposite empirical data for his
research. In indepth,unstructured,interviewing the company has little
direct control over the process. Furthermore it is almost inevitable
in this type of interviewing that the interviewee not only provides the
researcher with data and insight but is also affected by the process.
The mere presence of the researcher on site can give rise to all manner
of speculation and expectation right across the organisation. Moreover,
the nature of the process and the reflexive character of the
exploratory,indepth interviewing,all potentially affect the interviewee
in his feelings towards his organisation and in his perspective and
'theories in use' on important organisational issues. Continued access
in this type of situation depends on the sensitivity of the researcher
to possible ramifications of his intervention and his skill in the use
of the unstructured,indepth, interview medium.
Data collection
Data was collected primarily through largely unstructured personal
interviews ,Annual Reports ,company plans ,contemporary press cuttings,
and a variety of other archival documentary material. Prior to entry
into the field the literatures on strategy,organisational theory and
resource allocation were all extensively read. Most of the data
collection took place over the period from May 1986 until August 1987.
In all 74 scheduled interviews were held with 39 different individuals,
each interview lasting on average between 1.5 and 2 hours. In addition
105 annual reports were closely studied for performance,sources and uses
of funds and chairman's statements on the current performance, future
prospects and strategic intentions of the organisation. The database was
also augmented by the collection and study of over 200 contemporary
press cuttings on the focal organisations covering mainly their
more recent history over the last two decades. Published histories of
the focal industries and more general historical works were drawn
on heavily for historical perspective prior to the 1950's. In addition
to these sources the researcher had access to numerous in-house company
reports and documents from the company archives. There were also
countless 'follow-up' phone conversations and informal discussions with
interviewees,and further collection of contemporary press and company
documentation,as the analysis progressed.
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Formal analysis did not begin until the data collection process had
clearly reached a certain saturation level where the marginal utility of
the additional information was declining relative to the marginal cost
of obtaining it. However,data collection did continue right through the
formal analysis stage though at a lower level of intensity and
formality. This was done to fill in lacunae in the data already gathered
and also to keep abreast of contemporary developments. Limiting the
study to strategy formation in the organisations under study up to some
comparatively recent cut-off year,like say 1986,would have been very
convenient. The researcher could then have proceeded with the analysis
without worrying unduly about the relevance of contemporary
developments. However,as the case narratives clearly show,the current
period in the late 80's is amongst the most interesting and historically
significant in the development of all of the organisations in the study
and the researcher found it intuitively impossible not to include it.
A widening of the initial research focus
In the first two cases data was collected around two primary themes,the
history of the organisation with its main turning points and strategic
episodes and the internal resource allocation process. The primary focus
at the initial stages of this research was on the internal resource
allocation process at the organisational level of analysis. However,as
the data collection progressed it began to emerge that much greater
insight into the process of strategy formation in the focal
organisations could be achieved by widening the focus of the research to
include multiple levels of analysis. This was strongly indicated in the
interview data by the tendency of the interviewees to continually refer
the researcher to developments in the wider context of their
organisations in order to make their accounts of the strategic resource
allocation processes more fully intelligible to themselves and to the
researcher. The researcher was also moved to widen the research focus to
multiple levels of analysis when he began the search for a basis from
which to make meaningful and insightful comparisons as the data
collection was extended beyond the first case site. By the time that he
was ready to move on to carry out empirical work at the third case site
it had already become clear that the data that he had been collecting
on the history of each focal organisation,and on the main strategic
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episodes within that history,would now form the primary database for the
study because it appeared to offer the most potential for comparative
analysis and for theory generation. The data collection emphasis was,
therefore, modified accordingly. Resource allocation outcome data
continued to provide a useful indication of operant strategy but the
internal resource allocation process was no longer viewed as the primary
unit of analysis for comparative study from this point onwards.
It was at this stage also that the decision was made to include an
independent historical treatment of the national context as a distinct
part of the overall database separated from the case narratives.
This was done when it began to become fairly apparent that certain
developments in the overall national context were associated with phase
changes in all or a number of the organisations in the study. An
independent description of the national context was included to
facilitate the multi-level analysis of strategy formation and was
developed from published historical material. Finally the historical
treatment of the individual organisations was extended to industry
level,again when it clearly emerged from the early data collection
that strategy formation at the level of the organisation was more
meaningful when viewed in the context of the overall structural
evolution of the industry.
The case narratives therefore contain a description of strategy
formation at both the organisation and the industry levels. Together
with the separate historical treatment of the evolution of the national
context they provide a rich descriptive data base for the study of
strategy formation at multiple levels of analysis. The data presented in
the four case narratives and in the chapter on the national context are
not strictly raw data. The raw data is contained in the interview
transcripts,annual reports,press cuttings and other source material used
for the study. Organising this raw data into case narratives or
historical narrative of the national context involved some analysis
in the selection,emphasis and patterning that are an inevitable part of
narrative construction. However,since this material represents the
reader's only access to the raw data,every attempt was made in the
construction of these narratives to present the data in their own terms
in order to avoid premature categorisation or analysis.The organisation
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of the case narratives into episodic sequence was derived from the
interview data where the interviewees themselves provided the historical
punctuation with a very high degree of cross-interviewee consistency.
The data in these narratives is kept as descriptive as possible and is
presented in rich description in order that the data may be opened out
to the reader as far as possible. In this way the researcher has tried
to provide a high degree of access to the data for the reader so that
the use of this data in the subsequent analysis and synthesis can be
critically checked and evaluated at all stages. However since much of
the descriptive data must be used again in support of the analysis this
approach makes for a lengthy research report. This report could be
shortened by presenting scaled down narratives but the reader's access
to the data would have been impaired by the higher degree of editing
that this would have involved. The report might also have been
shortened by more heavily cross-referencing the analysis and synthesis
chapters with the data chapters but this would have made the report more
difficult to read.
Multiple data sources
A variety of data sources were used for several reasons. Firstly,the
desire to carry out descriptive analysis at multiple levels required
that data on the focal organisations and their strategic episodes be
gathered from external sources as well as organisational sources. The
main external sources were relevant historical works,contemporary press
and business magazine/journal extracts, and some personal interviews
with executives operating at industry or national level. The second
reason was that the data from a variety of sources on the same strategic
episode were often complementary in helping the researcher achieve a
fuller description of what happened. For example,the interview data
provided valuable information on the internal context and process of
strategy formation not available or only sparsely revealed in published
documents. The interview data however was retrospective on the issues of
strategic intention and outcome and there were many, gaps in the personal
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recollections of the interviewees. The annual reports provided valuable
contemporary information in both of these areas which helped to fill in
these gaps. Furthermore the interview data provided the historical
bracketing into episodes and helped to identify turning points or phase
changes which were not as easily identified from a study of the
contemporary documentary material.
The third reason for the use of multiple sources was to help to
ensure,as far as was possible,the internal validity of the data. In this
regard,for example,the documentary data often helped to clarify
important issues of chronological sequence that were sometimes confused
in the memories of the interviewees. Furthermore,data from one type of
source often provided valuable independent confirmation of the
description that was emerging from the other sources. Care was taken to
try to achieve a high degree of internal validity through the cross-
referencing of documentary evidence with interview data and through the
cross-referencing of internally-published documentary evidence with that
which was externally published. Within the interview data itself care
was taken to include interviewees across and down the organisation
structure in the interview schedule and to cross-reference the material
from all the interviewees within each organisation.
In sum,the overall strategy taken with regard to data collection in
using muliple sources of data might be best conveyed through the
nautical metaphor of 'triangulation'. Triangulation involves the
use of multiple reference points to locate an object's exact position.
In the same way,according to Jick(1979;602-3),"organisational
researchers can improve the accuracy of their judgements by collecting
different kinds of data bearing on the same phenomenon". Triangulation
of data sources not only helps to improve internal validity but also
helps to generate the thick description which is the fundamental basis
of any truly contextual or holistic research(Jick,1979). In this last
regard the finding of variances or conflicts in the description that
emerges from different sources is not always to be viewed as a problem
of internal validity,though it may be. It may also be that these
variances in fact reveal different interpretations or the attribution
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of different meanings to the same factual outcomes. Such differences in
interpretation and meaning are themselves interesting data to a
researcher seeking to explain human action, and what it means, in a
truly contextualist way and they are part of the raw material for
contextual analysis.
Data collection through direct personal contact
Before leaving this issue of data sources one further feature of the
data collection process is worth discussing in some detail. In many
ways the pivotal link in the whole data collection process was the
personal contact with key individuals,both within or associated with the
organisations under study. How these contacts were established and
developed were themselves important elements in the whole process of
empirical investigation.
In all four of the organisations in the study a liaison person was
formally appointed by the organisation to interface with the researcher
throughout the study. The role of the liaison person was to facilitate
the scheduling of the personal interviews and to deal internally with
the researchers requests for archival material,facility visits and other
aspects of the overall assembly of data. The liaison person also
represented the company's interest by monotoring the researcher's
activities so that the company management knew at all times what the
researcher was doing on site. In all four cases the informal rapport and
mutual trust that built up between the researcher and the four liaison
executives proved invaluable in maintaining,and often increasing
the overall quality and depth of access. The liaison executives became
over time an inherent extension of the researcher and the research
process. They provided a useful sounding board for checking the
perceptions that were coming through from the personal interviews and
often provided pointers to further data sources,both documentary and
verbal,through which an emerging issue might be more fully explored.
Where perspectives on certain issues differed the liaison executive was
often able to provide some insight into why the accounts of the same
episode should be different from two different sources ,which was itself
a valuable source of contextual information in its own right.
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The personal interviews themselves allowed the researcher's network of
internal personal contacts to widen as the project progressed. The
researcher usually asked for and secured at least one follow up
interview with each interviewee. As Wilson(1980;118) and other
researchers have found,that have used the medium of the personal
interview extensively in their empirical work,the formalities of
interviewing became lessened with each interviewee as the interview
progressed. What started off as the interviewee responding to a number
of open questions specially chosen to encourage him to discourse and
provide descriptive responses usually developed into more of a dialogue,
or mutual exploration of episodes in the organisation's strategic
history. The second interview was often more productive because of this.
Moreover,since the whole data collection process was cumulative,the data
collected earlier from documentary or verbal sources were often entered
by the researcher into later interviews to enrich the dialogue.
Furthermore,once the interviewees had established some rapport with the
researcher though the face to face medium of the personal interview they
often offered to provide further information through informal follow-up
should the researcher find that certain issues were inadequately covered
in the scheduled interview. They also often pointed the researcher in
the direction of other sources,verbal and documentary,that could further
enlarge the researcher's data base. In all of these ways the overall
process of data collection became informally extended and significantly
enhanced.
Research memoranda and theory development
Finally,the data collection was never without a clear focus though this
focus did widen as the research progressed. Neither,however,was there
any attempt to force the data into any preconceived categories or
theoretical constructs. The theoretical emphasis was on induction and
the search for categories and relationships was as far as possible
grounded in the data. To borrow a favourite metaphor of Andrew
Pettigrew's the data were to a large extent "allowed to speak for
themselves" and to reveal their inherent untidiness and complexity.
In this regard,also,it should be noted that the linear sequence of this
report does not fully accurately reflect the way the research process
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proceeded. Linearity was imposed to some degree by the discipline
of trying to present the research and its findings to the reader in an
intelligible way through the written word. In fact,the actual research
process involved a complex and non-linear interaction between existing
theory,theory development,data collection and data analysis.
Analysis of the data itself proceeded interactively with the data
collection and more data was collected during the intensive analysis
phase of the project,almost right up to the date of completion. At all
times since the research began a wirebound notebook was kept for
'research memoranda' to self (Glaser & Strauss,1968;107) on the
theoretical notions and connections that were stimulated by thinking
about and analysing the data as it was being collected. By the end of
the project over 80,A3-sized,sheets were covered with such memos,which
were written at all odd times of the day or night whenever a promising
idea occurred as the subconscious mind was continually engaged in the
detection of patterns and the search for creative leaps. Some of these
ideas eventually provided the basis for the analysis and synthesis of
the data in this project, others have provided a fruitful ideas base
for possible future publications, while still others would appear to
contain the germ of some future research projects.
The foregoing discussion of method and methodology brings part one of
this report to a close. In part two the empirical data base for this
study of strategy formation in complex organisations is presented
to the reader in the form of five historical narratives. The first
narrative is a historical treatment of the common national context of
the four organisations in the study,reviewed in its own right at a
national level of analysis. This is followed by four detailed case
narratives which provide both an industry-level and an organisation-
level perspective on the life histories of the organisations under
study. These narratives will then,taken all together,form the
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empirical data base for the subsequent comparative analysis and
conceptual development that comprises the remainder of this
dissertation in the search for a fuller understanding of strategy
formation.
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PART TWO
THE DATA
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT (Ireland since the late 1800's)
The empirical data is presented in this and in the next four chapters
which together comprise part two of this dissertation. As discussed in
the conceptual chapter this study has deliberately set out to develop a
multi-level perspective on the situational context - organisation
interaction in order to more fully understand it. To that end,in this
chapter the national context of the four organisations in the study is
reviewed on its own terms in order to try to reveal and to understand
its own temporal rhythm and pattern. This is done in order to provide a
national level perspective on context which can be later applied to the
empirical analysis of the context-organisation interaction which is the
the primary concern of this study. The industry-level and organisation-
level perspectives on this interaction are developed and presented
together within the case narratives that comprise the remaining chapters
of this part of the dissertation.
The history of any nation is a rich and complex web of political,
economic, social and cultural developments. To present it in a form that
will be useful to a study such as this one involves a high degree of
selectivity. The criterion for selection must be relevance and in this
the researcher must use informed judgement. Selection was made
concerning the organising of the treatment into separate phases or
periods in the knowledge that "all history is one continuum and no
division by dates has more than a relative validity"(Thompson,1957;18).
Selection also had to be made concerning which major developments to
highlight and to concentrate on in this review and some prior knowledge
of the histories of the focal organisations was essential to make this
selection most meaningful. So while the focus was on reviewing the
national context on its own terms and from a national perspective,
nevertheless,this was done with an eye to understanding the genesis and
development of Irish complex organisations in their wider political,
economic,social and cultural context as a central historical theme.
To carry out this review of the national context I have drawn freely on
the works of well established authorities on the political,economic,
social and cultural development of modern Ireland and on widely
referenced review articles and position papers that reveal contemporary
thinking on the major developments in particular historical periods.
This review is divided into two sections. The first presents a
brief historical treatment of the national question which is a central
dynamic in the evolution of the modern Irish state. The second section
reviews the main phases in the political,economic and cultural history
of the country since the late 1800's. This section gives special
attention to the country's economic,social and cultural development
since the foundation of the State.
(For the convenience of readers not already familiar with the Irish
context a short section is appended to this chapter which contains a
glossary of key terms,a chronology of key historical events and a
chronology of Irish administrations.)
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SECTION ONE - The National Question
A central dynamic in modern Ireland is the national question. The
struggle for independence will be,for the most part,ground rather than
figure in this review. Because of this it has been highlighted right at
the beginning to alert the reader to its continuing presence even when
not at the forefront of the discussion in the later section.
It is perhaps the central irony in a history that contains many ironic
twists and features that the father of the republican movement in
Ireland was an Ulster protestant, Theobald Wolfe Tone. Constitutional
nationalists and republican extremists,even today,separately claim
continuity with the republican movement of Tone to legitimise their
mutually exclusive approaches to the national question. Tone's most
cherished ideas,according to one authority,were "the iniquity of English
influence in Ireland and the excellence of the French Revolution" (Mac
Dermot,1937;introduction).He formed the United Irishmen in 1791 in
order to pursue separatism and confided to his journal on 11/March/1796
what was to become later one of his most quoted remarks:
"Our independence must be had at all hazards.If the men of property
will not support us,they must fall. We can support ourselves by the
aid of that numerous and respectable class,the men of no property."
Lyons(1973,15),in rejecting the "tired old witticism that every time
the English came within sight of solving the Irish question the Irish
changed the question" ,has asserted that this 'national demand' of Tone
remained the central dynamic in Irish history into the current century:
"It is true,of course,that men differed in the nineteenth century, as
they have continued to differ in the twentieth, about how complete the
break should be,or more precisely,perhaps,about how far the full
separatist ideal was practicable.But whether they took their stand on
the rock of the republic,or were prepared to settle for a repeal of
the Union and some form of Home Rule based on a reanimated Irish
parliament, they were emphatic that the first step towards real
independence was to recover for Irishmen the right to control their
own affairs".
Tone's own attempt at the achievement of separation was abortive. In
fact the immediate consequence of the rebellious 1790's was the Act of
Union in 1801 which politically fully integrated Ireland in with the
rest of Great Britain.However,by the middle of the 19th century Ireland
had seen a successful mass movement for religious freedom and a
disastrous famine.The experience of the Catholic Emancipation movement
demonstrated the power of peaceful political mass pressure.The
experience of the famine and the inept handling of it by a remote
administration rekindled the separatist flame. Towards the latter
end of the century a powerful mass movement of the 'men of no property'
was coalescing with a growing movement within the Irish parliamentary
party,consisting mainly of the professional class and some 'men of
property', for Home Rule.
The poverty and insecurity of the Irish tenant-farmer was to be a
continual basic source of unrest during the 19th century. Security for
the tenant-farmer against abitrary eviction was to be the immediate
objective and fair rent,freedom of sale and fixity of tenure the basic
demands. The plight of the Irish tenant-farmer was brought
into stark relief by the famine and his fate,in the face of famine,
was an indictment of all that 19th century English liberalism
stood for. As a biographer of Gladstone (Magnus,1963;202)described it:
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"The difference between agrarian custom in England and Ireland was..
very wide.The law in both countries was the same,but the custom was
more important than the law. In England,squire, parson, and
tenant-farmer formed a closely-knit community of interest and sympathy
that was undreamt of in Ireland. Irish tenants were men of straw,
barely distinguishable from agricultural labourers,rack-rented and
living in constant dread of eviction. In consequence the idea of
property,which in England was popularly associated with the
unquestioned rights of the landlord, was associated in Ireland with
the alleged wrongs of the cultivator of the soil".
A man of Gladstone's moral convictions could not reconcile this
situation with his liberalism.However,when he turned his attention to
the Irish question he had,according to Magnus(1963;196) "no suspicion
that in the cause of Ireland he was destined to lead the Liberal
Party to martyrdom,or that the whole of the rest of his life would be
devoted to that cause". The land question was to become the "engine that
would drag the national question in its train"(Lyons,1973;163).
The move for Home Rule for Ireland in the latter half of the nineteenth
century was a shifting coalition. The main actors associated with it
were Davitt,the leader of the land reform movement and an Irish catholic
of tenant farmer stock; Parnell,the leader of the Irish parliamentary
party and an Irish protestant of the propertied class; and Gladstone,
the great liberal prime minister. Irish representation at Westminister
was to shift in profile from a liberal-conservative split reflecting the
position in the rest of the UK to a split along the single issue of Home
Rule,with a majority behind the movement. The Commons as a whole was
divided on the issue and the Lords was predominantly hostile towards it.
There was a strong feeling within the Conservative party that Home Rule
for Ireland would threaten the whole Union. Furthermore Lord Randolf
Churchill argued that there were two Irelands and that Home Rule would
not be accepted by the whole country.His slogan 'Ulster will fight,and
Ulster will be right' would actually help to galvanise the trenchant
resistance of Unionists in the north east corner of the country to the
Home Rule movement.Gladstone introduced his first Home Rule bill into
the Commons in 1886 and it was narrowly defeated by a combination of the
Conservatives and a minority of Liberal Unionists within Gladstones own
party. The narrowness of the margin was an indicator of just how much
parliamentary support had gathered behind the Home Rule cause by this
time.Gladstone called a general election in the wake of his defeat in
the Commons and lost office.Later that year the parliamentary leader of
the Irish Home Rule party,Parnell,was cited as the third party
in a much publicised divorce case which had the effect of weakening
his moral authority just when it was most needed. The movement
itself split as result, which weakened it still further. Gladstone on
his return to office moved a second Home Rule Bill through the Commons
in 1893 only to have it rejected by the Lords.Gladstone retired from
public life soon afterwards.In the meantime in 1891 Parnell had died.
It was to be 1910 before the Irish parliamentary party was again to hold
a balance of power that enabled it to once more seek a Home Rule
measure from a Liberal administration. The issue continued to
remain the immediate aspiration of most constitutional nationalists and
to remain unresolved into the years of the Great War,when events were to
come that would quickly supercede it.
In the latter part of the nineteenth and into the early part of the
twentieth centuries there was,side by side with this political activity,
a great revival of interest in Gaelic culture. Out of this came the
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launching of the Gaelic League in 1893.According to Lyons(1973;227) "Of
all the factors influencing the rise of a new and urgent sense of
nationality at the end of the nineteenth century,this has come to be
regarded as perhaps the most significant..". It fostered a consciousness
among educated Irish men and women of their cultural distinctiveness and
a desired to preserve their cultural heritage. Out of the ferment
created by this intense cultural nationalism was to come the
developments that were eventually to lead to the setting up of the Irish
Free State and the partition of the country. In 1905 Arthur Griffith
founded Sinn Fein (translation: 'Ourselves') as a movement to pursue
economic nationalism and self-reliance in Ireland. Griffith took his
inspiration from the Hungarian, Franz Deak, who had achieved the
reestablishment of a separate Hungarian parliament in Budapest by
organising a massive abstention of Hungarian representatives from the
Imperial Diet at Vienna. The idea was to be non-violent non cooperation
which would make Ireland essentially ungovernable from a remote
location. An important element in Griffith's movement was the
economic argument that the development of the Irish economy would be
stunted under free trade and that what was needed to secure the
development of Irish industry was a policy of protectionism implemented
by an Irish administration.The grand objective of Sinn Fein was declared
by Griffith to be the reestablishment of the independence of Ireland.
However,what precisely he meant by that was ambiguous. Independence
could mean anything from devolved government within the United Kingdom,
through Dominion type autonomy within the British Empire,all the way to
a Republic. Lyons(1973;256) underlined the implications of this
ambiguity:
"Thus early in its career did Sinn Fein hesitate between....different
conceptions of Irish nationality,a hesitation which,magnified and
distorted as it was by events of later years, was to have a momentous
influence upon modern Irish history".
However most Irish people,up to the outbreak of the Great War and
through its early years, continued to support the constitutional
nationalism of the Home Rule movement which still relied on the
achievement of Home Rule through the building up of sufficient support
for the policy within the UK parliament. Irish nationalism in 1914 was a
coalition of varying extremes rather than a solid monolith. The outbreak
of the war brought the gun back into Irish politics. The Home Rule
movement formed a volunteer force,the Irish Volunteers, which was
originally intended to be a home guard auxiliary for the forthcoming
hostilities. Arising out of the fermentation of cultural nationalism
already mentioned and the charged athmosphere brought about by a war
environment the attention of a small,but significant group,of these
volunteers turned to the possible use of force to accelerate the
movement towards some form of independence. There was growing
frustration among this cadre of young idealistic and intellectual
nationalists at the protracted and as yet unsuccessful constitutional
movement towards Home Rule,now in temporary suspension for the duration
of the war. An armed insurrection took place in Easter Week of 1916. In
retrospect it is difficult to understand how any of those involved could
have imagined the immediate insurrection as being likely to succeed.
However,at least one of the most prominent leaders of this rebellion,
Paraic Pearse, expected that even in the event of the failure the blood
sacrifice that would inevitably be involved would inspire a revived
nation to wage a more successful war in due course.
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The insurrection itself was poorly supported and lasted only a week.
Hostilities were almost totally centred in Dublin. The main blood
sacrifice was to come,not in the hostilities themselves,but in the
subsequent execution of the leaders. One of the leaders,Eamon DeValera,
was spared execution because the authorities thought it prudent in view
of the fact that 'De-ye was an American citizen; he had been born in New
York to a emigrant parents,a Spanish father and an Irish mother.
DeValera was to play a significant role in Irish affairs right into the
1960's. The insurrectionists had, during their occupation of the General
Post Office, proclaimed Ireland to be a republic and linked the
legitimacy of the rising to this ideal. This legacy was to be important
in the events to follow. Contrary to what is widely believed the Easter
Rising was not a Sinn Fein rebellion. Many of the insurrectionists were
members of Sinn Fein but the rising was not Sinn Fein orchestrated. In
fact Griffith was not directly involved in it. As Pearse had expected,
the blood sacrifice did revive the momentum towards separation and Sinn
Fein became the main political vehicle for this renewed separatist
movement. Sentiment in the country at large shifted quickly in the wake
of the executions of the leaders of the Easter Rising . Sinn Fein which
up to then had provided a marginal challenge to the main Home Rule
movement in Westminister elections became the main political expression
of Irish nationalism and provided the political path to separatism
through its abstentionist policy. Parallel with this an armed guerilla
struggle,the War of Independence,was waged against the forces of Crown
rule in the country and by 1920 the country was clearly ungovernable
from Westminister without the most severe repressive measures.
These measures were politically extremely difficult to maintain in the
wake of the success of the 1914-18 Great War where the allies had
legitimised their intervention on the basis of protecting the right to
liberty of small nations. The British government came under severe
external pressure,especially from the US, to find a political solution.
A major stumbling block to an all Ireland measure of separatism was the
position of Ulster Unionism,referred to briefly already. British
colonisation of Ireland neither totally failed nor totally succeeded.
Either result might have led to a stable polity. The Unionist in the
north east of the island represented a significant and concentrated
force for preservation of the Union. The movement towards Irish
separatism had failed from the beginning to find an accomodation with
Ulster Unionism. It was believed that this small section of the Irish
people,a minority within the island as a whole, and representing just
about 50% of the people of Ulster itself, would not be allowed to impede
the will of the majority for a separate government. This was to severely
underestimate the depth of Unionist passion and the depth of support for
the preservation of the Union within the mother parliament.Maxwell
(1933;8) gives an insight into the depth of the Unionist sentiment:
"What this bond of union with the people of Great Britain means to the
people of the Province,none who have not visited Ulster can ever know.
It is the breath of their being. It is the vital principle for the
preservation of which they have been ever ready to sacrifice their
all.Between the English people and the Ulster people there exists and
has existed a sympathy of race and sentiment and ideal which is both
deep and abiding".
An Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in 1921 which provided a political
settlement and ended the hostilities between Irish separatists and the
Crown. An Irish free state was set up with its own parliament and its
status within the Empire was to be that of a dominion. Ireland would
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remain within the Empire and delegates to the Irish parliament would be
required to take an oath of allegiance to the British monarch in his/her
capacity as head of the Empire. A governor general would represent the
Crown in Ireland. Six of Ulster's nine counties were to be excluded from
the Irish Free State and to be given a provincial parliament,subservient
to the mother parliament in Westminister,thus retaining the Union in
the north east of the island. For strategic reasons the British army
was to remain in control of key ports in the Free State and a schedule
of land annuities was to be payable to the British government as the
legal means for returning the land in the Free State to the Irish
people and for buying out the stakes of the non-national landlords.
For many separatists the treaty represented a settlement that was at the
time far beyond what could have been expected only a few years earlier.
For others, the acceptance of anything less than a republic,and one that
included the whole of the island,was a betrayal of those whose blood
sacrifice had been the inspiration for the War of Independence. The
Treaty split the nationalist movement from top to bottom. In the
provisional parliament,set up by Sinn Fein as a defacto parliament-in-
waiting, the Treaty was approved by a narrow majority after a bitter
debate. The pro-Treaty faction set up the first Free State
administration and was immediately confronted with civil war which
lasted for a year. The new administration was eventually able,with its
access to institutional force,to bring the civil war to a successful
military conclusion. However the split on the Treaty and the subsequent
civil war were to leave an indelible stamp on the development of party
politics in the new state and to remain the central political issue
until the latter half of the twentieth century. The central figure on
the pro-Treaty side in 1922 was Arthur Griffith. On the anti-Treaty it
side was Eamon DeValera.
However even the nationalists who supported the treaty never saw it as
in any way a final solution to the national question. They were prepared
to accept it as a framework within which to move the claim of Ireland to
nationhood forward. Northern Ireland,as the world knows,remains
politically unstable. The nationalist dilemma which continues to burn
deeply in the national psyche is captured succintly by Lyons(1973;493):
"..the ultimate reality which nationalists had always been curiously
reluctant to confront (was) the fact that there was a solid phalanx of
Ulstermen deeply and immovably attached to the Union and utterly
unaffected either by threats or cajolements from the south.
Southerners, very naturally obsessed by the.. .fate of Ulster
nationalists condemned to minority status in the six counties,could
never reconcile themselves-and still cannot do so-to the notion that
Northern Ireland intended to remain a separate entity.."
The Irish Free State finally cut its political connection with the
British Commonwealth in 1949 and became a Republic.
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SECTION TWO - The national context
Having dealt with the outlines of the national question in section one
of this review attention is now turned to developments in the national
context from the late 1800's on up to the present with the genesis and
development of Irish complex organisations within their wider political,
economic, social and cultural context as a primary concern. The
organisations chosen for detailed case study are representative of the
major types of complex organisation in Ireland today and include a
state agency, a state-owned entreprise, a public limited company and a
major producer cooperative.
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1921
As we have seen in section one of this review the political scene in
Ireland was dominated by the Home Rule issue from the late 1800's to the
years of the Great War. We also saw that this movement grew out the Land
issue of the immediate post Famine period. However,there were others
besides Davitt and Parnell who were to apply themselves to the plight of
the Irish peasant farmer and who looked for solutions directly in the
socio-economic sphere that cut across the Home Rule-Unionism political
divisions. The most enduring contribution in this regard was that of Sir
Horace Plunkett the main inspiration behind the development of the
Cooperative Movement in Ireland. According to Lyons(1973;207):
"..the closing years of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a
new and startling phenomenon-the attempt by men of different
religions,backgrounds and political convictions to forget for the time
being the things that separated them and to concentrate instead on the
work of social generation that cried out to be done. Pride of place in
this movement. .belongs beyond question to Sir Horace Plunkett."
The cooperative movement of Horace Plunkett was a major development in
this period that would leave a lasting and visible legacy on the
structure of Irish complex organisations.
The Cooperative Movement in Ireland 1889-1921
Sir Horace Plunkett was an Irish Unionist who was born into the landed
class in 1854. He had a conventional education at Eton and Oxford. He
lost some family members to tuberculosis and the threat of the disease
drove him to Wyoming where he lived the life of a rancher for ten years
from 1879-89. He returned to Ireland to look after the family interests
but these commitments did not take up his full talent for administration
and he found time to turn his attention to the socio-economic problems
of the day.Even before he left for Wyoming he was deeply impressed by
the achievement of the Rochdale cooperators and this form of
organisation was to engage his energies for the remainder of his life.
On his return to Ireland he found the situation of the peasant farmer to
be still a central source of concern and an impediment to Irish economic
development. Through the efforts of Davitt's Land League movement and
through the parliamentary skills of Parnell the tenant-farmer now had
security of tenure and freedom from the arbitrary action of the
landlord. However wider economic developments since the middle of the
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century had brought further sources of peasant farmer insecurity. The
development of transportation had given greater access to the Irish
and English markets for foreign imports.The peasant farmer found himself
at the mercy of market shifts over which he had no control. The prices
that he could get for his produce became erratic and with this his cash
flow. His erratic cash flow led him to seek credit to fill out the
troughs.Normal sources of credit at standard terms were not available to
him and the main providers of this credit became the local traders who
extended credit on his purchases or money lenders known as 'gombeen
men' .Both sources tended to extract usurious premiums for the credit
extended and since the farmer was already very dependent on the local
trader for supply,not having any alternative outlets,the prices
themselves were well above normal competitive retail prices. He was
caught in a vicious cycle of dependency which kept him continually at
subsistence level. This was exascerbated by his dependence on middle men
to market his produce and they also extracted the maximum so that he
received a very small proportion of the market value of his product.
In Plunkett's view the economic position of the peasant farmer was
central to the wider economic development of the country. It was a
social problem of course,but it was much more. Since the peasant farmer
constituted the mass economic unit,his spending power would determine
the rate of development of agriculture itself. In the first place he
needed to be able to continually reinvest in more productive farming
systems in order to maintain his own competitiveness on the important
home and English markets and to secure his livlihood. Furthermore,the
development of a native manufacturing base depended on the farmer's
spending power. Irish manufacturing,if it was to have any hope of
reaching the scale needed to be competitive,required the presence of a
strong domestic mass market. The only real prospective basis for such a
domestic mass market was the peasant farmer,the mass economic unit in
the country at the time. As Plunkett saw it,an economic system that kept
the peasant farmer at subsistence level was,therefore,an impediment to
its own organic growth. His answer was to build up the economic power of
the peasant farmer through the principle and practice of cooperation.
Plunkett was to acknowledge his debt to Davitt's work in organising the
tenant-farmers in the mass movement for security of tenure because the
success of this earlier effort made the work of organising the
tenant-farmer easier than it would have been otherwise(Cole,1944;242).
However,according to Bolger(1977;78,note4):"The single-minded Davitt,who
was impatient to forge ahead from a 'land' victory to a political
victory of Home Rule,regarded Plunkett's cooperative schemes as a
childish and irritating distraction..". The active support of Devitt
himself would have been invaluable, and had it been forthcoming
doubtless cooperative organisation in Ireland today would have been
even more prominent and pervasive than it is. Plunkett and his
associates soldiered on without it. They quickly focused their efforts
on dairy production as the area most urgently in need of attention.
Dairying was the major activity of the peasant farmer and the situation
in dairying at this time is graphically described by Digby(1949;51):
"..Steamships and railways had opened the American Continent and food
from overseas was competing with Irish produce in the English market.
The cattle trade was fairly prosperous but it was for the rich
graziers of Meath rather than for the little dairy farms of the south
and west. Irish butter,made by primitive methods on the farm,passed
haphazard through fairs and village grocers to the dealers in the
ports and,after crude blending,reaching the English market in no state
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to compete with the best product of other countries. .The Irish
peasant,strengthened in his dealings with his landlord,was helpless in
the hands of traders with a world market on call."
The main competition on the vitally important English market were the
Danes. They had already achieved a high degree of cooperative
organisation by the 1890's and were able to produce butter at a
consistently high quality.
Around the late 1800's the technique of butter production began to
change in Ireland. Small creameries began to appear that involved the
use of cream separators and power-driven churns and they were turning
out a superior product with much less labour than the farmer's wife.
These initial ventures were farmer,joint-stock companies but the major
shareholders were usually butter buyers and merchant investors.
According to Bolger(1977;65):
"Plunkett saw the 'industrialisation' of butter production as
inevitable but also recognised the danger of the process falling into
the grasp of middlemen.If this were allowed to happen,the farmer who
produced the milk,the most perishable of all farm products,would be
even more helpless than before"
After a few frustrating early attempts Plunkett managed by the end of
1891 to have 16 creamery societies formed along cooperative lines.
The tangible success of up and running cooperatives was the best
advertisement for the movement and it quickly spread. Plunkett soon
came to the conclusion that the movement needed a central organising
body.In 1894 he founded the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society for
this purpose and was elected president of the new organisation.
Plunkett was impressed with the potential for cooperation in
retailing and manufacturing as evidenced by the British experience and
retained hopes that the IAOS would catalyse the extension of the
cooperative movement to those areas. However cooperative dairying was to
be the main focus of his early efforts and was,and still remains,by far
the largest sector of Irish agricultural cooperative activity (Bolger,
1977;183). By 1898 there were more than 125 cooperative societies and by
1904 the Irish cooperatives were taking most of the major prizes at the
London Dairy Show,such was the improvement in quality and consistency of
Irish butter achieved through the organisation of these cooperative
creameries. The years 1913-20 were to be years of plenty for the
cooperative creameries. The supplier-owners were getting good prices for
their milk supplies and bonuses on cooperative profits. Plunkett's early
hopes for the cooperative movement were being largely realised. These
good times were disrupted in 1920 as the War of Independence gathered
momentum.The creameries were singled out by the Black and Tans and the
Auxiliaries,the special forces sent over from England to quell the
guerilla warfare being conducted by the Irish nationalists. At first
they were actually attacked and burned by the Crown forces as
reprisals for guerilla attacks on army patrols. Later a softer approach
of simply enforcing their temporary closure was adopted.Both had the
effect of severly setting back the cooperative momentum in the dairying
sector and were a severe blow to Plunkett personally as be was coming to
the end of his own active involvement in the movement.
By 1921 the cooperative movement had achieved considerable success in
the Dairy sector. But even by then the problems that would continue to
beset the movement were much in evidence. Plunkett had visualised a
vibrant and growing cooperative network expanding into all types of
commercial activity guided by a resourceful IAOS and supporting each
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other. Cooperative banks would provide services to other cooperative
organisations.Cooperative marketing agencies would provide a
concentrated marketing resource for cooperative producers in the same
class of products. This ideal was not approached in Plunkett's time nor
at any time after him. The cooperatives did not foster cooperation with
each other.In fact,even in the first years of the movement the dairy
cooperatives began to find themselves competing for supplies.
Furthermore the working cooperatives did not provide anything close to
the contributions needed to develop and sustain a resourceful central
coordinating IAOS. Producer cooperatives did not adequately support the
cooperative purchasing and marketing agencies that the IAOS tried to
develop for them. Finally a large degree of managerialism was to develop
and continue right up to the present day which restricted the spread of
cooperative participation in the financing of the growth of these
organisations and progressively pushed out to arm's length the active
involvement of the supplier-owners in the strategy making of the
organisations. Nevertheless,notwithstanding these problems,by the early
1900's the cooperative movement was already well established in the key
agricultural sector of the Irish economy. It has remained a major force
in the development of that sector right up to the present day.
Plunkett left another legacy which arose out of his efforts to establish
a cooperative movement in Irish agriculture. While the purist
cooperative philosophy would eschew the notion of enlisting state
support,Plunkett none the less sought it on the basis that he was
addressing more than individual entreprise; he was working towards the
development of the economy as a whole. He was returned as the Unionist
MP for South Dublin in 1895 to a parliament that formed a Conservative
administration. He urged his fellow countrymen to put aside their
differences on the Home Rule issue,since clearly nothing was going to
happen on this under the Conservative administration,and to work
together for the promotion of legislation that all parties could agree
on.He managed to form an all-party committee representative of Unionist
and Nationalist opinion alike around two specific issues, the need to
set up a Board of Agriculture specifically for Ireland and the need for
a Technical Education Bill. In 1899 Plunkett's 'Recess Committee',so
called because it met mainly during periods of parliamentary recess,
succeeded in getting the government to pass an Act creating a Department
of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland. This involved the
state in the provision of educational,research and advisory services to
agriculture. The new department,like the cooperative movement itself,did
not fully live up to Plunkett's expectations in his own lifetime.
However,he had established a precedent for the involvement of the state
in the provision of these services which,over the long run,came to make
a major contribution to the development of agriculture in Ireland.
Industrial Development in Ireland generally up to 1921
Conditions in Ireland up to the foundation of the Irish Free State did
not,by and large, favour a rapid or extensive process of
industrialisation. The reasons why,many of which were discussed in the
previous section,are summarised by Lyons(1973;55) as follows:
"The rapid decline of the population in the decades after the Famine;
the poverty of the people and the retarding effect of the land System
upon their ability to accumulate savings and thus provide either the
nucleus for industrial development or a market for its products; the
frequently disturbed state of the country; the scarcity of coal and of
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raw materials; the cost and difficulty of transporting Irish goods to
centres of trade other than Britain,or for that matter to Britain
itself; the impossibility of building up manufactures in a backward
country under a free trade regime which exposed it to the formidable
rivalry of far more highly developed competitors-all these things
together combined to make Ireland a place where,with a few important
exceptions,businessmen preferred not too risk capital in the hazardous
entreprise of creating new industry in so unpromising an economy.And
in the last resort it was the unwillingness to take certain minimal
risks that lay at the heart of the problem."
There were however some very notable exceptions. Outside of agriculture
itself the main industries in which there was concentration of capital
were brewing, distilling, biscuit making, textiles , shipbuilding and
engineering, centred mainly around the key ports of Dublin and Belfast.
Capital was attracted to these areas initially because there were
lucrative profits to be made in the importing and exporting activities
themselves. Some concentration in production had been established in
the liquor,biscuit and textile industries before the Act of Union of
1801. Prior to this Act,there had been a measure of devolved government
in Ireland that had been able to provide some tariff protection for
these entreprises in the late 18th century within which they were able
to grow initially.
The textile industry was centred largely in the Lagan valley,around the
Belfast area. By 1815 there were over 2000 people engaged in this region
in the manufacture of cotton and there was at least one factory which
employed over 300 people(Lyons,1973;61). The cotton industry collapsed
in the face of free trade competition with the cotton-spinning
industry of Lancashire. The Lagan valley turned to the manufacture of
linen from local raw material as Ireland's natural textile. The shortage
of cotton brought about by the American Civil War created the fortuitous
conditions that allowed a sizeable market for linen to be developed at
home and abroad and secured the future of the industry. The manufacture
of wool in Ireland did not achieve the type of concentration or market
access that the linen industry did and remained small under the enormous
trading pressure of imported substitutes. Shipbuilding became a major
industry in 19th century Ireland largely through the prescience of the
Belfast Harbour Commissioners,who in the process of expanding the
harbour facilities in the late 1840's, set aside from the trading area
separate harbour facilities for ship-building. This exceptionally
favourable site attracted new capital into what was up to then a
relatively small industry. This new investment brought the skills of
Edward Harland and G.W.Wolfe into the industry and these two
entreprising individuals built up the world famous ship-building firm
that bears their names and employed over 12000 men by 1914. Their
activities also attracted other ship-building to Belfast and by 1914 a
second firm in the area Workman & Clark were employing over 10000 men.
Engineering works,which grew initially to service the engineering
needs of both the textile and the ship-building industries,developed
into a major industry in its own right with a high level of export
activity.
Biscuit making was most highly developed in the Dublin area and this was
mainly due to the individual entreprise of the W.&R. Jacob firm which bY
1907 employed over 10000. In the area of biscuit manufacturing Ireland
was at this time a significant net exporter, with exports exceeding
imports by a factor of three to one(Riordan,1920;92-4). In the brewing
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and distilling area Ireland was also a large net exporter in the early
1900's. These industries were more dispersed than the biscuit trade but
nevertheless some large concentrations of capital had been achieved by
1907. The largest brewer was the firm of Arthur Guinness & Sons in
Dublin and at this time it probably accounted for around two-thirds of
all the beer and porter brewed in the country(Lyons,1973,68). In the
distilling area the industry had just over twenty participants in 1907,
which represented a major consolidation of the industry since the late
1700's when there were over 2000 small family-owned whiskey stills in
the country(McGuire,1973;167).The major distillers in 1907 were John
Power & Son and John Jameson and Son, in Dublin; Cork Distilleries
Company Ltd,an amalgamation in which Murphy's of Midleton was the major
party, in Cork; and Bushmills, in Antrim. By 1907, according to the
Census of Industrial Production there were 2400 employed in the
distilling industry and 6600 in brewing.
Irelands main industries in 1907 then were Food & Drink (including
agricutural produce), Textiles and Shipbuilding & Engineering which had
gross outputs of £27m, £16m and £6m respectively and the Textiles and
Shipbuilding & Engineering activities were concentrated in the north
east in the hinterland of Belfast. Lyons(1973;69-70) provides the
following summary of the position of the Irish economy at the turn of
the century when the separatist drive started to gather fresh momentum:
"Ireland remained at bottom an agricultural country with one industrial
region and a handful of trading centres.. .About four-fifths of Irish
exports went to Britain and about two-thirds of imports came from
Britain...Although foreign trade was not large in itself, it was large
in relation to the population,actually larger per head than the
external trade of the United Kingdom. This meant that Ireland was
extremely dependent on outside-in effect,British-markets for the sale
of her commodities.. (In 1904) imports of food and farm produce
accounted for £20.7 million;of raw materials,for £8.8 million; of
manufactured goods,for £23.8. Against this,agricultural exports were
£30.4 million,raw materials £3.4million and manufactures £15.3
million.'To sum up', as an acute contemporary observer remarked,'the
one broad feature of Ireland's economy is that what we produce we do
not consume,and what we consume we do not produce'..the prime fact
(is) her dependence,itself a melancholy epitaph on the economic
history of Ireland under the Union".
This was the economic inheritance that confronted the new Free State
Administration when it took office after the signing of the Anglo-Irish
Treaty.
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THE NEW STATE 1921-1958 
While reaction in England and in the Commonwealth generally was very
favourable to the Anglo-Irish Treaty (Packenham,1951;327) the settlement
split the Sinn Fein movement right down the middle. In the crucial vote
on the Treaty,the pro-Treaty won and settled down to the business of
setting up the first administration for the new Irish Free State.
Those who felt that the cause for the 'Republic' had been betrayed
refused to acquiesce in the new arrangement. A bitter and bloody civil
war broke out which lasted under a year. The new Free State Government
resolutely asserted its authority and using the new Free State regular
army, brought hostilities successfully to an end. The tragedy of the
civil war was that the lives of many talented and resourceful Irishmen,
who had worked effectively together in the separatist cause,were lost at
the hands of each other. Griffith ,"the greatest intellectual force
stimulating the national revival" and the man that looked destined to
lead the first administration died of heart failure in his early
fifties,"worn out by past labours and privations and present anguish" at
the turn of events which had lead to civil war. Within a week Michael
Collins,the military genius whom Griffith himself had proclaimed as
"the man who won the War (of Independence)" and a crucial negotiator and
defender of the Treaty settlement, was ambushed by a group of irregulars
and killed. He was still only 33 years old (quotes from Packenham,1951;
340-42). The bitterness and recriminations that arose from the civil
war,and from the fratricidal loss of such talent at a crucial stage in
the history of the fledgling state,came to dog Irish political life for
as long as these events were living memories.
The First Free State Administration 1923-32
With Griffith and Collins gone the mantle of leadership in the first
Free State Administration fell to W.T.Cosgrave. Cosgrave's primary
concern initially was to establish the machinery for self-government as
quickly and as efficiently as possible. One major advantage that the
Irish Free State had over many emerging nations was that the new
administration "inherited a complete apparatus of government,both
central and local"(Dooney,1976;1). As the Final Report of the Commission
of Inquiry into the Civil Service 1932-35 described it:
"The passing of the State services into the control of a native
Government,however revolutionary it may have been as a step in the
political development of the nation,entailed,broadly speaking,no
immediate disturbance of any fundamental kind in the daily work of the
average Civil Servant. Under changed masters the same main tasks of
administration continued to be performed by the same staffs on the
same general lines of organisation and procedure".(par.8.)
The lasting legacy of this first administration is that it succeeded
quickly in establishing and making work a cabinet system of
administration that,with some development and elaboration,has remained
the basic blueprint for the government of the country ever since.
One of the major difficulties that faced the first administration was
the political instability that remained in the aftermath of the Civil
War. The anti-Treaty side continued to contest General Elections under
the leadership of DeValera but,while achieving considerable electoral
support,they maintained an abstentionist policy during the early years
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of the new state. The Cosgrave administration was governing without a
major parliamentary opposition and a large element of the electorate
was not actively represented in the first Dail. The assassination of
Home Affairs Minister Kevin O'Higgins,in July 1927,by a small group
anti-Treaty extremists, was a sharp and painful reminder to both sides
of the political divide that potentially destructive civil war tensions
still remained not far below the surface of Irish political life.
In 1926 DeValera broke with the more extreme elements in the anti-Treaty
side to form the Fianna Fail Party. Fianna Fail entered the Dail
for the first time in 1927 and in retrospect this represented the major
step forward towards the firm establishment of constitutional politics
in the new state. The long term stabilising effects of DeValera's
decision to abandon abstentionism were far from obvious at the time. The
main difficulty was the requirement on sitting deputies to take an Oath
of Allegiance to the British Monarch as head of the Empire.
Nowlan(1967;12) describes the difficulty that Fianna Fail had in
circumventing an important point of principle in order to enter the
Dail in 1927:
"In coming into Dail Eireann,Mr. de Valera stressed they had acted
under duress.Free State legislation had faced them with the
alternative of acting as they did or of abandoning all they had
achieved;a new civil war would have been 'unpardonable'.'I grant',he
said,'that what we did was contrary to our former actions..It was a
step painful and humiliating for us who had to take it. .There was and
is no change of attitude on our part as to the national significance
of that Oath'.
We can now see that the Fianna Fail decision was one which,in the long
term,gave a new strength and reality to Irish parliamentry life. .There
had always been a welcome element of realism in Irish political
history.The time for effective protests outside the Dail had passed."
The pragmatic and pithy Sean Lemass,a senior member of De Valera's new
party,described Fianna Fail's position in the Dail in March 1928 as that
of a 'slightly constitutional party. .perhaps open to the definition of a
constitutional party,but before anything ..a republican party' (cited in
O'Sullivan,1940;224).The presense of the 'slightly constitutional party'
however had the immediate effect of providing the Dail with an
opposition which did offer real prospect for an alternative government.
Among other things this new opposition was now able to put the
Government's performance on the economy under effective parliamentary
pressure.
The first Free State administration used the tariff mechanism very
sparingly up to 1932 when it went out of office. This is at first glance
surprising since it seems to have been at odds with the economic
philosophy of Griffith outlined earlier in this review. The followers
of Griffith did not implement his protectionist philosphy with regard to
native industrial development so why not? It was the young Minister for
Home Affairs,Kevin O'Higgins that gave the answer in the Dail:
"The propagandist writings of any one man cannot be accepted simply as
revealed truth,requiring no further investigation,something that must
be accepted for ever as beyond question,beyond doubt,beyond the need
of examination".(cited in Meenan,1967;70)
The Cosgrave administration therefore had no doctrinaire attitude on the
issue of protection versus free trade. The Minister for Finance in his
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budget speech in 1924 put this on record(cited in Geary,1951;405):
"The Government takes up no doctrinaire attitude on the question of
free trade and protection.It regards the matter as one of expediency
which may be variously decided in different circumstances"
According to O'Brien(1962;15) the fiscal policy of the this first
administration was 'cautious and experimental' with the government
largely feeling its way on the issue of protectionism. The large
indigenous industries of the Free State were,as we saw previously,
biscuit manufacturing, brewing and distilling.These were all large net
exporters and had not sought tariff protection which could have hurt
more than helped them,if their export markets were to repond with
tariffs of their own. The primary indigeneous source of wealth was
agriculture and here again the heavy dependence of this sector on
exports,particularly to the British market,made protection for this area
equally unattractive.According to Meenan (1967;71) the first government
aimed at two things in relation to economic policy:
"First,to improve the standard of Irish farm products. This was done by
means of a succession of Acts regulating breeding of livestock,and the
quality of dairy produce.They were regarded as almost totalitarian at
the time;and indeed it was the first time in this country that the
power of the State had been used to impose standards of production and
marketing.
The second point went much further.Farmers had to sell in a foreign
and fiercely competitive market.They could only do so if they could
produce as cheaply as possible. In this view it was preferable to
import maize rather than to produce homegrown feeding stuffs.It was
preferable to import wheat rather than to sacrifice land to growing it
at home. Irish farming in other words,was to be geared to the export
market;it was not to be protected in its own market.
In the same way,tariffs for industry should be imposed only with the
greatest care,so that farmers should not pay more than they should.
This ruled out an allround tariff."
Within Agriculture itself the cooperative movement,which had already
carved out an important place for itself in the dairy sector of the
industry,was in the doldrums by the mid 1920's. The Drew Commission
which had been set up by the Cosgrave administration to examine the
prospect and potential for Irish agriculture,reported in 1924 that the
cooperative movement was suffering from gross undercapitalisation and
minimal share capital,with most members having no real stake in the
businesses;lax business methods and a general lack of education and
training(Bolger,1977;113). It was evident too that new blood was needed
in the IAOS committee itself as too many of the members were
long-serving and membership turnover was very slow.Moreover Sir Horace
Plunkett himself was in very poor health,though still as president of
the IAOS giving his all to the movement. However,he had been personally
very dismayed by the destruction of the creameries during the War of
Independence and was also much grieved and harrowed at the loss of many
talented Irishmen and potential nation-builders in the Civil War,men
like Collins whom he had come to know personally and to admire. At the
time when Plunkett's influence was receeding a new personality emerged
within the movement that would come to dominate its development for the
next thirty years. Dr.Henry Kennedy was appointed to be secretary of the
IAOS in 1926. Like Plunkett,he believed that the movement could be best
advanced through a combination of self-help and state support. He was to
be a dynamic and a controversial figure in the movement and his own
personal beliefs and convictions were to have a major effect on the
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direction that the development of the movement was to take during his
years of active service to it.Bolger(1977;114-121) has given us some
insight into what those basic beliefs and convictions were:
"As a hard-headed economist and technologist,Kennedy saw that the
co-operative business was 80 per cent creamery and that Ireland's
real economic potential lay in her grasslands. Consequently he felt
that a build-up of the dairy sector must be the basis for
strengthening the whole movement. .(p114).
The principal objective of Kennedy's writings and public discourses
was to reveal the economic potential of Irish agriculture and the
technical and business arrangements necessary for its development.
Cooperation was ... less a social creed and more a business
device. .(p121).
Kennedy had an important ally in the Cosgrave administration.His
brother-in-law,Mr Patrick Hogan,was the Minister for Agriculture. Hogan
was to become one of the legendary figures in this first Free State
administration. His pragmatic,no-nonsense,approach to the development of
Irish agriculture within his government's overall economic policy of
Free Trade was defined by him once as 'helping the farmer who helped
himself and letting the rest go to the devil'(cited in Meenan,1967;72).
Kennedy,likewise,was not one to dissipate his energies or the limited
resources at the disposal of the IAOS on weak or lost causes.Rather,he
was to concentrate on those cooperative initiatives that were already
showing the potential for survival and growth i.e.the creameries.
Hogan and Kennedy,working in tandem,brought about a reorganisation of
the dairy industry in 1927 which,according to Bolger(1977;114) "saved
the cooperative movement from disaster,if not extinction". At this time
local creameries were springing up all over the major dairying areas of
the country.By 1926 there were 580 central and auxiliary creameries in
the Free State of which 400 were cooperatives. The Condensed Milk
Company controlled 114 of the remaining 180 proprietary creameries.
One of the largest shareholders in the Condensed Milk Company was the
large British wholesale firm of Lovell and Christmas and this connection
gave the company favoured access to the important UK market and a key
competitive advantage vis-a-vis the dairy cooperatives.Inevitably the
proliferation of competition and the over-capacity of the industry led
to a milk war which came to a head in 1926.The future role of the
cooperatives in the industry was in doubt as Hoctor(1971;153-4) records:
...many creamery societies found themselves going deeper and deeper
into debt,and when refused credit by the banks,they appealed to the
Government for aid.Towards the end of 1926 the trade war reached its
climax and the outlook for co-operative dairying was dismal indeed..
A decision had to be taken as to whether the law of the jungle should
be allowed to prevail.If allowed,the result might well be the
extinction of cooperative creameries and the transfer of the industry
to British capitalist concerns".
Kennedy persuaded the Minister to purchase the Condensed Milk Company
creameries and associated activities. The government set up a
state-sponsored company,the Dairy Disposal Company Ltd.,to manage the
newly acquired creameries until they could be integrated into the
cooperative system. By 1931 the Dairy Disposal Company had purchased 170
of the proprietary creameries,closed 79 of them and transferred 44 to
cooperative ownership. The company held and managed the remainder
because acceptable transfer deals were not forthcoming. The Dairy
Disposal Company was,then,the state's main instrument in the
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rationalisation of the industry.It was meant to be only a transitory
instrument as the name suggests yet it was to be still in existence
into the early 1970's,such were the difficulties over the years in
trying to achieve the desired degree of rationalisation.Kennedy was also
instrumental in bringing about the passing of the Creamery Act of 1928
which empowered the Minister for Agriculture to control the
establishment of new creameries so that the situation that demanded
state intervention in the first place could be prevented from happening
in the future. The central role of the cooperative movement in the
future development of Irish dairying was made more secure by these
developments. In addition,in 1927 under a great deal of personal
lobbying from Kennedy, the government set up the Agricultural Credit
Corporation as a state agency to provide the much needed development
capital for Irish agriculture that was not being made available through
existing commercial channels. An attempt to establish a central
marketing agency for cooperative dairy produce in 1928 was,however,a
disappointing failure.The new agency,in order to be a success,
would have needed the support of the vast majority of the cooperatives
in promoting and selling their produce through the agency.Furthermore,
it would have needed a high degree of product quality standardisation
across the supplying cooperatives to ensure that the product it was
marketing was of uniform and consistent quality. The new agency did not
receive the support it needed. The cooperative form of organisation,it
seems,was viewed by many of those involved as a pragmatic expedient that
was suited to the operation of Irish creameries. They did not fully
embrace the ideology of cooperation or actively seek its extension to
related activities. It was to be 1961 before a successful central
marketing agency for the export of Irish dairy produce would finally be
established and this was to be in the form of a state agency,An Bord
Bainne (The Irish Dairy Board),rather than an organic development
from within the cooperative movement itself.
Like its approach to the tariff issue,the approach of the Cosgrave
administration to the use of state funding for economic and industrial
development was piecemeal and cautious.Its crucial interventions in
agriculture were reviewed above.State funding was also used to harness
the Shannon river in order to provide electricity generating capacity at
a level and rate that would not have happened if it had been left to the
private sector. Beyond these developments,however,this first
administration is credited most with its contribution to establishing
and securing the institutions and machinery of government, a major
achievment in itself given the troubled birth and insecure early
childhood of the fledgling State. Its achievement in the area of
industrial and economic development is viewed generally as having been
conservative and lackluster.
Fianna Fail and Self-Sufficiency 1932-48
De Valera led Fianna Fail to power in the election of 1932. The country
had achieved a measure of political stability when Fianna Fail
abandoned their abstentionist policy and entered the Dail in 1927. Few
would have predicted then that they would come to power so soon
afterwards and even less that they would remain in office for an
uninterrupted period of sixteen years. It is reported that the 'slightly
constitutional' party was apprehensive about whether power would be
transferred to it peacefully when the Dail first met after the 1932
election and that Fianna Fail deputies entered the Dail chamber with
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revolvers in their pockets,fearing a possible coup d'etat (Williams,1967
;30).In the event "when the moment of change came" as Nowlan(1967;17-8)
records "though some men were fearful for the future stability of the
state,William Cosgrave made way,as a good parliamentarian and a good
democrat,for the leader of the new government,Mr.Eamon De Valera".
The peaceful transition of power in 1932 was another major milestone in
securing the future of the state. Moreover it brought to power for the
first time since the foundation of the state two of the most outstanding
personalities in modern Irish history,Eamon De Valera and Sean Lemass.
"At various times in Irish history-as in the history of every people-
there have been individuals whose impact,influence and personality
have set them apart from their contemporaries and earned for them the
special consideration of historians and of all those intent on
understanding the great impersonal forces and the decisive events that
shape a country's history. In modern Ireland such a man was Eamon De
Valera,a man whose towering presence. .presides over a great part of
the story of modern Ireland in the first half of the twentieth
century".(Lee&O'Tuathaigh,1982;12).
Yet even if De Valera was to become the acknowledged outstanding
political figure in modern Irish history,his most prominent cabinet
minister and obvious heir apparent,Sean Lemass, would come to be
credited,in his own right,with being "the main architect of
industrialisation" in the country's economic development(Lee,1979;16).
De Valera's obsession was with sovereignty. By 1932 the Cosgrave
administration had already extended Irish sovereignty through its active
involvement in the enlargement of the notion of dominion status. This
had culminated in the Statute of Westminister in 1931,which give the
dominions effective control over their own affairs without interference
from the British government. However the political polarisation which
had followed the Civil War had led the Cosgrave administration into an
over-defensive position on the status of the Treaty,which Collins the
Treaty's most crucial advocate,had justified to himself and to his
supporters as a stepping stone and framework within which to work
towards even greater independence and autonomy(Pakenham,1951;279:
Leavy,1975;17-8).De Valera in office succeeded with amazing speed to
disentangle the Treaty limb by limb with little more political fallout
in Anglo-Irish relations than a period of mutual economic sanctions.
Lee and O'Tuathaigh(1982;67-70) provide this succinct summary of events:
"The advent of Fianna Fail to power in 1932 heralded a period of rapid
and dramatic constitutional change.In 1933 the oath of allegiance was
abolished. .The Governor-General's role and functions were inexorably
cut down,prior to the abolition of the office. .and in a move of
considerable oportunism de Valera took advantage of the abdication
crisis(of Edward VIII) in December 1936 to remove from the
Constitution all remaining references to the Crown and to the Crown's
representative.This was accompanied by an Act(the External Relations
Act) empowering the king recognised by the states of the Commonwealth
to act on behalf of the Free State(on the advice of the Free State
government)in certain external matters.. .The new Constitution of
1937,while stopping short of actually proclaiming a republic,gave
concrete form to the concept of popular sovereignty in Ireland.."
In 1938 an Anglo-Irish Treaty was concluded at which the annuity
question was resolved by a once-off lump payment by Ireland and De
Valera managed,as part of the negotiations,to secure the return of the
ports and the removal of the British naval bases from the Free State. It
was this last success that enabled him to take up for Ireland a
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position of neutrality in the 1939-45 War. Ireland's neutrality,which de
Valera managed to maintain throughout the Second World War in spite of
at times enormous British and American pressure,was the clearest
tangible evidence at the time of just how sovereign the Irish Free State
had become.
There were dramatic changes also in the economic sphere under this
Fianna Fail administration. The new government pursued a policy of
economic self-sufficiency through the widespread application of tariff
protection. There were clear indications,as early as 1928, that Fianna
Fail would pursue self-sufficiency actively if and when it got into
power when Sean Lemass,advocating protectionism, said in the Dail:
"We believe that Ireland can be made a selfcontained unit, providing
all the necessities of living in adequate quantities for the people
residing in the island at the moment and probably for a much larger
number" (cited in Meenan,1967;74).
Lemass and his colleagues,while they had rejected the political solution
of Griffith,had embraced to the full his economic doctrine which his own
followers had all but abandoned. The right to safeguard Irish economic
interests by pursuing an independent economic line from Britain had been
central to the whole separatist movement that lead to the 1921 Treaty
and as Geary(1951;399)states "the claim for self-government was based
largely on the country's right to economic development in general and to
development in industry in particular". As well as the economic argument
there was also another consideration,the conviction that the country
would be culturally and spiritually the poorer if it were to depend
solely on agriculture and the traditional brewing and distilling
industries for its basic commercial life. AE (George Russell)
articulated this viewpoint in the Irish Statesman in 1925 when he made:
"..not so much an economic case as an intellectual and cultural case.If
the country lives almost altogether by a few industries its
intellectual life will lack richness and variety,and our cultural life
has lacked richness and depth because agriculture..did not find
employment for large numbers of engineers,electricians,chemists and
bacteriologists... "(cited in Meenan,1967;74).
Fianna Fail,then, had come into power,committed to a policy of
protection geared towards the twin objectives of relieving unemployment
and developing the resources of the country (Geary,1951;406).
Coinciding with the Fianna Fail approach there was,in the early
thirties,a general drift towards protectionism throughout most Western
economies.Events like the Wall Street crash in 1929 and the Great
Depression in the 30's caused a crisis of doubt about the capacity of
unbridled capitalism within a Free Trade framework to lead to lasting
economic prosperity.Also,influential economists such as J.M Keynes were
then moving away intellectually from Free Trade towards protectionism
as an economic doctrine. In a lecture in Dublin 19/4/33 Keynes outlined
the direction that his mind was taking at this time:
"I was brought up,like most Englishmen,to respect Free Trade not only
as an economic doctrine. .but almost as part of the moral law...Yet the
orientation of my mind is changed;and I share this change of mind with
many others. .It is my central contention that there is no prospect for
the next generation of a uniformity of economic system throughout the
world,such as existed,broadly speaking during the nineteenth century;
that we all need to be as free as possible of interference from
economic changes elsewhere,in order to make our own favourite
experiments towards the ideal social Republic of the future;and that a
deliberate movement towards greater national self-sufficiency and
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economic isolation will make our task easier,in so far as it can be
accomplished without excessive cost"(The Finlay Lecture, UCD).
Ireland then,in 1932, was heading quickly towards protectionism in an
overall environment that was itself fast becoming protectionist. However
it was to be political developments,to be reviewed later,that came to
accelerate the process and this is hardly surprising in a country
where to borrow one of Sir Horace Plunkett's favourite aphorisms
political economy is spelt with a large P and a small e.
In spite of the new administration's clear commitment to a protectionist
policy private investment in industrial projects remained low. The
difficulty was not so much lack of capital but more the lack of private
entrepreneurs with good projects to attract that capital. The new
administration accelerated a trend which had begun in 1927 under the
Cosgrave government,that of state involvement in various developmental
and commercial projects. The most prevalent form that this involvement
took was through the setting up of the state-sponsored body or semi-
state organisation.As Barrington(1967;87) records "if there was to be
development,and if the civil service was not to be regarded as a
development agency,then new forms of institution had to be invented".
In the period 1932-45 there were 18 semi-state organisations added to
the 6 set up by the Cosgrave administration and by the early 60's there
were over 50 altogether. FitzGerald(1963;5) has provided a generic
working definition for these bodies in the Irish context by describing
them as "..autonomous public bodies other than universities or
university colleges ,which are neither temporary in character nor purely
advisory in their function,most of whose staff are not civil servants,
and to whose board or council the government,or ministers in the
government,appoint directors,council members etc". Among the semi-state
companies set up during the 1932-50 period were Aer Lingus,the national
airline,and Aer Rianta,the airport management authority; the Irish Life
Assurance Company; Irish Shipping; CIE, the public transport authority;
Bord Na Mona,the turf and peat processor;and CSET, the Irish Sugar
Company.
The semi-states,have over the years,been subjected to all kinds of
criticisms. It has been said that they competed too much with the
private sector,that they took too large a share of the managerial
talent available to the country and that they have held the consumer to
ransom.Sean Lemass,as Minister for Industry and Commerce,was largely
retponsible for the growth and expansion of semi-state activity to the
point where it had become a central and enduring feature of the Irish
economy. Speaking at a meeting of the Institute Of Public Administration
in Dublin on 2-Mar-59 Lemass explained his own and his government's
view on the development of semi-state activity and of its role in Irish
economic life:
"In contrast to many countries where similar State-sponsored
organisations have been created as part of a deliberate policy of
State socialism,they developed in this country in a more haphazard way
to meet particular needs and oportunities as they arose,when no other
course appeared to be practicable. Industrial development in Ireland
is based on private entreprise and the profit motive: State financed
industries have been set up only where considerations of national
policy were involved or where the projects were beyond the scope of,or
Unlikely to be undertaken by,private entreprise."
(Lemass's paper is reproduced in Chubb & Lynch 1969;177-194)
Clearly the semi-states were never intended to compete with the private
sector and Lemass's statement would appear to leave wide open the
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possibility that some of these organisations might indeed be privatised
at some future time. It would be a matter of policy,not of principle.
The second criticism was addressed at the same meeting by one of the
invited respondents to Lemass's paper,C.S.(Todd) Andrews.Andrews was
the chief executive of Bord Na Mona,the turf processing semi-state which
was at that time one of the clear successes(Barrington,1967;88).
Speaking in reply to the Minister,Andrews said:
"..the companies have given to the administrators and technologists in
Ireland oportunities for advancement which would never have been
available to them in an economy where the family-owned firm was
dominant and the crown prince blocked promotion to the top posts.
The companies have introduced into Ireland modernity in
mechanisation and in management methods,in industrial environment and
in the training of staff...I believe that without these companies the
country would be little better than a cattle ranch,managed by what
someone once described as the finest herdsmen in the world."
(Andrews's remarks are reproduced in Chubb & Lynch 1969;194-8)
However,Lemass was concerned about how to ensure the continued economic
performance of these companies. He was also worried about their tendency
to accumulate reserves to fund their own expansion at the possible
expense of the consumer and of the industrial customer,whose own
competitiveness could thereby be at risk. The issue of how best to
control and motivate the performance of these companies to the national
interest was,in Lemass's view,an ongoing problem with no unique and
universal solution. It was an issue that required continuous monitoring
and reassessment. The overall pragmatic and idiosyncratic approach that
was taken to the setting up and control of these bodies can be seen in
the variety of capital structures and organisation forms that came to
characterise the semi-state organisations and to reflect their empirical
and adhoc formation. The selection of the top executive was,for Lemass,
the critical determinant of future performance. In the course of the
same paper quoted from above he made his view on this plain:
"The performance of a State corporation depends,in our experience, on
the capacities of the individual holding the chief executive post,who
is sometimes the chairman and sometimes a managing director or general
manager.There is no uniformity in our practice."
It was,then,during the 1930's that the semi-state organisation really
emerged as a major instrument in Irish economic development. It is clear
from Mr Lemass's paper,quoted above,that "it is not necessary to seek
any profound philosophy of state socialism behind the emergence of this
variegated collection of organisations"(Lyons,1973;618). At the time,
however,any extension of the state's direct involvement in economic and
social affairs was viewed with extreme caution. The political situation
was still potentially volatile. Socialism was on the rise throughout
Europe and many countries turned to systems of government that involved
a dominant role for the state in human affairs such as Fascism and
Communism. In 1931 Pope Pius XI produced the encyclical 'Quadragesimo
Anno' to coincide with the 40th anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's
encyclical on Catholic social teaching 'Rerum Novarum'. Rerum Novarum
had set only the broad outlines of the Church's approach to the issue of
social organisation.It had asserted man's right to private property but
it had also asserted the state's right to intervene against bad working
conditions. Class struggle was not accepted as inevitable and Catholics
were urged to seek a form of social organisation that would foster class
harmony. Quadragesimo Anno was much more specific than Rerum Novarum
and pointed to the concept of Vocationalism or Corporatism as the way in
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which the Catholic social principles could best be implemented.
Whyte(1980;67) summarised the main ideas in the 1931 encyclical as
follows:
"The solution it proposed was that the members of each industry of
profession be organised in 'vocational groups' or 'corporations' ,in
which employers and workers would collaborate to further their common
interests.. .It would restore the State. .to its rightful place.. to
direct,watch,urge and restrain subsidiary organisations. For,the Pope
argued,there is a basic principle in social philosophy,the principle
of subsidiary function:'It is an injustice and at the same time a
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and
higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do".
The two major elements in this development in Catholic social thinking,
the philosophical concern with the extension of state involvement and
the proposal that Vocationalism represented the best principle on which
develop appropriate forms of social organisation,did have some manifest
effects on the Ireland of the time. Firstly,the electoral system chosen
by De Valera for the reinstated Senate in the 1937 Constitution was
based on the vocational principle. Furthermore,the government
established a commission in 1939 to 'examine the practicability of
developing...vocational organisation in the circumstances of
this country (and) the means best calculated to promote such a
development'(cited in White,1980;87). The recommendations of this
Commission ran into the opposition of cabinet ministers and senior civil
servants who saw them as a basic intrusion on the cabinet government
system.De Valera with customary political skill outlined his cabinet's
general response which was that they believed "that if it (vocational
organisation) is going to be of real value to the community it will have
to be a natural growth"(White,1980;109) and the report was quietly
shelved by Fianna Fail in 1946.The Vocational blueprint might not have
been destined to make a major impact on Irish social organisation but
the underlying philosophy in Quadregesimo Anno was to bring about,within
five years,the biggest Church-State clash in modern Irish history
It was inevitable,perhaps,this vocationalist movement of the 30's and
40's would touch the cooperative movement in some way. To many
vocationalist's the cooperative movement represented the very essence of
their own 'self-help through subsidiary organisation emphasising social
harmony' approach to social organisation. In fact Dr. Henry Kennedy, who
by now was the dominant figure in the cooperative movement,was appointed
by the government to the Commission on Vocational Organisation referred
to above.According to Bolger(1977;124) "the proceedings of the
Commission appear to have been conducted harmoniously,and Kennedy,
contrary to his usual procedure,did not produce a minority report".
The work of the Commission provoked a fair deal of public interest and
debate and some of this centred around how compatible the two
approaches,the vocationalist and the cooperative, were:
"Some warned against the perversion of vocational and cooperative
organisation which had taken place in countries under communist and
fascist rule. Others saw the Irish co-operative movement as a happy
example of how the different concepts were successfully blended.
Nobody within the movement saw much point in demurring publicly. Yet
there was some private disquiet on the condition of Irish
co-operation:it was socially anaemic because of its continued failure
to have its members relate to each other as people. Co-operation was
increasingly threatened by economic competition between societies,and
although the movement was seen essentially as a vocational system in
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agriculture,there was all too little vocational cohesion between the
disparate elements:farmers,farm labourers,managers,milk carters and
co-operative workers"(Bolger,1977;124).
The new community development organisation that emerged in 1931,Muintir
na Tire(People of the Country),and which spread rapidly throughout rural
Ireland,was developed along Catholic social principles and organised
along vocational lines. This new organisation emphasised cooperation at
every turn but was vague on what specific areas to concentrate
cooperative projects on. It did,however,present Kennedy with a
potentially powerful medium through which to spread the cooperative
message but because of his own priorities and his personal disposition
he failed to take full advantage of it. Kennedy was interested primarily
in the developement of the dairy sector in the context of an overall
national economic policy with full government ideological and financial
support. He would back cooperative efforts that had already emerged
and looked likely to have some national economic impact but he was not
prepared to go around the country to educated local communities in the
principles of cooperation and to exhort them into various local
initiatives.
A significant feature of the 30's and 40's was,as we saw earlier,was
the rapid extension of the state's direct involvement in industrial
development through the medium of the semi-state body. The adhoc and
empirical nature of this development is well illustrated in its
intersections with the c000perative movement during this period as
appropriate forms for specific initiatives were sought.
Bolger(1977;119)records,for example,that:
"From the nineteen forties onwards there were many frustrating meetings
between Kennedy and Michael J. Costello,the dynamic general manager of
Comhlucht Siuicre Eireann Teo(the state-sponsored Irish Sugar
Company).Costello would come in full of enthusiasm for co-operative
schemes to serve the needs of his beet growers and of Irish farmers
and workers in general.Kennedy parried all proposals on the grounds
that the time was not ripe;they must wait until genuine demands came
from the people themselves,when they could elicit the wholehearted
support of government".(see also Foy,1976;chp 17.)
A further example of this intersection comes from the Bord na Mona(the
Turf Development Board) start up in 1934. C.S.(Todd) Andrews was the
man handpicked by Lemass to develop the turf bogs of Ireland in order to
provide an indigenous,self-sufficient,source of fuel for industrial and
consumer needs. As Andrews(1982;125-30) recalled in his autobiography:
"I had the idea that the marketing of turf might best be dealt with
through the formation of co-operative societies and I approached the
Irish Agricultural Organisation Society to see how this might be
organised...
Within a couple of years it became obvious that we were engaged in a
project that was inherently defective.There was no possibility of
getting turf of the required standard in any quantities...Organised
purely on a voluntary basis the societies themselves failed to manage
and effectively control their members' operations..."
It was only after the cooperative route had been tried and found
inadequate for the scale of the operation and the timeframe required
that Andrews turned to the semi-state form of entreprise for the turf
development project.
Earlier,we reviewed how the Fianna Fail government that first took
office in 1932 was already committed to a policy of self-sufficiency
based on protectionism. Furthermore,we saw that it had come to office at
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a time when the international scene was itself turning to protectionism
and isolationism in economic affairs. The new National Government that
came to office in Britain in 1931 ended the Free Trade policy that was
the foundation of her nineteenth century prosperity and turned to
protectionism.This was the Free State's main export market. Having
dominion status however still gave the Free State favoured access but
the large P in Irish Political economy asserted itself and changed the
situation dramatically. As part of his political programme to dismantle
the 1921 Treaty,one of the first moves De Valera made was to withhold
the annuities. This brought an immediate response from Britain in the
form of a penal ad valorem duty on all Irish goods entering Britain.
This intensified the protectionist and self-sufficiency drive. Ireland
responded by imposing penal duties on a number of imports from Britain
and what came to be known as the 'Economic War' was on. It lasted until
the 1938 Anglo-Irish agreement,reviewed earlier,brought it to an end.
The return of the ports as part of the 1938 agreement allowed Ireland to
choose a policy of neutrality and the 1939-45 World War brought
self-sufficiency and isolationism to Ireland in earnest. Because Ireland
was not itself at war,although thousands of Irishmen volunteered to
fight with the allies,this 1939-45 period was known in Ireland as the
'Emergency'.
According to Meenan(1967;76) the overall blueprint for the economic
self-sufficiency had involved the following:
"Agricultural self-sufficiency was to be sought under four main
headings,one at least of which may now raise an eyebrow. There was to
be an expansion in the home production of,first,wheat and feeding
stuffs; second,of fruit such as apples and soft fruits; third,of
vegetables; fourth, of tobacco production. Thus existing imports would
be saved. Further, there was to be an energetic drive to find new
markets. Lastly, and of greatest importance, there would be a gradual
run-down of the number of cattle".
The Economic War complicated the strategy. The strategic commodities in
this 'war' were Irish cattle and British coal. The Irish cattle trade
almost collapsed between 1932 and 1934. However,with the background of
general depression and high unemployment in both countries,reflecting
the wider international economic canvas, pragmatic accomodations in the
form of the coal-cattle pacts of 1935 and onwards,were arranged long
before the issues were finally resolved in 1938. In Ireland the general
attempt,through the policy of self-sufficiency to change the basic
structure of the agricultural sector of the economy towards
substantially more tillage and less cattle was largely unsuccessful.
There was indeed a substantial increase in wheat production but was
largely due to a transfer away from other forms of tillage. During
the Emergency a policy of compulsory tillage did lead to a significant
increase in the acreage under crops for the duration of the 1939-45
War and Ireland did manage,with some degree of rationing,to feed its
population without undue hardship. It also managed to export a surplus
in live animals and meat products and built up in the process a
substantial amount in foreign reserves because the level of imports had
been drastically curtailed for the duration of the hostilities. The
underlying structure of the basic problem in the Irish economy was not,
however,changed by the application of the self-sufficiency policy up to
the outbreak of the 1939-45 War. Crotty (1966;156) has provided this
sharp and succint summary of the then situation:
"Manufacturing industry was geared to the small protected home market
and because of this its costs were too high to warrant any hope of a
substantial export trade. Agricultural exports depended to a greater
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extent than ever on cattle,and against an expansion of cattle
production there were formidable and well-nigh impenetrable barriers.
An increase in non-cattle exports implied an increase in subsidies,
which in turn implied a further reduction in living standard."
National Despondency and Self-Doubt 1948-58
Fianna Fail left office in 1948 after 16 years in government. That it
remained so long in government in such trying circumstances is a tribute
to De Valera's leadership and to his capacity,in tough times,to mobilise
the 'national will'. Ireland's ability to maintain her neutrality
throughout the War was confirmation of her status as a politically
independent entity,both to her own people and to the outside world. Her
lack of success with the self-sufficiency policy ,however, was a painful
reminder of how dependent she still was economically on forces outside
of her control.
We saw earlier that the basic division in Irish politics was on the
political question of being for or against the acceptance of the 1921
Treaty. The low level of industrialisation meant that the labour
movement in Ireland remained small and unable to effect a basic cleavage
in national politics along right-left ideological grounds.This fact when
combined with a proportional representation system based on the single
transfereable vote has meant that shifting sectional interests or the
emergence from time to time of single large issues have both had major
effects on the outcome of general elections. The pattern established
after the first Fianna Fail administration has been that office has
alternated between single party Fianna Fail administrations and some
form of coalition government,usually involving an uneasy marriage of
convenience between right wing and left wing parties. Fianna Fail's
power base itself is not monolithic but is rather more of a quasi-stable
mixture of small farming and commercial interests. The large P in Irish
Political economy is,it seems, endemic to the political system that
Ireland has chosen for itself. The period 1948 to 1957 saw four changes
of government, two coalition governments led by John A. Costello from
1948-51 and 1954-57 interspersed with a De Valera led Fianna Fail
administration 1951-54. The 1957 change brought Fianna Fail back to
power once again and this time it was to be for another 16 year
uninterrupted period in office.
When the first 'interparty' coalition government came to power in 1948
one of the questions that had moved to center stage in the immediate
post-War period concerned the provision of social services by the State. In
Britain the welfare state was being constructed at this time and it was
casting a long shadow into the Irish scene. The Catholic social
movement continued to gather momentum in this period and the forces of
vocationalism increasingly came to identify the extension of government
bureaucracy as the enemy. Health legislation,inherited and modified
by the coalition government was to provide the 'casus belli' for the
biggest Church-State clash in modern Irish History. The specific
legislation that caused the furore was the Mother and Child Scheme that
the young and dynamic Minister for Health,Dr. Noel Browne, tried to have
enacted in 1951.Basically the scheme involved certain provisions
relating to maternity and to child welfare,including the education of
women 'in respect of motherhood'.This was to be available to all mothers
and to children up to the age of sixteen without any means test. The
medical profession were opposed to it because they saw the thin edge of
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a more extensive socialised medicine wedge in the scheme. While this
opposition was formidable,it was the added opposition of the Church that
proved decisive. The Church opposed the scheme on various grounds but
most significantly on the grounds that it was 'entirely and directly
contrary to Catholic teaching on the rights of the family,the rights of
the Church in education,the rights of the medical profession and of
voluntary institutions'(Cited in Lyons,1973;576). The coalition partners
did not stand firm against this opposition and Dr.Browne resigned.
Dr. Browne's swansong to the affair was his release to the press,in
1951,of all the major correspondence between the government and the
hierarchy relating to the issue(fully reproduced in White,1980;419-48).
The affair reflected badly on both the Government and the Church and
"demonstrated the extreme difficulty in a Catholic country of...
reconcilicing parliamentary democracy with ecclesiastical authority.
Such a collision was too dangerous to be repeated-and has not been
repeated"(Lyons,1973;578).
The effect on the government was almost immediate.The fissures caused by
this issue were very soon widened by others and the Costello interparty
government lost office later in the year. The effect on the Church was
to take longer to manifest itself and today the political ghost of
Dr.Browne continues to haunt any overt attempts by the Church to
influence social legislation. In the meantime the Mother and Child
Scheme was dramatic evidence of the influence of Catholic social
thinking and the vocationalist position in restraining any extension of
the State's direct involvement into socio-econmic affairs in the 50's.
This influence was to be a major element in the formation of one the
organisations in this study,An Foras Taluntais. In 1955 the Minister for
Agriculture in the second interparty government,Mr.James Dillon,
announced his plan for the reorganisation of higher agricultural
education in Ireland. Essentially what he wanted to do was to centralise
the third level teaching and research in Agriculture into a single
institution modelled on the Dutch agricultural university at Wageningen,
which had done much to make Dutch agriculture among the most efficient
in the world. Three university colleges already had faculties of
agriculture of varying size and importance and a fourth was agitating
for one. Dillon's proposal was to allow third level agricultural
students to go to the university of their choice for two years of
fundamental scientific education but that for the final two years of
their degree they should all attend the new Agricultural Institute.
His argued,in an interview given to the Irish Independent 20/7/55,that:
"It was manifest that we had not available the trained personnel to man
four faculties of agricultural science adequately,and that the only
consequence of attempting to do this would be to leave us with four
inadequate faculties of agricultural science instead of one good
centre for agricultural education and research"
In the event the Universities and the National Farmers Association
opposed it for a variety of reasons but the opponents of the scheme
mobilised the support of some influential members of the hierarchy on
the grounds that the proposed institution would extend the State's
involvement and was contrary to the principles of Catholic social
thinking as reflected in Quadregesimo Anno. Bishop Lucy's comments at a
meeting in Cork illustrate how these principles were being invoked by
the opponents to the Minister's proposal:
"The accepted principle is that in agriculture as in industry,commerce
and professions,etc.,the proper function of the State is to help the
private citizen and his organisations rather than to edge them out
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with its own agencies....
The people of this country would vote down a government that openly
committed itself to a policy of Socialisation. But Socialisation can
be a gradual, hidden and undeclared process. One department after
another can nibble more and more from the field of private entreprise
until finally little worthwhile remains outside civil service control.
That is why it is so necessary to examine the proposed Institute and
see if it be part of the larger trend or movement towards out-and-out
Statism. ."(cited in Whyte,1980;310).
As a result of all this opposition the Minister had to revise his
proposal for the new Institute. The teaching function was dropped and
left with the Universities. Supporters of the new institute had to fight
to retain its active research role in the legislation so that it wasn't
reduced solely to a coordinating function.
One noteworthy political milestone reached during the 1949-58 period
was the formal change in the status of the 26 counties of the Irish Free
State to a Republic.DeValera,as we had seen previously,had
dismantled the Treaty so completely that the Free State was,by 1939,a
republic in all but name. It was DeValera's party and not the successors
of Collins that realised Collins conviction that the Treaty was not an
end but a means within which to secure further independence and
autonomy. To add to the irony,it was the Costello interparty
government,led by the offspring of the pro-Treaty party, that took the
final formal step and declared the 26 counties of the Irish Free State a
republic. DeValera had avoided taking this last step because the felt
that the formal External Relationship that the Free State maintained
with the British Empire might be a useful framework within which to seek
a solution to the question of partition. When one of the large minority
parties to Costello's interparty government forced Costello to declare
a Republic,as a major condition of their support,DeValera's party as the
historic constitutional custodians of the 'Republic' could hardly oppose
the move. The event is not celebrated by constitutional nationalists
because a 26 county republic is still viewed by most as a transitionary
state. To celebrate it would be to deny the 'essential unity of
Ireland' which was the major principle that the plenipotentiaries had
brought with them to the 1921 Treaty negotiations.
The 1949-58 period,then,was one marked by a political milestone, by
frequent changes of government and it featured the biggest Church-State
clash in the recent history of the country. The most important
development in the period,was however,in the socio-economic sphere.
Up to the early to mid 1950's the new state could not be said to have
ever experienced 'normal' socio-economic conditions. The political
turmoil of the 1921-31 period,the Economic War and the Emergency of the
1932-48 period meant that there were always extraneous factors to point
to when any critical assessment of prosperity or economic performance
since self-government arose. In the more 'normal' socio-economic
conditions of the 1950's,however, glaring structural problems with the
Irish economy began to be exposed in sharp relief. The 26 counties may
have achieved its full measure of political independence by the time of
the 1949 declaration of a republic but the extent to which she was
economically dependent on external forces and especially on the UK
economy started to become painfully obvious in the 1950's.
Ireland experienced an economic boom in the immediate post war years.
The volume of personal spending rose by nearly 25% between 1946 and
1950 (Walsh;1979;27) and growth also occurred in the level of exports as
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the economies of Ireland's trading partners expanded and the pent-up
demand in the UK for food imports was suddenly released. This expansion
was short-lived and revealed the difficulties inherent in any expansion
of the Irish economy.The lack of natural resources other than
"an equable climate and fairly fertile grasslands"(Geary,1951;399) meant
that Ireland imported much of its raw materials for industry. She was
spending 35% of her gross domestic expenditure on imports,twice the UK
proportion(FitzGerald,1957;275),only 23% of which was accounted for by
the import of consumer goods(0'Mahony,1959;129).The remaining 77% was
for raw materials to be further processed by indigenous production. The
effect of any domestic spending boom was,not only to increase the demand
for imported consumer goods,but also and more significantly perhaps to
increase the demand for imported raw materials where the consumer showed
a preference for the home produced consumer product. Both effects tended
to put significant pressure on the balance of payments. Irish exports,on
the other hand,only accounted for 20% of GNP as compared with nearly 24%
for the UK(FitzGerald,1957;275),so that a comparatively small area of
economic activity had to provide the foreign earnings to balance the
increase in imports brought about by any spending boom. The 'orthodox'
policy response to an unfavourable tendency in the balance of payments
in the 1950's was to deflate the domestic economy or raise the levies on
imports. "The possibility that the payments deficit would set in train
deflationary forces,and thus prove largely self-correcting,was not
seriously entertained by orthodox economic opinion in Europe or America
at this time" according to Walsh(1979;28). The Irish authorities in 1952
and again in 1956 implemented stringent deflationary measures in
response to what was perceived as balance of payments crises. The effect
of these was to restore balance at a lower level of domestic economic
activity.
The relatively slow progress made in the development of agriculture
since the state was founded was the most disappointing feature of the
national economy(Geary,1951;410).Between 1929 and 1960 output increased
by just 14% and while there was a significant increase in productivity,
this was mainly accounted for in the mass exodus of labour from farming
rather than through any intensification of production(O'Brien,1962;19).
Between 1926 and 1958,employment in agriculture declined by almost a
quarter of a million.Up to 1951 the fall in agricultural employment had
been just about balanced by the rise in employment in the other sectors
of economic activity,i.e.manufacturing,construction,services etc.
Between 1950 and 1958,however,there was a fall of 108000 in the total
at work in the Republic. This reflected the continued drift from the
land and a less than full compensatory uptake in other sectors due to
the deflationary responses to the balance of payments crises (see
O'Mahony,1962;20 for these figures). The population of the 26 Counties
fell by 163000 between 1921 and 1931 and increased slightly by 28000
between 1931 and 1951. Between 1951 and 1961 the population fell by
146000 as the rate of emigration,always a significant feature of Irish
economic life,took a sudden and dramatic upward surge(see O'Brien,1962;
17 for these figures). Net emigration,which had run at an annualised
rate of 17 to 24 thousand between 1926 and 1951, rose quickly to a rate
of 40 thousand per year during the period 1951-61. In addition,the
character of this emigration had changed significantly since the 1930's.
Before the Great Depression over 50% of the net emigration from Ireland
was to the United States. By the 1950's over 90% of the net emigration
was to the United Kingdom(see Meenan,1970;209 for these figures). This
was facilitated by the terms of the 1921 Treaty which had allowed for
free mobility of labour between the UK and the Free State.This position
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remained after the 26 Counties became a Republic. While mass movement
from the land to the industrial heartlands was a common pattern in
developing economies and one that was actively encouraged in other
nations,it became a major cause for concern in the Irish situation.
This migration,which was normal where single labour markets coincided
with national boundaries,became emigration to the industrial heartlands
of Britain in the Irish case with all the deep affective connotations
that emigration traditionally had on the national psyche. According to
Geary(1951,400):
"The mass exodus following the Famine has implanted in the minds of the
Irish people the conviction that emigration is an unqualified evil,and
almost every nationalist in the hundred years before 1921 believed
that the main object of self-government was the development of native
industry and the intensification of agriculture,both of which would
increase the national wealth. .and diminish,if not stop,emigration".
What was particularly damaging to the national psyche about the upward
surge in emigration of the 1950's was that much of it was accounted for
by people who leaving because they wanted to,not because they had to.
Much of the earlier emigration had been of young single people,mainly
women,that found themselves surplus to requirements when they tried to
enter the job market at home. In the 1950's many of those who left had
actually left positions of employment in Ireland in search of a higher
standard of living elsewhere.These were often married men and frequently
they took their dependents with them which amplifed the decline in the
population. Some migration of skills and labour between nations is
considered a normal and healthy phenomenon in countries where the
political system is based broadly on liberal democratic principles.
However,the scale on which 'voluntary' emigration was happening in the
Ireland of the 1950's was,in the aggregate,a massive vote of no
confidence by her own people in their country's capacity to prosper
under independent self-government.
The people were rejecting,in the most tangible way possible,DeValera's
dream of a self-sufficient Ireland that "would be the home of a people
who valued material wealth only as the basis of right living,of a people
who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to the
things of the spirit. ."(Irish Press,18/Mar/43;p1). The flight from the
land was "inexorably altering the balance of Irish society (and) posed a
challenge of a fundamental kind.Would an increasingly urban society be
able to sustain itself as an economic unit in the modern world and could
any new policy check the flow of emigration from the countryside"(Brown,
1985;212).Healy(1968) in his book 'The Death of an Irish Town' has left
a graphical record of the social conditions created by the emigration of
the 1950's. It left imbalanced communities of the very old and the
very young in towns and villages all over Ireland that were bereft of
their share of energetic people of the middle years,those who are
normally the most productive economically,socially and culturally in any
community. Men of letters,like Patrick Kavanagh,were decrying the
cultural stagnation brought about by years of isolationism. He wrote in
his periodical 'Kavanagh's Weekly' that "from.. .Independence Day there
has been a decline j.n vitality..There is no central passion..all this is
horrid when you believe in people as distinct from the Nation,when you
believe that Pat and Micky and Tom on the edge of the bog have potential
as great or as little as a group of people anywhere"(quoted in
Brown,1985;212).The feeling of economic,social and cultural stagnation
was prevalent and national doubt and despondency were the order of the
day.
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The 1950's was a period of self-questioning for other nations as well.
John F. Kennedy made the 'new frontier' an election issue in the 1960 US
presidential election offering the American people a choice "not merely
between two men or two parties ,but between the public interest and
private comfort,between national greatness and national decline, between
the fresh air of progress and the stale,dank atmosphere of
i normalcy"(cited in Sorensen,1965;190). Michael Shanks(1961;232),in his
book 'The Stagnant Society' was asking the question of Britain:"What
sort of society do we want to be?. .A lotus island of easy,tolerant
ways. .shielded from discontent by a threadbare welfare state and an
acceptance of genteel poverty?Or the tough dynamic race we have been in
the past..ready to accept growing pains as the price of growth?"
The question for Ireland was even more fundamental,however.It was a
question of whether or not she had an economic future as an independent
entity.The gifted Secretary of the Department of Finance,T.K.Whitaker,
posed the question that he,himself,was to play a key role in addressing:
"(There is) an all-to-prevalent mood of despondency about the
country's future. .After 35 years of native government people are
asking whether we can achieve an acceptable degree of economic
progress.The common talk amongst parents in the towns,as in rural
Ireland,is of their children having to emigrate as soon as their
education is completed in order to be sure of a reasonable
livlihood"(1958,par12).
ECONOMIC REVIVAL AND NEW DIRECTIONS 1958-1979 
Though the latter half of the 1950's was characterised by feelings of
national self-doubt and despondency this was to change dramatically in a
relatively short space of time. Lee(1979;166),in his editorial summary
to a collection of essays on 'Ireland 1945-70' reflected on this change:
"There seems to be general agreement among the contributors to this
volume that the 1960's marked some sort of watershed in Irish history.
This appears to be one of those pivotal periods when a society swings
on its axis to face in a new direction..a seminal decade across a
whole range of Irish experience,political,economic,educational,legal,
religious and though perhaps more ambiguously,cultural. The years from
1945 to about 1960 appear,from this perspective as an epilogue to a
traditional Ireland..."
The momentum generated during this axial swing was to bring Ireland
into the EEC and to carry it through the early years of its
'europeanisation' on until the second oil crisis in 1979, when a new
period of national retrenchment and reassessment could be said to have
started.
Economic Expansion 1958-1972
Fianna Fail returned to power once more in 1957 under De Valera's
leadership and,after a decade of frequent changes of government,was to
settle in for another 16 year uninterrupted period in office. In
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mid-term,in 1959,De Valera retired from his position as Taoiseach and
Leader of Fianna Fail and passed the mantle of leadership onto Sean
Lemass. It was to be Lemass who came to be credited with leading
Ireland through the important 'front end' of its axial shift,its
economic revival and expansion in the early 1960's.
In 1956 T.K.Whitaker,just turned 40,had been appointed to the key post
of Secretary of the Department of Finance by the second interparty
government. Whitaker had already begun to look at the options available
for public policy to tackle the difficult prevaling economic conditions
when the government that had appointed him lost office in 1957. He
was then directed by the incoming Fianna Fail administration to
accelerate his work and encouraged to submit his analysis and
recommendations with all due urgency. Whitaker's(1958;par12) own
assessment of the situation highlighted the deleterious effects of
rising emigration on the country's prospects for economic development:
"To the children themselves and to many already in in employment the
jobs available at home look unattractive by comparison with those
obtainable in such variety and so readily elsewhere. All this seems to
be setting up a vicious circle-of increasing emigration,resulting in a
smaller domestic market depleted of initiative and skill,and a reduced
incentive ,whether for Irishmen or foreigners,to undertake and
organise the productive entreprises which alone can provide increased
employment oportunities and higher living standards".
There were inherent difficulties in the way of economic development for
a country where the population was small and had been declining for
over a century;where the population density was low and where,due to
prolonged emigration,facilitated by the common labour market with the
UK,a relatively high proportion of the population were in the dependent
age groups.The implications of these features were (i)a small home
market, where many industries could not attain the economies of scale
that permits costs to be minimised,where little diversity in product
range was economically feasible and where there was room for only a few
and often only one firm so that,in a protectionist environment, the
cushion of monopoly profits did not encourage efficiency; (ii) a
falling population,with the vicious circle effects highlighted by
Whitaker; (iii)low density, which meant that the cost of infrastructural
development per capita tended to be high; (iv) the high dependency,which
meant a relative high need for social services coupled with a relatively
low base to bear the burden of paying for them;and (v) the common
Anglo-Irish labour market,which tended to raise the reward expectations
of both labour and capital above those that would pertain were Ireland a
self-contained labour market(see O'Mahony,1962;11-16).
In 1958, Whitaker presented to the Government his analysis of the
situation facing the country together with his recommendations for
dealing with it in a document entitled 'Economic Development'.
In it he recommended that a programme of productive investment be
embarked on by the State in order to expand the economy. Lee(1979,170-1)
has drawn our attention to two interesting background features relating
to the Whitaker recommendations:
"Firstly, Whitaker may not have been originally appointed to plan for
expansion,but rather to pursue a rigorous policy of retrenchment. But
he had the calibre of mind to re-examine his assumptions in the light
of changing circumstances.Whitaker shared with Lemass a willingness to
revise his attitude in the face of fresh evidence.It was this capacity
to think through first principles which,allied with their energy,
79
ability and patriotism,made the partnership of Lemass and Whitaker so
fruitful.Secondly,at the institutional level,the commitment of the
Department of Finance to expansionist economic policies was itself
revolutionary in the context of Irish governance.Expansionist ideals,
insofar as they had existed at all,had hitherto been associated mainly
with the Department of Industry and Commerce,which had to fight a
regular war of attrition against the Department of Finance. That the
premier department should now commit itself to expansion,and expansion
through planning at that,marked a historic change in the history of
the state".
Whitaker recognised that his analysis and recommendations meant a break
with the past and an abandonment of the self-sufficiency policy,a
major mind-set change in national outlook. Self-sufficiency had,it might
be argued,helped Ireland weather the worst effects of the Great
Depression of the 30's and of the 'Emergency' in the early 40's. The
stagnation of the 1950's,however,revealed its glaring inadequacies as an
economic doctrine on which to base the economic development of Ireland
in a context of post-war European reconstruction:
"It is apparent that we have come to a critical and decisive point in
our economic affairs.The policies hitherto followed,though given a
fair trial,have not resulted in a viable economy. .(par 4).
It seems clear that,sooner or later,protection will have to go and the
challenge of free trade be accepted..It would be a policy of despair
to accept that our costs of production must permanently be higher than
those of other European countries,either in industry or in
agriculture. .If we do not expand production on a competitive basis,we
shall fail to provide the basis necessary for the economic
independence and material progress of the community. .(par 5)."
What was needed,according to Whitaker's analysis,was that:
"Our economic progress requires that more resources be devoted to
productive purposes.. 'productive investment' (meaning) investment
yielding an adequate return to the national economy as a whole..
Progress in the building up of real national income depends on capital
and labour being devoted to industrial and agricultural development,
particularly for export,rather than for the provision of welfare
services for home consumption. .(pars 6&7).
A 'dynamic' has to be found and released and it is not necessarily
increased capital investment...there are other conditions of economic
progress no less important than increased capitalisation.The first of
these is the development of a better appreciation of the dependence of
material progress on individual output.Others are a raising of the
general level of education,health and skill,the loosening of
restrictive practices,whether of employers or employees,the practical
encouragement of initiative and entreprise,the adoption of improved
methods,techniques and principles of organisation and management both
in agriculture and industry,and a greater readiness to apply
scientific advances..(par 18)
(Extracts from 'Economic Development' ,1958)
To release this 'dynamic' Whitaker(1958,par 12) proposed the setting up
of 'targets of national endeavour which appear to be reasonably
attainable and mutually consistent' and this is precisely what the
Lemass administration did when they produced their First Programme
for Economic Expansion 1958-63. The Programme was based extensively on
the Whitaker analysis and provided broad policy guidelines and
approaches towards expansion in agriculture,industry,fisheries and
tourism.This First Programme did not include specific sectoral targets;
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subsequent programmes were to be more ambitious in that regard.Expansion
in agriculture was a cornerstone of the strategy. The hope was that
increased agricultural productivity would lead to greater savings by
farmers. This would lead in turn,not only to direct investment in
livestock,farm buildings and equipment,but also to increased monetary
savings which could be used for capital formation by other sectors of
the economy. It was further hoped that expansion in agriculture would
lead to an increase the demand for goods and services that would raise
incomes all round (0'Mahony,1959;134). While the overall expansion
in economic activity was expected to have the effect of increasing
imports of both consumer goods and industrial raw materials, any
adverse pressure on the balance of payments would be offset by the
fact that the expansion was being largely funded by the foreign earnings
from agricultural exports to begin with. The main source of funds for
the initial investment in 'productive' projects that was to set the
dynamic in motion and give it momentum was the deferral of any further
state investment in the public housing programme,in the capital
development of the health services and in social welfare generally until
economic recovery was well underway(Walsh,1979;31).
'Economic Development' does not derive its pivotal place in modern
Irish history from any novel economic insight because it contained none.
In fact,while contemporary economists generally concurred with the
overall analysis of Ireland's economic difficulties contained in the
Whitaker document,some found it wanting in its approach to dealing with
these difficulties. FitzGerald(1959) found it too vague and general in
the area of industrial policy and O'Mahony(1959;133-4)saw it as largely
seeking to apply a 'Keynesian' approach to an economy where "the level
of activity...as a whole is determined by the relationship between costs
and prices rather than by the aggregates such as domestic consumption
and investment" rendering such an approach "irrelevant". The historical
significance of 'Economic development' was threefold.Firstly,it
signalled the beginning of an programming approach to the management
of the economy that was to last up to 1972.Secondly,its structural
analysis of the nature of the Irish economy continued to inform the
deliberations of policy makers,way beyond 1972,on the basic issues that
would have to be addressed in any approach to further economic
development. It was however the third contribution that was the most
important.Whitaker(1958,par 12) recognised that there was:
"a sound 'psychological' reason for having an integrated development
programme. .a real need to buttress confidence in the country's future
and to stimulate the interest and enthusiasm of the young in
particular. A general resurgence of will may be helped by setting up
targets of national endeavour which appear to be reasonably attainable
and mutually consistent. This is an aspect of good leadership.."
Just to have a programme and show measureable progress towards its
achievement was a major step in restoring the confidence of the
Irish people in their capacity to solve their own economic problems and
to produce,from within,leaders capable of guiding them through this
endeavour.
If the insight into what was needed was Whitaker's contribution,the
strong leadership to make it happen was provided by Lemass. To attempt
such a programme was politically very risky for any leader and for his
party.The contequences of a failure to realise the expectations set up
by this exercise would be to deepen the despair and despondency and to
seriously impair the electoral chances of those responsible for a long
time to come. The economic logic was,as we have seen,not accepted as
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self-evident and there were many who were unconvinced.It was a gamble.
Lemass fought his first general election as Taoiseach in 1961. He did
not have De Valera's charisma with the electorate and many of his own
party believed that they couldn't win a general election in the absence
of 'Dev'.In the event Lemass's Fianna Fail party were returned to the
Dail as the largest party but without an overall majority. Lemass had
to govern from 1961 to 1965 with the support of independents. To
implement this programme for economic expansion with even a strong
overall majority would have taken courage and skill.To do it with what
Lemass himself laconically came to refer to as his 'overall minority'
was testamony to his unique qualities of leadership and political nerve:
"Intelligent,pragmatic,with an almost instinctive understanding of
economic problems. .the new Taoiseach was admirably equipped to preside
over a period of rapid expansion"(Lyons,1973;584).
Lemass himself proclaimed that "the historic task of this generation
(was) to secure the economic foundation of independence"(Dail
Debates,3/6/59) and according to Lee(1979;22) he set about:
"..launch(ing) the rising generation on a momentous mission. .to create
a viable Irish society,self-confident without being unduly
self-righteous. .amounting to nothing less than an attempt to transform
a people's self-image and even their very character. .There were few
societies in Europe which appeared to offer less scope to a merchant
adventurer(one public figure's description of the Lemass temperament
and predilection)than the stagnant Ireland of the mid-twentieth
century.Only a conquistador of the spirit,however pragmatic his
short-term tactics,could have embarked on such a venture".
It was this momentum for change that he developed during his short time
as Taoiseach,more than any concrete result achieved during that
time,that was to be his major contribution.
The investment in the First Programme for Economic Expansion involved
about £54m in new government expenditure over the 1958-63 period which
was roughly 9% of the 1958 level of GNP.So,as Lyons(1973;629) remarked,
"the cost of this 'leap forward' was substantial,but,as the Programme
insisted,it was a time when risks had to be taken". Over the period of
the First Programme,1958-63,the volume of GNP expanded by over 4% per
annum; the Programme had tentatively projected 2%. Encouraged by this
expansion the government launched a Second Programme in 1963 to cover
the period from 1963-70. The Second Programme was more ambitious than
the First. It took the figure of 4% per annum as a minimum goal for the
rate of expansion through to the end of the 60's. It also gave the State
a stronger managerial role with all the attendant risks. The National
Industrial Economic Council,set up by Lemass in 1963 and composed of
nominees of government,the unions and employers,reported on the scope of
economic planning in the Irish economy:
"..economic planning must be active as well as being indicative.If the
targets are to be meaningful to managements and workers,they must be
broken down to the individual industry or product level.If the targets
are to be accepted as a guide to action,those who make the attempts to
achieve them must be involved in the fixing the targets. .If the plan
is to maintain a continuing influence on action,managements and
workers must be involved in the periodic reviews of performance.."
(NIEC,Report on Economic Planning,1963;par8)
Meenan(1970;375-87),writing while the Second Programme was still in
progress ,had some concerns about this new direction that the economic
planning was taking and felt that the risks were not fully appreciated:
"...It not only sets out targets (for increases in production in the
private sector):it also associates both management and labour in their
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selection.In this association,it would seem probable that the
initiative will usually rest with the central authority,the State.This
may well lead both management and labour very far from their present
positions...
It may be mistaken to fear that a succession of Programmes may inflict
grave damage on the paramount liberties and interests of the
individual,be he manager or wage-earner. Many will willingly accept a
considerable degree of etatisme in order to achieve development. It
may be that in Ireland,as has happened in other countries at different
times,the subordination of private interests to a central authority
may be a necessity..But there should be no ignoring the possibility
that the political implications may be far-reaching".
Lemass was presiding over the establishment of new procedures for
economic and social decision-making."Under his aegis,Ireland began to
shuffle towards a version of the corporate state"(Lee,1979;20-1).
However,Lemass's corporatism was different from that of the Catholic
Social movement of the 30's and 40's.He encouraged vocational
organisation but did not see it as an alternative to state bureaucracy.
Representative organisations provided an efficient means by which the
key economic units farmers,industrialists,and wage-earners could be
involved as 'social partners' in the process of planning the development
of the economy. He was not concerned that the state apparatus was doing
too much in the economic sphere,he was concerned that both the public
and the private sectors were doing too little.He tried to foster a
'development' mentality across the board taking his inspiration
mainly from the French experience and from Jean Monnet's concept of a
'pre-concerted economy' and not from anything in Quadrigessimo Anno.
The era of Lemass heralded in a new national hero to replace the
revolutionary patriot.This new hero was the professional manager,
committed to economic development and efficiency,willing to be
judged on the merit of his performance,and modern in his attitude to
management ideas and the use of empirical data in decision-making.
Lemass,himself,personified these values and his behaviour and
approach to economic development in his period of office conforms very
closely with a metaphor of 'Ireland Inc.' with himself as General
Manager and the past,present and future generations of Irishmen as the
stockholders.
The Second Programme was abandoned in 1967 because it became clear that
the sectoral targets were not going to be met. It was replaced by a
Third Programme,to cover the period 1969-72. Ireland's entry into the
EEC in 1972 marked the beginning of a new phase in the management of the
economy.Programmes of the type used in the 1958-72 period were no. longer
drawn up but the central role for the State,with the 'social partners',
in the planning and development of the Irish economy has endured.
Furthermore,much of the subsequent debate on economic policy has been
informed by the experiences of this period of economic experiment. The
Second Programme was over ambitious,given the open nature of the Irish
economy.Reflected in the setting of specific sectoral targets,and in the
advanced commitment of State funding to support them,was an unwarranted
over-confidence in the country's ability to control its own economic
fortunes,a confidence born from the success of the First Programme. The
unanticipated economic difficulties of Ireland's major trading partner,
the UK,led to a fall off in exports that resulted in a balance of
payments crisis at home. The corrective measures that had to be taken
meant that the Second Programme was thrown significantly off course.
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One noteworthy innovation in industrial policy during this expansionary
period was the attraction of foreign capital into Ireland through
various government incentives,mainly in the form of favourable
corporation tax terms and grants support for capital and training
investments. During the 1960-69 period more than 350 new foreign-owned
companies were established in Ireland,many of these in towns that never
had factories previously. The firms that were grant-aided under this
development had to be primarily export oriented so that they did not
compete with Irish manufacturers in the home market. Consequently these
firms were net earners of foreign exchange and their wages and services
expenditures were important pump primers for the local economies in
which they operated.Furthermore,they were providers of new skills and
experiences that helped to accelerate the industrialisation process in
the Ireland of the time. Perhaps the major disappointment of the
economic expansion drive was in agriculture,which as we saw earlier was
a cornerstone of the development strategy.Agriculture expanded at a rate
of less than 1% per annum,far short of the hoped for 4%. Furthermore,
the hoped for transformation of traditional home-market-oriented
indigenous industries into dynamic export-oriented companies was far
from successful.
What ever about the specific dissappointments in the later Programmes,
there was no mistaking the momentum that had been released by the whole
process that began with the publication of 'Economic Development':
"..economic growth during the 1960s was faster and more sustained than
in any previous period in Irish history.Not only did living standards
rise by 50% over the decade but by 1971 the population had grown by
over 100000 from the low point of 1961 to the highest level recorded
since the foundation of the state...growth spread out to more and more
regions of the eastern and southern half of the country.Only in the
west and north-west did the age-old pattern of population decline
persist..In fact,by 1970..Ireland became a net gainer from migration
for the first time in recorded history.."(Walsh,1979;33-5).
or the change:
"In part the change is visible and material-more factories, more
office-blocks, new housing estates..supermarkets,television sets and
family cars.But the change is more than just the emergence of the
consumer society..It is something impalpable and impossible to
measure-a change of attitude,perhaps a change of heart.One can best
describe it as a sense of new life and vigour,a stirring of hope, even
a belief that the future will be better than the past has even been".
(Lyons,1973;633).
Change and Modernity - Ireland in the 60's
The decade of the 60's was a decade of change and transition in many
facets of Irish life.It brought a new post-revolutionary generation into
the centre of the political stage,a new approach and attitude in the
civil service, a new interest in research and a new direction in
education, basic demographic changes and concommitent changes in basic
values and an outward orientation towards Europe in particular,and
towards the world in general.The transition was not painless and the
forces for continuity fought a determined rearguard action in some
areas but the change was pervasive and happened remarkably quickly.
David Thornley(1965;12)was conscious of a new era dawning:
"..we are for the first time at the threshold of a delayed peaceful
social revolution.It would be foolhardy to go on to predict its
84
course.It seems certain that our island will become affected
increasingly by the spread of European social and philosophical ideas,
strongly tinged with Catholicism.It is reasonably certain that many
issues of education and social welfare will slowly be transplanted
from the field of emotional controversy to that of economic
efficiency,and that a great deal more money will be spent on both. It
does seem certain that depopulation of the countryside will continue
and perhaps accelerate,and that our social habits and our politics
will take on a flavour that is ever more urban,and,as a consequence,
ever more cosmopolitan.."
DeValera had already begun to introduce some new blood into his
government in 1957.It was long overdue.The average age in Cosgrave's
first administration was 33,in DeValera's 41.In DeValera's 1951 cabinet
the average age was 57.The young revolutionary generation(Cohen,1972;5)
of 1921 grew old in power without any significant renewal until the late
fifties.When Lemass became Taoiseach in 1959 he accelerated the renewal
process. Consistent with his managerial outlook,Lemass put a
premium on demonstrated talent and he used the junior ministeries to
grow and prune that talent.The revolutionary generation had been
obsessed with national issues and constitutional problems which had
tended to divert their attention away from pressing social and economic
issues(Chubb,1974;87).The post-revolutionary group were more pragmatic
and economics-oriented,and were career-oriented politicians interested
largely in their own professional development. Loyalty to old
comrades-in-arms was replaced by consideration of the skills of the
incumbent and the demands of the job when awarding cabinet posts.
These new men came to power,not because they were men of destiny, but
because they chose politics as their preferred career and they were men
of ambition(Tobin,1984;132).
The pragmatic Lemass broke new ground with regard to relations with
Northern Ireland. Since 1921 the two parts of Ireland effectively looked
inwards and withdrew from each other. In an island as small as Ireland
where two political entities share a land frontier there was bound to be
a lot of scope for economic cooperation to the benefit of both.The major
political cleavage on the 'national question' ,the partition of the
country, was a road block to such cooperation. Lemass had,since his
succession,played down the 'green card' in his rhetoric and was clearly
signalling a willingness explore oportunities for economic cooperation.
A new generation of Unionist leadership in the person of Capt.Terence
O'Neill,who succeeded the aging Lord Brookeborough in 1963,was ready to
respond. In 1965,Sean Lemass went north for an historic meeting with
O'Neill at Stormont Castle,the bastion of Ulster Unionism and a new era
of cross-border cooperation appeared to have dawned. Lemass retired
shortly after this 'hands across the Border'initiative took place but it
was continued for some time by his successor Jack Lynch. Unfortunately
O'Neill had moved too fast for hard line Unionism who saw this process
as the 'thin edge of the wedge' of creeping Irish unity and O'Neill was
eventually forced to resign. There were political risks in the move for
both men.Indeed they are believed to have speculated in an informal
conversation during a break at the first meeting about who had taken the
biggest risk. It was a sign of the new confidence that had developed in
the South,and the new outwardness in outlook,that the move was generally
welcomed there.In the event,the fresh outbreak of internal troubles in
the North in 1968 brought the process to a premature end. In 1965 Lemass
also concluded the Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement with the British
Government. Though its first application to join the EEC had been turned
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down along with that of Britain,it was expected in the economic
expansion strategy that Ireland would be in the EEC by 1970. In the
meantime,unhindered access to a large market was needed if the
'export-led' growth strategy of the Programmes was to materialise. The
Free Trade agreement of 1965 manifestly brought down the final curtain
on the Self-Sufficiency era.
The major political parties underwent a metamorphisis during this period
of change.Lemass resigned from his position as Taoiseach and leader of
Fianna Fail in November 1966.He had secured for his party a further
period in office in a general election in 1965. He had,as noted earlier,
deliberately promoted a number of young,able and ambitious men of the
post-revolutionary generation and he kept them keen by studiously
avoiding any premature indication of a preferred heir."A mould breaker
and a mould maker..(Lemass) came to power too late-he left power too
early" according to the Irish Times 12/5/71 in its obituary appraisal.
He was probably influenced,in his decision to resign in 1966,by his own
excessively long wait for the reins of power when DeValera was leader of
the party. Fianna Fail had,in consequence of Lemass's refusal to
indicate a preference,its first succession race. Unfortunately it was to
be bitterly contested and led to a rivalry of personalities within the
party that was to have ramifications right on into the 1980's.Two main
camps emerged around the personalities of Charles Haughey and George
Colley,both in their early 40's.When it became clear that a direct
contest was going to split the party right down the middle a compromise
candidate was proposed,Jack Lynch.Haughey was persuaded to withdraw in
favour of the compromise but Colley insisted on a contest and lost.
Lynch was not expected to be leader for long and Haughey had banked on
this in his agreement to stand aside.Lynch,Colley and Haughey were to
remain the major figures in the party right up to the present.
Fianna Fail had always been a party of pragmatism but nested within two
ideals which gave the party its overriding sense of purpose.These were
the reunification of Ireland and the restoration of the Irish language
as the key to preserving a separate cultural identity.In the 60's this
changed and gave rise to tensions within the party and disquiet within
the public at large:
"..by the end of Lemass's career the twin national aims were being
quietly ignored,and there was nothing with which to replace them.
Fianna Fail was now merely 'the party of reality', and prey to those
cynical,realistic men who knew how the world worked,and that you could
put a price on everything...Fianna Fail had traditionally represented
itself as the party of the small man,but had now within the space of a
few years,become identified with men of considerable property who were
uninhibited in the way that they flaunted their wealth. There were
bound to be many in the party unhappy with this changed image: the
sleek Mercedes; the mohair suits; the expensive monthly fund-raising
lunches.."(Tobin,1984;159).
Fianna Fail had formed a fund-raising organisation called Taca. This was
an organisation of wealthy Fianna Fail supporters and reflected, in
itself,the change in values that was taking place within the party.
"(Lemass) came to office a poor man and was a poor man when he left it
but in his later years he accepted the ability to make money as a
criterion of success in others.It is a standard which enables
successful businessmen and speculators to buy their way into
politics"(Andrews,1982;250-1).
Taca became a focus for cynicism and ridicule,two very powerful censure
devices in a small country and it became,as an open organisation,a
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liability for the party.It was allowed to fade away quietly,at least
from public view. The clash of values,however,remained. Fianna Fail
had always been careful to cultivate and preserve an image of monolithic
party unity in public because it was a major electoral asset in a
polity where the only possible alternative administrations were
coalitions of some sort.In the mid to late 60's this image of
monolithism was breaking down.There had been an open clash over the
leadership succession and there was open divergence on the Taca issue.
Tensions within the Party came to a head in 1970 as a result of
developments in Northern Ireland.Lynch had proved himself to be an
unexpected electoral asset in the 1969 General Election and it
strengthened his position as leader within the Party.This was timely
as subsequent events were to show. When the Northern Ireland situation
deteriorated drastically in 1969 there were many in the South who
feared for the safety of their nationalist brethern up North,
particularly for those in West Belfast. Lynch's cabinet was deeply
divided on what action should be taken.From this division a crisis
developed,which Lyons(1973;587)has described,with due care,as follows:
"..in May 1970,the Taoiseach,Mr Lynch,was faced with (a grave)
crisis which led to the resignation of two ministers ,Mr 0 Morain and
Mr K. Boland,and the dismissal of two others,Mr Charles Haughey and
Mr Neil Blaney.The two dismissed ministers' names had been
persistently mentioned in connection with an alleged plot..to smuggle
arms into Northern Ireland,with the obvious intention that these
should find their way into nationalist hands,and one of them,Mr
Haughey,was brought to trial on charges arising out of the
allegations.He was subsequently acquitted.."
Indicative of ambiguity surrounding the issue,Haughey was not forced to
resign from the party but he was forced into the political wilderness
for the best part of a decade.Lynch was seen to have acted firmly and
decisively and he weathered the political storm.However the crisis did
damage the Party's standing and they lost the next General Election in
1973. The monolithic image of Fianna Fail was broken and remained deeply
fractured well into the 80's. The episode demonstrates a recurring
feature of the Irish context and that is that when the 'national
question' moves to centre stage it tends to dominate and to divert
energy away from social and economic development. As Lyons(1973;588)
reminds us:
"..different though the paths of north and south have been in the last
fifty years,the demands of blood and history are still insistent;the
island remains one island,and neither part of it can fail to be
vitally affected by what happens in the other".
Fine Gael,the second largest political party in the country,was also
experiencing internal tensions. A new post-revolutionary generation was
emerging here also that presented a challenge to the forces of
conservatism within the party and within the country at large.
At issue was the search for new ideals and new principles
appropriate to a country in rapid transition to modernity. Garret
FitzGerald(1964;348-51),a Fine Gael intellectual of the new breed,
articulated what was being sought:
"..recent years have shown that especially among young people in
Ireland there exists a solid body of thought..that is profoundly
Christian,idealistic,liberal,proudly Irish but 'antipathetical to
traditional nationalism,outward-looking and reconciled to the better
manifestations of the modern world. This body of opinion is seeking a
coherent philosophy,which it has yet to evolve. .We are too empirical
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in our approach to problems. .(but) we cannot without serious cost
continue indefinitely. .working from problem to problem,without ever
deciding what guiding principles we are trying to follow".
James Dillon,became leader of Fine Gael in 1959 and to him fell the task
of trying to provide,as Lemass had done in Fianna Fail,a bridge between
the present and the past.He was having more difficulty reconciling
traditional middle-class conservatism of the party with the progressive
tendencies of the younger members because he did not have the dominance
over his colleagues that Lemass enjoyed. Poor showings in two
by-elections in 1964 increased the pressure for change. This pressure
found its focus in Declan Costello,a young barrister and son of a former
Taoiseach, who embodied it in a progressive social policy programme
which he called 'The Just Society' .This eight-point programme:
"..called for full economic planning,not just programming;legislation
to ensure that private sector targets were met;the creation of a
Department of Economic Affairs;government control of the banks'credit
policies;direct government investment in industry;an increase in
social capital investment;an emphasis on direct taxation; and price
controls.. (It) was radical by Irish standards,and almost insanely so
by those of Fine Gael"(Tobin,1984;133).
When Lemass called a snap election in 1965 Fine Gael hurriedly tried to
put together a manifesto based on the Costello programme a few weeks
before the election and "the reluctance of the electorate to swallow the
reforms which the protagonists themselves had quite evidently only
half-digested,did much to reinforce the conservative leanings of the
party"(Lyons,1973;585). Dillon resigned the leadership after the
election defeat and the mantle passed to Liam Cosgrave,son of W.T.
Cosgrave,the Taoiseach of the first Free State administration. Liam
Cosgrave had been a major influence in getting the party to adopt the
'Just Society' and he inherited a party with a clear cleavage on the
issue of social policy.This dynamic internal tension was to remain a
feature of the party up to the late 70's.
The proportional representation system based on the single transferable
vote allows for some determined individuals and small interest groupings
to secure parliamentary representation from time to time,often on single
issues. The interparty government of 1948-51 contained no less than five
political parties along within one independent.By the 1960's,however,the
three most important political groupings were Fianna Fail,Fine Gael and
the Labour Party. The underlying pattern of electoral support over a
number of elections clearly demonstrated that only Fianna Fail could
hope for single party government. The only possible alternative to a
Fianna Fail dominated administration was a coalition of Fine Gael and
Labour with Fine Gael as the major partner.This was to remain the
pattern right up to 1985. The 'Just Society' strand in Fine Gael
provided the linking pin that made possible a coalition of the right
(the traditional conservative base in Fine Gael) and the left. Also, the
right in this potential partnership was never extreme right,nor was the
left ever extreme left.
The Labour Party's position in Irish politics had always been somewhat
enigmatic since 1921. According to Chubb(1970;;83):
"The most important feature of the Labour Party is that it has never
been an urban proletariat party but rather a rural working-class
party. .Once established,th(e) Labour support remained stable,centred
more perhaps on the individual representative than on programs,let
alone a clear cut ideology".
It failed to take root in Dublin,which should have been its natural
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habitat,because it marginalised itself on the 'national question' during
the crucial years leading up to the formation of the state.Up to World
War Two,it had less than 10% of the poll in the capital and main urban
centre. The party was also conservative and,in the period when the
Catholic Social Movement was at its height,afraid to articulate any
distinctive socialist policy that might attract the 'red smear'.
In the early 60's,when economic planning and state-managed development
was being widely advocated,it found that "the clothes they could
never quite bring themselves to put on had been stolen out of the
wardrobe"(Chubb,1970;76). In 1961 the leadership of the Labour Party
passed from the veteran William Norton to the much younger Brendan
Corish. Dr Noel Browne,the minister of the first interparty government
who had been at the centre of the Church-State clash of 1951,threw his
lot in with Labour in 1963.The party won 22 seats in the 1965
election,its best performance before or since. Encouraged by its
increasing electoral support it pledged itself formally to 'a coherent
socialist philosophy'(Lyons,1973;586) and attracted a new breed of
intellectuals to its ranks.Men like Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien,Justin
Keating and Dr David Thornley,all saw in Labour the only hope for a
new radicalism in Irish political life. Labour was at last beginning to
establish a clearer identity for itself in the minds of the electorate.
However,it has never managed to translate that identity into more Dail
representation.
The First Programme for Economic Expansion involved an immediate
increase in the number of state-sponsored agencies across a wide range
of activities and revitalised and redirected many of those that had
already been in existence prior to 1958. The expansion of the state's
direct involvement in economic planning and development was bound to
have implications for the character of the state bureaucracy. Lemass,in
an address to an Institute of Public Administration conference 22/5/61
reflected on what these implications were:
"Sometime ago I spoke of making every Department of the Government into
a development corporation in the particular field of national activity
entrusted to it. I had then in mind the bringing about of a change of
attitude and outlook amongst civil servants,a new psychological
approach to the Government's development responsibilities,rather than
on matters of organisation,but all experience teaches that the right
kind of organisation can help in developing the right attitudes.Can we
feel certain that the present structure of our civil service tends to
encourage the right attitude?"(reprinted in Administration,vol9,no2)
In 1966 a commission was set up under the chairmanship of Mr Liam StJohn
Devlin.Devlin was essentially chartered with the task of determining
what needed to be done to bring the service,which had changed little
since it was taken over from the British in 1922,into the modern era
heralded in by 'Economic Development'(Dooney,1976;8). The Devlin report
was to become the major blueprint for a restructuring of the service
that would continue well into the 70's. Among the major changes
introduced along the lines recommended by 'Devlin' were a restructuring
of government departments to separate the making of new policy from the
detailed execution of settled policy;the setting up of staff functions
of planning,finance,organisation and personnel in each of the main
government departments;the establishment of similar staff functions in
all the major executive agencies as well as in central departments;the
establishment of a new Department of the Public Service to take over the
central staff functions of organisation and personnel for the whole
service leaving the Department of Finance to concentrate on providing
central coordination in the areas of finance and planning;a unified
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grading structure that would open up access to the most senior posts to
technical professionals as well as administrators;merit-based promotion
to the more senior posts and many more(see Dooney,1976;chp9).The
Department of the Public Service was brought into being in 1973. The
Minister for Finance,in introducing the legislation to set it up,said in
the Dail that:
"Its first task will be to equip itself for the renewal of the public
service..it must guide and coordinate the general structural changes
required to produce a public service combining unity of purpose and
efficient and effective deployment of resources with diversity of
initiative towards the attainment of national goals"
(Dail Debates,Vol.267,3/7/73).
The focus on economic and social development in the 60's and the
commitment to planning for expansion "involved a new emphasis on
information"(Lee 1979;171).The pragmatic empirical approach to the
nation's problems that very much characterised this period was
reflected in an unprecedented quest for knowledge through scientific
research and analysis.An Foras Taluntais,the new state-funded institute
for agricultural research,had been finally opened in 1958 after some
controversy.It grew rapidly during the 1958-63 period.The Economic and
Social Research Institute was established in 1960 to conduct systematic
independent research and analysis on economic and social conditions.
Fresh impetus in the form of restructuring or revitalising where
necessary was provided to similar agencies where they were already in
existence. The Institute for Industrial Research and Standards,the Irish
Management Institute,the Institute for Public Administration, AnC0(the
Industrial Training Authority) and many more,were mobilised in support
of the national effort towards economic development.In a way these were
the infrastructural staff functions that were developed at this time to
support the main wealth creating elements in Lemass's 'Ireland Inc'.
approach to economic development.
This was also a time of major change in the field of education.
In 1962 the first scientific indepth study of Irish education was set up
under the joint sponsorship of the government and the OECD.The survey
team issued their report some three years later under the title
'Investment in Education'. This report focussed on education and the
manpower requirements of the economy;the effective use of educational
resources;and "dissected the social facts of Irish education,to reveal
the class and geographical components of the system,setting out its
human deficiencies for all to see"(Brown,1985;250). The whole system
from primary level to third level was subjected to a searching review
and analysis.A momentum for change was set in motion which was to carry
through well into the 70's and "it raised issues which have ever since
preoccupied those concerned with Irish education"(Sheehan,1979;63).The
OECD involvement was for Lyons(1973;652) an apt sign of the times where:
"..no less important than the readiness of the government to pour money
into education has been the psychological impulse towards reform which
derives from the increasing tendency of Irishmen to measure their
achievements by the standards of Western Europe".
The approach represented by this study represented a sharp break with
the past. This was manifest mainly in the new empirical-inductive
approach to such issues as overall policy,resourcing and curriculum
development as opposed to the old deductivist,conservative and
culturally insular approaches that dominated right up to the early
60's(Sheehan,1979;62-3). Among the radical changes introduced in the
late 60's were the rationalisation of the primary school system into
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larger units with better facilities,the introduction of free secondary
education with a more comprehensive curriculum,and the introduction of
new third level colleges focussed primarily on business and technology
and located at key regional centres marked out for industrial
development.In 1968 the Higher Education Authority was set up to
coordinate the development and financing of the higher educational
sector.As Lyons(1973;654) remarked "the mere list of major schemes
emanating from successive ministers from about 1963 onwards conveys
something of the atmosphere of urgency that has suddenly pervaded this
hitherto quiescent area of Irish life". The most immediate effects of
period were a massive increase in participation in secondary level
education,and a distinct shift from a classical bias towards a business,
professional,science and technological bias in higher education. The
coordinating structures and the empirical-inductive approach to the
process of formulating and reviewing policy right across the system
were to become significant long term legacies of this period.
The decade of the 60's was a time when the old certainties in Irish life
generally were giving way to new contingencies. The transition was
surprisingly fast but far from painless. The country was becoming
increasingly urbanised.In 1926 less than 33% of the population lived in
towns of over 1500 people,by 1951 this figure had risen to 41% and by
1971 it was over half the population at 52%(Brown,1985;258). Employment
in agriculture accounted for 53% of all those employed in 1926, by 1958
this was down to 38% and by 1971 down further to just 25%.This trend
was to continue throughout the 70's,but at a slower pace, reaching a
1981 position of 17%. As dependence on the land rapidly declined and
alternative livlihoods opened up more people could marry and at a
younger age than was possible under the old rural status system where:
"In order to pass on the farm intact,the father had generally to ensure
that only two children married locally, the son who had inherited the
farm,and the daughter who would marry into a neighbouring farm or into
a shop,whose assets had been sedulously investigated. Other children
had to be largely disinherited. Children who chose to stay at home
could not marry within within the rural status system"(Lee,1979;166).
The marriage rate rose dramatically by 40% between 1958 and 1970,along
with a significant trend towards earlier marriage(Brown,1985;259-60).
Though there was a comcommittent trend towards smaller planned families
the overall effect was to transform the country from having the one of
the oldest populations in Western Europe to having one of the youngest.
These demographic changes inevitability brought about major change in
the pattern of Irish social life.
Alongside these basic shifts in demography were other developments
that were bringing about fundamental changes in social attitudes and
outlook.Pre-eminent among these were changes in world catholicism and
the advent of mass telecommunications.The innovations of Pope John XXIII
and of the Second Vatican Council were almost revolutionary and were
bound to have a strong effect in Ireland,where the influence of the
Church up to the 60's had been 'overwhelming'(McCarty,1973;8).According
to Whyte(1980;354-56),three main effects of this revolution that were
directly reflected in Irish life were the growth of the ecumenical
movement,the growth in freedom of discussion and self-criticism within
the Church,and the change in emphasis and approach in Catholic social
thinking. Pope John's(1961)encyclical on Catholic social thinking,
Mater et Magistra,represented a major departure from the 1943 position:
"Recent advances in scientific knowledge and productive techniques give
to the public authority much more power than it formerly had to remedy
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lack of balance,whether between different sectors in the economy, or
between different parts of the same country,or even between different
peoples of the world"(excerpt quoted in Whyte,1980;356).
In other words,the extension of state involvement in economic and social
life was not alone sometimes desireable but often necessary. The effect
on the Catholic social movement in Ireland,according to Whyte(1980;332),
was that "instead of promoting a ready-formed corpus of doctrine,the
(movement)appeared increasingly concerned with empirical investigation
of the actual needs of the Irish people". The ecumenical movement
encouraged catholics to open their thinking to other points of view and
reflexively to better understand their own convictions and prejudices.
Freedom of discussion and the centrality given to the concept of the
'Church as the people of God' widened the active participation of the
laity. The Church's authority on many issues would no longer be accepted
without question. Furthermore the opening of the national television
station in 1962 "coincided with the spread of a questioning mentality
and a receptivity to change among the public(which) increased its
potential influence..It also acted. .as a major conduit for imported mass
cultural influences"(Lee,1979;172-3). Tobin(1984;60-1) astutely noted
the contrast between the cautious welcome that the new station received
from traditionalists like the President DeValera and Cardinal Dalton
who "had been uneasy at the coming of television" and the fulsome
welcome of the Taoiseach,Mr Lemass who "offered the view that the Irish
people were citizens of the world as well as Ireland, and that there
were standards,aims and values which transcend national frontiers and
were universal in their application".
The economic expansion of the 1958-63 period had been twice as fast as
even the most optimistic had hoped for and raised aspirations and
expectations for the rest of the decade. The unprecedented growth
introduced new pressures into the country's economic and social life
and existing institutions were found inadequate to deal with them.
During the 60's the country experienced a series of major industrial
disputes that were characterised for their protractedness and their
bitterness. All classes of workers were involved,the busmen,the
building workers,the power workers,the teachers,the bankers and the
maintenance men.Charles McCarthy chronicled the major disputes of the
decade and tried to find some underlying explanation for the industrial
relations ferment of the time. He was unconvinced by suggestions of some
concerted movement linking the disputes.They were essentially empirical
adjustments to the general upheaval in the Ireland of the 60's:
"..Ireland at the end of the fifties was still a very structured
society; the relationships between people were clearly marked,their
roles set and explicit and,as a result,there was a powerful sense of
gemeinschaft..the nineteen sixties in Ireland (was) a decade of
upheaval. .The old structures of society were breaking down,the Second
Vatican Council had shattered the timeless authoritarian image of the
Roman Catholic Church.New attitudes were being painfully developed and
new structures and institutions to reflect them.Television mirrored
and magnified all that we did. .And up to the 1969 maintenance strike,
those in the middle of events saw no malice in the disputes but rather
the painful inadequacies of men and institutions caught up in the
whirlwind of new affluence and new expectations"(McCarthy,1973;2&219).
There was a general concern and uncertainty among occupational groupings
right across the board about their relative status and material welfare
in the socio-economic flux of the sixties. The maintenance strike had a
cathartic effect on all concerned. Because of a particularly cynical
use of the picket which exploited the peculiar reluctance of Irish
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workers to pass any picket,a small group of 'buckaneers' wrought
nationwide industrial havoc in support of an unofficial action. The
moral authority of the whole trade union movement was undermined and its
status as a social partner in planning under threat. All of this
industrial relations ferment in general,and the debacle of the
maintenance strike in particular,threatened the whole economic
development process. Concessions made to one group tended,through the
"black dog of comparabilities",to make the whole system even more
unstable and inflationary and thus tended to weaken the very basis of
the development strategy. The effects were seen in the slowing up of the
growth in national output in 1969 and 1970 following a high point in
1968. The response was a reconstituted Employer-Labour Conference that
was to dampen down the ferment and to conclude a series of sophisticated
national agreements which came to be a feature of the seventies.
The demographic shift towards urbanisation and towards employment in
industry and services gave rise to a new group consciousness among the
farming community.Lee(1979;173) has analysed this development:
"Town-country tensions began to emerge effectively for the first time.
So too,in reaction did farmer organisations.The very fact that farmers
felt it necessary to organise in pressure groups reflected their
changing role in society.Organisation must substitute for ideology.
The farming organisations were effectively led,but it is symptomatic
of changing values that they felt obliged to pitch their arguments in
the economic terminology of the new tradition instead of remaining
content to rest their case on the axiomatic moral superiority of an
ideal rural social order".
In the jockeying for position that characterised the strike behaviour
of various occupational groupings at this time the farmers were not
to be left out.They found a new issue,the comparison of average farm
income with average industrial wage,and a new way to apply pressure,
selective commodity strikes and the mass use of their tractors to
disrupt the flow of traffic throughout the country. Their tactics and
their influence were to get more sophisticated as time went on:
"..they learned the limits of street politics,and re-learned the
techniques of political lobbying that they had developed in the early
sixties. The protests were an emotional spasm,which served to carry
away their frustrations in the years when everyone in Ireland seemed
to be prospering except them.But when it was all over,and they came in
from the streets to the negotiation table,they set themselves to
master those skills of persuasion and argument which were to stand
them in good stead in the seventies.For the farmers,it was to prove a
surprisingly short journey from the steps of Government Buildings to
the corridors of Berlaymont"(Tobin,1984;179).
The sixties was,then,a time of major change in Irish life. It was a time
of economic expansion which brought new hope and confidence to the
country but also new problems and issues that put the basic institutions
and structures of society under new fissaparious pressures,as interest
groups jockeyed for position in the changing order. It was a period
when old ideologies gave way to new empiricism and pragmatism. It was as
if Ireland had shed a traditional image of herself and was struggling
and fumbling to find a new identity consistent with its modernisation.
"It was a period of national adolescence"(Mc Carthy,1973;2) when "the
matur(ing) of a culture,no less than of an individual,is reflected
in the urge to search for,and the capacity to confront the truth about
itself.Behind its sober prose,Economic Development extended an
invitation to Irish society to embark on a search for self-knowledge,
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and not to flinch from the findings.. .Ritualistic invocation of
emotively elastic terms like 'spiritual','tradition','family',
'materialism', have now begun to be subjected to scholarly
scrutiny,as research probes,however hesitantly,the realities shrouded
in the comfortable drapery of ignorance or hypocracy"(Lee,1982;2).
The inheritance that the sixties passed on was to leave to
succeeding years a powerful change momentum in dynamic tension with
strongly entrenched forces for inertia as the full implications of
changes of the sixties continued to ramify throughout the institutions,
structures and processes of Irish Life.
Many of the major changes that took place in the Ireland of the sixties
were connected directly,or indirectly,with major changes happening on
the broader canvas of European and World affairs. The US had passed its
torch to JFK and his new frontiersmens 'born in this century' ,Britain
had embarked confidently on its modern socialist experiment under Harold
Wilson, the USSR had shown the capacity of a fully planned economy to
accomplish major technological successes like putting the first man into
space. Television and Jet Aircraft vete movihg the voild closeT to the
global village. Indicative planning had worked in France and was being
tried in Britain. Would Ireland's economic expansion have happened
anyway as a result of the favourable external economic conditions that
were developing in the early sixties. Could the influence of 'Economic
Development'and the personal contributions of Whitaker and Lemass have
been overrated,and the influence of changes in the wider economic and
social context been corresponding underplayed,by most modern
historians? Possibly! It will probably never be conclusively established
empirically,one way or the other. Nevertheless what is apparent is that,
thanks to Whitaker and Lemass,when the winds of change began to blow
Ireland already had her sails up and her course set.
The North,Europe and Oil Crises - Ireland in the 70's 
The 1960's was,as we have seen,a decade of upheaval in Irish society.
The processes of transition in Irish life set in motion during this
period by economic takeoff,cultural revolution,and ecclesiatical
upheaval continued to transform the structure and texture of Irish
social and economic life on through to the 1980's. The main outlines of
the transition were already very much in evidence by the end of the 60's
as Ireland began to take on more and more of the features of a modern,
urbanised, industrialised nation.
"It was a transformation set in motion as an act of will...But by
intervening so significantly the state had introduced changes whose
logic would be worked out within the social structure,and over which
no individual or government could retain control...Such significant
interventions to a society release social forces which subsequently
become independent of their immediate authors".
(Rottman & O'Conne11,1982;64-8)
What was new and exciting in the 60's,however,became more 'normal' in
the 70's as the transformation continued within an economy that was
still expanding.Against the background of this transformation the issues
which came to prominence during the 70's were the Northern Ireland
troubles,the entry into the EEC and the inflationary spiral set in
motion by the oil crisis of 1973.
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The Northern Ireland Troubles
The troubles in Northern Ireland that broke out in the late sixties took
most of the South by complete surprise. With the exception of those
Southerners who live in border counties,most people in the Republic felt
remote from their nationalist brethern in the North and were ignorant
of the conditions under which they lived(O'Malley,1983;75).There was
still the strong aspiration for unity in the Republic but in the forty
years since the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 there had been no movement or
hope of movement on the ground towards this ideal.It would be reasonable
to say,also,that there was little or no understanding of Ulster Unionism
in the Republic at this time. There were periodic 'campaigns' by IRA
extremists but since the mid-20's the gunman had been marginalised in
Irish political life. The 1956-62 'campaign' was a demoralising
non-event for the IRA prompting the New York Times to comment at the
time that:
"..the Irish Republican Army belongs to history,and it belongs to
better men in times that are gone.So does the Sinn Fein.Let us put a
wreath of red roses on their grave and move on".
(cited in Coogan,1970;418).
The IRA called off the campaign in 1962,publicly admitting that one of
the main for its failure was lack of nationalist support in Northern
Ireland itself(Lyons,1973;761).
In the early 60's Lemass was managing to wed the commitment to economic
development in the South to the nationalist aspiration for a united
Ireland:
"Lemass gave Irish men and women to understand that work for economic
renewal was the best way to serve the national aim and the most
practical form of nationalism,for it would make the southern state
attractive to the northern unionist population that had in the past
ample reason to reject incorporation into a state which could not even
maintain its own population"(Brown,1985;280).
There was,though,a lot of ground to be made up if the South were
ever to be able to offer a comparable standard of living to that
available north of the border:
"Although its population was less than half that of the Republic,
Northern Ireland had,in 1964,95000 children in secondary schools
compared with 85000 in the South;while expenditure on higher education
was almost three times higher...According to one estimate,had the
Republic tried to bring its social services up to Northern standards
in the year 1969-70,the then current expenditure of almost £143m would
have had to be increased by about a further £150m,or by 105 per cent..
Without British help life in Northern Ireland would have been very
different indeed.In 1963 payments by the United Kingdom to Northern
Ireland amounted to £46m..in a country whose expenditure was £119m..
(Buckland;1981;102).
In 1965 Lemass and his counterpart in Northern Ireland,Capt.Terence
O'Neill exchanged visits to open up a rapproachment on economic
cooperation. This was the first intergovernmental contact at that level
since the 1921 settlement. Most people in the South looked at this
development as constructive and hopes were high for a new era in
North-South relations. O'Neill,like Lemass,saw the common pursuit of
economic prosperity as an issue on which to build bridges with Northern
Catholics and with the Republic. Such was the optimism for the O'Neill
approach in the South that he was voted 'Man of the Year' by the readers
of the Dublin national newspaper The Sunday Independent in 1968. It
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still seems incredible,looking back,that the situation should have
changed so dramatically and deteriorated so rapidly in the space of
three short years. However the problems of Northern Ireland were endemic
to the divided society there and were deeply embedded in the social
structure and polity of the region. As Lyons(1973;760) has remarked:
"..despite these hopeful signs,very little hindsight is needed to see
that the anticipated golden age was largely the product of wishful
thinking. No-one acquainted with the history of the province could
rationally have supposed that the memory of centuries of conflict and
tension could be forgotten overnight or that the realities of
discrimination and alienation could be dispelled by a wave of Captain
O'Neill's wand".
Protestant ascendancy had been established at the beginning when
Northern Ireland was given its own regional parliament within the United
Kingdom through the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. By opting for the
inclusion of only six of the nine counties of Ulster in the Northern
Ireland statelet,Unionism secured for itself a 66% to 34% majority over
the nationalists. Given the basic nature of the political divide this
effectively meant that Unionists maintained a monopoly on power in what
became,in reality,a single party state. Ulster nationalists,with their
known aspirations for a united Ireland,were perceived in the Unionist
psyche as 'the enemy within'(Maxwel1,1938;16). Fear among Unionists that
they would some day find themselves in a minority situation in Northern
Ireland itself and that they would be outvoted into a unitary Irish
state goes some significant way to explain why there were widespread
structural biases and discriminations against Northern nationalists,
constituting a denial of basic civil rights. Unionists had used their
monopoly on power to ensure its perpetuation. Nationalists were,for
example,grossly under-represented in Parliament,in the Civil Service and
in the Royal Ulster Constabulary(Buckland,1981;63). They were also
grossly under-represented in the workplace. The biggest difficulties
were at local government level and it was at this level that the issues
were most keenly felt.
"The composition and behaviour of Londonderry Corporation were the most
controversial of all.The city was two-thirds Catholic,but the
Corporation was controlled by Unionists and Protestants got the plum
jobs.. .Unionist control of the Corporation was sustained by
controversial ward boundaries,the restricted local government
franchise and confining re-housed Catholics to a ward with an already
large Nationalist majority..In the Waterside Ward 3697 Unionists
returned four councillors and in the North Ward eight councillors were
elected by 3946 Unionists,but it took 10047 nationalist voters to
return eight councillors in the South Ward.Londonderry was both the
symbol of Unionist pride and the acme of minority grievances against
the Stormont regime"(Buckland,1981;116-7).
That these problems were allowed to fester in Northern Ireland up to the
outbreak of the troubles in the late 60's is an indictment on all of the
parties to the 1921 settlement. Efforts over the years by Nationalist
MPs at Westminister to get the sovereign parliament to intervene were
met with little interest. Little more than ritualistic denunciations
of the evils of partition were forthcoming from the state that wanted
a role for itself as a 'second guarantor' of nationalist interests in
the North,the Irish Republic. What little attempt that was made by a
more moderate form of Unionism to get its own house in order was
consistently blocked by hard line resistance from within the ranks of
Unionism itself.
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Inspired by the achievements of Martin Luther King in the US of the 60's
a new generation of nationalists,not prepared to accept the perpetuation
of their second class citizenship,switched from the politics of the
pressure group to the politics of mass protest. They also chose to focus
on the more immediate and limited issue of civil rights,in particular
the issue of one man one vote for local government elections.The events
that followed the first civil rights march on 28 August 1968 are well
known and were played out in the full glow of the world media. It is not
appropriate here to try to present a full record and analysis of these
events. However,a brief description of some of them will facilitate the
later discussion of some issues of direct interest. What started off as
a pure civil rights movement became more impure as the movement grew.
The inadequate response of the Stormont regime to the initial demands
allowed the movement to grow and to come under of the influence of those
with more radical objectives. In January 1969 a four day march
led to serious rioting culminating in the 'invasion' of the Bogside in
Derry City by "a number of policemen (who) were guilty of misconduct
which involved assault and battery,malacious damage to property..and the
use of provocative,sectarian and political slogans" as the Cameron
Commision reported it(cited in Buckland,1981;125). The march was
"modelled on the Selma-Montgomery march in Alabama in 1966" and had been
deliberately designed,according to the organiser,so that it was to be:
"the acid test of the government's intentions.Either the government
would face up to the extreme right of its own Unionist Party and
protect the march from the 'harassing and hindering' immediately
threatened by Major Bunting,or it would be exposed as impotent in the
face of sectarian thuggery,and Westminister would be forced to
intervene,re-opening the whole Irish question for the first time in
fifty years"(Farre11,1976;249).
The situation deteriorated rapidly during the 'marching season' in
August of 1969. A traditional Orange parade in Derry on August 12th was
stoned by onlooking Catholics who then managed to baracade themselves in
the Bogside and succeeded in persuading the British Army not to enter.
'Free Derry' was proclaimed and was hailed as a victory in the Bogside:
"..it was a victory at a price,the price being paid by Catholics in
Belfast.Belfast's Catholics,hemmed in by Protestants,had long been
held hostage for the good behaviour of their co-religionists elsewhere
in Ireland"(Buckland,1981;130).
On the night of August 14,Protestants went on the rampage in Catholic
West Belfast.Five Catholics and one Protestant were killed and 150
Catholic homes were burned out:
"These four days in August 1969...shook Northern Ireland to its very
foundations and decisively altered the course of its political
history.They finally and emphatically underlined the inability of the
Unionist regime to cope with the challenges that had emerged in the
1960's but which were born of historical divisions"
(Buckland,1981;131).
In spite of belated attempts at reform the strife escalated and in March
1972,the Stormont Parliament was suspended indefinitely and Northern
Ireland entered a period of direct rule from Westminister which has
continued up to the present.
The sequence of events that led to the destabilisation of Northern
Ireland and to the suspension of Stormont began within the North itself
and did not involve the men of violence at the outset. In fact:
"The events of August 1969 had caught the IRA totally unprepared.The
leftward and political trend pursued since the failure of the armed
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campaign of 1956-62 had left Republicans with neither the organisation
nor the arms to defend the Catholics of Londonderry and Belfast when
they came under loyalist attack in the summer of 1969.'I.R.A.-I Ran
Away'was chalked up on the walls of the beleagured ghettos.A sense of
impotence and humiliation led some members of the Belfast IRA to take
independent action"(Buckland,1981;143)
This independent action was the formation of the Provisional IRA. The
same sense of impotence and pressure for action from some sections
within the governing Fianna Fail party in the South threatened to bring
about the fall of Jack Lynch's administration in Dublin in 1969-70.
Certainly the Cabinet was split on the issue and some senior members
were believed to have pressed for armed intervention(Lyons,1973;770),
though it is difficult to understand how this possibility could have
been seriously considered.A much more plausible tactic for those who
wanted to intervene directly would have been to help provide to the
beleagured communities the means for self-defense,i.e.training and
arms.Allegations that cabinet funds were in fact diverted for such a
purpose led to the dismissal of two government ministers and the
resignation of two more as noted earlier,though these allegations
were never proven.What is known is that an officer of the regular Irish
Army "was in the course of duty,in regular contact with the Northern IRA
leaders before and after the 1969 disturbances and that he kept his
superiors informed of their needs and attitudes"(Lyons,1969;771). Lynch
felt sufficiently pressured to go on national television on August
13 to say that the Northern government had lost control of the situation
which was 'the inevitable outcome of policies pursued for decades by
successive Stormont governments'and that 'the Irish Government can no
longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse'.
In the same speech he called for the intervention of a UN peacekeeping
force and he announced the establishment of Irish Army field hospitals
in the border regions(Farre11,1976;261). This appearance of action
without actually doing anything was sufficient to defuse tension in
the South in the immediate aftermath of the West Belfast disturbance.
In this way he kept the South at arm's length from the Northern troubles
and in this approach he had the support of most people in the Republic.
These events of 1969,and the subsequent troubles in the North,
however posed some awkward questions about the contemporary nature
of Irish nationalism,especially in the South. It soon became clear
that most Southerners were reluctant to allow the Northern
Ireland situation to undermine their hard-won economic development and
prosperity of the 60's. Yet when the nationalists in the North drew the
attention of the world to the intolerable conditions under which they
were living, it seemed likely that Southerners were going to be faced
with a challenge to their national aspirations that pious rhetoric could
no longer answer. The four days of August 1969 had already indicated how
the question would be asked. How far was the South prepared to put its
own security at risk in order to protect the beleagured nationalists in
the North? How far was it prepared to press for the final solution that
it had always advocated,national re-unification? If the British
government,faced with the costly and seemingly intractable problems of
Northern Ireland,had been persuaded by the traditional nationalist
argument that the re-unification of Ireland was the solution that
offered the best prospect for lasting peace and stability was the
Republic ready to face the realities that this would entail:
"..when unification is demystified,robbed of its heroic pretensions,
examined harshly in the context of real alternatives,the public is put
in the uncomfortable position of having to face up to the unpleasant
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possibility that they may not want that which they have aspired to for
so long..questions that might have revealed a chasm between the level
of aspiration to unity and the depth of commitment to it. .What if the
South is unwilling to bear the costs of unification,unwilling to drop
the aspiration to unity,and unwilling to make a tradeoff between the
two?"(0'Malley,1983;79)
The events-that raised these questions did not develop to the point
where they demanded an answer,one way or the other and because they
didn't the South was able to temporise as it had in the past.
However well the policy makers and the general public may have managed
to avoid facing up to it,the possibility that the national aspiration
might in fact be conditional and rather than essential raised
fundamental questions about national identity.A new revisionism became
evident in the work of historians and social commentators at this time.
For example,Shaw(1972) challenged what he called a cannon of Irish
history which:
"honours one group of Irishmen by denying honour to others that merit
it no less.In effect it teaches that only the Fenians and the
separatists had the good of their country at heart,that all others
were either deluded or in one degree or another sold out to the enemy"
O'Brien(1972) challenged the central tenet of nationalism,the concept of
an Irish nation whole and indivisible.Ireland,according to him was in
fact two nations and he argued that the reluctance of Southerners to
recognise this,together with their ambivalence with regard to partition,
were dangerous luxuries in a period that continued to pose a real threat
of full-scale Irish civil war.
The possibility that Ireland might not be one nation,whole and
indivisible,served to seriously undermine the old self-image of Ireland
that had motivated the revolutionary generation and that had begun to
crumble since 1958:
"That national image,in its full development,showed Ireland as: an
ancient,virtuously rural ,self-sufficient nation,democratic and
republican in its politics,comprising(in all but political fact) all
the inhabitants of the island,and scattered widely beyond the seas and
oceans;an anti-imperialist and neutral nation,with a long history of
freedom struggle;Gaelic essentially,and engaged in reviving its Gaelic
language,while in the interim speaking English;Catholic,in a
fundamentalist and missionary manner that stressed the dangers of
modern immorality and athesism,but proudly including Protestants and
Jews and holding some of these in high honour. That image of a people
with a specific history,specific values and behaviour patterns,bonded
the Irish nation and distinguished it clearly from its neighbours,the
British and American nations"(Fenne11,1986;396).
Clearly this was no longer a viable self-image or bonding agent for the
the new Ireland that started to emerge from the 1960's.This new Ireland
had abandoned self-sufficiency and was industrialising with the aid
foreign capital.It was becoming urbanised and it was importing through
its economic development and through its mass media many of the elements
of an Anglo-American culture. Its attempts to revive a Gaelic culture
had largely failed. In the light of the Northern troubles the principle
that Collins had sought to establish,the 'essential unity' of Ireland
was now being openly debated and was being replaced by a more contingent
and calculating conditional unity. The need to search for a new identity
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and national self-image and to uncover what are the new bonding agents
of Irish society in the post 1960's,if any,has continued to engage
national attention right up to the present.'Studies',the journal which
has mirrored Ireland to herself since 1912, recently devoted its
entire 300th issue (Vol.75,Winter 1986) to the topic 'Towards a New
Irish Identity'.
It is true,as Brown(1985;282)points out,that "the Northern conflict..
did not stimulate major ideological redirection in the Republic".It is
also the case that the issue of the North consistently ranked "as one of
the South's lesser concerns" in the general elections of 1973,1977,1981
and February 1982(0 1 Malley,1983;84).For most of the 1970's the two main
political parties were able to maintain a bi-partisan approach to the
Northern issue. Fianna Fail under Lynch and Fine Gael under Cosgrave had
become substantially indistinguishable from each other in the one area
where their major historical difference lay,the issue of Northern
Ireland. In this they were reflecting the sentiment of the vast majority
of the Southern electorate who clearly "did not wish the Northern crisis
and the avowed republican nationalism of the state's traditional
ideology to interfere with the economic progress of the country along
the path signposted by Lemass in 1959"(Brown,1985;281). The South has
supported the 'politics of process'(Leavy,1975;19),the approach adopted
by the SDLP,the main political party of constitutional nationalism in
the North. As enunciated recently by John Hume(1986;381),leader of the
SDLP,this process would involve three stages:
"The first stage is the creation of equality of treatment in the North
for all people.The second,based on that equality,is the process of
reconciliation,of breaking down the barriers that divide us.In
practice that means working together in all institutions of the North
and by doing so over the years to build the trust to replace the
distrust that has disfigured us till now. .The second stage,the
breaking down of barriers,will evolve naturally into the third
stage,the development of new relationships within Ireland and between
Ireland and Britain.That will bring the only unity that really
matters,a unity born of the agreement on how we are to live together".
The policy of the South appears to be to support whatever is acceptable
to the nationalists of the North as long as it does not preclude the
possibility of national reunification at some,however indefinite,future
time. "The aspiration to unity may still be strong,but the commitment to
it is far less so"(01Malley,1983:97).
The Northern issue has not figured prominently in general elections in
the South but it has led,both directly and indirectly,to a number of
important political consequences. The events of August 1969 led,as we
have seen,to tensions within Fianna Fail.It was a critical time for
the party and it was only through resolving these tensions that the
party's approach to the Northern situation emerged clearly and
decisively before the electorate. Yet,even though the party and the
country rallied behind Lynch and allowed his administration to survive
the crisis,the monolithic image of Fianna Fail was damaged and this
contributed to their losing the 1973 General Election. Furthermore, the
so-called 'Haughey factor' ,which was to become an important element in
the political life of the country from 1979 onwards had its genesis in
the Arms Crisis of 1970. In addition,it was the inability of Lynch to
keep his backbenchers in line on'Northern policy in the late 70's that
precipitated his retirement in 1979 and allowed Haughey,rather than his
own and his cabinet's preferred choice,George Colley,to succeed him as
Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fail. Finally, Garret FitzGerald's rise
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to the leadership of Fine Gael,eventually to become Taoiseach,was also
affected by the Northern troubles though the effect was more indirect
and contained an interesting twist of irony.FitzGerald was a prime-mover
in an internal putsch to remove Cosgrave from the leadership of Fine
Gael in 1972. Cosgrave's decision to vote with the Fianna Fail
Government on the Offences Against The State Act was initially opposed
by most of his own party but his determination to carry it through
seemed to seal his fate. A bomb explosion in Dublin shortly before the
critical vote,the first major overspill of the Northern violence into
the Republic,rallied the Fine Gael party back behind Cosgrave and
unexpectedly secured his leadership. When Cosgrave became Taoiseach in
1973 FitzGerald was not given the premier portfolio of Finance that most
political commentators had expected him to get but had to settle instead
for Foreign Affairs. This perceived sanction for disloyalty probably
saved FitzGerald's political life. The Finance Minister,Ritchie Ryan,
bore the brunt of the political fallout which came from the unexpected
Oil Crisis of 1973 that had set the country on a dangerous inflationary
spiral. Ryan's remedial measures to dampen down the economy earned him
the rather harsh subriquet of 'Ritchie Ruin' and no doubt ended his
political career prematurely. Meanwhile FitzGerald in Foreign Affairs
was not only insulated from all this but was earning prestige for
himself and his country as Ireland took on the presidency of the EEC for
the first time since entering the community in 1972. Directly and
indirectly,events in the North have presented some significant 'snakes
and ladders' to political careers in the South.
The Economy - EEC and the Oil Crisis
While the Republic of Ireland was studiously trying to avoid becoming
entrapped in its past,it took a bold step into the future by joining the
European Economic Community in 1972 along with Britain and Denmark.
Ireland had already applied for membership in the early 60's but at that
time its application was treated as being associated with the British
application and as such it suffered the same fate. In the early
70's,after a decade of outward-looking economic development,Ireland was
determined to press its case for entry irrespective of what Britain
decided to do. The lessons of the failure of the self-sufficiency policy
in the fifties were deeply etched on the national mind. EEC entry was
supported by both major political parties,Fianna Fail and Fine Gael,and
the referendum held to decide on entry in 1972 was carried by an
overwhelming 83% in favour.At the time of entry Irish enthusiasm for the
Community was in sharp contrast with the more cautious approach of the
Danes and the British and in a series of 'Eurobarometre' surveys carried
out since membership,the popularity of the EEC among the Irish has
remained close to the level of that in the original six and well ahead
of its two co-entrants over the first decade of membership(Coakley,1983;
53).
Ireland's decision to join the EEC had already been anticipated in the
programmes for economic expansion that had begun in 1958. When accession
came then,in 1972,it was undramatic though it was potentially the most
far-reaching choice that the country had made since independence. The
primary considerations were economic.The Whitaker analysis in 'Economic
Development' had emphasised that economic growth in a small open economy
like Ireland's would have to be export led. The EEC offered free access
to a larger market for Ireland's key export,her agricultural products,
than she enjoyed up to 1972 and offered it a prices that would be
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protected against cheap imports from non-community competitors. Ireland
also expected to benefit considerably from the the EEC Regional and
Social fund,the mechanism used in the Community to help towards the
equalisation of living standards among the member states. Membership of
the Community also offered Ireland an oportunity to overcome a major
structural weakness in her economy,her over-dependence on the British
market for exports:
"Probably the most telling prospect of change in economic circumstances
was the likely shift from economic dependence on the United Kingdom.
At the time of accession the UK accounted for a larger share of Irish
trade than all the other member states taken together,including
Denmark,by a ratio of four to one"(Coombes,1983;4).
Undoubtedly the economic issues were dominant in the minds of the
electorate when they gave their overwhelming vote of approval for EEC
entry. Not only were the anticipated economic benefits important,but
most Irish people believed that futher economic growth of the kind
experienced in the 60's could not continue if Ireland chose to remain
outside the Community,particularly if her major trading partner decided
to join. These economic considerations,the anticipated positive benefits
of entry and perceived negative consequences of remaining outside,had
overridden any fears the electorate might have had concerning the
implications for future sovereignty. We saw earlier that DeValera's
obsession had been with the issue of sovereignty and that he had led the
people through economic hardship in the 30's in order to secure it. The
country had only recently emerged as an independent nation so it is
reasonable to ask why there was not more concern over the issue:
"..nationalists in general did not see the EEC as a threat.Not only
might the country be able to lessen its enormous trade dependence on
Britain by diversifying its markets,but it was entering an exciting
new alliance.Comparisons between the Treaty of Rome and the Act of
Union were regarded as inaccurate:unlike the position in 1800,Ireland
was now free to choose its partners,the resulting Community would be
pluralist rather than being dominated by a big brother,and the
decision-making mechanisms would allow Ireland considerable capacity
to defend its vital interests.In any case the new alliance was seen as
incomparably looser:it would not compromise Ireland's traditional
policy of neutrality;there was no question of surrender of the
essentials of national independence"(Coakley,1983;49).
In fact,in many respects,entry into the Community represented a positive
affirmation of country's independence and nationhood and one completely
consonant with the outward-looking Ireland of post-1958. Ireland,in
contrast to Scotland,for example,would have direct and independent
representation in the European club,something she would not have had had
she remained a province of the UK. If she had to be in Europe anyway
because her further economic development depended on it,she could best
protect her vital interests by having a seat at the table in her own
right. In a way it gave her historical struggle for independence a new
legitimacy,and a new oportunity to be a positive force in the national
psyche,to be valued and justified as having been a struggle for
something rather than merely against something.
Since joining the Community,not only have Irish attitudes been more
positive towards the wider ideals of Europe than those"of its
co-entrants but "both before and after accession,Irish ministers have
consistently sounded far more 'European' than their British and Danish
counterparts" according to Coombes(1983;9). This however may just be a
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form of enlightened self-interest rather than evidence of some greater
fundamental commitment to the ideals of European integration on the part
of the Irish. Being a small country on the periphery of Europe,Ireland
stands to lose more if the bigger members of the EEC put their
self-interest before the wider aims of the Community and it stands to
gain more if they can be persuaded not to. Also since progress towards
political union has been much slower than the architects of the Treaty
of Rome had hoped for,Ireland's commitment to European integration has
not yet been really tested. The luxury of being able to appear to be
positive Europeans has up to now carried a relatively small price tag.
The main effects of membership have been felt in the economic sphere, in
agricultural and industrial development,and in the sphere of central
administration though the benefits to the economy were mitigated by the
effects of the oil crisis of 1973. It is to these areas that we now
turn.
When Ireland entered the EEC in 1972 the expectation was that the
expansion of the economy that had characterised the 1958-72 period would
continue apace. In the event,the economy did continue to expand through
to 1979. In the 1957-72 period,the average annual growth in GNP was
4.0%,and the average annual growth in output per head was 3.9%. In the
1973-80 period,the average annual growth in GNP was 3.2% but because the
population had increased the average annual growth in output per head
was only 2.1%. While the expansion rate in the economy had slowed down
somewhat,it had also become more volatile. It ranged from 1.2% in 1976
to 6.1% in 1977(Blackwel1,1982;43-4). The Government White Paper
entitled 'The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities',
published in 1971,provides this record of the official expectations:
"The overall assessment of the economic implications of membership is
favourable. Economic growth is likely to average nearly 5% per annum
during the transitional period and is expected to exceed that figure
thereafter.."
The Oil Crisis of 1973,within a year after EEC entry,created recession
uncertainty and volatility and dampened the optimism that was in
evidence at the time of the White Paper. After this setback the economy
did return to an expansionary mode until 1979. The Oil Crisis of 1979,
however,heralded a prolonged period of low growth and recession for most
Western economies and brought Ireland's period of rapid economic
expansion to an abrupt end.
The prospects for agriculture were a major consideration in the
decision to join the Community. Agriculture was an important
cornerstone of the whole economic expansion strategy which,for an
economy as small as Ireland's,had to be based on export-led growth.
The relative importance of agriculture to the country's economy can
be seen readily by comparison with its EEC partners. Minshull(1980;
94-117) provides comparative figures for 1976 that show Ireland as the
partner with agriculture accounting for the highest % of GDP at 17.3%,
followed by Italy at 8.4%; with food and agriculture accounting for the
largest % of total exports at 41.6%,followed by Denmark at 32.1%; and
with the highest % of its labour force employed in agriculture at 23.8%,
followed by Italy at 15.5%. The Irish economy was expected to gain
considerably from the guaranteed prices,the export subsidies,the access
to the large internal EEC market and the grant aid implicit in the
Community's Common Agricultural Policy,the CAP. The government White
Paper already referred to outlined what was believed,in 1971,were the
prospects for the agricultural sector of the economy from membership of
the Community:
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"The prices paid to Irish farmers for most of the major products
will,during the transitional period,rise progressively to the common
price levels of the Community.In particular,the cattle and beef and
milk and dairy sectors will experience a substantial increase in
prices.., it has been projected that the volume of gross agricultural
output will increase by about one-third by 1978. .family farm income
will by 1978 be twice as high as in 1970.."
Gross Agricultural Output did grow by over 35% in the years 1970-78 but
levelled off after that. The major expansion within farm commodities was
in dairy output,which in 1978 was almost 60% above the 1970 level.
Milk production rose from 656000 gallons in 1970 to just under
1000000 gallons by 1978,mainly through increased yield per cow rather
than as a result of any significant expansion in the national dairy
herd. Concurrent with this major expansion in production were important
developments on the processing side. The IAOS,the central coordinating
body of the cooperative movement in Ireland,had concentrated its efforts
mainly on the dairying sector and had for years worked towards bringing
about a major rationalisation in the dairy processing industry. The
government's Second Programme for Economic Expansion had:
"..indicated clearly that the IAOS would be given the responsibility
of encouraging the cooperative creamery societies 'to achieve such
voluntary consolidations and mergers as are designed to bring to the
industry the operating and marketing advantages to be gained from
economies of scale and diversification of production'"(Bolger,1977;
230).Progress had been slow throughout the 60's in spite of the urgings
of the Knapp study in 1964 and the Cook&Sprague study of 1968. The
difficulties lay mainly in the overcoming of local vested interests in
those units destined to be absorbed in the rationalisation process. A
change in the law in 1971 brought the majority vote needed to approve an
amalgamation from 75% to 51% and this helped to speed things up. Major
consolidations began to take place in the early 70's and by 1979 five
major groupings,Mitchelstown,Golden Vale,Ballyclough,Avonmore and
Waterford,were among the top thirty Irish businesses having all grown
substantially with the overall growth of the sector.A sixth major,the
Kerry Group,was just outside the top thirty in 1979 but was to become,in
the 80's,the leader of the industry and the first group to become a
public limited company with a stock exchange quotation.
In spite of its rapid expansion during the 70's the dairy sector was
still far from reaching its full potential. In common with the rest of
the agriculture a very high proportion of the sector's exports continued
to go out in "unprocessed or slightly processed form thus giving low
off-farm employment"(O'Connor,1986;53). A dairy marketing board,An Bord
Bainne,had been set up by the government in 1961 as part of the First
Programme for Economic Expansion. An Bord Bainne had succeeded in
upgrading the image and value of Irish butter on the important UK
market in the 60's through branding and promoting it under the Kerrygold
label. However,the traditional focus on production and commodities and
the lack of attention to the changing needs of the consumer,and to the
attendant oportunities for adding value through further processing and
new product development,remained major weaknesses throughout the dairy
sector and indeed throughout the whole of Irish agriculture. Ironically,
therefore,the very benefits that the CAP provided in the 70's may well
have retarded the development within the industry of a more market-led,
consumer-oriented approach:
"..the predominant activity of the Irish food processing sector in the
cattle and the milk area continues to be in the activity of first
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handling and first stage processing of farm products. .Undoubtedly it
has been influenced significantly by the nature of the EC intervention
and export mechanisms,and the high degree of risk-avoidance which
could be derived from the apparently open-ended availability of the
EC supports during the past decade"(Lucey,1984;1-2).
The situation with regard to cattle,the other major sector,was
disappointing.This sector expanded at the beginning of the decade but
went into decline after the crisis in the the world cattle industry in
in 1974 with the result that "the cattle sector today may be even more
fragmented, uncoordinated and residual than a decade ago"(Cox&Kearney,
1983;181).Farm incomes,which throughout the 60's had been at or less
than 85% of the average industrial wage,rose to 112% in 1973,suffered a
setback to 71% in 1974 as a result of the oil and cattle crises,rose
steadily again to exceed parity in 1977 and 1978,only to plummet after
the second oil crisis to below 60%.The outpacing of input costs
over price increases,as a result of the comparatively high inflation
rate in the country,has been the major depressant on farm income levels.
Farm structure remained an intractable problem. There was little
movement towards consolidations into larger,more economic,units. There
were 289500 holdings in 1960 and by 1980 this had only reduced to
263600.Average farm size had increased by only 2.8 acres in the same
period(Cox&Kearney,1983;158-82).
Capital investment by farmers increased dramatically up to 1978 and
then fell off subsequently,reflecting the trend in farm incomes.
In fact the increase in farm incomes up to 1978 had encouraged farmers
to take on repayment commitments not just for farm modernisation but for
land purchase and for home improvements. The sudden and rapid
deterioration in their income position after 1979 led to repayments
difficulties throughout the sector and to real hardship for some farm
families and for the economies of their local communities:
"Even in retrospect it is difficult to appreciate the havoc which this
set-back brought on an economy highly dependent on agriculture.In 1978
farmers were on top of the world, building new houses ,buying
machinery, borrowing for investment,spending freely in the local towns
and generating large-scale employment in the service sector. Two years
later they were on their knees and had taken with them all those
depending on their spending"(O'Connor,1986;52).
This dramatic downward change in farmer fortunes in the early 80's,in
sharp contrast to the optimism and almost euphoria of the late 70's,was
clearly associated within the farming community to adverse world trends
and not to EEC membership. The farming community remain among the
strongest supporters of continued EEC membership in the country,as was
clearly shown in the 1987 referendum on the Single European Act.Whatever
their recent disappointments,they clearly perceive that the best
prospects for the development of agriculture in Ireland still lie within
the Community.
It was hoped that entry into the EEC would give new impetus to the
country's industrial development. The major transition in industrial
strategy had already taken place in the 50's when Ireland turned away
from protectionism. The first major effort to industrialise had,as we
have already seen earlier,taken place under a policy of protectionism
which had operated from the 30's through to the 50's. Under this regime
there developed a number of indigeneous firms mainly serving the home
market,side by side with some foreign-owned establishments,mostly
British subsidiaries,which had been set up to preserve their sales in
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Ireland following the advent of protectionism. By the early 1950's the
country had already begun to develop a more outward looking approach to
industrial development. Incentives were made available to manufacturing
industry,in the form of capital grants and tax relief on profits,for
projects that were export-oriented. Furthermore,it was in this period
that efforts were begun to attract foreign entreprise into the country.
There had also been,by this time,a considerable development of the
infrastructure necessary for industrialisation through the Public
Capital Programme carried out by the first inter-party government in
the late 40's:
"By the time that T.K. Whitaker's classic work,Economic Development,
welded these measures together into a coherent framework,the
foundations of the new industrial policy were already in place,though
the dismantling of the old had not yet started"(Kennedy,1986;41).
With the publication of 'Economic Development' and the development of
the programmes for economic expansion there was a sustained growth in
manufacturing output,the volume of which doubled between 1960 and 1973.
The industries which expanded during rapidly during this period were the
electrical equipment,metals,minerals and chemicals industries while many
of the traditional industries,like clothing and footwear,which grew up
under protection,lagged behind. In 1969 the Industrial Development
Authority(IDA),the state agency responsible for seeking new industrial
projects,was significantly given the added responsibility for funding
them as well.Under the dynamic leadership of Michael Killeen,the IDA
became a model for other countries seeking to accelerate their
industrial development through the attraction of foreign investment.
By the late 60's Ireland's entry into the EEC was imminent. This
provided a new attraction to would-be foreign investors and the IDA
proceeded to market it with great skill. The attraction was the prospect
of free access to a market of 250 million people.
By 1980 foreign-owned firms in Ireland employed about 80000 people which
was close to 34% of the total manufacturing workforce. Over the 1973-80
period there was a net increase of 22000 jobs in foreign-owned industry.
Over the same period the net increase in jobs in indigenous industry was
only around 2000(Telesis,1980;18).These figures illustrate the
importance of foreign-owned industry in Irish industrial development,
in terms of both expansion in industrial output,particularly for export,
and in industrial employment. The main growth industries were the
electrical and electronics industries,especially the computer sector,
and the pharmaceuticals industry. By 1980 there were,for example,over 70
multinational companies in the electrical and electronics industries
operating in the country and employing over 10000 people. By the mid
1980's manufacturing production in Ireland was four times the 1960 level
and had replaced agriculture as the dominant source of exports. As
Kennedy(1986;40) aptly remarked this was "quite a revolution" and due
mainly to the large influx of foreign-owned industry into the country
over two decades. Moreover,through the agency of the IDA,the government
used the strategy of attracting in foreign projects for regional
development by the use of selective incentives. This meant that the
industrialisation of the 60's and 70's,with all the concommittant
changes to the pattern of social life,was a nationwide phenomenon.
The growth in manufacturing employment and the growth in GNP that
occurred throughout the 70's would not have been possible without the
contribution of foreign-owned industries. Yet,by the early 1980's,there
were already serious misgivings in many quarters about continued
106
efficacy of the industrial strategy of the 70's. Firstly,many of the
major spin-off developmental benefits expected from bringing in the
foreign projects did not materialise. Many of the overseas companies
confined their Irish operations to manufacturing only. They,therefore,
did little to contribute towards the development of native skills in
technology and marketing which as Kennedy(1986;49) points out are the
"key elements of self-sustaining growth" for any developing economy.
Furthermore,in many cases these companies were only weakly linked into
the native economy,sourcing many of their raw materials from abroad.The
difficulty in this case was to a large extent a structural one.In order
to service the sub-supply needs of many of the high technology foreign
firms located in the country,it would take "a stronger corporate
structure than is typically found in Ireland..to promote a skilled
foundry,computer cabinet operation,or tool-maker"(Telesis,1980;16-18).
A second major weakness was the comparative neglect of the indigeneous
sector of Irish industry. While some indigenous industries were expected
to dissappear under full free trade conditions it was hoped that this
would be more than offset by others that would respond to the
opportunities offered by the enlarged market. Some indigenous companies
in essentially non-traded areas like Smurfits in packaging,and
Cement-Roadstone in cement,have become large multinational businesses in
their own right.However being in non-traded goods('goods in which the
productivity improvements that can be achieved through increased
production scale are not great enough to offset the increased costs of
distributing the product to a foreign country':Telesis,1980;4) these
companies have grown successfully through overseas investment in similar
businesses rather than through exporting from their home bases.
Activity in many of the traded goods indigenous industries has ceased
altogether or has been drastically curtailed.For example,over 10000 jobs
were lost in the textiles,clothing and footwear industries over the
1973-80 period. The result was that by 1980 the exporting sector of the
Irish economy was severely imbalanced with foreign-owned firms
accounting for almost 75% of all Irish exports.
The major failure in the Irish industrial policy of the 60' and 70's was
in not focussing on the need to build up a selection of strong Irish
companies geared to world markets.According to the NESC commissioned
review on Irish industrial policy carried out by the Telesis Consultancy
Group:
"Successful indigenously-owned industry is. .essential for a high income
economy.No country has successfully achieved high incomes without a
strong base of indigenously owned resource-based or manufacturing
companies in traded businesses"(Telesis,1980;26).
Ireland is now being forced to - look towards the development of its
indigenous industries as the most important route to further economic
growth. This strategy is needed to provide a more secure foundation for
ongoing economic development than exists at present. In any event
the prospects for attracting more and more foreign projects are
declining because there are fewer around in the uncertain 80's and there
are more countries competing for the few that are there,thus increasing
significantly the cost of continuing with this strategy. However a
strategy of focussing on the development of selected strong indigenous
industries on which to build for further economic growth will be
expensive in the short term and will demand political steadfastness to
see it through:
"We staked our money on the hare of foreign entreprise rather than on
the tortise of native industry. .Yet the race is not always to the
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swiftest.The approach produced quick but not lasting results...the
industrial programme failed to dynamise the largest section of
manufacturing-the domestic industries.It did not go far enough in
developing native skills in technology and marketing,the key elements
of self-sustaining growth.The foundations of the industrial
superstructure therefore lacked depth"(Kennedy,1986;48-9).
The Political Scene in the 70's
After the Arms Crisis in 1970,and the departure of the more hard line
ministers from Lynch's government,the two main parties in the South
were able to maintain a bi-partisan approach to Northern Ireland policy.
As Farrell(1986;145) remarked:
"The North has sometimes been allowed to become a football in the games
that political parties play;it is not a definitive way of
distinguishing between the teams".
Furthermore,on the other major political issue of the decade,the EEC
referendum, both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael urged their followers to
support entry into the Community. By the early 70's,with the post-
revolutionary generation dominant in both major parties,'bread and
butter' economic issues,and less frequently social issues,came to
dominate in the competition for electoral support. Even in their
approach to these issues no significant ideological differences were
discernable. This prompted Gallagher(1983;273)to observe that "the 'end
of ideology' dawned in Ireland before ideology had even arrived".
Both main parties now compete for a large agreed middle ground of the
electorate and are reluctant to clarify the basic differences between
them.They offer the electorate only a choice of management not of policy
or of ideology.Image and promotion,the tools that professional
marketers use to try to differentiate essentially homogenous
products ,have become the new tactics of the political parties in the
70's and 80's.
By 1973 Fianna Fail had been the governing party for an uninterrupted
period of 16 years.The trauma in the party following the Arms Crisis
and the departure of four government ministers did not force the party
out of office.In fact the Lynch administration went on to record some
notable successes even at the height of the Northern troubles,the most
significant being the winning of the EEC referendum in 1972. However the
Arms Crisis and the open split within the party over Northern Ireland
policy had damaged the party in the eyes of the electorate.When Fine
Gael were able to form a pre-election coalition with the Labour party
and together present themselves . to the electorate as The National
Coalition,with a specific programme for government,they secured a
mandate to govern in the 1973 General Election. The new Taoiseach was
Liam Cosgrave and among his cabinet appointments was Garret FitzGerald
as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Cosgrave administration survived
until 1977.The optimism that accompanied the country's entry into the
EEC in 1973 was quickly checked by the first Oil Crisis later that
year. EEC entry had been expected to provide the opportunity for
continued and possibly accelerated economic growth.A period of rapid
inflation followed on directly due to the unexpected major increase in
oil prices.The Cosgrave administration took strict remedial measures to
deflate the economy and these,coupled with the temporary depression in
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world demand immediately following the Oil Crisis,were a brake on
further economic expansion. Following the application of the economic
'hairshirt' for a couple of years the remedial measures began to take
effect and the government decided to go to the country in 1977,one year
short of its full term.
The 1977 General Election has a special significance in modern Irish
affairs. The Cosgrave administration was most vulnerable on the issue of
the economy.Following the years of the 'hairshirt' there was a lot of
pent up demand in the economy and a widespread impatience to return to
economic growth. Fianna Fail sensed this prevailing mood and in their
manifesto for government,subsequently referred to as the 1977 Manifesto,
they presented the electorate with a reflationary economic package
designed to stimulate economic activity by stimulating domestic demand.
Fianna Fail was,after all,the party of Sean Lemass and the economic
expansion of the 60's and the electorate endorsed the Fianna Fail
strategy by returning them to office with a majority of over 20 seats,
their best electoral performance ever. The introduction of economic
programming by Lemass in 1958 had,as we have seen,heralded the end of a
form of economic nationalism based on self-sufficiency.However,
according to Neary(1984;71) the very success of the Lemass approach
"became associated with a different but equally dangerous form of
economic nationalism;a tendency to exaggerate our ability to control
our own destiny..always behind our approach to planning there lurked
dangers; the danger that we would neglect the external constraints
facing our small open economy; the danger that we would not be
flexible enough to respond to changes in these constraints; and the
danger that we would build up expectations of continued growth which
could not be realised".
All the elements in the Fianna Fail strategy had been adopted by
previous governments,the reliance on foreign borrowing,the stimulation
of employment through increased government expenditure and the attempt
to generate confidence and a climate for investment within the private
sector through stimulating demand.What was new in 1977 was that all of
these elements were brought together and pushed further than in the
past:
"It was a brave strategy but a risky one.It gambled on continued
economic growth in the rest of the world; and it gambled on Irish
workers being willing to accept lower wage increases than our
competitor countries,so that we could increase our share of growing
world trade. Regrettably,both bets lost. In particular,the second oil
crisis of 1979 plunged the Western World into the worst recession
since before the Second World War.Our exports faltered but imports,
fuelled by foreign borrowing,continued to grow"(Neary,1984;73).
As a result,Ireland entered the 1980's faced with a prolonged recession
in world demand coupled with an unsustainable level of foreign
borrowings,reducing considerably the country's flexibility to deal with
the challenges of the new low growth environment.
i
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NATIONAL RETRENCHMENT AND REALIGNMENT
- Ireland in the 1980's
Ireland,which had been undergoing a major transition since the late
50's,has had to face some formidable challenges during the 1980's. World
trade went into recession,deepening into depression,in the wake of the
second oil crisis. The situation was rendered more difficult in the
Irish case because the country entered the depression of the 1980's with
a high level of public borrowing. As the decade progressed the state of
the public finances steadily deteriorated,reaching critical proportions
by late 1986. For much of the decade the country's economy was
in the grips of a vicious downward spiral that successive governments
seemed to be incapable of arresting and turning around. The low level
of economic activity,brought on through the general recession,provided
little scope for offsetting the rising burden of debt interest on
the revenue side of the public finances. In fact,the rising level of
public borrowing tended to drive direct taxation levels and general
interest rates upwards,which in turn only tended to act as further
depressant on the overall level of activity in the economy.
The ongoing burden of trying to service a rising debt progressively
reduced the government's room for manoeuver. The possibilities for
using fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth at home by taking
advantage of any recovery in world trade became progressively
diminished as the decade wore on. It was not until after the General
Election of early 1987 that any real prospect emerged of turning the
national economy around on the road to recovery.
The debt to GNP ratio grew from 29% in 1976 to a level of 70% in
1985(Mc Aleese,1986;22),much of it denominated in strong foreign
currency. The development of this situation can be seen to have
originated in the deliberate decision by the Lynch government in 1972
to abandon the convention of not running a deficit in the current
budget(Whitaker,1986;14). The quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973
was bound to have a major depressing effect on an economy such as
Ireland's with its high level of imports of oil and oil-dependent raw
materials. So in order to mitigate the effect and allow for
'controlled' deflationary adjustment the Cosgrave Government moved to
protect living standards,employment and social services by increased
borrowing for current expenditure. As the economy began to recover in
the mid-70's the Cosgrave administration returned to more conventional
budgetary strategies.However a new Fianna Fail government swept into
office in 1977 "committed to a political manifesto and ancillary
economic programmes of irrational optimism involving much higher current
deficits than ever before"(Whitaker,1986;14). By the time the second oil
crisis had arrived in 1979 "we had already been so misusing our
borrowing potential that we had little leeway for stimulating the
economy when genuine need arose"(Whitaker,1986;15).
Tackling the major problems of the high level of public debt,the low
level of economic activity and high unemployment proved to be difficult
for a number of reasons. Included in these reasons were the changes that
had taken place in the structure of the Irish economy since the 1960's,
the resistance and inertia of sectional interests,the lack of any strong
national aspirations or cultural bonding,and,up to early 1987,the lack
of strong and imaginative political leadership. It is to a consideration
of these issues that we now turn.
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Structural changes in the economy
The economy of Ireland has changed considerably since the abandonment of
the self-sufficiency policy in the late 50's. It has always been a small
economy in international terms.It is now more open and more closely
integrated with the world economy than at any time in its history. In
this,of course,it reflects a wider trend towards economic integration in
the world generally. It is also a direct consequence of the economic
policies pursued by successive governments since 1958 which involved a
redirection of national economic strategy towards economic development
based on export-led growth,fuelled by domestic and foreign investment.
The culmination of this progression towards a more open and integrated
economy came when Ireland joined the EEC in 1972. McAleese(1986;19)
has summarised the position as it stands in the late 1980's as follows:
"The fact of integration is indisputable. .We depend on foreign
countries for most of our industrial raw materials and components,
for four-fifths of our machinery, for necessities such as oil and coal
and luxuries such as tropical fruits and wines. Our dependence on
overseas markets is not confined to the exchange of goods. Foreign
manufacturing subsidiaries,for example,account for four out of every
ten jobs in Irish industry. .The Irish government has borrowed
extensively abroad.. .Private individuals,both resident and
non-resident,also move capital in and out of the country in large
amounts every year.Irish capital is internationally mobile.So also is
Irish labour.."
Irish exports as a % of GNP rose from 25% in 1960 to over 60% in 1985
and international trade links became more extensive as the UK market
became less dominant in the export pattern,its share of Irish exports
falling from 75% in 1960 to less than 35% in 1984.
The effects of this integration are being manifest right throughout the
economy as external developments become an increasingly more important
factor in the decision making of Irish economic units. For producers and
processors in the agricultural sector the major development in the
1980's has been the progressive change in the Common Agricultural Policy
of the EEC. By the late 70's the Community was more than self-sufficient
in beef and dairying,the two major Irish agricultural commodities.It was
also in surplus in sugar,another commodity of importance to Irish
agriculture. The price support system that was aimed at giving the
marginal producer a reasonable living off the land was encouraging the
efficient producers to overproduce. Large surplusses were building up in
many of these commodities,the so-called beef and butter mountains and
milk and wine lakes,putting enormous pressure on the Community budget.
The costs of supporting the CAP were rising rapidly at just the time
when the world economy was entering the worst depression since the
1930's. The Community reacted by first reducing the price supports and
later by imposing production quotas on a country basis for each
commodity in surplus.Penalties in the form of 'superlevies' were imposed
to discourage overproduction.This development has forced a reorientation
among Irish producers and processors,however belatedly,away from the
production of commodities towards higher valued-added branded goods.
For many food processors this involves a major change in overall
strategy from a production to a marketing emphasis, and for many primary
producers a change from production systems that simply maximise the
the volume of output to systems that focus on maximising the price/cost
relationship through variability and flexibility in production.
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For Irish manufacturers generally the effect of increasing integration
has been two-fold. It has presented them with an oportunity to expand by
having access to wider markets. However it has simultaneously exposed
them on their home market to the full winds of competition from abroad.
Generally they need to be able to successfully defend their home market
in order to generate the cash flow necessary to fund the development
of export markets,which is a costly exercise even with the removal of
tarriff restrictions. For many indigenous firms this has meant that
European and international referents have now become the standard for
cost competitiveness and many have had to embark on major
rationalisation and capital investment programmes in order to stay
competitive.The changes have been major in many industries like brewing
and distilling,and very drastic in others like clothing and footwear:
"The extent of import penetration has been remarkable.It is still not
widely appreciated that imports account for three-quarters of domestic
expenditure on clothing and footwear.In 1959,the import share of
expenditure products was negligible. So also at that time were exports
of clothing and footwear whereas now these industries export over
two-thirds of their output.."(McAleese,1986;24)
We saw earlier that this transition was painful and costly in terms of
firm failures and job losses in the clothing and footwear industry.
As well as having become much more integrated with the world economy
generally,the underlying structure of the Irish economy had changed
significantly over the 60's and 70's.Agriculture's share of GDP dropped
from 22% to 15% over the period 1960-79.Industry's share rose from 28%
to 38% over the same period,while that of services remained at
around 48%. Employment in agriculture fell from 397500 to 229000 from
1961 to 1978,while the numbers employed in industry grew from 257000 to
319000 and employment in services grew from 416000 to 500000 over the
same period. Of those at work the proportion classified as employees
rose from 56% in 1961 to 69% in 1979.The proportion of those classified
as professionals or managers rose from 7.6% of the total employed to
13.3% over the same period. The class profile of those in the employee
category changed from 36% middle class,20% skilled manual workers and
44% unskilled manual workers to 50%,29% and 21% respectively from 1961
1979.Rottman & O'Connell(1982;63)concluded from these data that:
"By 1979,Ireland had clearly ceased to be characterised as petit
bourgeois:the predominant categories were of large scale employers and
of well-qualified employees.. .wage bargaining in a class system
sharply differentiated by skills and credentials became the dominant
factor in determining one's life chances"
The organisational hierarchy had become a major gradient in social
status and progress up the hierarchy more dependent on merit based on
scholarly and technical accomplishment as criteria for social
evaluation.The importance of training and education in society were thus
enhanced. In this major readjustment in the social and economic order
there was a small but significant number who had been marginalised in
the process:
"Even in 1979,a substantial share of the workforce was in residual
classes stranded in the course of industrial development,especially
farmers on marginal holdings and labourers without skills. .People in
these marginal categories have little oportunity to transfer to the
more favourably placed categories;their childrens chances are little
better,perpetuating marginality within families"
(Rottman & O'Conne11,1982;72).
The depression of the 1980's brought with it a progressive increase
in the numbers falling into this residual category.
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The rapid economic growth of the 60' and the 70's was accompanied by a
major increase in the size of public sector and in public spending.The
overall numbers employed in the public service increased from 182000 in
1960 to 295000 in 1980. The number of government departments had risen
from 15 to 20.0ver the 1958-82 period the number of senior executives
in the civil service at the level of Assistant Principalship or higher,
the administrative cadre,had risen from 386 to 1490 while those
concerned with overall coordination of the service,what Barrington(1982;
98) has classed as "the thinking part of the administrative side of
government" which included the departments of the Taoiseach,of Finance
and of the Public Service,had grown from 46 to 363 administrative staff
over the same period. Public authorities current spending had risen from
24% of GNP to 42% over the years from 1958 to 1978. Growth in the public
sector has been a characteristic of the post-war economic development of
most western societies. In Ireland advantage was taken of the economic
expansion of the 60's and 70's to extend the range of social services in
the community to bring them closer to the levels then prevailing in many
economically advanced countries.
The example of the welfare state in Britain was a major influence on the
thinking of the policy makers at home and on the public,particulary
since Northern Ireland was part of that welfare state.As the economy
in the South grew there was an inherent pressure within the system to
close the gap between the level of services available within the two
jurisdictions on the island. There were,consequently,major expansions in
the areas of health,education and social welfare. Health and education
are labour intensive and much of this labour involves highly-skilled,
and highly paid professionals, with a high level of bargaining power
within the community.The level of social welfare benefits had also risen
in line with the country's growing affluence in the 60' and early 70's.
As Ireland entered the 80's,the level of dependency in the community was
growing.There was a net increase in population over the two decades
since 1960 of 20%.Yet the relative size of the working cohort had
decreased from 43.8% to 41.4% during the same period.The under 25 age
cohort had increased from 45% to 47.9% over this time.As the depression
of the 1980's deepened job losses in the private sector accelerated and
employment prospects for those arriving on the job market for the first
time dwindled.A contracting tax base was being saddled with a
progressively expanding social welfare burden.
One of the major manifestations of the growth of government in Irish
society during the 60'and 70's was the proliferation of new state
agencies. Around 40 new state-sponsored bodies had been created during
this time with responsibilities ranging from the marketing of Irish
dairy produce abroad to the improvement in the public's health.
State-sponsored bodies have served the state well in many areas and were
in the van of economic development when private investment proved shy.
However there were according to Walsh(1986;65) some obvious drawbacks:
"The smaller agencies have high overheads and a significant portion of
the money allocated to some projects is absorbed by the expenses of
running the agencies set up to administer them. The size and
complexity of the larger agencies makes them autonomous empires ruled
by executives who although paid from public moneys are not directly
answerable to the elected representatives of the people. Public sector
bodies that fail to perform the tasks they were created to discharge
have not been closed down.Agencies that have successfully done the job
for which they were established remain in existence long after they
have outlived their usefulness"
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Lemass who had pioneered the use of the semi-state mechanism to such
great effect in the early development of the economy had been
concerned,as we reviewed earlier,about how to ensure the continued
economic performance of these companies and of how best to motivate and
control that performance in the national interest. His warning of the
need for continuous monitoring and reassessment in this regard went
largely unheeded until the late 70's. According to Bristow(1982;173)"a
cosy and complacent relationship developed over the years between a
state-sponsored body and the department responsible for it" in many
cases.
This cosy,arms length,relationship was disturbed in the late 70's
when some of the commercial state-sponsored bodies like CSET and
NET began to show serious financial losses. The Joint Oireachtais
Committee on state-sponsored bodies conducted detailed investigations on
behalf of the legislature into the affairs and prospects of 20
state-sponsored bodies between February 1979 and May 1981.The Joint
Committee in their investigative process had recourse to independent
expertise in their analyses of these companies and were able to subject
members of the boards of these companies to public,oral
cross-examination which was a new experience for most of them. The
financial difficulties of the companies coupled with the growing
realisation that tighter control on public expenditure was becoming
imperative led to a major change in the general attitude within and
without government circles towards these bodies in the 80's.According to
Bristow(1982;173):
"..there can be no doubt that the general financial environment has
generated-in political and official circles and in the public media-
an increased questioning as to whether Irish society is getting value
for money from its state-sponsored sector"
Since these bodies were established on an empirical,pragmatic basis with
no overtones of any socialist ideology the issue of their privatisation
at some future time was always an open one.It is a possibility that is
being discussed more and more in the later half of the 1980's.
Tackling the problems in the Irish economy since the 1979 oil crisis and
the onset of world depression in the 80's has involved unpalatable
choices. The large public sector grew up at a time when prolonged
depressions were believed to be a thing of the past.There might be short
downturns in the business cycle but the secondary trend was believed to
be inexorably in the direction of increased prosperity. This belief made
it easier to have recourse to government borrowing as a temporary
expedient which could protect living standards in the short term and be
phased out when economic growth returned. It was an acceptable
'Keynesian' buffer to smooth Out the peaks and throughs of the trade
cycle. When the recession of the 80's became prolonged depression the
government was faced with a number of unpalatable options,each one worse
than the last politically. It could continue to run a current deficit
which would buy some time in the short term but which could not continue
indefinitely.Sooner or later the accumulation of government debt would
leave the country overgeared,where additional debt raising capacity
would be taken up in servicing the current debt. Secondly it could raise
the levels of direct and indirect taxation but sooner or later the
removal of spending power from the economy would lead to diminishing
returns.Thirdly it could prune back current government spending to a
more sustainable percentage of GNP by economies in operation, cuts in
services, cuts in transfer payments and cuts in public sector
employment. The most effective solution was probably the most
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unpalatable one,i.e. government cutbacks. This option has proved to be
extremely difficult in the Ireland of the 80's and was only finally
pursued with determination after all the others had been tried and had
failed.
Weak cultural bonds and strong sectional interests
The lack of strong bonding agents in Irish society,together with the
rise of strong sectional interests since the 60's have both made it
difficult for political leaders to mobilise the 'national will' in
support of unpalatable measures. The dominant traditional bonding
agents of nationalism and religion have been much weakened over the
period since 1958. The aspiration to national unity is still relatively
strong among the Southern Irish but,as we saw earlier,the commitment to
it is no longer absolute. It is conditional and much weaker than the
aspiration(O'Malley,1983;97). In fact both the aspiration and the
commitment have been progressively weakening over the years. According
to a recent survey carried out for the Irish Times(1/9/87) the
percentage of people in the Republic that still aspired to national
re-unification had fallen from 76% to 67% over the 1983-87 period while
the percentage of people that have come to expect that re-unification
will never happen had risen from 39% to 49% over the same period. Not
surprisingly,therefore,it is no longer as easy to link the national
aspiration for unity to economic sacrifice as De Valera was able to
do in the 30's and 40's,nor is it easy to use it as a motive force for
national entreprise as Lemass was able to do in the 1958-65 period.
Furthermore,while the committment to national unity has become
conditional,yet the 26 county Republic is still widely regarded as
being incomplete,as a transient state only,and not in any fundamental
sense a 'nation' in itself capable of evoking deep feelings of
identification and overriding loyalty. As Fennell(1984;30-1) put it:
"Our first self-definition as a nation began to crumble in the 50's,
was assaulted throughout the 60's,and faded away in the 70's. All that
is left in its place,as a public image of Irish identity,is the
factual Twenty Six County state,without any cultural or ideological
overtones other than 'democratic'"
Morever the efforts to revive a Gaelic culture,especially to revive the
language,have largely failed. A national identity based on a distinct
Gaelic culture is no longer seen as a realistic prospect and can not be
appealed to with much confidence in any attempt to mobilise a national
effort.The cultural bonding power of religion has been considerably
diluted over the years. The weakening of the authoritarian image of the
church after Vatican II,the growing empiricism of a more educated laity
towards the development of Catholic social thinking, and the spread of
materialism,secularism and pluralism in the wake of economic
development and advances in telecommunications have all contributed to
this dilution.As Garvin(1982;31-2) has observed:
"The process of secularisation,familiar elsewhere in the west,occurred
belatedly but rapidly in Ireland,and the Church lost,almost without
realising it,the role of intellectual and cultural arbiter that it
once had. .The demise of the Church's secular leadership has left
political society in the Republic in a curiously leaderless condition
...there is no large group of people in the society who have the trust
' of the population,and can get its cooperation for medium- or long-term
goals..."
Finally,the 'pecularly weak sense of identity by Eurpean criteria'
that Lee(1982;13) saw as characterising the Ireland of the 80's has
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continued to be further weakened by the unrelenting shift taking place
in educational emphasis away from the arts and humanities towards
business,technology and the professions which elevates the material,
the empirical and the particular at the expense of the spiritual,the
cultural and the universal.
One of the outcomes of the two decades of economic growth has been the
development of strong sectional interests that have become deeply
embedded in the emergent socio-economic order.Many of these interests
are vocational and anxious to preserve the privileges that they have
derived from the enlarged public sector. Others are representative
organisations capable of mobilising substantial sectional political
clout in pursuit of their claims to a share of the public purse.Still
others are professional groups which inflate the value of their services
to the community by keeping their proprietary skills artificially in
short supply.Commenting on these interests Lee(1980;24) said that:
"It would be hard to argue that even the most selfish groups of
workers,like the maintenance men who went on strike in 1969,exhibit
a cruder moral sense than the most selfish sectors of other, more
affluent groups,like those veterinarian surgeons laden down with their
trophies from the battle against brucellosis,or the big farmers
wending their way in sombre procession to the poor house in
Brussels,or the doyens of the Incorporated Law Society striving might
and main to ensure fair entry into their profession,or the disciples
of Hippocrates deluging the Revenue Commissioners with their tax
returns.."
And yet others are state agencies that have over their histories
developed and consolidated for themselves positions of considerable
autonomy and power in both public policy formulation and in the
acquisition and allocation of public resources.According to
Farrell(1986;148-9):
"The growth of government has been accompanied by what can be described
as a new corporatism,the development of institutions and practices
through which ministers,civil servants and representatives of the
great vocational and sectional interests decide policy and conduct
administration..(but)..Legitimising their role has encouraged a feudal
tendency for powerful interest groups to challenge and reject openly
the legal decisions of government and parliament.Far from inducing
some sense of common purpose,the new corporatism has encouraged the
the pursuit of narrow self-interest;agencies created to stimulate the
economy or tackle particular social issues have become vested
interests pursuing their own organisational goals".
Political weakness
To take the tough decisions necessary to restore order to the public
finances,given the comparative weakness of the bonding agents and the
comparative strength of sectional interests in Irish society,would have
demanded strong political leadership. For a variety of reasons this
leadership was lacking up the early 1987. The Irish political scene
since 1979 has been dominated by two personalities Charles Haughey and
Garret FitzGerald. The large parliamentary majority that returned Jack
Lynch to Dail Eireann as Taoiseach in 1977 proved later to be a problem
for him. Lynch had been forced to bring Haughey back from the political
wilderness while Fianna Fail were still in opposition because it was
clear that Haughey was still a major electoral asset for Fianna Fail in
his constituency.When Lynch formed his administration in 1977 Haughey
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was given the Health portfolio. Haughey,the consumate politician,used
his portfolio with customary flair and imagination and reestablished
for himself a national profile. A number of Lynch's own backbenchers
began to publicly challenge his policy on Northern Ireland,something
they could not have risked had the parliamentary majority been small.
Lynch's authority was been slowly undermined and he brought his intended
retirement forward by some months. The leadership contest that followed
was the delayed showdown between George Colley and Charles Haughey which
had only been averted in 1966 by the entry of Lynch as a compromise
candidate.
Colley was Lynch's 'groomed' successor and had the support of
almost all of the cabinet. Haughey,however,had used Lynch's large
majority to muster sufficient support among the swelled ranks of the
backbenchers and forced a contest.The internal split which the party had
tried to avoid in selecting Lynch in 1966 was deeper than ever after the
1979 contest. Haughey became Taoiseach. The mistrust and antipathy for
Haughey was still strong among many of Lynch's former cabinet.Within
days Colley had declared publicly that he would give his loyalty to
the office of Taoiseach but not to the man. Between 1979 and 1982
there were three concerted attempts to remove Haughey from the
leadership,all of which failed. The mistrust of Haughey that was evident
within Fianna Fail at this time was a legacy mainly from the 1970 Arms
Crisis.This mistrust was also reflected in the country at large.Haughey
led Fianna Fail into four general elections since 1979 and did not
secure an overall majority in any of them. He consistently lagged his
party in popularity in the opinion polls and was,if anything,an
electoral liability to his party up to recently. His survival as leader
of Fianna Fail,under these circumstances,was eloquent testamony to his
considerable political skill.
The other main personality in Irish politics since 1979 has been Garret
FitzGerald. FitzGerald was the uncontested choice as successor to Liam
Cosgrave when Cosgrave retired after the 1977 election defeat. By the
late 70's the ideological differences between the major parties was
practically non-existent as we had noted earlier. The Irish electorate
were being offered a choice of management rather than of policies,and
image and promotion became the major competitive weapons in election
campaigns.In this regard the Cosgrave persona had been a liability.
FitzGerald on the other hand was a personality that could be cleverly
packaged by the public relations men and sold to the electorate.
In particular he was articulate and comfortable on radio and television,
which by the late 70's had become the major media through which the
electorate could become most directly acquainted with the choice of
management that was on offer. FitzGerald became a major electoral
asset to Fine Gael and was ideally suited to the new style of
presidential politics that has characterised Irish electioneering since
1977. Between 1977 and the next general election in 1981, FitzGerald
brought about a radical reorganisation of Fine Gael at constituency
level and fashioned a party machine that was capable of rivalling the
famous Fianna Fail machine in the logistics of electioneering. Under
FitzGerald's leadership, Fine Gael was to achieve its highest ever
parliamentary representation and seemed at last,in the early 80's,to be
heading for a situation where it could hope to acceed to government in
its own right at some time in the near future. In contrast to Haughey,
FitzGerald had proved to be consistently more popular with the
electorate in the opinion polls than his party,and was a clear electoral
asset.
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In spite of the undoubted ability of both men neither Haughey nor
FitzGerald managed to secure the kind of political support that would
have allowed either of them to implement the tough decisions necessary
to restore order and strength to the public finances. Haughey went on
national television early in 1980 to alert the general public to the
need for tough economic measures in the wake of the 1979 oil crisis.
However,in spite of this accurate assessment of the situation he did not
take the tough action required. Bedevilled by the split within his own
party arising out of his accession to the leadership and conscious of
his low personal standing in the opinion polls he evidently did not feel
secure enough in his own position to be willing to take the political
risks that would be inherent in any tough approach to the public
finances. He did not want to jeopardise his ambition to win his first
general election as the new leader of his party and to secure his
position as Taoiseach by popular mandate. In the event,the general
election that he called in June 1981 provided an indecisive result.
Though Haughey was not expected to preserve the large overall majority
that Lynch had won for Fianna Fail in 1977,he failed to secure a
decisive result. His prospects were damaged by developments in the
North. The H-Block hunger strike,in which several hunger strikers
persevered to their deaths,led to a temporary wave of sympathy for the
strikers. This allowed Provisional Sinn Fein to achieve a rare electoral
success in the South. They put forward some of those on hunger strike as
candidates in the 1981 General Election in the Republic and managed to
take two seats,at the expense of Haughey's Fianna Fail,in the border
constituencies of Cavan-Monaghan and Louth.
FitzGerald had fought the 1981 election on a platform of fiscal
rectitude and achieved for Fine Gael its highest ever Dail
representation. He was still well short of an overall majority. He
entered a coalition arrangement with the Labour Party and,
with the conditional support of some left wing independents,managed
to form a government. This government fell in February 1982 when,
through political naivety,it failed to hold its independent support
for a tough budget. In the general election that followed the result was
once more indecisive. With the H-Block issue removed from this election
Haughey came close to an overall majority.However he only managed to
form a government by first entering into an expensive and much
publicised deal with the independent deputy representing Dublin's inner
city which involved a substantial commitment of scarce public funds
towards inner city renewal. The Haughey government fell in the Autumn of
1982 and a FitzGerald led coalition of Fine Gael and Labour came to
power with an overall majority.This administration continued in power
until January 1987. The period June 1981 to November 1982 saw three
general elections and three Changes of government.Because of the
delicate political balance in the country at this time the election
campaigns took on the appearance of 'dutch auctions' with both Haughey
and FitzGerald seeming to yield to special interests and to court
electoral popularity with unrealistic promises in their attempts to
secure and hold onto power.Fianna Fail,in their election manifesto of
November 1982,'The Way Forward' ,had clearly moved very close to the Fine
Gael policy of fiscal rectitude. The personal antipathy between Haughey
and FitzGerald,however,precluded any grand coalition of the two main
parties which might have provided a strong national government based on
a wide consensus among the electorate and with a strong enough electoral
mandate to implement tough economic measures in the face of deeply
embedded sectional interests. The inability of the system to produce a
decisive result and a strong government to deal resolutely with the post
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1979 depression and the manoeuverings and deals of the politicians who
were widely perceived to have put personal ambitions and personal
animosities before the national interest led to a growing
disillusionment and disenchantment among the public at large with both
the system and political leaders.These conditions were hardly conducive
towards any galvanising of the 'national will' behind tough and
necessary fiscal policies.
The FitzGerald coalition of 1982-87 had only limited success in dealing
with the public finances.Cutbacks in public services and/or in public
sector employment would always be difficult for the ideologically left
wing coalition partner to accept. Consequently FitzGerald was forced to
confine himself mainly to containment action on the public finances and
was politically unable to achieve the type of radical restructuring in
the fiscal area that he and his own party saw as imperative. The
government had already exhausted the softer options.Indirect taxation on
such items as drink and tobacco had passed the point of diminishing
returns.Direct taxation was unbearably high and also at the level of
diminishing returns.Public sector growth had been contained by
restrictions on new recruitment and cutbacks in non-pay expenditure.
Even with these containment measures the public sector was still too
large for the level of private sector activity in the economy to
support. 1987 was to be an election year in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. The senior partner in the FitzGerald
government,FitzGerald's own Fine Gael party,decided to adopt the
strategy of framing the January 1987 Budget in terms reflecting the full
force of Fine Gael policy on the economy,involving cutbacks in the
public service. Labour could not accept these cutbacks and the Dail was
disolved. FitzGerald went to the Country with his Budget as his
manifesto.
The February 1987 general election was indecisive but clearly
the Irish electorate were in no mood to tolerate a return to the 1981-82
situation that saw three elections in the space of 18 months. A new
party had emerged in Irish politics in the run up to election,the
Progressive Democrats,led by Desmond O'Malley. O'Malley had
unsuccessfully challenged Haughey for the leadership of Fianna Fail when
the latter had failed in the 1981 general election to return his party
to power and O'Malley had become the focus for the anti-Haughey faction
in Fianna Fail. His official break with Fianna Fail came in a public
disagreement with Haughey over policy on Northern Ireland. O'Malley
attracted sitting Dail deputies from both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael to
his new party which he hoped would break the sterile mold of civil war
politics in Southern Ireland for good.The new party had hoped to hold
the balance of power after the 1987 election.In the event it did not
achieve this but its credible performance at the polls underlined for
the two major parties the growing impatience of the electorate with
their inability to sort out the public finances and to get the economy
back a more secure footing. Haughey,as the leader of the largest party
in the Dail after the January election,managed to get himself elected
Taoiseach without an overall majority. FitzGerald pledged his party to
support Haughey in the Dail on the 1987 Budget if the latter adopted a
strategy on the public finances that was reasonably close to the Fine
Gael position. FitzGerald then resigned from the leadership of his party
within days after the start of new Dail and was succeeded by Alan Dukes.
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Programme for national recovery
The latest Haughey administration has,since its election in 1987,pursued
fiscal rectitude with all the zeal of the convert. No administration
since the fiscal difficulties began in the post 1979 period has been in
a stronger position politically to implement the tough measures
necessary to restore order to the public finances and to create the
conditions for a return to economic growth. Haughey has had a united
Fianna Fail behind him since his return to power. The former dissidents
have either left to join the Progressive Democrats or have finally
chosen to accept his leadership. Haughey does not have an overall
majority but there is a wide consensus of the Right in the Dail,which
has remained intact since the 1987 election,providing him with broad
support for a programme of tough measures to reduce and stabilise the
the national debt. The new leader of Fine Gael publicly extended the
support offered by FitzGerald for a economic strategy of fiscal
rectitude to cover at least two budgetary periods.
The performance of this latest Haughey administration over its first
twenty months in government has been impressive and contrasts sharply
with his earlier administration of 1981-82. The Government has
implemented two tough budgets since taking office and has achieved large
reductions in public spending. It has embarked on a major programme of
rationalisation of the public service which has included tough political
decisions involving closures,staff cut-backs and amalgamations,and it
has done it with a rare determination. In the Autumn of 1987 the
Government involved the 'social partners' ,the employer groups and the
unions,in the development of its Programme for National Recovery. In
this effort the Government widened the base of agreement for its
strategy that restoration of order to the public finances was a
necessary pre-condition for any return to economic growth. In
particular,the unions agreed to a programme of wage restraint and
rationalisation in the public service in return for a commitment by the
Government to prioritise the creation of sustainable employment once the
recovery got underway.
The restructuring of the public service which the Haughey administration
has embarked on is the most radical in its history. The growth and
elaboration of the public service,particularly of the semi-state sector,
was a prominent feature of the expansion in the economy that took place
over the 1958-79 period. Semi-state agencies that were set up to perform
specific development tasks in a certain periods tended to perpetuate
while new agancies were created to tackle new challenges. While there
was growth in the economy successive governments avoided the difficult
political task of pruning and rationalising the state sector. Even when
the economy went into prolonged recession successive governments up to
1987 did not feel politically strong enough to embark on the major
rationalisation of this structure that was long overdue. In less than
two years since the 1987 election the situation has changed
dramatically.The Haughey administration began its radical restructuring
of the semi-state sector by closing down one of the smaller agencies,An
Foras Forbatha. This move raised the level of reality within the rest of
the sector. At the same time the Government introduced a major voluntary
redundancy scheme across the board in the state sector to help in the
rationalisation process. An article in the Sunday Independent on
7/Feb/88,under the heading of 'The great shakeout' ,captured the
historical significance of the Government's overall rationalistion
moves:
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"The era of the all-powerful state promotional body is gone for
good..There is a new breeze blowing through the state sector which may
yet blow the most familiar names into oblivion..The budgets of the top
handful of agencies have been savaged..The fear engendered by the
abolition (of An Foras Forbatha) ensured that management (of the rest)
would take the cuts. .There is virtually no agency that has been
unaffected by job losses. .But the really big job losses were coming in
those agencies where the Government forced mergers".
Among the mergers being forced through by the Government in this major
rationalisation drive was the merger of An Foras Taluntais and ACOT,the
agricultural research institute and the agricultural advisory
service,into a new body called Teagasc. In the process the aggregate
budgets and staff complements of the all the merged entities,including
Teagasc,were being significantly slimmed down. As the Government
continues its drive to rationalise the public service and reduce the
overall level of public expenditure as a percentage of GNP, public
support for the privatisation of some semi-state companies has grown
apace. A poll in the Sunday Independent of 21/Aug/88 showed that 42%
of those polled favoured the privatisation of some state companies with
32% against and the remainder undecided and the leader writer of the
same issue was unequivocal in advocating that the "next step is
privatisation".
In the Autumn of 1988 the Programme for National Recovery has already
begun to show significant results. The Government have exceeded their
own ambitious targets for the reduction of the national debt and look
set to stabilise the debt as a percentage of GNP well ahead of target.
In late 1988 the country's inflation rate is running at under 2%,its
lowest for 25 years and well below the EEC average of 2.8%. Interest
rates have fallen as a result of the reduction in public spending
wrought by the two tough budgets since early 1987. More significantly,
however,domestic interest rates remain low in spite of the upward surge
in rates in Britain,the US and West Germany. Ireland's recent immunity
to the rise in international rates "has been little short of
revolutionary"(Maev-Ann Wren,Irish Times 13/Aug/88) and represents a
significant uplift of confidence in the economy by the international
money markets. The Irish pound,in August 1988,was at the top of the EMS
band,the strongest currency in the system. Much remains to be done to
strengthen the base of the economy and to create the conditions for
sustainable recovery,but much has already been achieved. The OECD's
forecast of .25% growth in the Irish economy for 1988 will be well
exceeded with more recent independent forecasts being more optimistic
than even the Government itself and predicting,in early Autumn,a growth
rate for the year in excess of 2.5%. "The economy gets better in nearly
all respects",according to the 3/JUL/88 leader in the Sunday
Independent,as "the recovery continues".
In spite of the harsh measures that the Government has taken,and must
continue to take for some time to come,its standing in the polls has
actually increased substantially since the 1987 election. The painful
restructuring of the economy continues to have broad based support.
Charles Haughey has shown a capacity for strong and determined political
leadership that seems little short of a transformation on his previous
performance. To his long-standing admirers,who have always seen him
somewhat in the mold of Lemass,he has at last begun to show his real
leadership talent,unhindered by the debilitating internal divisions that
weakened his position in his pre-1987 administrations. Even many of his
ardent critics have had to acknowledge that the recent achievements of
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his administration on restoring order to the public finances and
confidence to the economy have surpassed most expectations. The
improvement in the cost competitiveness of economy,manifest in the low
level of inflation,and the lowering of interest rates ,has led to an
improved climate for investment and to a strengthening of the country's
performance on exports,which has happened much sooner than expected. So
far the growth in exports by the multi-national manufacturing sector has
been in the van of the recovery. In the coming months the country in
general,and the unions in particular,will be looking for signs that the
recovery is more soundly and broadly based and that it does hold out
a real prospect for the creation of economically sustainable jobs.
1992 - the completion of the EEC internal market
The need to stabilise the national debt and to restore competitiveness
and growth to the economy has become more urgent with the enactment of
the Single European Act in 1986 ,which was approved for ratification by
the Dail in the referendum of May 1987. The EEC's programme to complete
the internal market by 1992,given effect by the enactment of the SEA,
is of historical and profound significance to Ireland and to the other
members of the Community. The evolution of national organisations,the
structural evolution of national economies and of the Community and
Global economy are likely to be affected in very fundamental ways as the
EEC moves decisively towards fuller economic integration. For Ireland,
in particular,the very meaning of 'Irish' industries and 'Irish'
industrial policy is likely to be altered in a profound way. Some
indication of the far-reaching effects of what is to come are given in
the following extracts from the recent Cecchini(1988;xviii-xxi)study:
"For all the complexities,the essential mechanism is simple. The
starting point of the whole process of economic gain is the removal of
non-tariff barriers.
The release of these constraints will trigger a supply-side shock to
the Community economy as a whole. The name of the shock is European
market integration. Costs will come down. Prices will follow as
business,under the pressure of new rivals on previously protected
markets,is forced to develop fresh responses to a novel and
permanently changing situation. Ever-present competition will ensure
the completion of a self-sustaining virtuous circle. The downward
pressure on prices will in turn stimulate demand,giving companies the
oportunity to increase output,to exploit resources better and to scale
them up for European,and global,competition...
For business and government,the two main actors,the road to market
integration will be paved with tough adjustments and the need for new
strategies.
For business,removing the protective barriers creates a permanent
oportunity,but signals a definitive end to national soft options. Cost
reductions will be good news,but market opening means also the
permanent threat,actual or potential,of competition. .The situation
will be one of constant competitive renewal..(and) one thing is
certain. Firms from outside the EC,who are already positioning
themselves in Community markets. .will not miss oportunities overlooked
by their indigeneous rivals... (And) governments must do more than
achieve the European home market. They must maintain it..(by providing
and sustaining) an institutional framework to deal effectively with
th(e) problems inherent in the success of the 1992 programme.."
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The pace of transnational mergers and alliances is already gathering
momentum in the run up to the single EC market in 1992. The takeover
battle for Irish Distillers,in the Summer of 1988,has been seen in
Ireland as the first major tangible indication of the kind of
structural change that is likely to be in store for many Irish
organisations,whether as predators or prey,wooers or wooed,as the
programme for the completion of the internal market progresses.
For the Irish economy as a whole,and for Irish organisations in
particular,the post-1992 era seems likely to be very different from
anything that has gone before since the foundation of the State.
Interparty
Government
Irish Free State
Northern
Ireland
Republic of
Ireland
Semi-state Bodies
Tanaiste
Taoiseach
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SPECIAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR
Glossary of key terms
Bord Bainne
Clann na Poblachta
Clann na Talmhan
Cumann na nGaedheal
Dail Eireann
Eire
Fianna Fail
Fine Gael
Oireachtas
Teachta Dail
The Irish Dairy Board
small political party and minority coalition
partner in the first interparty government.
Left wing and republican - 1947-65.
(Lit. The republican family or kin).
- small special interest political party
representing farming interests over 1943-61.
(Lit. The kinship of the Land).
The original pro-Treaty party(see Fine
Gael below. Lit.'The Association
or frate-rnit of tAye Gaels'
The Irish Parliament in the narrow sense
(commonly referred to as the Dail)
- The gaelic term officially,and commonly,used
to refer to the Irish Free State.
The party formed by the anti-Treaty faction
in 1926 and one of the two main political
parties.(lit. 'Soldiers of Destiny')
The reconstituted Cumann na nGaedheal from
1933 onwards. One of the two main political
parties. Pro-Treaty in origin.(lit. 'The
tribe or kinship of the Gaels).
Two administrations in the 1950's involving
a multi-party coalition.
The official title of the Irish state from
1922-49.(see Eire above).
The six counties in the north east of the
country that are politically part of the
United Kingdom. (Commonly referred to as
Ulster but in fact comprising only six of
the nine counties in the province of Ulster.
Also commonly referred to as 'the North')
The Irish Parliament in the wider sense.
Constitutionally consisting of the two
houses,the Dail and the Seanad(Senate),along
with the Office of the President.
The official title of the Irish State since
1949.(Commonly referred to as 'the South')
- State-sponsored agencies,many of them
State-owned entreprises.
The deputy Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister. In fact the term
taoiseach means chieftain,and conveys a
stronger leadership tone than the primes
inter pares of prime minister.
- Dail Representative,commonly referred to as
a TD (abbrev. for Teachta Dail) or as a Dail
Deputy.
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Irish Administrations Since 1922
Taoiseach Main Parties
1922-32 W.T. Cosgrave Cumann na nGaedheal
1932-48 E.	 de Valera Fianna Fail
1948-51 J.A.	 Costello Inter party
1951-54 E. de Valera Fianna Fail
1954-57 J.A.	 Costello Inter party
1957-73 E.	 de Valera(1957-59) Fianna Fail
S.	 Lemass
	 (1959-66)
J.	 Lynch	 (1966-72)
1973-77 L. Cosgrave Fine Gael,Labour
1977-81 J.	 Lynch (1977-79) Fianna Fail
C.J.	 Haughey(1979-81)
1981-82 G. FitzGerald Fine Gael,Labour
1982-82 C.J. Haughey Fianna Fail (Feb-Nov82)
1982-87 G. FitzGerald Fine Gael,Labour
1987- C.J. Haughey Fianna Fail
Note: The above shows only the main administrations and
changes of administration. It is not a chronology of
General Elections. The maximum life of any elected
Dail is five years under the Irish Constitution.
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Chronology of Key dates in Irish History since the 1800's
1798	 Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen - birth of
Republicanism. Armed rebellion - defeated.
1801	 Act of Union. Ireland integrated into the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland.
(1779-1823 The early rationalisation of the Irish distilling industry;
the emergence of the major family firms which came to
dominate the industry's subsequent development)
1829	 Catholic Emancipation.
1842	 The Young Ireland Movement - the birth of modern Irish
Nationalism.
1845-48	 The Years of the Great Famine.
1850	 The formation of the Land League - the agrarian movement
which later widened into a constitutional movement.
1867	 Armed insurrection by the Fenian Movement,a failure.
1873	 The Home Rule League - the constitutional movement.
1885	 Parnell and the Home Rulers return 86 members to
Westminister (every seat in Ireland outside of eastern
Ulster and Trinity College).
1886	 Defeat of Gladstone's First Home Rule Bill.
1889	 Plunkett starts the Cooperative Movement in Ireland.
1891	 The fall of Parnell.
1893	 The defeat of Gladstone's Second Home Rule Bill.
1893	 The launching of the Gaelic League - the cultural movement.
1907	 Arthur Griffith founds Sinn Fein.
1914	 Asquith's Home Rule measure - put in abeyance at the
outbreak of the Great War.
1916	 The Easter Rising and the subsequent execution of the
leaders.
1918	 Sinn Fein landslide,win 73 seats out of 103 in Westminister
election. Pursue an abstentionist strategy.
1919	 First Dail. Sinn Fein provisional government.
1919-21 Anglo-Irish War. (War of Independence to nationalists)
1920	 Government of Ireland Act, Northern Ireland gets its own
parliament. Partition of Ireland.
1921	 Anglo-Irish Treaty. Treaty issue splits the Dail.
1922	 Establishment of the Irish Free State; first Free State
government; civil war.
1926	 Boundary Commision affirms the partition of Ireland.
1926	 De Valera forms Fianna Fail. Sinn Fein marginalised.
1927	 Fianna Fail abandons abstention and enters the Dail.
	
(1927	 Government intervenes to rationalise the Irish dairy
industry.)
1932	 De Valera and Fianna Fail come to power. Economic self-
sufficiency.
1933-38	 The 'economic war' with Britain; De Valera dismantles the
Treaty with limited political fallout.
	
(1934	 Comhlucht Siucre Eireann Teo. is founded as the State rescues
the ailing sugar beet industry and plans to make the country
self-sufficient in sugar)
1937	 Bunreacht na hEireann,the Irish Constitution,is drawn up.
1938	 Economic war ends; Britain hands back the ports.
1939-45 The Emergency. Ireland remains officially neutral throughout
the Second World War.
1949	 Southern Ireland becomes a Republic.
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1951
	 Major Church-State clash over the Mother and Child scheme;
the influence of the Catholic Social Movement at its nadir.
1958
	 Whitaker publishes 'Economic Development'; the First
Programme for Economic Expansion gets under way. Lemass
abandons Self-Sufficiency and leads the drive to open and
expand the economy.
(1958
	 An Foras Taluntais,the Agricultural Institute is finally
started after years of controversy)
1963	 Ireland's application to join the Common Market is blocked.
(1963
	 Report of the Survey Team on the rationalisation of the
Dairy Industry)
(1964
	 Knapp Report on the restructuring of the Dairy Industry)
1965
	 Lemass meets O'Neill at Stormont; first ever Summit Meeting
between a Taoiseach and a Northern Ireland Prime Minister.
1965	 Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement.
(1966
	 Consolidation of the Irish whiskey industry;merger of the
three dominant producers).
1968	 Civil Rights Campaign in the North. Outbreak of the Northern
troubles.
1972	 The Stormont Parliament is suspended;direct rule in the
North.
1972
	 Ireland joins the EEC.
(1972-74 Major amalgamations in the Dairy Industry)
1973	 The first Oil Crisis.
1973
	 The Sunningdale Agreement; tri-partite agreement on
provisions for the future government of Northern Ireland.
1974	 The failure of the Sunningdale initiative; the fall of the
power-sharing executive in the North.
1977	 The Fianna Fail Manifesto - the genesis of the problems with
the public finances;the economic strategy that backfired.
1979	 The second Oil Crisis;the rise of monetarism and
neo-classical economic doctrines in the global economy;
prolonged recession and depression in world trade and in the
Irish economy.
1980-87
	 Irish economy in recession;disorder in the public finances
reaches critical point.
1985	 The Anglo-Irish Agreement; an inter-governmental conference
gives the Irish Government a formal advisory role in
Northern Ireland affairs.
1986	 The Single European Act; Ireland ratifies the Act by
referendum in May 1987.
1987	 The Programme for National Recovery.
A
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY - AN FORAS TALUNTAIS
In this and in the following three chapters the individual case narratives
are presented.Each of these chapters contains a description of the strategic
history of one of the four organisations under study. The four organisations
are representative of each of the four main forms of organisation in
Ireland's small,open and mixed national economy. The four organisations are
An Foras Taluntais(AFT),a state sector agricultural research institute;
Irish Distillers Group Ltd,a large public company; Comhlucht Siuicre Eireann
Teo.(CSET),the state-owned sugar company; and Golden Vale Co-op Creameries
Ltd,one of the country's six largest dairy processors and a cooperative
organisation. Having made this brief general introduction to all four cases
we now turn to present the first of the narratives,the genesis and strategic
history of An Foras Taluntais.
Introduction to An Foras Taluntais 
An Foras Taluntais (AFT), also known as The Agricultural Institute, is a
public service agency set up by the Government through an Act of Dail Eireann
in 1958. Its general functions, as described in the Act, are to "review,
facilitate, encourage, assist, coordinate, promote and undertake agricultural
research." The full Act prescribes 11 more specific functions for AFT.
AFT's early interpretation of its basic mission is revealed in the following
extracts taken from its 1959-60 Annual Report to the Minister for
Agriculture. Recognising the "important function of agricultural research as
the basis for the ordered expansion and development of the agricultural
industry in all its aspects" AFT determined that it must strive to develop
"an adequately balanced research programme (which) must aim at improving
efficiency in production, processing, marketing; improving farm economic and
living standards; eliminate the waste and losses involved in storage,
diseases and pests; explore and expand markets and ensure that any changes or
advances consequent on technological improvements are adjusted to human
well-being and a balanced rural life...Not only must research have these
objectives, but it must ensure that the fruits of this research are brought
to bear on farming as early as possible.." and it felt that these objectives
could only be achieved by an organisation working "...in full harmony with
the different agencies responsible for policy making, and ... with the
Advisory Services and farming and rural organisations."
AFT,then, could be described as an infrastructural research organisation to
Irish agriculture funded by the State. The main resource in this type of
institute is professional staff and the main activities to which this
resource is applied are discrete research projects. "We only have one
product; information, and we only have one source; ideas" was how one senior
manager put it. In 1986,when the field work for this study began,the
Institute had approximately 236 researchers out of a total complement of
about 1200 personnel. The remainder were divided between technical,
administrative and general support staff. There were in the region of 700
discrete projects in the overall research programme of the Institute.
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Main phases in AFT's history
The interview data revealed a widely shared perception of certain distinct
phases in AFT's history. These phases, with their key events, forces and
turning points, are described briefly below.
1945-58 Origin and Formation
Direct public sector involvement in agriculture began in Ireland in 1899 when
the Westminister government set up the Department of Agriculture and
Technical Instruction for Ireland(the DATI). The decade leading to the
setting up of this new department was a very formative and very significant
one for the whole future structure of Irish agriculture. The leading
influence in these formative developments was Sir Horace Plunkett.
Plunkett was an Irish Unionist of the landed class. He came to the view that
the great political question of the time,Home Rule,was diverting too much
energy and attention away from the economic development of Irish agriculture
to the material detriment of all the interests involved,whatever their
politics. Plunkett was concerned about the overall lack of productivity and
competitiveness of Irish agriculture by the international standards of the
time and he feared for its overall future viability. He became passionately
interested in the principle of cooperation as the basis for progress,"not
just (as) a more efficient way of utilising the resources of the country
but also as "a means of restoring the Irishman's self-respect,sapped,so it
seemed to (him),by many years of cooercion and eviction and also by the
demagoguery of nationalist politicians" which had "led to a weakening of
moral fibre and self-reliance"(Lyons,1973;208).
In 1889 Plunkett founded the first cooperative society at Doneraile in County
Waterford. After a slow start the cooperative movement in Ireland began to
gather momentum. Plunkett was especially concerned that the newly emerging
creamery system would be run for the economic benefit of the milk producers
and their rural communities. Within ten years there were 876 cooperative
societies with a combined turnover of Om. In 1895 Plunkett,by then a
Unionist member at Westminister,formed his famous Recess Committee of Irish
MP's which cut across party lines and devoted itself to issues of general
economic welfare. Plunkett used the mechanism of the Recess Committee to
pursue two of his own personal hobbyhorses,the need to create a Board of
Agriculture for Ireland and the need to promote practical,technical education
in agriculture. The Recess Committee published a unanimous report in 1896. In
this document,which was based on Plunkett's own thinking,they highlighted the
backwardness of Irish agriculture in relation to what was being done
elsewhere,and argued,as Plunkett(1904) himself later put it,that "the time
had come when a sound system of State aid to agriculture might be fruitfully
grafted on to (the) native growth of local effort and self-reliance" that was
already being achieved by the rapidly growing cooperative movement.
Direct State involvement in the development of Irish agriculture was,in
this way,strongly advocated. In 1899,on the recommendation of the Recess
Committee Report,the new Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction
was set up. Plunkett was,himself,appointed its first Vice-President and Chief
Executive Officer. The attendant dangers in direct State involvement were
recognised by the Recess Committee from the beginning. According to
Anderson(1935;97) "all through the (1896) Report it is enjoined that the new
Department should supplement the efforts of the voluntary associations but
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never attempt to provide a substitute for them". In 1922 the Department
passed into the hands of the Irish Free State along with the rest of the
State bureaucracy,as agreed in the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Over the
1899-1945 period, under various administrations in Westminister and later in
Dublin,the Department came to enlarge and diversify its involvement into
various activities in support of agricultural development including
education, technical advice,inspection and quality assurance,and research.
The idea of establishing a national agricultural institute first took root in
the immediate post World War II period. Soil fertility had suffered over the
years of shortage and economic depression that had characterised the 1930-45
period. In 1948 a visiting grassland expert from New Zealand,a man called
Holmes,reported that "the country's grasslands were producing the minimum
possible under an Irish sky"(Bolger,1977;244). At the same time the Marshall
Aid Programme for European recovery and reconstruction was underway. Special
delegates had been assigned by the US Government to each country in Europe to
administer the programme. In 1948,the Irish delegate,a man named Carrigan,
was invited to speak at a meeting of the Agricultural Science Society, an
undergraduate society, in University College Dublin. He used this platform to
argue that Ireland was too small a country to have multiple agencies
conducting research in agriculture without coordination. At the time the
Department of Agriculture, the Universities and some State-owned and private
enterprises were independently engaged in agricultural research without any
overall coherent strategy. Carrigan's proposal was that the US Government
would be favourably disposed to lending financial and other support, through
the Marshall Aid Program, for the establishment of a national agricultural
institute. According to O'Sullivan(1973;158):
"The original American intention was that the new Institute would be
responsible for teaching at University level in agriculture,veterinary
science,horticulture and forestry; research in these subjects; the
dissemination of research results and that it would take over the Advisory
Services".
This proposal gave rise to much conflict and controversy. It was to be nearly
ten years before the new national institute finally opened its doors. The
proposal threatened a number of powerful interests that were already engaged
in the activities that were earmarked for the new institute under the
American model. Among these interests were the Universities,the Catholic
Hierarchy,the Department of Agriculture and some farming bodies. Conflict
arose among these interests over the proposed domain of the new institute and
over the form of control. By 1954 the Governments of the US and Ireland had
concluded the formal arrangements for the establishment of the new institute
and in 1955 the Minister for Agriculture,Mr James Dillon,publicly announced
his plan for the reorganisation of higher agricultural education in Ireland.
Essentially what the Minister wanted was to centralise all third level
teaching and research in Agriculture into a single institution modelled on
the Dutch agricultural university at Wageningen,which was believed to have
had much to do with making Dutch agriculture among the most efficient in the
world. At this time,three of the universities already had faculties of
agriculture and a fourth was agitating for one. The Minister argued in an
interview given to the Irish Independent on 20-7-55 that:
"It was manifest that we had not available the trained personnel to man four
faculties of agriculture adequately,and that the only consequence of
attempting to do so would be to leave us with four inadequate faculties of
agricultural science instead of one good centre for agricultural education
and research".
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University and farming interests were the main opponents of the Minister's
plan but they managed to harness powerful support from the Catholic
Hierarchy. They appealed to Catholic social teaching on the organisation of
society,as then most recently ennunciated in the papal encyclical of Pope
Pius XI, 'Quadragesimo Anno',published in 1931. The two main elements in
Catholic social thought reflected in this encyclical were a philosophical
concern with the extension of direct state involvement in social organisation
and the idea that Vocationalism represented the best principle along which to
develop the organisation of society. The Pope had argued that there was a
basic principle in social philosophy,the principle of subsidiary function,
and that 'it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and
disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what
lesser and sub-ordinate organisations can do' (Quoted in Whyte,1980;67). The
period 1946-58 was when Catholic social thinking,as reflected in Quadregisimo
Anno,was at its most influential in Ireland. It defined its main issue as one
of Vocationalism -v- State bureaucracy in Irish social organisation. By
harnessing this issue the university and farming interests were able to
mobilise a number of influential Irish bishops in their opposition to the
Minister's plan.
The Archbishop of Tuam,the Bishop of Galway and the Bishop of Cork all
entered the public debate on the side of those opposed to the proposal. The
Bishop of Cork's intervention illustrates just how effective the opponents of
the Minister's plan were in harnessing Catholic social thought to their
position. At a meeting in Cork the Bishop said:
"The accepted principle is that in agriculture as in industry,commerce and
professions,etc.,the proper function of the State is to help the private
citizen and his organisation rather than edge them out with its own
agencies..
The people of this country would vote down a government that openly
committed itself to a policy of Socialisation. But Socialisation can be a
gradual,hidden and undeclared process. One department after another can
nibble more and more from the field of private entreprise until finally
little worthwhile remains outside civil service control. That is why it is
so necessary to examine the proposed Institute and see if it be part of the
larger trend or movement towards out-and-out Statism.. "(cited in
Whyte,1980;310).
In the face of opposition on such a scale,the Minister had to modify his
proposal. The teaching function was dropped and left with the universities.
The advisory services were left with the Department of Agriculture. In the
end the supporters of the new Institute had to fight to have it retain an
active research brief. There were many who wanted it to be reduced to a mere
co-ordinating body,with no direct research activity. There were also many who
questioned the need for the new Institute to be an independent, autonomous
body. According to the interview data it is believed within AFT by some
senior people that " there was tremendous political activity by the
Department of Agriculture in particular, and possibly by the Department of
Finance, to deny the autonomy that the American Government was particularly
anxious to assign to the new institute". A report was commissioned by the
Government which actually recommended that an independent agricultural
research institute was neither necessary nor desireable. However,one of the
commissioners dissented from the majority view saying in effect that 'no one
would have any respect for it unless it was independent of friend and foe
alike'. In the end the government of the day decided in favour of an
independent institute but excluded from its remit responsibility for
university teaching, veterinary research and the Advisory Services.
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In sum, the formation of AFT was characterised by conflict over its autonomy
and over the extent of its legitimate domain. These issues of autonomy and
domain are still concerns for AFT more than 25 years on and remain only quasi
resolved.
1958-68 Establishment and Early Growth
Dr Tom Walsh was seconded from the research staff at the Department of
Agriculture to be the new Institute's first Director. The initial funding for
AFT came from the Marshall Aid fund in the form of a capital grant of £840000
and an endowment fund of £1m. The interest from the endowment fund was meant
to contribute towards the operating expenses of AFT though it was always
accepted that an annual grant-in-aid would be needed from the State to
supplement it.
AFT had been born in controversy and powerful institutional interests,by then
already long established in the field of agricultural education and research,
were critically watching the early development of AFT and jealously guarding
their own traditional domains. In Walsh's own words AFT expanded quickly "and
this fact raised the ire of some people in the Department and in the
universities". Right from the word go 'the Doc',as Dr Walsh came to be known
by all his staff ,had to fight for his operational scope and freedom. He was
clear on what he wanted as he recalled in interview:
"The Institute was set up to develop the agriculture of the country.
Agriculture included food,this is very important. It did not just mean
farming. It brought in the socio-economic structure and behavioural
sciences as well.The model was the State college of agriculture(in the US)"
His own vision for the new institute was not fully shared by vested interests
outside of AFT. There were objections to him setting up a rural economy
division because "it was said that the Institute's focus was production" but
the Doc "never saw it that way". He won this battle but lost others in this
formative period. For example,he ran into stout resistance from the
Department of Agriculture which refused to transfer their cerial breeding
and barley breeding research programmes over to AFT. The Department continued
to maintain a research division in spite of the strong representations made
to Government by Walsh and his council to have all of the Department's
existing research activities transferred over to the new institute.
Undaunted by these difficulties the Doc quickly set about defining the major
fields for research in the new institute. He structured the initial research
programmes under the broad categories of soils, animal production, plant
sciences and crop husbandry, horticulture and forestry, and rural economy.
In his initial structure he set up two special liaison activities,
scientific liaison and agricultural liaison. The first was chartered with
maintaining ready access to the research output of similiar institutions
across the globe and the second with developing the disemmination channels
and relationships that would bring the scientific information that was
generated,or acquired,by AFT out into the field as quickly as possible.
He assembled the physical and human resources to fulfill his vision for AFT
with the minimum of bureaucratic procedure. He negotiated personally for the
transfer of existing facilities and staff from the Department and from the
Universities. Decisions were often made at a single informal meeting
between himself and the other principals involved. With the Marshall Aid
money,he and his senior staff went out and bought land and buildings in the
same informal way,haggling personally over the terms and conditions as if
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they were dealing for themselves. In this way the initial resources for AFT
were quickly acquired and assembled. He hired a mix of experienced graduates,
some of them non-nationals,and a crop of fresh young Irish graduates. He
moved quickly to build up the skill base of the Institute to the highest of
international standards. In these first years of the Institute's life he sent
off scores of his newly minted Irish graduates on Kellogg Foundation
scholarships to take higher degrees in reputable US universities; at one
point he had as many as 100 such graduates on this programme concurrently.
By 1961 AFT had already grown to 705 personnel and by 1967 this had expanded
further to 1076. According to one senior manager in AFT "officially the
Department of Agriculture were very alarmed at the rate of AFT's early
expansion" and clearly had never intended nor expected that it would grow so
large,so fast.
AFT's rapid growth during the 1958-68 period was due to a number of factors.
Firstly the early work of AFT had an immediate impact. "One of the success
elements of AFT in the early years was that we were starting out from such a
low base that anything that was done was going to make an immediate impact"
was how one interviewee put it. Another illustrated the point by giving
the example of the country's production of silage which was 120,000 tons in
1950 and is 20,000,000 tons today from the same land area with "the
Institute's work. .largely responsible for such an increase". One of the
difficulties which has dogged AFT over the years is that progressively
greater research effort and sophistication has seemed to be needed to make a
comparable impact.
The second major factor in AFT's rapid early growth was that the new
Institute had "emerged at a time of revolutionary thinking in national
policy"(O'Sullivan,1973;158). As we saw in chapter 4,the year 1958 marked a
major watershed in the development of modern Ireland. Throughout the 50's the
country was stagnating as emigration reached levels that were unprecedented
since the foundation of the State. There was a prevailing mood of
despondency. In 1958,the same year that AFT was founded,Whitaker's 'Economic
Development' was published. In this highly influential and now historic
document,Whitaker,a senior executive in the Department of Finance argued for
a national programme of productive investment in order to expand the economy.
For Whitaker(1958;par 12)there was also "a sound 'psychological' reason for
having an integrated development programme" and "a real need to buttress
confidence in the country's future". A 'dynamic' needed to be released in the
economy to bring it from its clearly under-developed state to take-off and a
national indicative programme seemed to Whitaker to provide a possible
answer. Lemass accepted the Whitaker analysis and supplied the political
leadership that resulted in the development of The First Programme for
Economic Expansion to cover the five year period 1958-63.
The First Programme laid a strong emphasis on agriculture. Agriculture was an
important export sector and a significant net earner of foreign exchange.
To expand industry in the Ireland of the time involved an increase in imports
of capital equipment and raw materials. An increase in the export-earning
potential of Irish agriculture was looked to in the Programme to help
generate the foreign exchange necessary to allow industry to expand without
any balance of payments difficulties. Investment in applied research in
agriculture was looked on as productive in the Whitaker and Lemass
development scheme. AFT's rapid growth over the 1958-63 period took place
within the context of the First Programme as is clearly seen in this extract
from the Annual Report of 1963-64:
"At the request of the Minister for Agriculture a report on developments in
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(AFT) in relation to the first Economic Expansion Programme was prepared
and submitted..In line with the objectives of the Programme a comprehensive
organisation with competent staff was built up to carry out research in the
fields of plant sciences and crop husbandry,animal production, horticulture
and finally rural economy.."
Encouraged by the success of the First Programme,which had exceeded all
expectations in terms of overall growth in the economy,the Government
decided to extend the policy of indicative planning through to the end of the
decade. When the Second Programme For Economic Expansion came to be
formulated the Institute was required to advise on the research needs for
agriculture up to 1970. AFT's proposed programme,on approval by the
Government,was directly incorporated as an integral element in the Second
Programme's plans and objectives for the agricultural sector,which again was
pivotal to the overall national strategy. Further investment in research was
still regarded as productive in the Second Programme:
"While labour and capital are the essential ingredients of economic growth,
research and education are now regarded as the essential "third factor",
being the basis for innovation and the invention of new processes and
materials as well as the improved utilisation of available resources.
In the Second Programme for Economic Expansion the role of research in this
respect is fully recognised"(Annual Report,1964-65).
During the period covered by the Second Programme the Institute got the only
multi-year budgetary allocation in its history. This was a three year
financial committment from the government to cover the planned development of
AFT over the 1963-66 period.
In sum,over the first decade of its existence public funding was available
for investment in research as part of a national strategy for planned
economic expansion. As one senior manager remembered it:
"There was great growth and buoyancy associated with the Programme for
Economic Expansion. The rising tide was raising all boats..it raised our
boat"
AFT was also fortunate during this general expansionary period in "having
an advocate in court" to counterbalance the less than satisfactory
relationship between the Institute and the Department of Agriculture. As the
Doc put it "the Department were not friendly. .there wasn't the right level of
goodwill between the Institute and the Department" but he "knew Ken Whitaker
and the Minister Jim Ryan in the Department of Finance". This 'in' with
the Department of Finance was a help in securing the multi-year funding over
over the 1963-66 period. It also allowed the Doc to maintain control over AFT
salary levels during the first decade of AFT's development in spite of
considerable opposition and resentment from the Department of Agriculture.
AFT's ability to pay above the general public service rates helped the Doc to
attract and to keep a cadre of well qualified and highly motivated
researchers. The skills and energies of these professionals allowed the
Doc to build AFT into an institution of considerable national importance
and impact in less than a decade after its foundation.
A third factor of significance was the Marshall Aid itself and the
Institute's control over its disposition. According to AFT's Finance Officer
the capital fund "was entirely under AFT control and this bought the farms
and built the buildings. It gave the Institute the freedom to expand as it
did without having to refer back to the State. When that ran out your
expansion slowed down and you had to go back to the State and they could say
yes or no. This had a noticeable effect on AFT's rate of expansion". The
Marshall Aid funding,and the inter-governmental agreement that went with it,
allowed AFT a level of operational autonomy in this first decade that
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facilitated its growth and development. This operating freedom was felt to be
an important factor in AFT's early development,given the attitude and concern
that appeared to exist within the Department of Agriculture to the new
Institute and its first Director. As the Doc himself recalled in interview:
"There was a certain resentment within the Department to the Institute. We
were doing things,getting a lot of publicity in the press and this created
some jealousies. The Department expected me to go cap in hand to them and
say we'll be good boys. .The Department of Agriculture had a long background
of paternalism.. (However) the Director of AFT was.. .a statutory entity in
his own right. .a government appointee. Along with the (Director's) contract
you had the inter-governmental agreement..the Director (therefore) had a
lot of strength. .The Department wanted a lot of control. I was operating
the autonomy of the Institute. It was a continual struggle day in,day out".
Last,but not least, within AFT itself there is little doubt that the personal
characteristics, beliefs and operating style of the Institute's first
Director,Dr. Tom Walsh, had a decisive influence on AFT's early expansion and
ultimate size. As one senior manager, in AFT since its foundation, put it
"the Doc was the driving force...it would never have been as big as it
is. .never have been what it is today ..if it had not been for the Doc".
Another said of Walsh that "he was the outstanding character". He went on to
remark that he and others, when looking back over AFT's early expansion and
development, have often asked themselves "who else could have done it".
The Doc was growth orientated and "anything that anybody was doing in
agriculture,food or environment Doc Walsh threw his beady eye on it ..arguing
against fragmentation". He "just grew and grew in not a very planned manner.
He was an opportunist". He "had no concept of, and did not want discussed,
when the end of the expansion of AFT was to be". His strategy around
recruiting was to "get the best people, motivate them, turn them loose and
they will define the programme". He was aided in this by having control of
the salary structure of AFT during the early years, and by not being
constrained by general public service rates. He was a cavalier and a builder
who attracted like-minded people into AFT and encouraged them to be
innovative and to build up their departments and programmes. With the ferment
that he generated it was almost inevitable that difficulties would arise;some
people in key positions were moved,others resigned. Some were not cavalier
enough,others were too much so. "The main thing was to get the job done".
Walsh fired his young staff up with a belief in themselves and in the
importance of their mission to the nation. He was driven by his own deep
nationalist convictions.He described his own management approach in this way:
"My main job was building morale. .to get to know each person and their
capacity. .The big thing was the motivation of the staff and how they could
be motivated. They had a national job to do. They might have thought that
they were small cogs but the work that they were doing was important.."
He "had a charisma of leadership where young scientists identified for
themselves individually and collectively a mission in the revival of Irish
agriculture". He infused in them a spirit and a belief that "as scientists,
even though from a small country,we were equal to the best and better than
most". He saw himself and his young staff as "bringing science to the
people" and the Doc believed passionately in the potential of the application
of science for the development of the economy in the national interest. As
one long serving senior executive recalled:
"he had the idea that there was no problem that could no be solved by AFT..
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Science and technology could be harnessed to do anything and to hell with
the politicians and people who got in the way. .He saw no limit to the
growth of agriculture in Ireland and he saw agriculture as the primary
engine of the economy.."
The Doc continually pointed to native renewable resources as a primary source
of the nation's wealth and one of his favourite metaphors for Irish
agriculture was 'the mine on the top of the land'. The Doc always saw AFT as
part of a larger national effort. Many of the young pioneering scientists
that he had attracted to AFT in the early days later left to take up key
positions in the meat and dairy processing industries which,as Institute
scientists,they had been helping to develop and modernise. This was a matter
of pride for the Doc who looked on this process as a natural extension and
valuable by-product of the developmental role of AFT:
"There is the whole thing about the intellectual investment..the resource
pool..the training of staff provided a pool of scientifically trained
manpower to this country in a real sense. .to the meat processing sector, to
the universities etc.."
1968-73 Review and Reorganisation
After its initial rapid expansion, the late 60's saw AFT confronting some new
issues. The easy gains from investment in agricultural research had been made
and it was now becoming harder for AFT to demonstrate the impact and value
to the economy of its research programme. It had grown to a full
establishment of just over 1000 personnel in permanent and pensionable public
sector jobs and it was facing concerns about its continued relevance and its
future resource support. It was also finding it more difficult to maintain
its relative freedom of action.
Up until 1967/68 the Department of Agriculture had no direct representation
on the AFT Council. The appointment of a new council in 1967/68 brought two
officials of the Department onto the governing body of the Institute, "the
two men that the Department put in to control me" as Walsh himself recently
put it. According to one senior manager of AFT " there was head-on conflict
between the Department Secretary and the Institute. .fierce controversies..
even walk outs. .that no one talks about" in AFT's relationships with the
Department at that time. Furthermore the capital fund was almost completely
expended by 1964 and the interest on the endowment fund was contributing a
a very small and declining proportion of the Institue's operating
expenditure. At AFT they knew that they would have to seek continued and
expanded support through the annual estimates for the Department of
Agriculture and they were expecting difficulties.
Walsh met the new situation by organising a major review of the Institute's
programme for relevance and scientific quality. He involved major external
interest groups and highly reputable external scientific expertise in these
reviews. From this major review a 5 year plan for AFT called 'Research for
Agriculture 1970-75' was produced and published. The plan called for moderate
expansion at a rate of 5% per annum over the period covered. The major review
and the consequent 5 year plan were seen within AFT as "Walsh's reposte to
the new situation that the Government had imposed...He knew he was going to
have a new chairman and a new council that were going to be difficult. The
question was how to contend with this. .how to keep them at arm's length. .His
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answer was to draw up a charter". The plan ,it would appear, was a mechanism
for seeking legitimacy for AFT's current programme and intended new
activities and by extension a staking of its claims on resources in support
of them. As the Doc himself recalled the 1970-75 plan was "addressed at the
government of the day to get more money" though its impact fell far short of
his own high aspirations in this regard.
If AFT did not get all the financial support that it sought in this period,
nevertheless it was able to continue its expansion though at a more modest
rate. The production of the 1970-75 plan,with its strong external validation
element,did help. However,it alone was not sufficient to overcome the concern
and scepticism of the Department of Agriculture which by then was having an
increasing influence on the AFT funding. Some of the Department officials
are known,in AFT,to have believed that "the initial expansion of AFT was
wrong and that it would come home to roost". Yet by the late 60's,after
a decade of service to agriculture,there were important countervailing
influences that supported AFT. "The media, particularly the Farmers Journal,
which..lionised the work that was being done at the Centres" was a major
influence in shaping opinion throughout the sector. In addition there were
"certain political forces motivated (to support the Institute) through
grassroots feedback. .people down the country could see their lot improving
and could connect it with the work of AFT". This countervailing support
did not,however, remove the sense of uncertainty that pervade right down
through the organisation at that time. One department head remembers it as a
"very sticky (period)..from a resource point of view and from a sense of
direction. AFT was a little bit uncertain about where it was going and about
how it slotted in with other organisations".
As AFT undertook its major review of the research programme and the
development of the programme priorities for the 1970-75 period it began to
take a close look at its organisation structure and administration systems.
There were concerns that "the system had begun to creak" under the strains of
growth. AFT had expanded rapidly throughout most of the decade and Walsh was
no longer able to direct and control the organisation using direct personal
supervision as the primary coordinating mechanism. The original organisation
structure had been developed around scientific disciplines but the facilities
had been built up and clustered around commodities. There were many instances
under this structure where a department from one division would be physically
located in facilities primarily dedicated to,and under the facility direction
of,another division. This was causing "all kinds of difficulties of dual
control and dual command". The Doc himself was concerned that AFT was
becoming institutionalised and losing some of its early vigour and dynamism
in the process:
"..the organisation had settled down and maybe settled down too much. The
divisional structure had created a sense of division. It was a problem of
ensuring a flow of knowledge across divisions. It was a sense that the
divisional structure was seen as inhibitive in some way. It was getting too
structured in terms of mobility and action"
The question of whether to organise primarily around disciplines or
commodities was one that concerned other national agricultural research
institutions at the time and was being discussed by Walsh with his
counterparts in Canada and New Zealand. He persuaded the Council of AFT to
engage the services of Dr.J.A. Anderson from the University of Manitoba to
advise on a reorganisation. According to the annual report of 1970/71 "the
latest developments in the organisation of research in many countries were
examined in public, scientific, commercial and industrial institutions" and
were taken into account. The main change in the organisation structure,that
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emerged from the Anderson study was that staff and facilities were now to
be organised around 7 main Research Centres with a programme/commodity
focus rather than around 6 Divisions with a scientific discipline focus.
Five of the seven new research centres were focussed specifically on
commodities. The five commodities were beef,dairying,horticulture,
soils/grasslands,and tillage crops. A sixth centre was devoted to rural
economics and welfare. The setting up of the seventh centre was,itself, a
strategic departure and an exception to the overall reorganisational
rationale. It was to have a regional rather than a commodity focus. The
Doc described the reason for setting up a centre for the Western region:
"There was always political pressure to develop the West. The West demands a
different orientation for research. .We were raising the development of the
land in the West to a national priority level. .The Western area was not
moving. People from our council came from the East and there were big
problems getting people focused on the West.."
It is clear from his later writings(Walsh,1981) that the Doc had a deep
personal conviction about the importance of developing the Western region in
the interests of the people of that region and in the overall national
interest. It was more than a matter of economics,it was about preserving the
"rural way of life with its fundamental and intrinsic values"(p2) in the
disadvataged areas of the country that accounted for nearly 50% of the
nation's land. It was also about restoring a culture of self-reliance and
self-confidence to these areas where "over many generations the people on the
land have been disadvantaged,resulting..in frustration,lack of motivation,
reduced living standards and static in relation to change"(p8). The problems
of these areas demanded an integrated approach to rural development that
involved "agriculture, human resources,non-agricultural and service
activities,each of which interacts synergistically when the balance is
right"(p15) and a research programme for the West would have to reflect this
need.
The reorganisation brought about a significant change in the pattern of
resource deployment within the Institute. Along with the change in overall
reporting structure there were some new decision making structures introduced
at this time. A Central Directorate was set up that was to consist of the
Director, the Deputy Director, Headquarters Associates and the Heads of the
Research Centres. This was to be a new corporate structure which "evaluates
and develops a unified research programme in line with Council policy" as
described in the annual report 70/71. The Doc explained in interview why he
wanted to set up this Central Directorate:
"I wanted cohesion and sharing in the administration..They (the division
directors) were beginning to run these divisions as independent entities..
running several institutes instead of one. .The concept of a central
directorate (was one) where the head of Centre was part of the corporate
management team...It gave each Centre director the right to talk about
how the other Centres were managed"
There was also to be, "a consultative management committee..representative of
all personnel categories. .at each Centre" which would ensure "staff
participation in programme development, evaluation and review".
The Deputy Director post was another novel feature of the 1970/71
reorganisation and later events were to show that this was in effect a
Director-in-waiting position. A further development directly connected with
this reorganisation was the setting up of a Planning Information and Analysis
Department (PIAD) at headquarters because it had become "even more important
that the right decisions are made on research priorities having regard for
the resources available. Our Planning Information and Analysis Department
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plays a significant role here. .Planning is therefore all important" as the
1971/72 annual report heralded this new subunit. An early contribution from
the PIAD was the development and introduction of the ARMIS system, a
computerised Agricultural Research Management Information System, which was
intended to "provide a comprehensive database on programme activities for all
the staff in the organisation" (Higgins,1973:182). According to Higgins(1973:
184) the introduction of the ARMIS system meant that "forward planning,
describing the desired configuration of resources over the short to
medium term planning periods (1 to 5 years) is now possible and progress
towards these configurations can be monitored and controlled using ARMIS. On
this basis we can apply a conscious and planned approach to the problems of
resource reallocation and redeployment"(Higgins,1973:184).
The 1970-71 reorganisation was not an unqualified success for a number of
reasons. There was a serious controversy over the appointment of one of the
new Centre directors which led to the resignation of one of the Doc's most
talented cavaliers. The Doc and Mick Walshe clashed openly on the latter's
appointment to the newly established Western Centre.Mick Walshe had wanted,
and had been generally expected to get,the directorship of the Dairy Centre
at Moorepark and he refused to accept the outcome of the Doc's
reorganisation. After months of controversy,which extended beyond the
Institute into the media and the political system,Mick Walshe eventually
resigned. When the irresistable force met the immovable object in this
reorganisation episode AFT lost a talent that in the Doc's own view "had the
attributes. .had a good chance of being a future Director (of AFT)".
There were further difficulties which tended to undermine the effectiveness
of the reorganisation blueprint. The Doc,by personality,was not suited to the
participative structures that emerged from the reorganisation. His dominating
style meant that none of the new administrative supports, the Deputy
Directorship,the Central Directorate nor the consultative committees,were
used to anywhere near full effect under his leadership. The Doc himself
came in time to regret the organisation of 1970-71 in that it went too far
too fast. It was not primarily new structures that he wanted out of the
reorganisation process; these were somewhat forced upon him by the Anderson
study. What he really wanted was to "keep the pot stirring in some ways"
because of his conviction that "in any research organisation there has to be
agitation or nothing will get done". He later came to feel that "there was a
mistake made in terms of reorganising all at one time" instead of reviewing
and reorganising a department or centre a year just to keep things on the
boil. Furthermore,the ARMIS system never really came to full fruition during
the Doc's regime. He wanted AFT to be seen to have a comprehensive formal
planning system but he also wanted the flexibility to manage intuitively
and opportunistically as he had always done. According to one of those most
involved with the introduction and implementation of ARMIS:
"Walsh never believed that he needed all the planning paraphernalia. He
believed that research was managed best through the personal touch. (The
Doc) lacked major commitment to a planning function".
1973-79 EEC and Contract Funding
"If a man from Mars was to look at the Institute from the beginning the most
significant change that he would see would be the growth in the Institute's
contribution to its own finances". This statement was made by AFT's Finance
Officer and the major change that he was referring to was set in train by
developments that took place in the period 1973-79.
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A new confluence of factors developed in AFT's environment during this
the 1973-79 period. The first of these was the decision of the Irish people,
through a referendum, to join the EEC. "The decision to join the EEC
dominated the farming scene.. (the) early realisation of the benefits of EEC
membership has had considerable influence on the farmer's outlook and
willingness to invest"(Annual Report 72/73). AFT reasserted its national role
in its annual report 72/73, stating that " the primary national objective of
An Foras Taluntais's research is to help achieve the goal of maximising net
export earnings from the agricultural sector. .The fundamental oportunity..(is
to help the sector) produce, process and market more efficiently". While the
early emphasis of AFT had been on production research directed at increasing
the productivity of the primary producers, it now proclaimed an
expanding role for itself 'beyond the farm gate'. Closer links with the
processors and marketers of farm produce was the signalled intention and
the development in the programme of increasing emphasis on Food Science and
Technology was to be the mechanism. In addition, EEC entry meant not only the
opportunity to play an expanding role in helping Irish Agriculture to
maximise earnings from the enlarged tariff-free market but it also offered a
new role to AFT as a major Irish contributor to Community approaches to EEC
agricultural development. After 1972, AFT was to seek and be sought for an
increasing involvement in EEC research projects. It opened up a valuable new
source of funding for AFT and offered the Doc and his Institute continued
opportunity to expand its research activities at a time when,as we will see
shortly, additional public funding for agricultural research began to become
progressively more difficult to get.
As well as entry into the EEC there were other developments of importance for
AFT taking place. In 1973 there was a change of government in Ireland for the
first time in 16 years. AFT had a new political master. The new Minister for
Agriculture and the new Government appointed a new council for AFT. The new
government was only months into office when the Western World was confronted
with a major oil crisis that signalled an end to cheap energy and started a
period of very rapid inflation for Western economies including Ireland. This
inflationary spiral threw public financing into disarray. Annual estimates
of expenditure for the coming year, drawn up in late 1973 and incorporated
into the January '74 Budget of the Government proved totally inadequate to
cover the 1974 outurn. Uncertainty and financial crisis seeped down from the
Government and its operating bureaucracy into the State-owned entreprises and
public service agencies, including AFT, during this "period of extreme
uncertainty and depression"(annual report 74). Putting added pressure on AFT
was the operating deficit of £.5M that had been run up by 31/3/74 which the
annual report of 73/74 highlighted as "the difficult liquidity position..the
culmination of under financing over a number of years, heavily accentuated by
rapid inflation".
1974 was "a watershed " in other ways. The energy crisis had caused rapid
inflation in the price of many farm inputs, putting pressure on farm incomes
and bursting the bubble of optimism that had spread throughout the whole
agricultural sector on EEC entry. Over the two years since entry farmers'
incomes had risen by on average 80% creating new prosperity and confidence in
farmers and a willingness to invest in new methods and machinery. Farm
incomes dropped by 12% in 1974. Adding to the effects of the rising cost of
inputs there was a surplus of output in the beef sector, leading to a fall in
beef prices. This "hiatus about livestock production was the first cold
douche that the EEC was no bonanza. .the air of optimism of the 60's was
burst". 1974 proved to be just a temporary set back but it gave rise to
a new air of realism with regard to the prospects for agriculture within the
EEC. The following year saw a return to growth in the agricultural sector
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generally and in the dairy sector in particular, which continued on up to
to 1979. Farm incomes,which throughout most of the 60's had been at or below
85% of the average industrial wage,rose to 112% in 1973,fell back to 71% in
1974 and then rose steadily again to exceed parity in 1977 and 1978.
The growing prosperity of the agricultural sector throughout most of the 70's
led to a developing sentiment within the polity at large that the sector
should do more to pay its own way. The agricultural sector was seen as the
primary beneficiary of the country's entry into the EEC and the sector's
moral claim on the public purse was weakened as a result. Moreover,since the
late 60's the priority for public investment had shifted to industry and the
need to create employment opportunities for rising number of well-educated
young people who were coming onto the job market every year. While
agricultural income was rising employment in the sector continued to fall as
productivity improved. The sector's claim for further public investment was
therefore also weakened in a context where the national priority was job
creation. Furthermore the supply of public funds was under pressure from the
high level of wage inflation in the public sector that persisted right on
throughout the 70's.
In the post-1973 period AFT began to find itself having to look more and more
to the generation of user funding in order to further develop and expand its
research programme The new Minister for Agriculture made it clear at the
outset that no further public funding for agricultural research beyond the
maintenance of the State's then current commitment would be forthcoming
without matching contributions from the agricultural industry itself. Only in
this way could he envisage any further expansion of AFT's activities. There
was much subsequent argument and confusion between AFT and the Department of
Agriculture about the nature and intent of the Minister's statement,and about
what was actually said. AFT's interpretation of the proposal was contained in
the 1974 Annual Report which records that " one government proposal was that
in relation to the financing of our activities we should seek support from
the agricultural sector, with the Government to contribute matching funds
over and above a sum to be decided, based on what we have been receiving by
way of Government grant". History came to show that the Government did not
operate this pound for pound formula. As one interviewee simply stated "the
Department welched on this and did not meet the expansion pound for pound".
However AFT acted on their own interpretation of the Minister's message and
went out in search of funding from the sector. A variety of mechanisms were
developed to operationalise this policy shift towards user-funding. With some
users specific research projects were contracted directly on a commercial
basis ,most notably with CSET(the Sugar Company) and the chemical companies.
In other cases a commodity levy was agreed and the funding made available
from the levy was then applied towards projects directly associated with the
levy. The milk levy,in the dairy sector, was the prime example of this
approach.
Finally,this 1973-79 period was notable for a major non-event of strategic
significance to the Institute.The 1973/74 annual report records that in his
speech to the new Council the Minister for Agriculture of the new National
Coalition Government, Mr Clinton, said that "there should be close working
arrangements between the research, development, advisory and educational
agencies" and added that he looked forward to " the early integration and
streamlining of the various services available to the farmer". The full
implications of the Minister's thinking emerged in the form of a white paper
in 1975 wherein he set out his proposal to establish a 'National Agricultural
Advisory, Education and Research Authority'. The setting up of the proposed
new body, whose title was later shortened to the National Agricultural
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Authority (NAA), was to involve the dissolution of AFT as a separate
entity and the amalgamation of its then current activities, facilities and
personnel with those of the existing Advisory Service. The Advisory Service
was at that time under the joint administration of the Department of
Agriculture and the local County Councils.
There followed on from this proposal a major political struggle within AFT.
It had raised the collective consciousness of the research staff
in their opposition to the dissolution of AFT and its merging with the
Advisory Service. Their fears were summed up by one senior manager who said
that "the two services were incompatible. Give an organisation two areas
of responsibility and you create chaos. .the one with the political strength
at the user level(in this case ,the Advisory Service). .will get more funds
when the organisation as a whole is strapped for funds and the other piece,
the research piece will be starved". The Director, on the other hand, was
totally in favour of the proposed merger and was perceived by the researchers
as not seeing and sharing their concerns because "he was after power. .he
wanted to expand his power base". The issue was fought in public through the
media and in the Dail chamber. The researchers found a strong supporter
for their position in the main opposition party's front bench spokesman
on Agriculture and Minister designate if returned to government. The
legislation was drawn up to proceed with the establishment of the NAA but
before it was enacted there was a general election and the opposition party
was returned to power. AFT was excluded from the brief of the new Authority
when the legislation finally came before the Dail. By an accident of
history, as it were, AFT maintained its independent identity.
1979-86 New Director, Commodity Surpluses, Resource
Contraction and Programme Reorientation.
In 1979 the first Director of AFT,Dr.Tom Walsh,retired from the Institute and
took up the appointment as the first Director of ACOT, the newly constituted
advisory service that was set up after the amalgamation moves had failed. Dr
Pierce Ryan, Deputy Director of the Institute since the 1971 reorganisation,
succeeded him as Director of AFT. The two immediate effects of this change
were,a change in leadership style and a change in the dominant coalition.
In contrast to the direct, driving, expansionist, authoritative style of
Walsh, the Ryan style has been characterised as "quieter but equally
committed to the advances that science and technology can make", a man who
has "a vision. .a more balanced view of where the Institute should be going",
a man whose inclination is towards a "more collegiate approach". Various
epithets and adjectives were offered in an attempt by various interviees to
convey the contrast in approaches; Walsh as a motivator of men, Ryan as a
logician,systems-man and diplomat; Walsh as more of a Chief, Ryan as more of
a Chairman.
The other effect of the change of leadership was the consequential creation
of 3 Deputy Director posts at headquarters. At the apex of the organisation
there was now an 'Executive', an inner circle , that shared power with the
new Director. The three new Deputy Directors were each given a major
strategic focus, one on the resource allocation and control of the
organisation as the effective director of operations; another as the
architect of the research programme with a brief to keep the programme as a
whole relevant and to identify the research technologies and skills needed to
support it; and the third was focused on external relations with a
particular brief to develop the links with the EEC. The role of Deputy
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Director under Walsh's leadership was perceived to have had relatively little
impact because of Walsh's personality and his natural tendency to keep power
at the centre. Walsh's relationship with his Deputy Director was perceived in
terms of "a dominant Director who had a deputy director in name only..The
Deputy Director had no influence on programme composition..this was
influenced by external events and the Director". Walsh only delegated " the
things he did not want to handle himself. .like personnel (issues)..". Under
Ryan's Directorship the role of Deputy Director has had content, clout and
responsibility. In terms of the dispersion of power within AFT, these 1979
changes were descibed by a head of department as "more significant" than the
changes resulting from the 1971 reorganisation.
The new Director and his new directorate,or executive,came to the helm at a
time when the operating environment of AFT began to undergo some dramatic
changes which presented them with unprecedented and threatening challenges.
These challenges came from a combination of factors. The most notable were
the dramatic change in EEC policy towards agricultural production and the
related change in national agri-product strategy, the gathering crisis in the
country's public finances,and some structural rigidities in AFT itself.
The 1980's saw the EEC move way beyond self-sufficiency in many major
commodities after years of expansion in agricultural production throughout
the Community,largely in response to the price support incentives in the
CAP. This expansion in production was mirrored right across the world's major
food producing blocks so that the international situation in the 80's became
broadly one of increasing supply and falling demand. Serious surpluses began
to mount in many of the Community's main commodities. The mounting surpluses
put an increasing strain on the Community's finances and put the CAP under
threat of breakdown. Throughout the 1980's the Commission adopted various
measures designed to curtail production and to control the surpluses,each
one more drastic than the previous one. In the case of milk production,for
example,they first reduced the level of the price supports in real terms.
When this alone proved insufficient the Commission decided in 1984 to impose
a system of production quotas on the member states with a superlevy penalty
on producers that exceeded the quota. Even this superlevy system proved to
be inadequate and in late 1986 the Commission resorted to the most drastic
action of all by imposing cutbacks on production quotas across the Community.
These changes have had massive implications for AFT. Restrictions and
cutbacks on production have meant that the primary thrust of AFT's research
had to undergo major reorientation. AFT's major drive over the years was to
increase the output of Irish agriculture. In the 1980's this had to change to
take account of production restrictions and cutbacks. The new goal in
production research had to become how to optimise the input/output ratio in a
situation of restricted output. Furthermore the problems of commodity
surpluses confronted Irish agriculture generally with the need to reduce its
dependence on low value intervention type commodities which were more than
ever subject to the whims of the political system. National strategists
emphasised the need to bring about a major shift in product strategy across
the board in Irish agriculture towards a greater reliance on higher
value-added branded products with a high level of consumer acceptance.
To maintain its relevance and impact in this changing situation AFT was faced
with the need to bring about a reorientation in its programme emphasis that
would be the most fundamental and far-reaching in its history to date.
As one senior manager explained:
" the priorities (in the research programme had been broadly).. increased
efficiency and productivity..This ethic ran right up to 1984 until we
had the confrontation over the Superlevy. This motivation ran through all
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the systems. .There is an absolutely new ball game now. .restrictions on
production now. .a whole revolution taking place. The changes that take
place in any one year since 1983 are as important as any that took place
in decades before that. These changes have enormous implications for
research".
In the post-1980 environment,then,AFT faced the need to bring about
a fundamental re-alignment of its research programme. The Institute's
difficulties as it turned to address this strategic priority were compounded
by what was becoming a more stringent and more critical resource environment.
Throughout the 1980-86 period the problem with the public finances,described
in detail in chapter 4,progressively deepened to crisis proportions. AFT's
annual grant-in-aid from the State became progressively tighter and covered a
declining proportion of the Institute's current expenditure. By failing to
maintain the real value of AFT's grant-in-aid the government forced AFT to
either rationalise or to become more self-supporting through the increasing
commercialisation of its services. This in turn had the effect of changing
the basic nature and operant mission of the organisation though its statutory
mission was never altered. Long-term,basic,infrastructural research began to
get pushed out of the programme to make way for an increase in user-funded,
user-defined, short-term applied or problem-solving projects. As the public
finances got tighter not only did AFT's state-aid contract in real terms but
the Institute faced a more critical and sceptical resource environment. The
Institute felt itself under increasing pressure to justify its existence and
its continuing right to even the diminishing support that was forthcoming
from the public purse. A typical example of this more critical environment
was the inclusion of AFT in a list of State-sponsored bodies which "test the
taxpayers' tolerance" in an Irish Independent article on 27/4/83. These
developments led to an increasing sense of identity crisis and concern for
the future within AFT itself. As a senior financial executive put it:
"What (was) happening as the budgets (were) being reduced (was) that people
(were asking) the question why? Why are they reducing ours? Either there
are no votes in it or they do not see us as contributing.."
The problem of bringing about a strategic realignment of the programme in
this resource situation was particularly formidable. In the past resources
were moved to emerging priority areas by channeling the incremental or
marginal funds that were associated with growth,however modest,towards those
priority areas while letting the lower priority areas run down through
natural attrition. Now,in the 80's,the situation was different. Dramatic
change was needed in a relatively short timeframe and in a situation of
contracting resource. This could only be accommodated by carrying out a major
redeployment and redirection of existing resources. In AFT this had to
involve the major redeployment of research professionals since these are the
strategic resource around which the programme is built and towards which the
support resources flow. However,by the 1980's,there were some demographic
and social rigidities in AFT that made this difficult. The complement of
AFT researchers had not changed significantly since the late 60's with the
result that the profile of the 'typical' AFT researcher,by 1985,was a 40-50
year old with 15 to 20 years of cumulative specialist experience in a given
discipline and an employee of AFT since graduation. Reassigning such people
to new research areas,requiring the newer disciplines like biotechnology,was
inevitably going to prove difficult. Moreover,since the AFT research centres
are geographically dispersed throughout the country,strategic reallocation of
professionals across centres implied unwelcome domestic upheaval for many.
144
In additional to these demographic and social rigidities there were also
substantial ideological and political difficulties. Ideologically there
were many within AFT that found it hard to accept the changing emphasis
away from long-term, basic,developmental research towards short-term,applied,
problem-solving research that was carried out in many cases under specific
contract. They felt that the traditional distinctive character of AFT,its
sense of national mission and the quality of its scientific base,were under
threat. Politically there were substantial internal vested interests at all
levels, professional,departmental and centre, in the traditional balance and
emphasis of the research programme which had emerged over many years. For
example,the attempt to bring about a fundamental shift in programme emphasis
from a farm-based production orientation to a consumer-based processing
orientation had major resource and status implications right across the
Institute. This change threatened the traditional status and dominance
of the production researchers and of their departments and centres in AFT.
As early as 1980 the new Director and his team instigated a major internal
review of AFT's research programme in order to bring it up to date with the
new priorities emerging in agriculture and with the latest developments in
science and technology. This review process involved all of the professional
staff in an attempt to systematically evaluate the programme and to develop a
fair degree of consensus around future priorities. Under Pierce Ryan's
patient and persistent leadership the Institute began to make steady,if slow,
progress in the task of transforming the programme. In fact the ARMIS system,
which had "done just about enough to keep it alive over the years" since its
introduction,was revitalised by Ryan and his team as one of the procedures
used in this overall transformation effort. However,it was difficult for the
reasons discussed above,to get the need for change widely recognised within
AFT and to build up a strong enough momentum for change to bring it about. As
the 80's progressed,however,the sense of urgency increased. As the EEC policy
on agricultural production began to change dramatically and as the resourcing
environment became more stringent and more critical,more and more of the
AFT staff came to accept the new realities facing the Institute. In October
1985 AFT produced a major document outlining the progress of this internal
review process over the 1980-85 period and the priorities and plans for the
Institute's programme for the 1985-89 timeframe. In this document AFT
publicly recognised the new realities facing it:
"The mid-eighties is a time of major significance to the future of An Foras
Taluntais. It coincides with a time of rapid advances in scientific and
technological achievements,of diminishing support for agriculture within
the EEC,of increasing competitiveness in export markets for food,and of
reduced State finances for R&D for the agriculture and food
industries" (p1).
By 1985 the realignment and rationalisation efforts of Ryan and his team had
already resulted in the closure of six individual research stations,a
reduction in total staff from 1345 to 1201 and the transfer and redeployment
of 55 staff. Within the programme itself 69% of the discrete projects were
new and the inside farm-gate/beyond farm-gate ratio was running at around
60/40 with a sustained effort underway to move further towards 50/50.
Though the redeployment of resources across departments and centres still
remained relatively small in scale, considerable progress had been made in
transforming the programme at the discrete project level.
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Post 1985 - Cashman Report, Realignment and Rationalisation
The pace of events quickened for AFT as the country's fiscal problems became
more acute. In April 1985 the FitzGerald Government set up a commission,under
the chairmanship of farm leader Donal Cashman,to examine the operation of the
Institute and of the related advisory body ACCT. Cashman's brief was to
recommend how the existing resources of the two bodies might be better
deployed and coordinated. This was the first major review of the Institute's
activities to be commissioned by a government in the lifetime of the
organisation and was itself a manifestation of the new realities facing the
Institute. Successive governments had kept the operation of AFT at arm's
length for most of its history. However,as public funds became more scarce
government evaluation and control of expenditure in the public sector became
more stringent and commissioned reviews of the affairs and operations of
state agencies became more prevalent. The Cashman study took place in the
context of the government's own programme for the economy called 'Building on
Reality 1985-87':
"Both ACOT and AFT have important roles in helping farmers to increase
productivity through the adoption of cost-effective new technology.
However,because of the growing cost to the Exchequer of maintaining both
bodies it is imperative to ensure that the services provided by both
organisations are fully coordinated and that their resources are used
effectively in helping agricultural industry to expand"(par 2.44).
In the case of AFT the Cashman Report highlighted publicly some of the
structural difficulties that beset the organisation and impaired its
performance. Cashman addressed his study primarily to the issue of how
the research activities of the Institute might be expanded and extended into
new areas without any increase in overall resource input. Among the problems
given prominence in the Cashman Report was the high age profile and low ratio
of research to non-research staff in AFT. Cashman lay the responsibility for
the reform of these structural problems primarily within AFT itself.
AFT,which had already begun the painful process of major transformation in
its research programme and resource alignment in its internal review process
over the 1980-85 period,now came under substantial public pressure to speed
up the process,whatever the internal difficulties. This public pressure
actually helped Pierce Ryan and his executive in dramatising the need for
urgent change internally and in getting it even more widely accepted within
AFT.
In December 1986,with the external pressure for change continuing to mount
the Director of AFT and his Council decided to accelerate the process of
transformation. AFT's morale had been badly dented at a meeting of
agricultural interests convened by the FitzGerald Government in late 1986.
They met to try to map out a national strategy for agriculture in the light
of the dramatic changes happening in the Common Agricultural Policy and in
the international marketplace,taking due account of the acute resource
constraints in the public sector. At this meeting the influential chief
executive of one of the largest dairy cooperatives in the country publicly
dismissed AFT's effort on food research as largely ineffective. Though AFT
could fairly question the objective merits of this sweeping criticism,
nevertheless it was a damaging blow to Institute's public image. The
Council,at a crunch meeting on 3-Dec-86,decided on "a number of substantial
changes in the research programme and in the structure of the organisation".
It highlighted 5 strategic priorities for the programme. These were:
(a) raising net farm output and profitability through increased efficiency
in crop and animal production.
(b) developing profitable alternative land uses.
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(c) improving the efficiency of the food processing industry.
(d) identifying alternative(non food) economic uses for agricultural
products.
(e) supporting the expansion of markets,especially into Europe.
Along with further rationalisation, reallocation of resources and project
realignment,the major change to emerge from this exercise was the decision
to set up a separate research centre for food research. Prior to 1986 food
research had been carried on right across the Institute in a number of the
commodity-focused centres. For over two decades the Institute had been
stressing the need to give more attention to food research in its research
programme. It had always stopped short of setting up a separate research
centre for food,partly for internal political reasons and to a large extent
also because the question of whose rightful domain food research was a
politically sensitive matter across a number of different research agencies.
In the context of late 1986 AFT decided that the situation was critical
enough for it to confront these difficulties head on. It finally gave food
research the resource concentration and status of a full centre in its
overall structure.
Since the General Election of February 1987 there have been even more
dramatic developments. This general election did not produce a decisive
result. It returned a Haughey-led minority Fianna Fail administration.
However,Fianna Fail's late conversion to fiscal rectitude effected a
broad consensus of the centre and centre-right in the Dail. The Haughey
Government was given an unprecedented prior commitment of broad support by
the main opposition party over two budgetary periods to concentrate on
getting the public finances back under control. Since then the Haughey
Administration has pursued fiscal rectitude with the zeal of the convert.
No administration since the fiscal difficulties began in the post-1979 period
has been in a stronger position politically to bring about radical change in
the public sector,in spite of its minority position. The implications of this
development for the whole semi-State sector,including AFT,have been
enormous. The Government softened up the public sector for the biggest
rationalisation in its history by closing down one of the smaller agencies,
An Foras Forbatha. This raised the level of reality among the rest.
An article in the Sunday Independent on 7-Feb-88,under the headline of 'The
great shakeout' in the public sector described the significance of what was
happening as follows:
"The era of the all-powerful state promotional body is gone for good. .There
is a new breeze blowing through the state sector which may yet blow the
most familiar names into oblivion. The budgets of the top handful of
agencies have been savaged...The fear engendered by the abolition (of An
Foras Forbatha) ensured that management(of the rest) would take cuts..
There is virtually no agency that has been unaffected by job losses. .But
the really big job losses were coming in those agencies where the
Government forced mergers"
In late 1987 the Minister for Agriculture announced his intention to merge
AFT with ACOT,the advisory service,in order to achieve substantial
rationalisation. The combined budgets of the two organisations were targeted
in the 1988 budget for a cutback from E35m to £20m. This cutback was to
involve a cut of the order of 500 in the combined staff of 2100. In 1977 the
move to set up a single National Agricultural Authority,which had as its
centre-piece the merging of AFT and the Advisory Service,failed because of
the resistance of AFT staff who were supported by Fianna Fail Party,then in
opposition.A Fianna Fail administration,barely a decade later but in totally
new circumstances,is brooking no opposition as it drives through essentially
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the same merger in 1988. The merging of AFT with ACOT to form a new corporate
entity,Teagasc,is the most significant development for AFT since its
its foundation in 1958 and represents a fundamentally new phase in its
history. It will have major implications,not only for AFT's present
leadership and staff,but also for the future role of public sector
agricultural research in the ongoing development of Irish agriculture.
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CHAPTER SIX
CASE STUDY - IRISH DISTILLERS GROUP PLC
AND THE IRISH DISTILLING INDUSTRY
The second case narrative in this research covers the evolution of the Irish
distilling industry and focuses in particular on the genesis and strategic
history of Irish Distillers Group Plc.
Introduction to Irish Distillers Group Plc. 
The Irish Distillers Group in June 1988 are the sole producers of Irish
whiskey.The company owns two distilleries, a modern plant at Midleton, County
Cork, and the Bushmills distillery in County Antrim.In addition to providing
stocks for their own brands,IDG also supply a whiskey-based ingredient for
the production of a range of Irish liqueurs, including Bailey's Irish Cream.
IDG also produces a range of other potable products,including gin ,vodka and
a range of liqueurs including several Irish Coffee related products.
IDG dominates its domestic market,accounting for two thirds of spirit sales.
The trend in recent times has been for this share to increase rather than
come under pressure,with Irish whiskey squeezing out imported whiskey. After
considerable growth throughout the 60's and 70's the domestic market for
spirits has been largely stagnant throughout the 80's.
The UK and European regions have provided promising export growth for IDG
but the company has concentrated strategically on the US market as offering
the major growth oportunities for the company's core business. Though the US
market for spirits generally has been in slow decline during the 1980's Irish
Whiskey was the fastest growing category of mature spirits in this market
for several years. With a starting base of less than 1% the potential for
for growth remains enormous,in spite of the downward trend in the overall
market.
Irish whiskey can be taken as broadly equivalent in market position to Scotch
malt whiskeys and like these is a premium product relative to the blended
Scotch,which is considered the 'commodity' whisky. This quality differential
with blended Scotch forms the basis of the main promotional message in
overseas markets. The company's flagship brands are its main assets and IDG's
best known whiskey brands are Power,Paddy,Jameson,Bushmills and Tullamore
Dew.
Main Phases in the history IDG
The history of IDG is essentially the modern history of the Irish distilling
industry. The concentration of Irish whiskey production within a single
organisation began in 1966 when the traditional family firms of Powers,
Jameson,and the Cork Distilleries Company merged to form the United
Distillers of Ireland,later styled Irish Distillers Ltd. This concentration
was completed when the firm of Old Bushmills became wholly owned by the
merged entity in 1978. This consolidation of Irish Whiskey production in one
organisation was the most recent major structural phase in the evolution of
an industry which has its roots in the mists of time. The acquisition by IDG
of a controlling stake in Bushmills in 1974 was heralded by the chairman of
IDG at the time as the fourth major date in the historical evolution of Irish
distilling.
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The year 1988 will now undoubtedly become the fifth. In May 1988 IDG became
the object of a unwelcome takeover bid . The company initially sought to
defend itself against the hostile bid on its own but when this became no
longer possible it persuaded Pernod Ricard to enter the takeover battle as a
white knight. Pernod Ricard eventually became the new owner of IDG and with
the success of the Pernod Ricard bid the company and the industry would
appear to have entered a totally new phase in their historical development.
The main phases in the evolution of Irish distilling and the main phases in
the history of IDG,as the focal entity at organisational level in this case
study,are now described. The description of the evolution of the industry
from the mists of time up to the 1966 merger draws heavily on the excellent
histories of Irish distilling by McGuire(1973) and Magee(1980).
Evolution of the Irish distilling industry up to 1966 
It is believed that the art of distilling spirits was brought to Ireland by
Irish missionaries returning from the Mediterranean regions and that the
early use of spirits was for curative purposes. The word 'whiskey' is
believed by some to have been coined by the soldiers of King Henry II as they
became partial to the native 'uisce beatha'(water of life) and had difficulty
with pronouncing the full Gaelic name.
Evidence for the distillation of spirits in Ireland becomes much stronger
from the beginning of the 15th century. By the mid-17th century the
distillation and drinking of spirituous beverages was widespread. The first
statute governing the sale of intoxicating liquour in Ireland was enacted in
1635,during the reign of Charles I. This act was designed to curb the "many
mischiefs and inconveniences (that) doe arise from the excessive numbers of
ale-houses. .in woods,bogges and other unfit places. .and kept by unknown
persons. .for whereby many times they become resceptacles for rebels and other
malefactors,and harbours for gamesters and other idle,disordered and
unprofitable livers..". The purpose of the act was specifically to "reduce
those needlesse multitudes of ale-houses to a fewer number,to more fit
persons,and to more convenient places"(extracts from the preamble,Magee,1980;
75) by a system of licensing. In 1661,after the restoration of Charles II,
the first duty was introduced on the production of distilled spirits,at 4d
per gallon for home spirits and is per gallon for imports of high quality.
By the mid-17th century the basic pattern of the complex relationship
between the authorities and the industry,that has characterised distilling
for most of its history,was already being established. From then on the
authorities were to have mixed motives with regard to the growth of the
industry. They wanted to control . and contain it in the interests of
maintaining social and political order;yet the industry was a valuable source
of revenue which automatically expanded with any growth in consumption. The
1661 act also gave the home industry its first measure of protection through
the provision of differential duties for home-produced and imported spirits.
Emergence of the factory system - early consolidation
Over the next hundred years the distilling of spirits in Ireland grew
substantially and became widely dispersed throughout the country. Over time
the duties imposed on the production of spirits rose. Excise collection
methods,in the early days,were crude and control on distilling was loose. The
rise in duties and the loose administration encouraged all kinds of evasive
and illegal distilling practices,particularly in the remoter rural areas of
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the country. Faced with this development the Government passed an act in 1757
prescribing a legal minimum size for a commercial still at 200 gallons of
capacity. The establishment of this minimum,though not particularly large,
represented an important first step in the structural evolution of the
industry towards larger units and greater concentration. Growth in the size
of individual distilleries was also encouraged by the growth that took place
in the overall domestic market for home-produced spirits from 134000 gallons
in 1730 to 1115352 gallons in 1777(McGuire,1973;119). The larger units tended
to develop close to the large ports and Dublin quickly emerged as the main
distilling centre. Dublin provided a large concentrated local market.
Furthermore,the large ports provided more economic access to imported coal
and grain than inland centres.
Government legislation in 1779 provided further and far-reaching impetus for
consolidation. In spite of the 1757 measure the extent of illegal distilling
grew with the overall growth in the industry,even in the legally registered
distilleries. The 1779 act changed the mode of assessment for excise duty.
Excise officers had difficulty establishing the true volume and strength of
still production in order to properly assess duty on an actual production
basis and the Revenue Commissioners were convinced that as much as two thirds
of total still production was evading duty. The new mode of assessment levied
duty on capacity,as well as production.A minimum still charge was introduced.
Over the 1779-1823 period this system of a minimum charge had the unintended
consequence of bringing about the first major consolidation in the industry.
The minimum charge was assessed on still volume and levied over a 28-day
period.Initially the minimum still charge was supposed to be a supplement and
was expected to be a small percentage of total excise assessment. Because of
its convenience as a mode of assessment and because of the continued
widespread evasion in the volume-related duty the Revenue Commissioners came
to look to the minimum still charge to provide an ever increasing proportion
of the excise duty. The minimum charges were progressively raised,raising the
fixed costs associated with running a still. The effect of the escalating
minimum still charge was to drive more and more of the smaller legal
distillers out of business, those unable to increase their production rates
and/or their market outlets in line with the escalation in their fixed costs.
It also acted as a disincentive to the development of very large scale units.
By the 1820's the system of a minimum still charge was totally discredited.
It had led to a deterioration in distilling standards as distillers were
pressured into seeking volume at the expense of quality. Furthermore,abuses
were rampant and most distillers,even the most reputable,were forced to
engage in evasive practises,supported by illegitimate payments to excise
officers,in order to survive. In 1823 the whole system of minimum still
charges was abolished. By this time the number of legal distillers had
fallen from 1228 in 1779 to 40 in 1823. The small family-owned operation
had been driven out of business or outside the law. It was during this 1779
to 1823 period that the family-firms of John Jameson & Sons Ltd(founded in
1780) and John Power & Sons Ltd(founded in 1791) first came to prominence in
the industry. Furthermore,the Old Bushmills distillery in County Antrim,which
was originally licenced in 1608,became an officially registered company in
1784. The firms of Jameson,Power and Old Bushmills,along with that of
Murphy which was founded in 1825,were to become the dominant players in the
future evolution of the industry right up to and beyond the merger in 1966.
The abolition of the still license system of assessment in 1823 meant a
return to the system of assessing duty on the basis of the volume and
strength of spirit produced. This was facilitated by the perfection of a
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satisfactory sacchrometer and hydrometer which helped to eliminate many of
the problems of physical measurement that had plagued the system of
assessment by output prior to 1779. The return to a system based on
output,not capacity,brought new incentives for development within the
industry. Under the still license system distillers were pressured into
developing still types that could produce faster,usually at the expense of
quality and of efficiency in the use of energy and raw materials.In the post-
1823 situation distillers had the incentive to return to a concentration on
quality and efficiency in the development of distilling equipment. This once
more opened the way for the development of larger scale,more efficient,
operations. Meanwhile the domestic market for Irish whiskey continued to grow
as the quality of the product improved and its reputation became enhanced.
Whiskey became the preferred drink,outstripping beer,wine and rum along
the way. Developments in engineering and in transportation and communication
throughout the 19th century also encouraged the evolution of larger scale
units. In 1823 a total of 40 distilleries produced 3.0m proof gallons. By
1900 a total of 30 distilleries were producing 14.0m proof gallons. During
this period of expansion and consolidation there were a number of mergers and
amalgamations including the merger of Murphy's(founded in 1825) with four
other distillers in the Cork area to form the Cork Distilleries Company
Ltd(CDC) in 1868.
Technological breakthrough - The column still
The one major technolgical discontinuity in the history of the distilling
industry happened around 1830 when an Irish excise officer,Aeneas Coffey,
invented a fundamentally new type of distillation process. The Coffey still
became known in the industry as the continuous column still to distinguish it
from the traditional pot-still. The basic object in distilling is to produce
ethyl alcohol. In the pot stilling process small quantities of other alcohols
and ethers are produced as extraneous elements to the main process. However,
it is these extraneous elements,retained in the proper proportion and
derived from the proper raw materials,that give the pot-stilled product its
distinctive character and flavour. The continuous still process,as developed
by Coffey,produces a very pure neutral spirit with virtually none of these
flavouring elements. The column-still was a more efficient process for
producing pure alcohol. Moreover since it removed nearly all of the
flavouring elements there was no need to use expensive high quality malted
barley as the primary raw material when much cheaper grains produced
essentially the same result. In consequence column-stilled spirit came to be
commonly referred to as grain spirit.
It seems most likely that Coffey .
 invented the column still as a more
efficient process for the production of industrial alcohol and of
grain-neutral spirit. Just over twenty years later,however, Andrew
Usher,a prominent wine and spirits merchant in Edinburgh,began to experiment
in the blending of column-stilled and pot-stilled spirits. His experiments
marked the earliest foundations of the future blended Scotch whisky industry.
Blending was given an important impetus in 1860 when the revenue authorities
agreed to allow the blending of plain spirit in bond,and spirit dealers were
allowed to mix pot-stilled spirit from any part of the United Kingdom with
neutral spirit that was also of United Kingdom origin. By tradition the
pot-stilled product in Ireland and in Scotland was laid down in oak casks and
allowed to mature for years,an expensive process which added to the quality
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of the product though it was not required by regulations. This process added
little to column-stilled spirit. In the 1860's various spirit dealers
throughout Britain were able to put column-stilled spirit onto the market
directly after distillation,flavoured with small quantities of matured Irish
pot-stilled spirit,and market it as blended Irish whiskey.
The whiskey controversy and the emergence of the blended Scotch industry
The initial reaction of the major Irish distillers to the blended product was
that the market would soon come to see it as inferior and to reject it.
Indeed in the early days of whiskey blending there were many abuses and much
of the blended product was of doubtful content and origin. The domestic
market largely reflected the views of the large distillers and rejected the
blended product. However,as time went by,the new blended product began to
find a growing acceptance in export markets,particularly in the important
English market. It was cheaper and lighter than the pot-stilled product and
began to find favour with more price-sensitive and less discerning spirit
drinkers. In the 1870's the large Irish distillers joined together in a
campaign to discredit the blended spirit,which they claimed was not true
whiskey and should not be marketed as whiskey. They published a book to
disseminate their argument called "Truths About Whiskey". They were given
support in a London Times leader of 1-Feb-1876 which roundly condemned 'the
fraudulent imitations masquerading as Irish whiskey' and were further
supported by The Lancet and the Medical Examiner which were concerned at the
health hazards posed by the widespread marketing of dubious blended
whiskies(Magee,1980;27-9).
The major Irish distillers continued in this purist opposition to the
blended product right through to the mid-20th century. They kept the whiskey
controversy alive at every opportunity and continued to seek to exclude the
blended product from the right to term itself whiskey. The great whiskey
controversy raged on until 1909. In November 1905 a judgement was handed down
in an Islington Courthouse to the effect that liquor comprising of
column-stilled spirit to which a dash of pot-stilled spirit was added could
not be classified as Irish or Scotch whiskey. The clear implication of the
judgement was that the blended whiskey trade was illegal. The furore and
controversy that followed led to the setting up of a Royal Commission of
Inquiry in order to clarify the situation with respect to the blended
spirit for once and for all. After over twelve months of taking and
evaluating evidence from more than 100 witnesses the Commission,in its final
report in July 1909, reversed the findings of the Islington ruling and
vindicated the blended product. The Irish and Scottish pot-distillers had
finally failed in their thirty year mission to have the blended product
excluded from the right to be called whiskey. An interesting footnote to the
great whiskey controversy is that the historical spelling difference for the
spirit across the Irish and the Scottish industries took on a new and deeper
significance for insiders in this war over what was and what was not entitled
to be classed as whiskey. For the traditional Irish distillers whiskey "with
an e" signified the authentic Irish pot-stilled product while whisky, the
spelling used for most of the blended spirits,signified the adulterated
imitator.
In the early 1900's,at the height of the great whiskey controversy,Irish
was still the "sovereign whiskey" at home and abroad and more Irish
pot-stilled whiskey was exported than any other type(Magee,1980;83). However,
history came to show that the Irish distillers,entrenched in their opposition
to the new blended product,totally underestimated its future potential. True,
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the new product took time to become a serious competitor and its early
diffusion throughout the market-place had been hindered by the presence of
the many dubious offerings from get-rich-quick charlatans with little
interest in building up a longer term consumer franchise. However,underneath
all the controversy and fly-by night activity a more reputable blended whisky
industry was beginning to take strong root in the lowlands of Scotland. It
was spear-headed by well established spirits merchants who were more
market-led than the primary distillers of the pot-stilled flavouring whiskies
in either Scotland or Ireland.
This industry began to emerge in the 1860's when several large column-still
operations were established to exploit the oportunities presented by blended
whisky. In 1877 six of these firms amalgamated to form the Distillers Company
Ltd. which was to play a prominent part in the future evolution of the
blended Scotch industry. During the 1914-18 war years the blended Scotch
industry went through further consolidation. As part of his 1915 Budget the
Chancellor of the Exchequer,Lloyd George,introduced a compulsory three-year
bonding period for all whiskies. The Immature Spirits (Restriction) Act which
gave this measure the force of law led to a major rationalisation in the
blended whisky industry. The new requirement posed no difficulties to the
pot-stilled industries of Ireland and the Scottish highlands because it had
long been the practice in pot-stilling to mature the spirit in cask for a
numbers of years before sale. It also posed little difficulty to the larger
and more reputable producers of blended Scotch because it had also been their
practice to age their product. For those operators that did not age their
product it meant a once off suspension of sales for the initial three years
and a large investment in maturing whisky stocks and storage. Many of the
smaller blended whisky producers did not have the resources to meet these new
requirements and were driven out of the business,leaving the blended Scotch
industry much more concentrated than before. During the 20's the industry
further consolidated as the Distillers Company Ltd expanded to bring in the
top names in the industry,the Dewars,the Haigs,the Walkers and the Buchanans.
The inter-war period - a difficult time for the whiskey industry
The period from 1918 to 1945 was a difficult one for the whiskey industry
generally. The groundwork for the export-led growth of the blended Scotch
industry was firmly laid in the structural consolidation of the industry in
the post-1920 period. It was only after the Second World War,however,that the
blended Scotch industry really took off in such spectacular fashion and the
real market potential of the blended spirit became fully apparent. It was
only then that the traditional myopia of the Irish distilling industry with
respect to the blended product became fully exposed.
Exports of Irish whiskey fell from over 1 million proof gallons in 1925 to
just over 100,000 proof gallons by 1945. There were a number of reasons for
this. Irish whiskey began to lose market share in the British market to the
cheaper blends and to beer. Rising spirit duties and prolonged economic
depression pushed all spirits,and particularly Irish pot-stilled
whiskey,into the expensive luxury category and this undermined its position
in the British mass market. During the depths of the Great Depression,in the
1930's,the market for all spirits had so declined in Ireland and Britain that
a number of Irish and Scotish distillers actually suspended production or
ceased operations altogether. The interwar years resulted in a major
shake-out and consolidation of both the Irish and Scotish industries. Export
potential beyond the British Isles was also severely limited during this
period. During the period 1919 to 1933 the United States operated prohibition
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which effectively closed off this market. The US emerged from the prohibition
era with its own budding whisky industry. The 1930's were characterised by
general depression and high unemployment in export markets and by the spread
of protectionism in international trade,all of which presented an
unfavourable context for the development of the whiskey industry.
In 1922 Ireland separated politically from the United Kingdom and the Irish
Free State was established. In 1926 the compulsory bonding period in the
Irish Free State was raised from three to five years. The extended period
strengthened the position of the Irish distiller on the home market and
penalised the blended spirits because the imposition of a longer storage time
helped to eliminate some of their cost advantage. However,the measure proved
to have a down side for the domestic industry. The spirit laws in the US
prescribed that no spirit could be marketed there that could not be sold in
the exporting country. Irish whiskey exports to the US had to be therefore
5 years old whereas British exports needed only to be 3 years old. This
presented a comparative disadvantage to Irish whiskey exports. Later,in the
1930's Irish whiskey exports to Britain became seriously impaired by the
so-called 'Economic War' between the two countries which raged on from
1933 to 1938. The with-holding of the land annuities by the DeValera
Government in contravention of the terms of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty was
met with severe economic sanctions by Britain in the form of penal ad valorem
duties on Irish imports. In the 1939-45 Emergency years,the Government
introduced curtailments on production in order to conserve cerials for food
stocks. They also prohibited exports in order to conserve the limited
production for the home market and to maintain excise revenue. This was in
sharp contrast to the policy of the British Government which facilitated the
dollar exports of Scotch whisky while leaving the domestic market short.
Post-war recovery - the spectacular rise of blended Scotch
The post-war period saw the spectacular rise of blended Scotch to prominence
in the international spirits market. By the early 50's it was clear that the
world market for whiskey outside of Ireland clearly favoured the lighter,
blended whisky of the Scots. This preference was skillfully cultivated and
fully exploited by the blended Scotch industry. Their post-war success in
penetrating the US market,and their dominance of the British market,were
particularly important. The seeds of success in the US market had already
been set in the period after prohibition was abandoned and the continued
supply of Scotch to the US troops serving in Europe during the 1939-45 war
helped to establish the product with the servicemen who remained loyal to it
on their return to America. By the end of the war the blended Scotch industry
had a high degree of consolidation and a significant concentration in
marketing resources to put behind their leading brands.
By early 50's the spectacular success of the blended Scotch industry on
export markets contrasted sharply with that of the Irish pot still industry.
In 1952 exports of Scotch amounted to £32.5m. Exports of Irish whiskey in the
same year were only £0.5m. This poor relative performance of Irish whiskey
exports became a matter for public debate and was raised in the Dail. In 1953
An Coras Trachtala,the Irish Export Board,was directed to help the distillers
to assess the market potential for a blended Irish whiskey,particularly in
the US,and a market survey was carried out to this end. The following year an
independent deputy in the Dail introduced a private members measure proposing
that steps should be taken to promote the exports of Irish whiskey. He urged
the Irish distillers to come together to build a new distillery for the
production of a blended Irish whiskey and went so far as to suggest the
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setting up of a state-sponsored company to produce a suitably blended Irish
whiskey should the distillers themselves fail to respond. Though some
concerted effort was made by the industry to actively promote the consumption
of Irish whiskey on export markets at this time through the formation of a
trade association nevertheless the Irish distillers,as independent entities,
remained largely fragmented and conservative in their approach to export
marketing and to product policy. They emerged from the interwar period with a
dominant position on the domestic market but had yielded the high ground
on export markets to Scotch. They were not sufficiently organised as an
industry to mount the kind of concentrated marketing effort required to win
over the foreign consumer to the Irish pot-stilled product in large numbers.
And they continued to fear that any attempt to market a blended Irish whiskey
of the Scotch type would confuse the consumer and undermine their existing
export trade.
1966-1970 The Merger and its Immediate Aftermath
By the mid-60's the distilling industry in Ireland was concentrated in the
hands of four firms. The difficulties of the interwar years had forced many
of the other players out of the industry. Some steep increases in spirit
duties in the budgets of the early 50's added to the pressures on the
remaining marginal producers and led to further concentration. The four firms
that remained were Power & Sons, Jameson & Sons, and the Cork Distilleries
Company in the Republic of Ireland and the firm of Bushmills in Northern
Ireland. The year 1966 brought a new phase in the industry's evolution when
the three Southern distillers merged to form the United Distillers of
Ireland Ltd,a publicly quoted company.
The idea that the major Irish distillers should come together and put their
combined resource power behind a drive to revitalise the industry had,as we
saw earlier,been a matter for speculation and debate within the industry and
in the public arena for more than a decade. The spectacular post-war success
of the Scotch industry in developing substantial export markets for whisky
products,and the comparatively poor export performance of the Irish
distilling industry,keep the debate and the pressures on the industry for
consolidation alive at both industry and national levels. Though the
commercial rationale for a higher level of resource concentration in the
industry became more convincing as the 50's progressed there were still some
formidable obstacles to be overcome. These were mainly to be found in the
traditional conservatism of the older generation of distillers,in the long
tradition of rivalry between the firms and their flagship products,and in the
reluctance of the family firms to surrender any control of their traditional
pre-eminence within the industry to a larger corporate entity.
The post 1958 period saw the Lemass administration officially abandon the
protectionist policy of economic self-sufficiency. The programmes for
economic expansion involved the deliberate opening up of the Irish economy
to direct foreign investment and a national commitment to greater
liberalisation in international trade. Lemass signalled his intention to join
the EEC at the earliest oportunity. Then,when the initial application was
turned down and deferred indefinitely in 1963,he set about negotiating the
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement with the country's major trading partner,the
United Kingdom. He concluded this trade agreement in 1965. The opening up
of the economy to direct foreign investment and the general policy of trade
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liberalistion had major implications for the Irish distilling industry. The
domestic market,which the Irish distillers had long dominated and had grown
to depend on for most of their sales and profits,was going to be more open
to competitive pressures from imported whiskies than before. Some of the
larger producers of Scotch had productivity levels and scale economies that
far exceeded those of the Irish family firms. Furthermore,since 1958 the
direct investment by large British interests in the drinks trade in Ireland
had increased,mainly in the wholesale and distribution areas. In 1964 Bass
Charrington acquired Bushmills in Northern Ireland and Allied Brewers were
making inroads into the Southern drinks trade. They acquired a number of wine
and spirits merchants and the Irish distillers became vulnerable to this
concentration of buying power. There were particular fears that the weakest
of the three distilling companies financially,Jameson & Sons,had become
vulnerable to take-over in the face of these developments(Brophy,1985;144).
The threat of entry of large British brewing or distilling interests into the
Irish distilling industry,through the possible acquisition of one of the
major players,provided the impetus for the merger that took place in 1966.
A resourceful new entrant would have posed major uncertainties for the future
evolution of the industry and threatened to severely limit the influence of
the Irish distillers over their industry's future structure. To meet this
threat,and to maintain control over their industry,the three main distilling
companies in the South of Ireland merged into a single corporate structure
in 1966.
To attribute the reasons for this merger solely to the threat of takeover of
one of the companies would be very unfair to the more far-sighted of the
leaders of the industry at the time. By the mid-60's a new generation of
businessmen were in positions of influence in the three distilling companies.
This new generation was more empirical and less tradition-bound than their
predecessors. They were reflections of the new generation of leadership that
the Lemass era heralded right across Irish society in both the public and
private sectors. Men like Frank O'Reilly,the chairman of Powers,wanted the
merger in order to secure the competitiveness of the industry at home,to
provide a concentrated resource base from which to intensify the effort to
expand exports and to provide wider access to equity for further growth and
development. The threat posed by the credible and imminent danger of a
resourceful new entry helped him and others who wanted the merger to overcome
the substantial inertia and opposition that they had faced within the
industry itself.
O'Reilly was one of the "architect(s) of the merger" and he became the
first chairman of the newly merged entity. His address to the shareholders
in the first annual report of UDI Ltd,in 1966, outlined the aims and
philosophy behind the merger. It also recognised the interdependence of
industry interests and national policy,particularly in relation to the
domestic market; and it sought the ongoing support of national policy makers
by linking the welfare of the new entity with prevailing national economic
policy and with the wider national interest,as the following extracts show:
"These three long-established and famous companies have united together in a
spirit of partnership to enable our industry to make its maximum
contribution to economic development in Ireland by utilising all our
resources to the fullest extent 	
By combining the technical skill,experience and tradition of the three
Companies your Board is confident that an even better service can be
rendered in future to consumers in Ireland,and we are sure that the
oportunities for expansion of exports will be increased as a result of the
merger 	
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We look to export markets for long-term expansion of our activities.Our
ability to sustain long-term effort depends in a large part on the
stability of the home market. It is now widely recognised throughout the
world that export success is generally founded on a firm base at home.For
this reason it is our ernest hope that increases in Excise duties and
taxation will be restrained....
As to the future,we trust that Ireland's economic development will continue
to increase rapidly so that real benefits will result from freer trade,not
only with Britain,but also with Europe 	 Our fortunes in large part are
derived from the soil. A distilling industry is surely ideal inasmuch as
native agricultural raw materials are processed in Ireland so that the
balance of payments is substantially increased when sales are made not only
abroad but also in the home market..."
However merging legally and making the merger work operationally proved to
be two different problems ,the first much easier to achieve than the second.
As one executive put it "for some time after the merger, no merger took place
except on paper. Each company went their own separate way. There was little
attempt at rationalisation". For a start there were different expectations
among the parties to the merger about how far the merger would go
operationally. The main difficulty was with the Cork Distilleries Company
partner. Prior to the merger CDC was a family firm headed up by Norbert
Murphy. Murphy was a strong independent-minded force in the industry. He
was a far-sighted and progressive distiller who had diversified CDC into
white spirits,through the adoption of column-still technology,and had
developed the brand leader in the Irish gin market. By the mid-60's he had
accepted the need for the three Irish distilling companies to pool their
efforts,in order to secure and develop their industry. However,in the
aftermath of the merger he remained reluctant to surrender any of his former
operational control over CDC to the new corporate entity. As one senior
executive recalled,"Cork looked on UDI as a trade protection association
(and) as a joint venture on exports".
Whatever the strength of the economic rationale which brought them together
under one corporate structure there were enormous difficulties in trying to
forge a unitary organisation out of three different cultures,polities and
systems,especially when unity of purpose and outlook had still not been
established at the level of the Board. O'Reilly,as an architect of the
merger and as the former chairman of the only public company involved in the
merger,was an obvious and uncontroversial choice for chairman of UDI,as
mentioned earlier. However great difficulties arose when it came to
considering the selection of senior management. The most immediate
development of strategic significance in the post merger situation was the
appointment of an outside professional manager as managing director. For
some months after the merger there was a "struggle for supremacy" among
the parties to the merger. It soon became clear to the Chairman that
little progress would be made on realising the full downstream potential of
the merger until an outsider was brought in,"with no axe to grind",in order
to best manage the business in the overall corporate interest.
In 1968 Kevin Mc Court was hired into UDI as Managing Director on a ten year
contract. He had a marketing background and was an experienced chief
executive. In the early part of his career he had worked for P.J.Carroll
Ltd.,the large Irish tobacco manufacturer in the sales and marketing end of
the business. He later worked as MD of the UK firm Hunter Douglas. On his
return to Ireland he had taken up a five year contract as Director General of
the national television service. When this contract expired he came to UDI.
The partnership of O'Reilly and Mc Court proved to be important in getting
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the merger to work. O'Reilly,as chairman,skillfully managed to "smooth oil on
troubled waters" in the boardroom while Mc Court "brought through very
difficult decisions. .forced the families to agree. .was the man for the time".
As one senior executive recalled,"I don't think that the need for an external
MD was seen before the merger. I don't think that Norbert Murphy bargained
for Kevin Mc Court. (Murphy) did not (for)see a unitary hierarchy developing
as quickly as it did".
To make the merger operationally effective difficult decisions had to be
taken and implemented. Initially "the biggest decision was to bypass the
wholesalers and sell direct to the publicans through the merging of the 3
salesforces into one".The Board had to get government approval for this
merging of the saleforces.Furthermore,the merging itself "was not without
problems. Afterall these salesmen had been competing against each other for
years and had been indoctrinated in the belief that their company's brands
were superior and that the brands of the other parties to the merger,which
they now had to promote as well,were inferior". The bypassing of the
wholesalers and the selling of a distillery-bottled product direct to the
retail trade involved a fundamental change in the industry structure in the
home market. It was a bold stroke which invoked a "vitriolic" response in the
wholesale trade. The reasons for this move and some of the risks involved
were described by one long-serving executive as follows:
"The marketing (rationale) was the need to get closer to the point of sale
to promote the products. There were other things too. The wholesale trade
was largely linked to wholesale bottling and we wanted to get away from
that. Also the majority of the traditional wholesale distribution channels
were controlled by the British brewers that had moved in. This move was
defensive to get some independence from these branches of the seven or
eight British brewers. This strategy involved us in a lot of extra working
capital and this was a risk. We were taking on the financing of the
receivables of the wholesale trade so there was a combination of capital
required plus the bad debt risk".
Kevin Mc Court brought a new professionalism and market orientation to the
management of UDI. Within O'Reilly's backing he quickly put in place a senior
executive structure built around the three primary functions of marketing,
finance and production and he set about forging UDI into an integrated
unitary corporate entity in earnest. The traditional strength of the
Irish distillers was production and he inherited inside expertise to head
up this function. To head up the other two functions,however,he went outside
the company for two experienced professionals with proven track records.
Archie Cook was brought in to head up marketing in 1969 and shortly
afterwards Gene Savage was hired in as financial controller. Finance and
marketing were the first functions to be integrated and the problems were
formidable. The problems involved in the merging of saleforces were described
earlier and according to the controller the integration of the financial
systems "took about two or three years. .having regard to the disparate
cultures it was not an easy task to do. .had to shake people away from the
previous system,they were very different,you just would not believe that
three systems could be so different".
While forging three disparate cultures and systems into one integrated
organisation presented many challenging difficulties at the operating level
there were also major obstacles to full integration and downstream
rationalisation and modernisation,in the immediate aftermath of the merger,
to be found in board level. As one senior executive recalled:
"It was often said (during) 1968-75 that the staffs and managements of the
companies went with the merger but that the lack of acceptance was at board
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level. Mc Court had (major difficulties) with the Board. .Powers were the
more committed to complete integration and rationalisation. Cork did not
want (it) to happen, they wanted it to go away.. (However) after you got
together,no matter how much you may have felt you misunderstood each
other,you now had a responsibility to the shareholders".
1970-79 Strategic alignment,modernisation and expansion
The new company's grand strategic intentions were clearly signalled from the
time of the merger and did not change in any fundamental way throughout the
1970-79 period. The Chairman in the Annual Report of 1972 took the oportunity
"to emphasize again two fundamental aims which are essential to our
strategy. Firstly,we have set ourselves the task of equipping your company
with the capability to produce our existing and new products at costs which
will be competitive in both the home and export markets.Secondly,we have
sought to make our industry capable of greatly enlarging our export trade.
This second objective is of great importance to the Irish economy"(p8).
Broadly the company's post-merger grand strategy has been to dominate the
home market and to use the profits from the home market to largely finance
company growth through expansion abroad. Developments in the 1970-79 period
have mainly been related to implementing this grand strategy. Some of these
developments were initiated,planned and implemented by the company itself
while others were environmental oportunities that were taken advantage of
when they arose. Among the more prominent developments during this period
were the development of new products for export markets, the rationalisation
and modernisation of distilling operations, the association with the
Distillers-Seagrams company and the acquisition of Bushmills,and the
leadership succession of Richard Burrows to Kevin Mc Court.
New products,new emphasis on marketing and intensifying competition
The O'Reilly/Mc Court partnership brought a stronger market orientation to
the new corporate entity. In 1971 the corporate name was changed to Irish
Distillers Ltd to help promote a more readily identifiable corporate image to
both home and export markets. In the same year the company introduced four
new products,a whiskey,a white rum,a vodka and a dry gin. These were the
first major corporate brands not traditionally associated with any of the
pre-merger entities. Their arrival helped to further establish a more unitary
corporate identity within the company and in the marketplace. The
chairman,in the 1971 address to the shareholders,underlined the growing
marketing orientation of this traditionally production-orientated industry
when he proclaimed that:
"We operate in an increasingly competitive world and I am convinced that
we must all be salesmen for our products. This is a responsibility,not
alone for of our sales force,but of all who have an interest in the
Company" (p4).
The company's new marketing emphasis was best illustrated in its
introduction,in 1972,of a new "North American Blend" for Jameson whiskey to
cater for the empirically researched tastes of that market. This was quickly
followed,in 1973,by the introduction of a new blend of Tullamore Dew,the
company's other flagship export brand in the US market,which was also
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"specially blended to meet the requirements of that particular market".
In the early 70's the company showed a greater willingness to experiment with
blended whiskies in order to find a product with most appeal to the overseas
consumer than at any time in the previous history of Irish distilling.
On the home front the full harmonisation of duties with the UK was
implemented in 1972 under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement
of 1965. The protective duties on imported spirits of UK origin were
eliminated and the domestic market opened up to the unbridled competition
from imported Scotch. This added significantly to the competitive pressures
on the industry. On the more positive side it provided more open access for
the company's products to the large British spirits market and provided a
substantial oportunity for export growth. This development intensified the
need for a stronger marketing orientation within the company.
Midleton- the rationalisation and modernisation of
distilling operations
The varying tastes of consumers and the intensifying competitive pressures
were important considerations in the company's decision to implement a major
capital programme of modernisation and rationalisation of the distilling
operations. This programme "dominated the period 1970-75". The centrepiece
of the programme was the decision to concentrate all the distilling
operations of the company in a single new purpose-built unit at Midleton in
County Cork.The Chairman signalled his intention to implement rationalisation
measures in the Annual Report of 1968 and in July 1969 the shareholders were
notified of the Board's conclusion "that we should concentrate production in
one location". He outlined the rationale for this conclusion in the annual
report of 1969:
"..We already have four distilleries with very considerable capacity. Modern
techniques could increase the output of each of them greatly,but we must
face up to the certainty of ever-increasing costs. We consider that costs
can best be controlled by building a single,large production facility. It
will be designed and constructed so as to ensure flexibility for the
Group's complete range of present and future products"
The possibility of a major rationalisation and concentration of distilling
operations was not anticipated by all the parties to the merger though it
was probably in some shape or form "in the minds of those more far-thinking".
As one senior executive recalled:
"I suppose Midleton was seen from the beginning but not by all parties to
the merger. Particularly Cork would not have seen it at the time of the
merger. It was a lot more difficult for Jameson and Power to accept. They
had to see their 150 year old distilleries close"
The consulting firm of A.D.Little were brought in to review the distilling
operations and make recommendations for future distilling strategy. However
the role of the consultants was largely "to confirm the Board's innate
feeling that they needed to do something" and to "take the personal politics
out of the situation" at board level. Elaborating on this last remark the
executive who made it said:
"If you bring someone as expensive as A.D.Little in and pay them large fees
you cannot walk away from the decision after that."
It seems,also,that Midleton was not the automatic choice as the ideal
location but the company had land there and a distilling tradition. Other
proposed sites did not have compensating factors strong enough to swing the
location away from Midleton.
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While the initial decision was communicated by the Board to the shareholders
in July 1969,work did not commence on the facility until early 1973 and the
new distillery was not finally commissioned until 1976. The issues involved
were complex,even apart from the political difficulties at board level.
There were some concerns about writing off the traditional distilleries with
little anticipated salvage value relative to the cost of the new facility.
The initial cost estimate for the new distillery at £2m proved to be way too
low when more detailed planning was carried out and the cost estimate had to
be revise upwards by a factor of three to £6m. With the rapid inflation
unleashed in the wake of the 1973 Oil Crisis,the project outturned on
completion in 1976 at cost of Om. There were concerns also that the nature
of product itself might be compromised in some way or that,even if not,the
consumer's perception of the product might be adversely affected. As one
executive put the concern,"the product is a traditional product strongly
associated with old,slow traditional processing methods. The transfer of the
process to new shiny facilities made it seem (to some) like chemical
production". Another executive added that "one of the worries was that people
would perceive that Power, Jameson and Paddy were now the same product,coming
from the same distillation process". The chairman anticipated this last
concern in his 1972 address to the AGM when he publicly reassured the
shareholders that:
"..the new Midleton will not be a single distillery but,effectively,a number
of distilleries in one. It has been so planned in order that we may
continue to produce,in the traditional manner of our industry,the whiskeys
of unique character and flavour for which your company is famous. Our
determination to do this has made the planning and engineering of the new
Midleton more difficult,and certainly,more expensive,but we are quite
convinced that ours are valuable heritages that must be preserved.."
In spite of these very real concerns which continued to linger even after the
decision in principle had been taken,an internal momentum in support of the
new distilling complex gradually gathered force across the different
functional areas.According to one senior executive "it became more imperative
as time went on. Marketing were asking for things which could not be done".
The overseas market,particularly the US,demanded a lighter colour and taste
than the home market."The decision arose on the negative side. .the problems
with the existing distilleries., the age of the equipment for brewing and
distilling....the water supply situation in the city was not that great..
effluent disposal (was) an increasing problem. The main area of concerns
would have been raised by the production people.The main thing was that they
did not have the flexibility to tailor or fine-tune the whiskey production to
meet the demands of marketing for a smoother product". According to this same
executive who was involved in the decision process "the decision was tested
on all counts". Costs,"when compared to the other advantages" were considered
light and "when all was said and done a lot of it was qualitative. .we had to
get new distilling facilities..(and)..it did prove financially successful to
the end". On the economics of the decision "one of the major economic factors
was that the old facilities were very labour intensive and the proposed new
one was energy intensive". The project was already underway when the 1973
Oil Crisis occurred. This "was a major negative feature associated with the
project" that was unpredictable at the outset. Once the project got rolling,
however,there was no attempt to turn back,even after the Oil Crisis and the
rapid inflation in the overall cost as a senior financial executive recalled:
"Once it was rolling we never had a review to say go-nogo. Denis Cotter(the
project leader) and Clem Ryan(the production director) had it in their
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minds and they knew what they wanted. I suppose as I think about it you
could say that this project was like a Japanese decision - it took a long
time to reach decision point but once there everyone was committed to do
it. Confidence in Cotter,Ryan and McCourt was a major element in the whole
thing".
The decision to concentrate production in Midleton meant the end of
distilling in Dublin. It meant redundancy for certain categories of worker
and it broke a centuries old link between certain inner city communities and
the distilling industry. An article in the Irish Times of 30-7-76 focused
attention on "...the social implications of switching from family firms
of four generations' traditions or longer to the just-flick-a-switch style of
distilling in Midleton" and pointed out that "the last members of
the St Patrick's Guild of Coopers belong to a trade founded in 1501". The
coopering trade in Dublin did in fact survive for several more years in order
to provide coopering for the pipeline stock of maturing whiskey that still
remained in Dublin warehousing and which were run down gradually after
Midleton was commissioned. Among the many reasons for centralising distilling
in Midleton and not in Dublin was that Dublin workers had a reputation and
tradition for being more militant trade unionists than the workers down the
country. The industry was particularly vulnerable to strike pressure because
supply interruption inevitably led to loss of market share which always
proved very expensive to regain. One of the major risks in centralising
operations was that it meant that it concentrated the power of the workers to
shut down the entire distilling production in one location and Midleton,
rather than Dublin,was felt to present less risk in that regard. However,
Midleton later proved to provide a much tougher industrial relations
challenge to the company than had been anticipated at the time of decision.
In a special Business and Finance feature on 13-9-84 the production director
of Irish Distillers went on record and summed up the company's industrial
relations in Midleton with the local union organisation as follows:
"We really have had more than our fair share of problems - strikes,partial
strikes,go-slows,the lot.It is not a happy place for us.."
The association with Seagrams and the acquisition of Bushmills
If the Midleton project tended to dominate the early 70's nevertheless there
were other strategic developments during this period of far-reaching
significance. The most important of these was the formation of an association
with Distillers-Seagrams and,through this association,the acquisition by the
company of a controlling interest in Bushmills.
On 24-Nov-72 IDG formed an association with the Distillers-Seagrams company.
To quote from the Annual Report of 1972 "in brief, this agreement has
resulted in Distillers-Seagrams,through their main United States subsidiary,
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., acquiring 15% of our enlarged ordinary share
capital. We,in turn,have acquired a 25% minority holding in the 'Old
Bushmills' Distillery Company Ltd. which Distillers-Seagrams purchased in
October 1972"(p.7). Seagrams were in fact interested initially in a full
take-over of Irish Distillers but the group board wished to maintain the
company's independence and to retain the ownership of the company under Irish
control. The deal eventually struck involved the acquisition by Seagrams of
15% of the equity of Irish Distillers and a restriction on the possible
future size of the Seagrams stake to an upper limit of 20%.
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The expected benefits to be gained from this association were outlined by
chairman further on in the same annual report."We have thus available to us
additional resources,outlets and promotional support,in major export markets,
which would have taken us an incalculable time to attain by our own
individual efforts and from our own financial strength...Additionally, Irish
Whiskey, for the first time, will now present a united front in its attack on
the export markets of the world.This can only be to the mutual advantage of
both Old Bushmills and ourselves, and there are further considerable benefits
to be expected from the pooling of our knowledge and expertise in production
and marketing"(p7).Distillers-Seagrams was the largest distilling company in
the world with wide global interests. Their interest in Bushmills and in IDG
was presented to the IDG shareholders in the 1972 Annual Report as "the
direct outcome of the successes we,and Old Bushmills,have been achieving in
export markets; it was..Distillers-Seagrams' appraisal of those successes
and of the great potential of Irish Whiskey that led to their desire for
association.. "(p7).
IDG raised their equity holding in Bushmills to 80% in 1974. The Chairman, in
the 1974 Annual Report,called this development one of historic significance
for the distilling industry in Ireland. He felt that "..future historians
(would) mark four major dates in the history of the Irish Whiskey industry",
The major dates that he referred to were the founding of the companies in the
group almost 200 years ago; the formation,through the merger of five
companies in the region, of Cork Distilleries Company in 1868; the merger in
1966 that led to the formation of IDG; and finally 1974 when Bushmills came
under IDG control. In 1977 IDG finally acquired the remaining 20% of
Bushmills equity .
The main strategic significance in the acquisition of Bushmills was the
consolidation of the total production of Irish whiskey under one corporate
entity. This enable Irish Distillers to approach the strategic marketing of
Irish whiskey as a generic product. The acquisition of Bushmills by Irish
Distillers brought the entire Irish Distilling industry under the control of
a single corporate entity. The acquisition had other benefits. The Bushmills
flagship whiskey brands were well established in the US and UK markets and
provided a strategic product base for export-led growth in these markets.
In addition the Bushmills distillery was the oldest in the world. This had a
certain market value in an industry in which tradition plays an important
part in the overall image of the product. Moreover,the traditional
distillery was well located in a rural setting with a pure and plentiful
water supply and was pretty efficient by industry standards as a result of
the modernisation programme which Seagrams had implemented when they took it
over initially. Finally,it provided Irish Distillers with a second production
location which helped to mitigate the industrial relations risk associated
with the centralisation of the rest of its distilling operations in the
modern Midleton complex.
The association with Seagrams,through which IDG acquired an interest in
Bushmills,was also expected to provide synergies in marketing and
distribution for both companies. This association became a contentious issue
between the management and a vociferous segment of the shareholders. The
question of what the 'quid pro quo' was for IDG in the IDG-Seagrams
relationship was hotly debated at several AGM's and reported in the press.
Reporting on the 1974 AGM an Irish Times article 1-3-75 records that "various
shareholders ..demanded the exact export figures to North America" so that
the could assess the impact that the Seagram link was making towards the
development of this market.The chairman,Frank O'Reilly, refused to provide
the figures claiming that "they would be very advantageous to our
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competitors".The shareholders saw this as evasive and persisted in their
demands but O'Reilly persisted in his refusal. At the 1975 AGM, as reported
in article in the Irish Press of 25-2-76, "..it was the export situation,
particularly in the US, that was of most concern among the more than 100
shareholders at the meeting,at which the Distillers board came under repeated
criticism for failing to disclose US sales figures".Again the feeling was
that the IDG-Seagrams link was proving much more beneficial to Seagrams than
to IDG.The issue persisted into subsequent AGMs with shareholders continuing
to request information on the exact level of US sales and the Board firmly
refusing to provide the information. Speaking about IDG's US involvement
generally one executive said that "the Press have given us a hard time on the
US involvement over the years because it has not developed as fast as hoped,
thus challenging the wisdom of the strategy". Unrealised expectations from
the Seagrams link may have been part of the reason why the US market had not
developed as fast,or as far,as had been hoped for. However,there were other
important contributory factors. These included some organisational
difficulties in IDG's own marketing effort and the underlying trend away from
spirits to lower alcohol drinks in the US market itself.
New managing director - Richard Burrows
Kevin Mc Court had been appointed MD of UDI in 1967 on a ten year contract.
He was in his late 50's by the time this contract had expired and he
signalled his intention to retire. Richard Burrows, according to one
executive interviewed,"was clearly being groomed for succession". He had
been MD of Bushmills. When it became clear that Mc Court intended to
retire,Burrows was brought in to IDG headquarters as his "right hand man"
for an overlap period of approximately 12 months,and was given the title of
general manager. He became MD of IDG in 1977,at just 31 years of age.
Richard Burrows had started out as a chartered accountant in the firm of
Stokes Brothers and Pim,Dublin, the auditors for Irish Distillers. He was
familiar to,and with,the company from the beginning of his career. His uncle,
Nigel Beamish, was chairman and MD of Edward Dillon & Co., the Southern
Ireland distributors for Bushmills and a company in which IDG had at the
time,a 65% stake. Burrows spent a short time working in Edward Dillon & Co.
after leaving the audit firm before being hired by Seagrams to become MD of
Bushmills which they had just taken over. Seagrams,through the leadership of
Burrows,"brought in the 20th century into Bushmills and spent money on it".
As the new MD of IDG he was both professionally qualified for the position
and raised in the tradition of the industry. Though there would be changes in
style,structure and tactics, the appointment of Richard Burrows was a signal
for continuity,rather than for change, in the overall grand strategy. Frank
0' Reilly was still Chairman of the Board and was to remain so until 1981.
Kevin Mc Court was to remain on the Board until 1982.
While there was no major change in overall strategic thrust on the succession
of Richard Burrows,there were some organisational changes. Mc Kinsey
Consultants were hired to advise on organisation so that the new MD could
"start with a clean slate". The job of the consultants was perceived by
some insiders to have been partly to "confirm the people that (the new MD)
wanted anyway" and to minimise the political fallout as the new MD
went about putting his own management team in place. Whatever about their
perceived political role the consultants were clearly expected to provide
substantive advice on organisational design. With Midleton on stream the
primary focus shifted from distilling onto marketing. The Mc Kinsey study was
"focused on the need to develop markets overseas" and to advise on the most
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effective sales and marketing structure for this purpose. It also looked at
the overall corporate management structure. The existing structure involved
an Executive Committee "which ran the day to day affairs" of the company and
consisted of the MD and the heads of functions. "When Mc Kinseys had a go at
this they changed its membership and called it the Group Operating Committee.
They dropped a number of people. .and changed it slightly". In this overall
organisational review McKinseys also recommended that a Supply Operations
function be set up to integrate the bottling and distribution activities
organisationally and operationally.
The post-merger period 1966-79 - summary
In the post-merger period up to the end of the 70's much had been achieved
and if the expansion in exports was still less that had been hoped for,
nevertheless,the company looked forward with considerable confidence to the
future. The company had carried out a major rationalisation and restructuring
of the domestic sales activity. It had rationalised and modernised its
distilling capacity and had sufficient capacity to handle the expected
expansion in output for years ahead. It had acquired Bushmills and finally
consolidated the production of Irish whiskey under the one corporate entity.
This helped to further its dominance of the home market and strengthen the
profit base with which it hoped to resource its strategic drive for
export-led growth. The lowering of protection and the general liberalisation
in trade with other nations,which was manifest in the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Agreement in 1965 and later in EEC entry in 1972,had led to greater
competitive pressure on the company but the company had responded well in its
rationalisation and modernisation efforts.
In all,over the 1967-79 period,turnover had increased by 105%,net assets
by 206% ,and PBIT by 293% in real terms. Productivity in terms of case sales
per employee had grown by almost 300%. In terms of volume sales the case
sales of whiskey to international markets had grown by nearly 400% over the
1968-78 period. Exports of whiskey had risen from around 21% of total whiskey
volume to almost 34%. One of the notable features in the first decade or so
after the merger was the expansion in the home market. While the company had
planned to strengthen its position on the domestic front it foresaw its main
growth coming from exports. However,volume sales of Irish whiskey on the
domestic market rose by 163% over the 1968-78 period,an increase which in
fact exceeded in absolute terms the expansion in export volume. One major
factor in this was the success of the national effort to expand the economy
and to reverse the decline in the overall population. Between 1966 and 1979
the population increased by 17% and the underlying domestic demand for Irish
whiskey expanded in line with this trend. A further factor of significance
in this domestic expansion was the substantial improvement in farm incomes
and agricultural living standards that followed on from EEC entry. The
momentum of this expansion in domestic sales was broken for a period when a
14 week industrial dispute closed down all distilling,bottling and domestic
distribution operations in 1974-75. It took two years for the company to
return to growth in domestic sales volume,a reflection of the strategic
relationship between continuity of supply and the maintainence of market
position in this fast-moving consumer goods business.
Overall,by 1979,the industry had been placed on a more secure footing.
Considerable progress had been made in the operational implementation of the
merger though it had been more difficult than company strategists had
expected or outside interests realised. The main elements of the post-merger
strategy were in place and working. There was still more scope for
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rationalisation downstream from distilling. However,by the end of the 70's
the company had still not achieved the self-sustaining breakthrough in the
strategic US market. Case sales to the US market had grown from 8% of total
volume in 1971 to around 15% in 1979. This was still far off the take-off
level that was a central objective in the overall post-merger strategy.
The achievement of take-off in the US market had proved to be more
difficult and more expensive than the industry leaders had expected. The
Midleton project,the acquisition of Bushmills and the full exploitation of
the natural increase in domestic demand had taken up a lot of company
resources and management attention. By the late 70's,however,it seemed that
the company was at last in a position to concentrate its resource power on
export development and accelerate the drive for take-off in the US market.
An Irish Times article on 23-2-79 captured the prevailing mood when
announcing details of a £30m expansion programme at Irish Distillers:
"Full of confidence for the long-term future of the distilling industry,
Irish Distillers is to spend over £30m in a drive to step-up production
and capture a larger share of the lucrative US market..at the end of five
years output is expected to have increased by 50%....the primary export
target will be the US,followed by West Germany,Holland and France"
The difficult 1980's - retrenchment and realignment
The year 1979 proved to be a major milestone and watershed in the
fortunes of Irish Distillers. Sales on the domestic market had reached a
record level and exports to all markets outside the Republic of Ireland
had passed the level of lm cases. A £30m physical development programme
had been embarked on and the distilleries at Midleton and Bushmills were
on full 7-day operation. The Irish Distillers management were looking
forward to the future with confidence,as we have just seen. Within a
year,however,the environment of the company began to change dramatically.
Richard Burrows and his team found themselves confronted with tough new
challenges which undermined their company's future prospects and
threatened the whole basis of the post-merger strategy. The company
experienced new pressures on both the domestic and the export fronts.
Contraction and stagnation in the domestic market
In the wake of the 1979 Oil Crisis the international trading environment
went into a period of prolonged recession. Many trading economies found
themselves facing a combination of low growth and high inflationary
pressure. In Ireland these problems were compounded by the high level of
debt in the public finances. The domestic demand for the company's products
has been largely determined by population trends,the level of consumer
expenditure and the price of spirits relative to other consumer goods.
Recession led to a decline in the level of real incomes. The Government's
fiscal difficulties led to high levels of personal taxation which depressed
real incomes further. They also led to steep increases in the taxation on
spirits which raised sharply the relative price of the company's products.
In addition,there was a dramatic slowdown in the growth rate of the
general population to one third of the level that prevailed throughout the
70's. The overall effect of all of these factors was that the domestic
market for IDG's products was stagnant or in decline throughout most
of the 80's.
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The sharpest decline in domestic demand was experienced in the early 80's.
Over the 1979-83 period the excise duty per bottle increased by over 200%
and over the 1981-83 period the sales of IDG's branded goods in the
domestic market fell in volume from 1.4m to 1.02m cases,a fall of 27%. This
was only partially compensated for by the related rise in the 'displaced'
demand(i.e. the volume of spirits which is bought in Northern Ireland and
re-imported,legally or illegally,for consumption in the Republic).The
margins on the displaced demand were lower and the overall effect was one
of decline in volume and profit from the total Irish market,North and
South. While overall consumer expenditure per capita was in decline by 2.3%
per annum,in contrast to the average increase of 2.3% per annum which
characterised the 1960-79 period,the company had little doubt as to what
the major factor was that brought about the serious decline in its domestic
market volume:
"The size of the fall in volume is a very considerable blow to (IDG).
Whilst the general economic conditions undoubtedly depressed demand for
spirits,the excessively high rate of duty now applying in the Republic of
Ireland is,in our view,the main cause of the sharp decline"(Annual
Report,1982;6).
As one senior executive put it:
"...throughout the history of distilling, the single constant factor which
has brought change to the industry has been excise".
The government's take in excise duty from domestic spirit sales rose from
£39.9m in 1979 to £66.8m in 1981. By 1983,however,the onward rise in excise
duties had depressed the market to such an extent that the overall return
to the exchequer had actually declined to £55m on the contracting sales
volume. In 1984 the company was successful in persuading the Government
that the excise revenue from spirits had passed the point of declining
returns and the duty was cut by 20% in October 1984. This led to a recovery
of 15% in total spirit sales over the following twelve months. However,
IDG's recovery of its domestic sales volume,in the aftermath of this cut
in duty,was temporarily delayed by a seven week strike which disrupted
production and distribution to the home market. In 1986 the Government once
more increased the duty on spirits and once more the domestic market
declined. By the end of 1987 the company's sales of branded products to the
domestic market stood at around 1.1m cases,an overall decline of 20% since
1981. This prolonged pressure on the domestic front was clearly seen by the
company as undermining its strategy of export-led growth where,in the words
of the chairman in his address to the shareholders in the 1980 Annual
Report,the company faced "mammoth competition" and "where its success is
directly dependent upon heavy promotional investment that must,in turn,be
funded from a strong home market".
The acquisition of BWG
Over the 1968-84 period the structure of the industry downstream of the
company had been undergoing substantial change. One of the most significant
developments was the shift away from the public house as the dominant
retail outlet towards the off-license and supermarket stores. The large
multiples dealt directly with the company and were serviced through the
company's own domestic sales and distribution organisation. Much of the
smaller supermarket and off-license trade came to be supplied through
independent cash and carry wholesalers and this mode of distribution was
continuing to develop into the 80's.
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One of IDG biggest strategic investments during the 1980's was into
the cash and carry business. In 1984 IDG acquired BWG for its food and
drink division. The net cost of this strategic investment,after the
engineering division and 71% of the pharmaceutical division of BWG were
disposed of by IDG, was flOm. This acquisition gave IDG direct control
over a nationwide wholesale and cash and carry network. This strengthened
the company's domestic distribution network. It also increased IDG's power
to market its products directly to the substantial cash and carry customer
base and helped it protect and strengthen its domestic profit margins.
Richard Burrows explained that the acquisition was made because "the fall
in the home market has eroded our home base so we need to consolidate the
home base"(Sunday Tribune,8-4-84) and the company felt that it had been
losing contact with its customer base with the growth in the cash and carry
trade.
The acquisition was perceived as defensive by the stock market. The
market's initial immediate response to the news of the acquisition was a
drop of 10p in the share price which reduced the company's market
capitalisation by £7m. The company was perceived to have invested
strategically in a stagnant market with no prospect for growth. The
market would have preferred to see any acquisition by the company focused
on the export front,where IDG's best prospects for growth in the 1980's,and
beyond,were seen to lie. According to a feature article in the Sunday
Tribune at the time(8-4-84) the news of the BWG acquisition had been met by
a "torrent of criticism from the press" and the move was "attacked by some
commentators as dull and unimaginative because it represent(ed) a
substantial investment in the Irish home market". The BWG acquisition
marked a turning point in the attitude of stock market to IDG. Up to 1984
the market had been relatively uncritical of the company and had kept faith
with its basic strategic thrust. Progress on exports continued to be
promising. After a sharp fall in EPS over the 1979-81 period from 17.55p to
11.56p the company's profit performance recovered steadily in difficult
trading conditions to an EPS of 17.55p in 1983. The stock market had
responded very favourably to this recovery and the quadrupling of IDG's
stock price over the 1982-84 period prior to the acquisition reflected
the market's confidence in the company's future export potential. After the
BWG acquisition,however,the attitude of the market appeared to have become
more critical of the company and less confident in the company's will or
capability to realise its full export potential. This was reflected in the
share price trend which began to lose ground against the general market
index after 1984.
Decline in the US market and major revision of marketing strategy
The underlying trend in the US market for whiskey has been in decline since
the early 70's. This decline reflects an underlying trend in consumption
away from spirits generally to beverages with lower alcohol content and
a shift,within the spirits category itself,from brown to white spirits.
Over the 1970-79 period the US market for alcoholic beverages experienced
general growth as a result of rising disposable incomes and expansion in
the overall population. However,the level of per capita consumption of
distilled spirits grew by just 10% over the decade in contrast to beer at
30% and wines at 71%,indicating the clear trend away from spirits. Within
the spirits category the white spirits and liquers enjoyed fairly good
growth in marked contrast to brown spirits. Over the period from 1960 to
1986 whiskey's share of the US spirits market declined from 74% to less
less than 40%. The trend away from distilled spirits to drinks with lower
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alcohol reflected a growing concern among the population at large with
fitness and health. This trend away from spirits for lifestyle reasons
continued throughout the 1980s and spread to the international market.
In addition,world recession after 1979 led to a general downward trend in
disposable incomes. As a result of these developments the international
market for spirits declined in volume over the 1979-87 period by 13%
overall,with the greatest decline taking place in the brown spirits
segment.
In spite of the underlying trend away from whiskey in the US market from
the early 70's onwards the market potential remained vast for IDG. The US
whiskey market,even after years of decline,still accounted for over 40% of
the global market for whiskey in 1986 with a total volume of 68m cases.
For IDG,with a market share of less than 0.5% in the late 70's,this 68m
case market,even in decline,still represented a major oportunity for its
generically distinct,high quality,products. A gain of just 1% in market
share in the US market promised a 33% growth in overall IDG sales volume.
The company's sales of branded whiskeys to the US increased from .04m cases
at the time of the merger to almost .35m cases in the early 80's. This
growth was achieved against the underlying trend in the overall US whiskey
market. Over the 1976 to 1982 period IDG increased its sales volume in the
US by more than 70% in a market that declined overall by 10% in volume for
all categories of whiskey and the market share of Irish whiskey doubled
over this period,albeit from a very low base. Irish whiskey was the fastest
growing mature spirit in the US market during these years. In 1983 the
company and the stock market continued to look forward with confidence to
good medium to longer term growth prospects for IDG based on its still far
from realised export potential in the US.
In the 1980's,as we have seen,the company faced difficulties from
unfavourable underlying trends in the strategic US market as it continued
to work for a self-sustaining breakthrough on the export front. However,its
marketing efforts in the early 80's were also hindered by internal
organisational difficulties. When Richard Burrows took over from Kevin Mc
Court as managing director he brought the Mc Kinsey organisation in to
help him develop his own senior management structure. The new structure
split the marketing function into two senior positions,one focused on the
domestic market and the other focused on exports. The marketing director
that Burrows had initially inherited from Mc Court resigned in 1979.
In 1982 Richard Burrows decided to revert to a structure that gave one
senior executive overall responsibility for the marketing function and he
went outside the company to make a strategic appointment in this area. A
new marketing director was appointed but the new man did not fit in with
the culture in IDG and left quietly within a year of his appointment.
Meanwhile the company had difficulties with its direct marketing presence
in the US. IDG's marketing strategy in the US,since the early 70's,was to
have each of its flagship brands handled by a different importer. Thus
Seagrams had Jameson,Brown-Forman had Bushmills and Heublein had Tullamore
Dew. In 1981 IDG set up a direct marketing presence in the US to provide a
closer involvement by IDG in the promotional and marketing efforts of the
importers. This operation had three different coordinators over the 1981-86
period. Then it was scaled down and relocated as IDG struggled to find
the most effective role for this direct marketing presence. One of the
major strategic difficulties that developed as the decline in the overall
US market for whiskey continued was how to keep the importers motivated to
push IDG brands when their own flagship brands were under severe pressure.
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The upward movement of IDG exports to the US against the underlying trend
in the market stopped in 1984. In the post-1984 period the US sales volume
stagnated at around .3m cases fQr a couple of years and then declined to a
level of around .27m in 1987. The decline reflected the large drop in the
consumption of spirits that followed on from the sharp increase of 19% in
federal excise tax in 1985. This stagnation in the company's US performance
and the company's 'defensive' acquisition of BWG began to raise new doubts
within the business community that IDG might not have the resources or the
will to really make a breakthrough on the export front. In particular,the
company's export performance looked lack-lustre in comparison to the
phenomenal export success of Baileys Irish Cream. Baileys Original Irish
Cream was by far the biggest whiskey-based new product success in
decades and it was developed outside of IDG. Its introduction by
Gilbeys,a traditional Dublin wine and spirit merchant,gave rise to a
whole new genre,the cream liqueur. Gilbeys became a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Grand Metropolitan,a large British conglomerate,in 1973. Backed by the
enormous resources of the parent company Gilbeys achieved an export
breakthrough with Baileys and by 1987 was exporting 2.6m cases,which
exceeded the total exports of all IDG brands by a wide margin. Baileys was
taken as a benchmark for what could be achieved on export markets with a
distinctive product concept backed by resourceful and creative marketing.
In 1985,with the momentum on US exports broken and the investment community
becoming more critical of the company,Burrows and his board decided that
the time had come for a fundamental review of export marketing strategy.
The existing strategy had achieved some notable gains in export volume over
the 1976-82 period but,in spite of a costly and sustained effort,had not
achieved the hoped for breakthrough. The reversal in the trend after 1984
undermined confidence in the existing approach. The company brought in
outside consultancy support to help them in this review. One of the lessons
which emerged from the US experience was that the company's premium brands
had withstood the overall decline in the US whiskey market much better than
its lower-priced brands. This review set in train a major reorientation in
the the company's product strategy for export markets. The metaphor used to
describe this reorientation was the change from a 'shotgun' approach to a
'rifle' approach to product/market targeting. The shift in strategic
thinking towards the rifle approach was heavily influenced by the company's
performance in the UK market where it was using a highly focused two-brand
strategy.Sales of Irish whiskey had doubled in the UK over the 1981-85
period from a base of around .027m cases. This success formed the basis for
developing a new,and more focused export marketing strategy for all
markets. The essence of the new strategy was this: the company would
continue to make its products available in many overseas countries and
support the traditional demand for particular brands but that it would
focus its main marketing efforts only in those geographical areas that
showed the most potential for growth. Furthermore,within these specially
targeted markets it would concentrate its full promotional effort behind
one,or at most two,flagship brands.
The essential conceptual change in the new strategy was that IDG determined
to increase its overall share of the international spirits market through
seeking a medium to large niche in selected markets rather than by trying
to develop and secure a small market niche across the board. The rifle
strategy was extended to Europe after 1985 and the West German,French and
Dutch markets were targeted as providing the best oportunities for IDG.
Over the 1984-87 period Irish whiskey sales to these three strategic
markets increased in total by around 45% from a combined base of .062m
cases. It took a little longer to extend the strategy to the US because of
171
the changes implied to some long standing relationships with importers
there. In 1987 the rifle approach was developed for the US market. IDG
decided to put all of its promotional efforts in this market behind its two
premium brands,Jameson and Bushmills,"with distinctive but complementary
positioning". It decided to phase out all other brands by agreement with
its importers. The company also determined to lead the marketing effort
directly in the five strategic States selected for intensive market
development. The five States chosen for this focused strategy were
California,Colorado,Florida,Illinois and Massachusetts ,which the company
felt offered the greatest potential for growth.
Rationalisation, and takeover bid
Though IDG undertook a major revision in their marketing strategy in
1985 it was only extended to the US market in 1987 and will take some time
to prove itself there. Over the 1980-87 period the company made a number of
major rationalisation moves designed to improve the quality of the its
earnings,through improving the cost competitiveness and productivity of its
operations and through reducing its overheads. In 1985 Richard Burrows and
his team invested nearly £1.5m in a major rationalisation of its domestic
transport operation. In 1987 they further invested over ElOm in a major
cost reduction plan,the central element of which was a reduction in the
workforce of the Group's main trading company of 30%. This move was
expected to improve the pre-tax earnings of the company by 25%,which would
repay back the investment in 2.3 years and strengthen the future earnings
flow of the company.
Over the 1980-87 period IDG had become a leaner operation which has
undergone a major revision in export marketing strategy,designed to
significantly improve its export growth potential over the medium term.
It had done this against a background of an international market for
spirits which is on a decline. In response to this general decline the
larger players in the industry,with the greater exposure to the declining
trend,have sought to maintain their earnings growth through acquisition and
take-over. The degree of concentration in the whiskey segment has become
even greater than that for the spirits industry as a whole. In 1987 the top
five spirits companies accounted for over 35% of the market while the top
five whiskey producers, Distillers(Guinness),Seagrams,Suntory,Allied Lyons/
Hiram Walker,and IDV accounted for over 60% of the global whiskey market.
This trend towards increasing concentration in the global whiskey industry
gave rise to increasing speculation in the market that IDG was a possible
target for takeover.
By the end of 1987 the effects of the company's rationalisation efforts and
revised export strategy had not yet begun to make a significant impression
on its bottom line performance. Over the 1979-86 period there had been no
growth in EPS and the IDG share had underperformed the market from late
1986 on through into early 1988. In June 1987 Seagrams sold off their
remaining interest in the company,a block of 13.8% of the IDG shares.
Development Capital Cerporation(DCC) picked up a 5.8% stake in IDG from the
Seagrams offloading. DCC increased their holding over the next few months
to 14.7%. In October 1987 FII-Fyffes,a large fruit importer,purchased
shares in the market representing a total stake of 5.3% in IDG. One month
later FII-Fyffes acquired the whole DCC holding to bring its total stake
up to 20%. This acquisition of a 20% stake immediately fuelled intense
speculation that a takeover bid was imminent.
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Richard Burrows,his Chairman Joe Mc Cabe and the Board moved swiftly to
galvanise their company's efforts in order to resist any takeover bid. They
brought their plans for IDG's future straight to their major institutional
investors.These investors had reportedly been "disenchanted for several
months with IDG,which they saw as going nowhere"(Sunday Independent,
8-Nov-87).The presentation of the company's rationalisation programme
and new marketing strategy went far towards restoring investor confidence
in the short term. No public takeover moves were made by FII-Fyffes. Its
chief executive,Neil Mc Cann,refused to be drawn on his precise intentions
for the IDG holding other than that his company viewed it as a "strategic
investment". IDG's half yearly performance figures,published on May 26th
1988 began to show the positive effects of the rationalisation and
marketing changes. The company's half yearly EPS rose 37% on the same
period in 1987. The EPS outturn for 1988 is expected to be 19-20p,an all
time high; the EPS had remained for almost a decade beneath the previous
all time high of 18.22p set way back in 1979.
At 7am on Monday May 30th 1988 a new joint venture company GC&C Brands
announced that it was making a takeover bid for IDG with the bid price on
offer to IDG shareholders at 315p per share. IDG described the bid as
"ill-conceived,unsolicited and unwelcome". The company that made
the bid was jointly formed for the purpose by Gilbeys and Cantrell &
Cochrane. GC&C made their move after they secured the pledge of FII-Fyffes'
full 20% stake at the bid price. The two principals to the initial bid were
Irish subsidiaries of British-based conglomerates. At the time of the bid
Gilbeys was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Grand Metropolitan and Cantrell &
Cochrane was owned 51% by Allied Lyons and 49% by Guinness. GC&C's public
rationale for the bid was that IDG did not have the resources or the
marketing skill to fully exploit the potential of Irish whiskey on the
export front. According to one of the principals to the bid IDG had "a very
small hand to play,very limited resources. The marketing strategies they
have adopted are appropriate to that small hand. What is required is an
investment which is beyond the capacity of Irish Distillers"(Sunday
Tribune feature,5-Jun-88). IDG retorted that the bid was highly
oportunistic and that GC&C had sought to acquire the company on the cheap
at a time when its future prospects looked brighter than they had for many
years. There was indeed support for IDG's view among some leading drinks
sector analysts. According to one in the London Evening Standard of
31-May-88 "the bid comes just as the fruits of what the management is doing
are coming through. The prospects for the company are better than for a
decade".
It was inevitable that the 'Irishness' of the Irish Distillers Group
would be made an issue in the takeover contest. What was at stake in the
proposed takeover was not just the future control of a company but the
future control of the entire Irish distilling industry. The Irish Times
editorial on 31-May-88 reflected the public interest in the takeover
battle:
"Irish Distillers is -or should be- one of the jewels in the crown of
manufacturing industry here. Its products are quintessentially Irish and
of the highest quality,with in some cases hundreds of years of tradition
behind them. The company and its products have a claim on the loyalties,
not to mention the tastes,of a great proportion of the population"
and it predicted that the events as they unfolded in the takeover saga
"would be "followed with avid interest by a public which feels that it has a
personal interest in the company's fortunes". However, seen in the wider
context of the recent ratification of the Single European Act(SEA),and the
Government's commitment to the programme for the completion of the internal
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market of the EC by 1992,it was clear that the scope for IDG to play the
'green card' in the takeover battle was more limited than at any time in
the past. Against this background the Government was unlikely to intervene
in the takeover battle just to preserve the ownership of Irish Distillers
in Irish hands.However,the national interest did demand that the Government
take care to ensure that the bidders,whose parent conglomerates together
largely controlled the international market for Scotch,were bona fide in
their stated intention to develop Irish whiskey. There was a clear risk
that the future growth of the Irish whiskey industry under the ownership of
the bidders might well be compromised if it threatened the already
declining sales of Scotch. As one prominent stockbroker and member of the
Irish Senate argued in a feature in the Sunday Independent on 10/Ju1/88:
"Roll on 1992 and free competition,and roll back narrow-minded
nationalism.. .Being Irish (owned) should not matter a damn. What does
matter is whether Irish jobs,Irish consumers and Irish shareholders are
threatened by the bid.."
The Irish Times leader writer on 31/May/88 succinctly summarised the
overall implications in the bid for the national interest as follows.
"The positive side of a takeover such as this,if it were to succeed,would
be that Irish products could be promoted internationally on a scale
hitherto impossible. The negative aspect of that equation would be that
control and profits of the expanded entreprise would not wholly be in
Irish hands"
This takeover bid for IDG raised some serious issues of national interest,
not only for the future of this traditional indigeneous industry,but also
for future Irish industrial policy.These were clearly laid out in an
Irish Times feature(4-Jun-88) by economics columnist Maev-Ann Wren,
in which she addressed herself to this aspect of the takeover bid for IDG:
"Will nothing be sacred in the brave new world of the single European
market? If Irish Distillers can pass into foreign ownership what will be
left? And why bother struggling to build up strong Irish firms, if they
will immediately fall to foreign predators?
The logic of the development of the single European market almost
presupposes that Europe's food industry should become concentrated in
fewer large multi-national companies.. (The argument in support of this
trend is) that if European firms failed to grow,they would be unable to
compete with the industry's giants,which are chiefly based in the US...
How then can a small country develop its industry in a world which is
increasingly dominated by multinational groupings? This question was
addressed by the Telesis Consultancy Group in its review of Irish
industrial policy over six years ago. Telesis recommended that...a
much higher proportion of State funds should be used to build up large
Irish firms. .Distillers is perhaps just the sort of company which should
have received very much greater state aid in return for a state
shareholding with the objective of building the company to the size where
it might have become an international food industry predator rather than
prey..It is probably too late for Distillers but..although the European
Commission generally frowns on state subsidies intended to build up
companies as so-called "national champions" it is required to adopt a
more lenient approach to the industrial development efforts of less
developed regions.
The Irish exchequer already spends or forgoes hundreds of millions of
pounds every year in the name of industrial development. The Distillers
bid underlines the need for that spending to become very much more
focused."
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Initially IDG attempted to ward off the bid by its own efforts. It sought
to persuade the shareholders that the bid grossly undervalued their
company. The market valuation of IDG shortly before the bid was made was
around £176m. The initial bid by GC&C valued the company at £198m. IDG
were successful in persuading the market that this initial bid was too low.
Before it could raise its bid GC&C ran into trouble with the European
Commission. The Commission took the view that the initial bid was a
concerted one by the two principals and it forced the breakup of the
consortium. A reconstituted bid was allowed when GC&C was restructured so
that it was soley owned,through its subsidiary Gilbeys,by Grand
Metropolitan. GC&C raised its initial bid to 400p per share on 19/Aug/88.
This valued IDG at £235m. At that point the takeover battle entered a
distinctly new phase. It became clear that,short of some unexpected
intervention by the Minister or the Fair Trade Commission,the only thing
that could now prevent the IDG shareholders from accepting this new bid was
a better counter offer. IDG's days as an independent company were numbered.
It was then that Pernod Ricard,the giant French drinks company,publicly
entered the takeover battle as a friendly bidder,a white knight.
Pernod Ricard entered the contest as a white knight on condition that its
offer of 450p per share was to be assured of success. It was not prepared
to become involved in an auction with GC&C. Over the weekend of September
3-4 the financial advisors to IDG and Pernod Ricard obtained irrevocable
undertakings from various IDG investors,including the FII-Fyffes
shareholding,that guaranteed the white knight control of over 50% of the
company. GC&C responded with a bid of 525p and the contest entered its
final phase which involved the Irish courts and the Take-Over Panel of the
London Stock exchange in its eventual resolution. The Irish courts ruled
that the irrevocable undertaken given by FII-Fyffes to the Pernod Ricard
advisers,though only verbal, was legally binding and that FII-Fyffes
were no longer free to entertain the GC&C offer of 525p per share. The
Take-Over panel upheld the irrevovable undertakings as not in breach of the
Take-Over Code,when challenged by GC&C. The final outcome of this
protracted and complex takeover process was that Pernod Ricard acquired IDG
for 450p per share.
Throughout the takeover process Richard Burrows,his chairman and his
board had shown considerable ingenuity and deftness in their fight to
preserve the integrity of IDG as a business entity. In the process
they surprised many of their supporters and confounded most of their
critics as they succeeded against all the odds in fighting off a powerful
and determined predator. The IDG board and management expect that Pernod
Ricard will operate IDG as an autonomous and integral subsidiary of the new
parent company,preserving the unity of the company and the existing
structure of Irish distilling industry. The GC&C takeover would have
involved the disintegration of the company and a fundamental change in the
structure of the Irish distilling industry,had it succeeded. While the
Pernod Ricard takeover signals continuity rather than fundamental change in
the near to medium term it is unlikely that this company willingly paid
nearly twice the pre-takeover value of IDG just to allow it to operate and
perform largely as before. Though the full strategic impact of the Pernod
Ricard takeover will take some time to emerge it is clear that the takeover
battle of 1988 was an important watershed in the history of IDG and the
Irish distilling industry and that the outcome heralds the beginning of an
important'new phase in the future development of the company and in the
ongoing evolution of the industry.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE STUDY - COMHLUCHT SIUICRE EIREANN TEO.
AND THE IRISH SUGAR INDUSTRY
In this chapter the third case narrative is presented. It covers the
evolution of the Irish sugar industry and focuses in particular on the
genesis and strategic history of Comhlucht Siuicre Eireann Teo.(CSET), the
State-owned sugar company.
Introduction to CSET
CSET is a state-owned entreprise (SOE),or semi-state company as they are
known in Ireland. It is the sole producer of sugar in the country and sugar
is the company's main product line. CSET dominates the home market for sugar,
though in recent times it has come under increasing competitive pressure in
its domestic market due to imports from other EEC countries.
CSET has five divisions. Sugar is the largest division and the other four
are Food,Engineering,Agrichemicals and Quarries. Sugar is the core business
and the main source of company revenue. Food began as a major diversification
activity in the 1960's. However its subsequent development fell far short of
the high aspirations set for it in that period. It is now a profitable
business for CSET and accounted for around 11% of company revenues in 1987.
The other three activities are closely related to the core business.
As we shall examine in more detail in the next section the company was
founded to be the major vehicle for the development of an indigenous sugar
industry in Ireland. This gave it a unique relationship with the beet growing
communities which are the source of the major input. Currently the
company,and its major publics are wrestling with a basic ideological problem
concerning the issue of whether its main mission is developmental or
commercial. At this time the total equity is held by the State which is
referred to as 'the shareholder' in company documents and annual reports. The
question of the possible privatisation of such semi-states as CSET is,in the
late 1980's, now moving to centre stage in the national political arena.
The company's operations have been organised regionally around the main sugar
plants in Carlow,Thurles,Mallow and Tuam. Carlow,Thurles and Mallow are in
the southern region of the country,with Mallow being the most southerly
operation. The Tuam plant,recently closed,was in the west. As an SOE the
company has been,and continues to be, impacted in its attempts to make
decisions on commercial grounds by local and national political pressures.
In 1980 the company started to report losses in PET after 45 years of almost
uninterrupted profitabity. During the 80's the company closed the Tuam plant
and carried out a major rationalisation programme. In the late 80's CSET
is planning to move to a two-plant configuration,which will involve the
the closure of the Thurles sugar operation. It is also actively searching for
oportunities to diversify. CSET currently figures in the national debate
concerning the possible privatisation of some SOE's and its present chief
executive has gone on public record as supporting the privatisation of the
company.
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Main Phases in CSET'S history
The interviewees tended to organise their recollections of the main phases of
the company's development around particular issues at some stages and around
particular leaders at others. In certain cases a large personality spans a
number of issues and in others a large issue spans a number of personalities.
The main phases with their key events,forces and turning points,are described
below.
1926-1939 Gestation,Formation and Early Growth
As early as 1660 sugar from cane was refined in Ireland. By 1766 there were
40 sugar refineries operating in the country. In 1842 the first acres of
sugar beet were grown in County Antrim, and in 1851 the first sugar beet
factory was built at Mountmellick by the Royal Irish Beet-Root Sugar Company.
This early production of home grown sugar failed in 1862. It was not until
1911 that the momentum began to build up for another attempt at establishing
an indigenous sugar industry. By 1925 this had resulted in the establishment
of the second Irish sugar company. The new Irish Sugar Manufacturing Co. was
a private entreprise. It erected a production facility in Carlow in 1926 and
began a beet growing campaign in the locality in the same year. By 1932 there
were 13400 tons of sugar produced at Carlow which was over 7% of the national
requirement.The new entreprise ran into difficulties and was failing in 1933,
but not before it had clearly established that quality sugar could be
produced in Ireland from beet grown locally. The approach of the first Free
State government to the use of state funding for economic and industrial
development was piecemeal and cautious,as we saw in Chapter four. Rowevem,
the administration of W.T. Cosgrove did provide an important lifeline to
the fledgling Carlow experiment in the form of a state subsidy ,which had,
helped to keep the hopes for an indigenous sugar industry alive for the first
seven years of the Carlow experiment,from 1926 to 1933.
The first Fianna Fail Government,which came to office in 1932,was committed
to a policy of self-sufficiency and industrial expansion.Sean Lemass,the
incoming Minister for Industry and Commerce in this administration had
clearly signalled his priorities for industrial policy while still in
opposition. In a speech to the Dail in 1928 he outlined his party's belief
that Ireland could be made "a selfcontained unit,providing all the
necessities of living in adequate quantities for the people residing in the
island at the moment and probably for a much larger number". In abandoning
the policy of laissez-faire/free trade and in turning to protectionism and
self-sufficiency the Fianna Fail administration was reflecting the economic
doctrine espoused by Griffith when he founded Sinn Fein in 1908. Furthermore,
it was also reflecting the wider movement away from free trade and unbridled
capitalism that was taking place in many Western nations during this period
of the Great Depression. Lemass,in line with this industrial policy,
decided to intervene in the failing sugar entreprise and to rescue the
entreprise and the fledgling industry in the national interest. However he
was not content to jut to save the failing Carlow entreprise. He was
determined to build on it and to expand it.
Lemass and his colleagues wanted to establish an industrial base in Ireland.
The use of State investment and State ownership in cases like the sugar
industry was a pragmatic rather than an ideological choice. This new Fianna
Fail Administration wanted to accelerate the process of industrialisation.
State intervention often happened only after private capital proved unwilling
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or inadequate to the task in this era of nation building:
"While strenuous efforts were made to encourage private investment (in this
period),..despite the protection that the tariff walls provided,private
Irish capital investment proved ..shy.By default the state was forced to
increase its involvement in Irish manufacturing industry..through the
mechanism. .(of) the state-sponsored body"(Brown 1985;144).
The Government saw the developmental value to the fledgling Irish economy of
an indigenous sugar industry catering at least for total home consumption.
This implied a much larger undertaking than the original Carlow effort. The
Carlow experience had established the technological viability of an
indigenous sugar beet industry this was a significant factor in the State's
decision to commit substantial public capital to the development of the
industry. As Foy(1976;40) has noted " it gave the Irish Government the
the confidence to establish Comhlucht Siuicre Eireann Teo. with authorised
capital of £2m " in 1933. The new State-owned entreprise acquired the Carlow
plant and by the end of 1934 had established further plants at Thurles,
Mallow and Tuam. Eamonn De Valera,the Taoiseach in this first ever Fianna
Fail administration,performed the cermonial sod turning for each of the new
factories. At the Thurles cermony on 25/Nov/33 he clearly linked the founding
of CSET to his government's wider industrial policy when he said that "in
establishing factories such as these we are making the way for a
self-sufficient and self-supporting State".
The debates in the Dail leading to the passing of the necessary legislation
to establish CSET were characterised by an almost absence of any partisan
politics. The debate centred largely on the economic viability of the
proposed project. Lemass was aware that on firm-level economic grounds. alone
the project was not a commercial proposition. He justified the State's
involvement in the project on wider economic grounds as the following extract
from his contribution to the Dail debate on the setting up of CSET in 1933
clearly demonstrated:
"In no country in the world is beet sugar an economic proposition if we
regard it from a purely accountancy point of view...But there are other
points of view besides the point of view of the accountant and,by giving a
measure of protection necessary to put the beet industry into existence,we
are going to provide employment...it will be a cash crop for farmers and
indirectly create new business for quite a number of industries,and we are
going to do that at a cost to the community of an additional halfpenny a
pound on sugar"
The high level of agreement in the Dail on the proposed establishment of the
new State-owned sugar entreprise was particularly significant in the context
of the time. Power had just been transferred for the first time in the Free
State's short history. Many of the incoming Fianna Fail government had been•
apprehensive about whether the transfer would be peaceful,given the fact that
the tensions between the two main parties generated during the 1922-23 Civil
War remained not far below the surface of Irish political life right into the
1930's. When viewed against the background of the time the high level of
cross party support for the setting up of CSET in 1933 meant that the
establishment of the new State-owned entreprise had the strongest and widest
possible political backing at national level.
While there was a high level of political consensus at national level around
the establishment of CSET and the expansion of sugar producing activity in
the country,there was inten§e regional political activity around the possible
locations of the proposed three new factories. There was a high level of
awareness of the spin off potential to any locality that might have been
chosen as a factory site. One long serving CSET senior executive,who is a
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widely acknowledged expert on the history of his company provided,in
interview,the following insight into the intense regional political activity
that led up to the selection of the three sites for the new factories:
"The regions were very alert to any advantage that the new government could
come up with that would favour their areas.There was keen regional interest
once the idea of setting up a national company was established. There was
awareness of the developmental spin-off. The 'economic war' with Britain
was on and no cattle were being exported.Minds turned towards tillage
naturally and the prospect of getting a factory for the region was a major
thing. There were literally dozens of committees formed with senior church
and political representatives.
These committees adopted different tactics from region to region in their
approach to trying to get a sugar factory for their regions.There were main
committees and then their were subcommittees. The women played a major role
in raising funds to send delegations to Dublin (to lobby government).The
men concentrated on lobbying farmers to see would they grow this new crop
which was alien to them.The canvas was very much done like a general
election. (The message was) 'sow for Ireland instead of fight for Ireland'
and farmers were shamed into declaring their willingness to grow.Each
committee was determined to show that farmers would uptake the crop and
ensure continuity of supply. Other areas offered sites for free etc.
The decision.. .was made (in favour of the regions with) the committees with
the biggest political clout,where the hardest Fianna Fail TD's came from
and where the most active Bishops came from.Tuam won against the better
judgement of farming hinterland reasons (relative suitability of the soil
for beet growing).Mallow likewise.The political element was so strong here
- it was not built in the town of Mallow because it was considered a
'shawneen' town (not republican enough when the fight for independence was
at its height, a town too accomodating to its British garrison),but was
sited in a village 4 miles out,in the town of Russell which was considered
to be pure republican.In Thurles the factory was sited where the social
need,political wallop and the quality of the committee (were the combined
forces in the choice process)".
The significance of the winning of a factory for an area was underlined by
the same interviewee who said that "in these areas the families of the
committee members that trudged the fields and won the factory still have a
special status in these communities" more than 50 years on. The significance
for CSET was that these early location decisions were to be among the major
character forming decisions for the new company as these locations became the
future centres for the expansion of the companies activities.The legacy of
the decision to choose Tuam was to become a major issue in later years
leading to the protracted effort by the company to close this loss making
facility in the late 70's, eventually succeeding as late as 1986.
The early direction of the new entreprise was in the hands of J.B. Connell, a
civil servant who was put in by the Government to run the company.Both
Connell and his successor,T.O'Hanrahan, were described as "administrators
and custodians" by one senior executive. He went on to characterise this
this early period as follows:
"You had a paucity of Irish skills and in these first years you had foreign
skills involved even down to the level of factory foremen. One of the first
things that the Government did was to pick university people and send them
abroad to learn sugar technology not just to have the sugar produced in
Ireland but to have it in Irish hands".There were six sent out at this
stage,Gannell,Daly,Burke,Flynn,Bradley and Twoomey.All were to play
important and enduring roles in the future development of the native sugar
industry.The 1939-45 World War dominated the latter end of this formative
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period. (The main effect of the war in the development of the company was)
that the Irish had to take over totally the operation of the entreprise.
They had to be self-sufficient earlier that expected because the
non-nationals (Belgians,Austrians,Germans and other central European
nationals)returned to their homelands".
Ireland chose a position of neutrality in the 1939-45 war and this period in
modern Irish history is known as 'the emergency' .The strategic benefits of
self-sufficiency in a commodity such as sugar became very apparent much
sooner than those instumental in establishing the entreprise some 5 short
years earlier had anticipated.The company was able during the emergency to
supply the country's basic needs in this commodity.However,the hostilities
did lead to severe difficulties in the aquisition of vital spares for the
beet processing equipment which were unobtainable from the original
suppliers. Furthermore as Foy(1976;48)relates "apart from the scarcity of
equipment,grease,oil and formalin were in short supply as were the vital beet
knives. .Beet seed,not available from abroad,had to be grown at home and
fertilisers were in extremely short supply".
The state of the entreprise and the industry at the end of this formative
period was described by one interviewee as follows:
"Because self-sufficiency was forced upon CSET during these years,by the end
of the War the company was ready for further development"
However,there was a difficulty at this time,as he went on to point out:
"Basically in 1945 you had a group of very experienced people but they had
expended their energies on stop gap measures (to cope with the
difficulties of maintaining production throughout the emergency) .me
industry had proved itself but the industry was not in a very coherent
state. They were strong people technically (the Irish pioneers of the
industry) but they were not leaders or strategists".
1945-1966 General M.J.Costello
At the end of the emergency,during which the industry had proved its
worth,the Government was concerned to secure its future. According to
Lynch(1886;12):
"Lemass and his associated Ministers were looking around for a man who had
proved himself not alone as possessing the ability and strength of
character to shoulder a major industrial appointment,but who had proven his
patriotism to the hilt".
It was an indication of Lemass's own pragmatic approach that he "crossed the
political lines",as one interviewee put it,in appointing Costello,since they
had both taken opposite stands in the Civil War.
Costello credentials were impressive.In the first year of the new State's
existence after the treaty,Costello was promoted to Colonel Commandant of the
newly established Free State Army.He was not yet 20 years old.It was a time
when young men of exceptional ability were being called upon to play major
roles in the fledgling state.He was to rise to COG of the 1st Division South
before his retirement from the army in 1945 at the age of 41.During his army
career he was chosen,with four other officers of outstanding ability,for a
special two year training programme at the US Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth,Kansas, the US military academy for Senior Officers.As one senior
executive put it	 1
"Lemass was basically an Army man himself-he had fought in the GPO (in the
Easter 1916 Rising)..the General as an army man was a servant of
the State and committed to the state in a very basic way and Lemass liked
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that kind of individual".
What Lemass,it seems,wanted for CSET at this time was someone to "loosen the
grip of the Civil Service" on the company because they "were not business
orientated".
The 'General' ,as he came to be referred to by all connected with the industry
inside and out,is a towering figure in the history of CSET and there were two
phases in the development of the company under his leadership.
1945-59 Securing the Supply Side
As was pointed out earlier,the industry was exhausted by its efforts to keep
going during the difficulties presented by the Emergency. The fields had been
over tilled. The factories were in need of modernisation. The saving of the
crop was still a very laborious task and the crop itself was exposed to all
kinds of pests and crop diseases.
Foy(1986;18-23) describes the main thrust of the General's strategy during
this period and provides useful insight into his managerial style:
"The General on joining,took a general's view. A 'campaign' was needed.The
fields must be made fertile if the industry was to have a future. The
programme he set had research as the key. That soon brought to light a
bewildering range of problems:disease in the beet was rife and threatening
the industry's very existence. So were the pests. Appalling shortages of
essential limes on the beet fields showed. No suitable fertiliser system
existed-indeed no system existed. Beet seed purity was at a low level.An
unsustainable high labour input per acre was involved (660 manhours in 1945
as against 22 manhours in 1986);soil testing (was) non-existent.
The General set up field stations at each factory.They became the country's
first soil-testing units. .The tests showed just how lacking in lime Ireland
was-and while there were private quarries in existence,the General saw the
need was greater than their collective capacity. He opened quarries on a
scale not known here but then found the farmers had not the equipment or
the resources to avail of them as the need demanded. The General had
recruited for the company a group of army officers who had served under
him. One of them was his director of transport,Capt.John O'Brien.Soon the
sugar company had purchased 300 British army trucks(which had seen service
in the North African campaign against Rommel and had become surplus).These
were fitted with spreading equipment and they not alone took the lime to
the farms but spread it as well.The war on want of lime was on,weather
conditions were ignored. Work on Irish farms now spanned the four seasons.
A new excitement gripped farming Ireland.,"
As well as expanding the company's involvement in the industry to the
provision of essential lime and to R&D activities,the General also dedicated
company resources to the problem of the inordinately high labour and drudgery
content in the harvesting of the crop.The first approach was to examine the
harvesting machinery available in Britain and other countries. Trials found
this equipment to be unsuitable for Irish soil conditions during the winter
months.The General solicited the help of Austin Armer,an eminent American
engineer,who was highly experienced in the design of agricultural machinery.
Under Armer's expert guidance a beet harvester was developed in Carlow and
named the Armer Mk 1 in recognition of Armer's crucial input into its
development. In the General's own words "It wasn't the invention of the
harvester which caused us the most trouble,but rather it was the task of
convincing a farmer to let us in to test it on his crop". Winning farmer
confidence to adopt new techniques and to apply the results of scientific
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research on the methods and conditions for growing the crop took up a large
part of the General's energies.The company was to later export to other beet
growing countries,machinery designed and built at the Carlow facility. The
General,himself,was to become one of the best known men in the industry in
Europe and he came to hold the presidency of the International Institute for
Beet Research. In his efforts to secure the beet supply the General went so
far as to have his engineering works develop a turf-cutting machine so that
farmers in the West would have more time away from the traditional
turf-cutting to concentrate on the growing and harvesting of the beet
crop. His was a fully intergrated and cooperative approach to the production
and processing of sugar.
The General was a benevolent autocrat in his managerial style. He believed in
consultation, in informing and in being kept informed,and he was willing to
take on board good suggestions and ideas.He believed in using peoples talents
to the full but took full responsibility for,and full charge of the direction
of CSET while at the helm."He attracted the best into the industry and
extracted the best from those attracted".He knew his employees and his
suppliers and kept close links with them. "He was not a man to pass a dirty
beet field without stopping to find the owner! and ..he organised so many
competitions,he presented so many prizes in the course of helping his growers
towards excellence,that he knew their fields almost as well as themselves"
(Foy,1986;23).He established Works Committees at the plants to give each
employee a say in the running of their sections. He established the magazine
'Biatas-The Tillage Farmer'to keep the farmers informed. The cornerstone of
the General's managerial philosophy,while at the helm of CSET,is revealed in
the booklet,published as a tribute to him by the company on the occasion of
of his death in 1986. This tribute identified as his steadfast theme his
personal conviction that "the co-operative theories of Horace Plunkett are
superior to communism or capitalism and the only workable alternative to
those"(CSET,1986;32).
Organisationally the General ran the company through 4 Area General Managers
and a few key staff officers.As one executive characterised it:
"The key men that the General Manager looked to in the industry were the 4
Area General Managers.These were the most powerful second level
managers.They made the profits and losses etc.In between you had the Chief
Agricultural Officer who was a very key and an important man.His duty was
to have built a human link between the big State edifice that the farmers
would perceive CSET to be (and the farmers).This was established by having
agricultural graduates assigned to the four areas. They would be in the
beet catchment areas to reflect the importance of each catchment area.They
were directly responsible to this Chief Agricultural Officer for overall
company policy on acreage,price,fertiliser price etc., but day to day they
were responsible to the Area General Manager. .The agricultural officers
support(ed) contract men at the parish level called field men..
The 4 Area General Managers met every month in Dublin with the General
Manager,accompanied by his backup staff,i.e. the Chief Agricultural
Officer,the Chief Engineer etc. This was the main management coalition
until the 60's.Under these the new developments happened within;the
quarries, the machinery etc were all integral to this structure."
The General had concentrated up to 1959 on securing the production of the
national need for sugar both for personal consumption and for downstream
processing in the sugar based industries. The marketing of the product was
left in the hands of those concerns that had been the major importers before
CSET was set up.By the end of the 50's the General had developed the sugar
side to the stage where the home market was fully covered. There was no real
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prospect for export of sugar as a commodity because the world market was
dominated by Britain and the United States and they had plentiful supplies of
relatively cheap sugar. The 1959 Annual Report gave this contemporary view of
the company's prospects,or lack of them, with respect to the possible export
of sugar:
"The total production of sugar in 1958 is estimated to have been fifty
million tons.About 80% of this is sold in markets protected by tariffs,
by quota restrictions or dominated by subsidies to home producers. .The two
greatest importers of sugar are the USA and the UK.The USA buys all its
sugar under preferential quota arrangements designed to give the producer a
fair return.It is the largest buyer from Cuba the country which is by far
the largest exporter.The United Kingdom. .buys from the Commonwealth and
colonies what amounts to about. .1.5 million tons. .at a negotiated price
declared to be reasonable to the producer"
The same report went on to explain that the so called 'free market' for
sugar applied,in fact,to only for a very small percentage of the total
world production. This free market was composed mainly of surplus stock from
the large exporters and stock sold below cost by Eastern Block countries in
search of valuable foreign exchange. The price in this market bore no direct
relation to the cost of production.
In the late 1950's,therefore,the General and his company started to look
seriously at oportunities to diversify.
1960-66 Diversification into Food
- under General Costello
In 1960 CSET under the General began a major diversification effort into food
processing.It was known in the early 60's simply as the food project. Sugar,
as we saw earlier did not offer any significant scope for growth beyond
satisfying the requirements of the home market. According to Foy(1976;81),
"the concept of a food division was first discussed by the sugar company in
the 1950's" so the idea was not new at this time. What gave it particular
impetus at the end of the 50's was the Government's national programme to
expand the economy.
In spite the success of semi-State entreprises like CSET in helping to
develop an indigenous industrial base in the country,the policies of
self-sufficiency and protectionism had,over the longer run,led to economic
stagnation by the mid-50's. Emigration was running at an all time high and
all across the country there was a gathering and pervading sense of national
self-doubt and despondency. Ken. Whitaker(1958;par12),the young and dynamic
Secretary of the Department of Finance at the time,captured the essence of
the predicament facing the country in the late 50's in his now historic
analysis of the situation, 'Economic Development' ,when he noted that:
"after thirty-five years of native government people are asking whether we
can achieve an acceptable degree of economic progress.The common talk among
parents in the towns,as well as in rural Ireland,is of their children
having to emigrate as soon as their education is completed in order
to,secure a reasonable standard of living."
Whitaker,who until this time had been "highly antagonistic to large-scale
state involvement in the planning and financing of economic development"
(Brown 1985;213),underwent a radical change of outlook when 'faced with the
damning evidence of the failure of the existing policies,namely the massive
tide of emigration. According to Whitaker(1958;par4) the policies of
self-sufficiency and protectionism "though given a fair trial, (had) not
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resulted in a viable economy". He went on to recommend to Government a
blueprint for accelerating the development of the Irish economy,which had
clearly much underdeveloped and latent potential. Sean Lemass,first as
Minister for Industry and Commerce and after 1959 as Taoiseach,supplied the
political will,imagination and leadership to the Whitaker blueprint in a set
of national indicative programmes for economic expansion. This blueprint
included greater involvement by the State in investment for productive
purposes,increased Central Bank power to direct investment by the commercial
banks,and the encouragement of foreign investment by packages of attractive
incentives. Economic nationalism was abandoned and a new expansionist
outlook replaced it that saw the development of the Irish economy in a wider
European and World trade context.
Whitaker(1958;par12) had also argued that there was "a sound 'psychological'
reason" for having such an integrated development programme and that was the
need to "buttress confidence in the country's future and to stimulate the
interest and enthusiasm of the young in particular". He was convinced that
with the right leadership such a programme would lead to "a general
resurgence of will" by the setting up and pursuit of "targets of national
endeavour which appear to be reasonably attainable and mutually consistent".
The change in outlook in Ireland that developed over the 1958-63 period
covered by the First Programme For Economic Expansion was dramatic. The
country entered the 1960's with a new sense of vigour and optimism that was
in marked contrast with the situation only a few years earlier. According to
Brown(1985;241) "most Irish people would still identify 1958-63 as the period
when a new kind of Ireland began to come to life". The transition was more
than economic it affected all aspects of Irish political,social,cultural and
economic life. Isolationism was abandoned along with self-sufficiency and
protectionism and the country became more empirical,cosmopolitan and
materialistic in outlook.
This was the era of Ireland Inc. and Sean Lemass was seen as a kind of chief
executive,decisive,efficient,impatient and pragmatic. Lemass mobilised the
economic effort by challenging the leaders of the country's industries and
entreprises directly in support of his government's national programme to
develop the economy. He believed that in "a small society with no inherent
momentum of its own and with a heritage of stagnation,it was men that
mattered. The initiative or lack of it,of a handful of individuals could make
or mar important institutions for a generation"(Lee,1979;24). He articulated
and personified a new form of patriotism,an economic patriotism,that was
relevant to the challenges of Ireland in the second half of the 20th century.
He threw down the gauntlet to the country's leaders and institutions in his
speech to the Dail on 3/Jun/59 when he declared that it was "the historic
challenge of this generation.. ..to secure the economic foundation of
independence".
The timing and the manner of the initial diversification moves of CSET can
only be fully understood against the backdrop of these broader contextual
developments.In 1960 the company was just over 25 years in operation.It had
"considerable financial strength;excellent working arrangements with
farmers;formidable and diverse capacity in human and technological
resources;widespread involvement in the rural economy"(Foy,1976;86).
The General and his organisation were ready to respond to the spirit of the
national programme for economic expansion in which significant net exporting
from the agricultural sector,as we had noted already in chapters four and
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five,was to be a key element. CSET's response was to be a major
diversification into convenience food processing. This was the genesis of the
Food business that came to dominate the company's activities from 1960 to
1972.
CSET is still involved in Food,which in 1987 accounted for about 11% of its
total revenues. In the heady days of the 60's the company would have forseen
their Food business as growing over time to be as significant a component of
the overall business as Sugar. The Annual Report of 1962 revealed the
aspirations that the company had for this business when it stated that over
the 1960-67 period "we hope to build up this new business to a scale which
will be larger than any industrial activity now carried on in Ireland". As
events were to turn out,the Food project was to be a more difficult
undertaking than had been expected and it never made the impact that was
hoped for. As one senior executive put it;"from the early 60's until 1972
Food almost dominated the strategic thinking. In that period the Food aspect
of CSET could be said to have both developed and declined". Reasonable men
within CSET even today still differ in their assessment of the reasons for
the failure of the Food project and at the heart of their different
interpretations lies the basic ideological issue of the very mission and
purpose of a company like CSET.
CSET in the early 60's went into the Food project with great energy and
enthusiasm. Food processing plants were established in the company's four
sugar factory towns. A new R&D facility was established in Carlow in 1961 and
expanded in 1964.New processing technologies were introduced.The first
commercial AFD (Accelerated Freeze-Drying, a revolutionary dehydration
process) plant in the world was opened in Mallow. It was significant that
Lemass personally performed the opening ceremony. The first commercial
product,instant potatoe flakes,appeared in 1962. The company was quickly
filling out the product line with each passing year. The Government increased
its equity in the company to provide funds for the erection of the new
facilities but the developmental costs in R&D,Marketing etc were all funded
by the retained profits of the company which were generated by the sugar
business. The company was enjoying,in 1964,both national and international
recognition for its initiative and effort in the food area as the Annual
Report of 1964 recorded:
"We have been encouraged by the enthusiastic recognition of the public in
Britain and elsewhere of the importance of our work and the quality of our
products.The tributes which appeared in newspapers like the 'Times',the
'Guardian', and 'The Financial Times' are a measure of the prestige which
the company already enjoys overseas.
At home also there is an increasing awareness of the significance of the
Company's activities for the welfare of the community.This public
appreciation was highlighted by the Taoiseach's tribute in the Dail last
July to the 'very positive response' of this Company 'in widening the scope
of their activities in areas unrelated to their present operations'.
This programme of expansion and diversification has appealed to the public
imagination,and this in turn has contributed in no small way to the success
of our new ventures."(p12).
The same report,reflecting on the experience up to that point,restated the
the rationale for moving forward resolutely with the food project:
"With our experience and knowledge of handling farmers'produce over the
years and our intimate knowledge and understanding of the farming problems
of our 30,000 beet growers,we tackle these problems with considerable
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advantages.We consider it our duty in the national interest to utilize our
special knowledge and our very considerable technological resources to
exploit the vast oportunities of economic expansion offered by the
convenience food business".(p8).
The new Food processing operation grew at first within the existing
organisational structure that the General had set up for the Sugar business
and its related activities. In 1963 four area managers were appointed "to
control all activities of the Company in areas assigned to them. They have
under them a manager of the local sugar factory,a manager of the food
processing plant,administrative staffs and the services of technical,
agricultural and horticultural personnel"(Annual Report,1963;17). Then in
1964 the Government set up a subsidiary company Erin Foods Ltd. with its own
board of directors. The 1965 Annual Report described how the new subsidiary
was to fit into the overall company structure:
"Erin Foods is primarily a marketing organisation which aims to provide a
guaranteed market and a guaranteed price for produce the kind,quantity and
quality of which is to be specified by the Board supplied by: (1) The food
processing plants operated by CSET..(2) The associated food processing
plants at Glencolumbkille,Midleton and Skibbereen (local cooperative
ventures).(3)0ther Irish food manufacturers who wish to use the marketing
resources of Erin Foods".
The company obtained on loan the services of Mr.Henry Roth,a high-level
marketing manager from the Grace organisation in the US. Roth was appointed
general manager of Erin Foods and was responsible to the General who was
still general manager of the parent company,CSET.
By 1965 concern was developing over the accumulated losses that the food
project was incurring.Despite the company's technical successes and
successful market launches with the new product line it was finding the task
of reaching a viable volume of sales in the targeted British market more
difficult and more expensive than had been anticipated.The Chairman outlined
the objective and the requirements in the 1965 Annual Report as follows:
"The major marketing objective of Erin Foods is to achieve a significant
share of the £1000 million food market in the United Kingdom.Even a small
percentage share would be a major boost to Irish exports.In this immense
market several giant companies are already well established and competition
is keen.On our achievement in this market will depend,to a large extent,the
ultimate success of Erin Foods.. .In order to achieve this it is necessary
for the company to invest heavily in the development of a competent and
highly trained consumer and catering sales force.Wide and efficient
distribution must be ensured.We have to develop skill in estimating the
demand for our various products.Investment in advertising and promotion on
a large scale is necessary in. order to reach the desired level of sales. We
must earn the support and confidence of the trade and establish our brand
image in the consumer's mind. Your Directors are fully conscious of the
magnitude of the task which they have undertaken and of its importance to
the National economy as a whole"(p12).
However,in the same report the representative of the Minister for Finance,
accepting the accounts on behalf of the Minister,revealed the growing concern
of 'the shareholder' when he said:
"The loss of almost £1.17m on the group's food-processing activities was,of
course,the dominant factor in determining the financial outcome of the
group's operations in 1964/65. .The Minister has no doubt that Board members
and staff alike are fully alive to the need for an early and substantial
improvement in the financial results of the project and he trusts that the
Company's plans and its heavy investment in promotion and marketing will
soon begin to give a return..It is evident...that much remains to be done
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to reach a volume of sales capable of supporting the heavy overhead and
promotional expenses of a pioneer venture of this kind and thus enable the
project to be put on a profitable basis.It is in the national interest that
this stage be reached as quickly and as economically as possible"(p18).
The position in 1965 in relation to the food-processing activities was that
the sales were growing rapidly but the losses were accumulating rapidly also.
The General and his Board were calling them 'development costs' and the civil
servants were calling them 'losses' .Which were they is now a matter for
speculation.The 'development costs/losses' of the food project were in 1965
absorbing nearly all of CSET's total cash flow from operations. The company
was attempting this major diversification strategy with what is now seen in
hindsight as a major handicap.As one senior executive put it:" In those years
Erin could only offer 10% of its total turnover for sale in this country.The
State was anxious that State entreprise would not discommode private
entreprise or have any advantages (in that regard). This put Erin on an
uneven keel from the word go".The conventional wisdom nowadays is that export
efforts should be built on a solid home market base where the profits from
the home market can underwrite the development efforts on the export front.
The General resigned in October of 1966. The widely held belief within CSET
is that his departure was not voluntary but was manoeuvered. In 1966 Lemass
resigned from his position as Taoiseach and Leader of Fianna Fail. During his
period at the helm of the party he had brought a new young breed of
politician into senior government posts as part of his drive for expansion in
the economy and change in the country. This new generation of politicians
were of the post War of Independence and Civil War era and were of a more
modern and materialistic outlook. According to Tobin(1984;159) "Fianna fail
had traditionally represented itself as the party of the small man,but had
now in the space of a few years,became identified with men of considerable
property who were uninhibited in the way that they flaunted their wealth".
This new breed of government minister became known cynically as the "men in
mohair suits"(Tobin,1984;160). As one senior executive remembers one of this
newer breed "was not a great admirer of the General whom he would have seen
as yesterday's man. The General's departure was manoeuvered. The General had
a habit when he did not get his way of threatening to resign or writing his
resignation and he usually got a delegation asking him to stay". On this
particular occasion,in late 1966,the General is believed to have sent in his
resignation "because of the resistance that his proposals were receiving in
the Department of Finance and he blamed the politicians for allowing (the
civil servants) to twart his plans for the development of a national food
industry". It is believed that word of the General's letter of resignation
was leaked deliberately to the national media before the by-then-customary
ritual of withdrawl,following the special pleading-by-a-delegation,could
take place. The media promptly carried the news of his resignation to the
to the nation at large and the General was cornered into publicly standing
over his decision or risking public ridicule.
1966-69 CSET under A.J.(Tony) O'Reilly
-diversification into Food,phase two 
The autumn of 1966 was a period of high drama in the history of CSET.
Immediately on the General's 'resignation' B.T.(Bart) Daly was appointed by
the Board as General Manager of CSET,directly replacing Costello.Daly was one
of the pioneers of the industry and as one executive put it "very much a
traditional sugar man rather than a food man". A senior executive recalled
what happened next as follows:
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"Within two months four stories appeared simultaneously in the four daily
newspapers saying that Tony O'Reilly was to become chief of the Sugar
Company.This caused consternation within Irish Sugar.Daly spoke to me about
it and said he was appalled and that the chairman was on his way to refute
it.Before 12noon the chairman discovered that O'Reilly was offered the
Managing Directorship of both Sugar and Food. B.T.Daly was left with his
title and O'Reilly came in. The workers and management were so stunned by
the events of those six weeks that they never really recovered from them".
O'Reilly came to CSET from An Bord Bainne,the Irish Dairy Board. He
was closely associated with the major success of the marketing of Irish
butter in the UK market under the brand of Kerrygold. He was a young
marketing man who was appointed clearly to provide the marketing orientation
that was hoped would make the food project successful. O'Reilly had the full
backing of the new breed of government ministers and he was given the
stronger position of Managing Director.The General had been General Manager
and,while he had had the right to attend Board meetings,he had never actually
been appointed to the Board. Tony O'Reilly was with CSET,as managing
director, for only three years before moving on to a career in the Heinz
Corporation that was to take him all the way to his current position as
chairman and chief executive of the Heinz Corporation,the first person
outside of the Heinz family to be appointed chairman in its 117 year history.
He also found the time and energy along the way to complete a PhD thesis in
marketing based on the Kerrygold success.He is currently a multi-millionaire.
The General and O'Reilly are the two large personalities in the history of
CSET,though there had able leaders of the company before,and have been since.
We now know of Tony O'Reilly's extraordinary abilities in hindsight. To put
his short career in CSET in perspective however and to understand it in the
context of the time we must remember that he was still only at the beginning
of his career when he joined the company.As with many marketing men with one
spectacular success behind them,there were those who wondered whether there
was really any substance behind the image.There had been many people involved
in the success of Kerrygold but O'Reilly had managed to become most closely
associated with it. There was no doubt that he had the right image. He was
playing international rugby for Ireland and was on social terms with very
senior politicians. Some insiders viewed his appointment with a sense of
excitement while others viewed it with a sense of cynicism and suspicion. He
was one of a new breed of Irish executive whose primary commitment was to the
advancement of his own career,a professional manager not a nation builder.
Like many of the post revolutionary generation his national pride was
expressed in striving to be a top class performer,by international standards,
in whatever field of endeavour he applied himself to,whether in his rugby or
in his professional life. As with any professional in any field,each specific
job was taken on primarily for the personal challenge that it offered and
for the contribution that it could make to his professional growth and to his
own personal advancement as an executive. He would judge himself and be
judged on his ability to achieve specific results over agreed timeframes.
However,like all profession managers he was mobile and would always be open
to better offers.
In 1965,while the General was still at the helm,the Board engaged A.D.Little
to do a study of the food project and to make strategic recommendations on
it.The 1967 Annual Report summarised the main alternatives that ADL put
forward for the company's consideration:
"1.Undertaking a programme of broadening its product range,investing up to
£15 million additional funds and incurring losses of at least £5 million
over a period of six years before an operating profit could be expected.
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2.Reducing the general level of activity,particularly in the Branded Retail
Market in the UK.
3.Considering some form of joint operation which would meet the Company's
objective of securing outlets for horticultural products,under lower risk
terms,and with as much assurance of success."
The option chosen was a joint venture with the Heinz Corporation. This would
involve the setting up of a joint company,financed equally by Heinz and
Erin.The Government had been closely associated with this move down along the
line. The ADL study had been prompted by the Government in 1965. The Minister
for Finance,Mr.C.J.Haughey,explained how the arrangement with Heinz would
operate in a statement to the Dail on 5-4-67 as follows:
"The essence of the agreement is that a joint company will be formed to
promote and develop the sales of Erin products abroad. Erin Foods will sell
its products to this joint company,at a price to be agreed.Heinz will do the
actual selling in the British market.The joint company will promote and
advertise the products sold through it.In brief,therefore,there will be
three functions to be discharged by three separate companies with Erin Foods
producing,Heinz-Erin marketing,promoting and advertising,and the H.J.Heinz
Company doing the actual selling...While the proposed arrangement cannot be
fully identified with any one of the specific alternatives mentioned by
A.D.Little,it should lead to increased export sales not appreciably lower
than those indicated by any of the alternatives mentioned by the
consultants,but at far lesser cost.
The increased sales which will be possible under this arrangement will be
welcomed both by the farmers who will benefit from the greater and more
assured market for their products and by the workers for whom employment is
provided in the food factories.The arrangement will also be welcome to the
country as a whole as holding out prospects of securing a return on the
large national investment involved and of making a welcome contribution to
exports.
I would like to emphasise,however,that the agreement holds out no automatic
promise that all these benefits will be secured.This is a commercial
arrangement between two commercial companies.Whether or not it will be
successful depends on the commercial acumen of the parties concerned..
As far as this country is concerned,perhaps the best service we can render
the food project at this stage is to recognise the commercial nature of the
undertaking and give it a reasonable oportunity to achieve the results we
are hoping for".
In the light of the manner of the General's departure and also considering
that one of the main effects of the proposed joint venture would be the
disbandment of the salesforce that the General had tried to develop in the UK
two further extracts from Haughey's statement are worthy of note.The first
gave the General credit for providing the energy and initiative behind the
food project,and the second suggested that the idea of joint venture was
something that the General had actually considered at some stage:
"Thanks largely to the drive and initiative of Lt.General Costello,the (food)
project has expanded steadily over the past few years and at present gives
employment,both in its own and associated plants,to some 1400 persons...
One of the possibilities mentioned in the A.D.Little report was a joint
venture partnership with a marketing oriented firm already having an
established position in the UK.This was not a new suggestion.Lt.General
Costello had earlier suggested it as a possibility.."
It seems that Haughey,one of the newer breed of post revolutionary government
ministers,was anxious to try to create a sense of normality and continuity
about a situation that was perceived,within CSET and outside of it,as one of
high drama and major change.
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Tony O'Reilly was Managing Director of CSET and of Erin Foods simultaneously,
reporting to two separate Boards.During his period as MD he expanded sales
in the food project from £2.5m to over £7m and he expanded production
capacity and acreage sown in line to support this major increase in sales.
The average level of employment in the food project in Ireland had risen from
989 in 1966/67 to 1384 in 1968/69.The acreage under food was increased from
4300 to 9200 in the same period.Furthermore the product line was extended
with the acquisition of Mattersons,a meat processing and canning company.
This was all achieved while reducing the 'development costs/losses' on the
project from a level of £1.9m in 1966 to £.3m in 1969.The Heinz-Erin joint
venture seemed to be having the hoped for effect of expanding sales while
significantly reducing market development and marketing overhead costs. By
1968/69,with the losses on food reduced to the order of £.3m the project was
'breaking even' on cash flow,i.e. the losses were at about the level of the
depreciation charges, and the company as a whole was showing an after tax
profit for the first time in four years. During the previous four years the
food project had been absorbing all of the after tax profits on sugar and
related activities and had also been eating into the company's reserves.
Ironically the Heinz-Erin link had the unintended consequence of giving the
talents of O'Reilly access to,and visibility to,the Heinz Corporation. In
1969 Heinz attracted O'Reilly away from CSET to head up their UK subsidiary.
He remained a Board member of CSET until 1972.In that year the affairs of
Erin Foods,along with its assets and liabilities,were reintegrated with the
other CSET business activities under a single Board. Food revenues were £8.9m
and trading losses were £.76m. Food had reached a peak of 28% of total
CSET revenues in 1969/70 but was now declining as a percentage of total
business.The great dream of that Erin Foods would be the major instrument in
the development of a national food industry was over.CSET were to continue to
be involved in food but by 1987 it was to account for only 11% of total
revenues. Would it have been different if the General had not gone in 1966 or
Tony O'Reilly in 1969? Was the strategy flawed and beyond the ability of even
these exceptionally able executives to make it succeed? In reintegrating the
activities of Erin with the rest of the company the Board once more examined
the position and potential of the food project.The chairman,in the 1971
Annual Report,reassessed the position as follows:
"In view of the long record of losses and the current deterioration in our
results ,a complete review of the Food Project has been carried out.To help
in this we engaged the firm of cnsultants,A.D.Little Inc., to study the
market oportunities for Erin products and to submit a realistic forecast of
the company's prospects.The Consultants confirmed that in the short term
little can be done with existing products to make an appreciable
contribution to a reduction in losses ,but over a longer term new production
and marketing policies could give a better return than is currently being
experienced. They emphasised that competitive pressures are severe in all
markets,particularly for bulk products,but saw in formulated products as
distinct from purely dehydrated vegetables good medium-term growth and
profit potential. The report confirmed the relative small size of and the
low growth characteristics of the dehydrated vegetable market.
In addition to revising our market policy we have had to reappraise our
production programme.Because of the size and scale of our operations we are
at a severe cost disadvantage compared with the large international
processors with whom we compete..."
Aspirations were not as easily abandoned as strategies or tactics. Even in
the face of its own proposed actions,which implied a significant scaling down
in the company's commitment to the project,the Chairman could still say:
"I want to emphasise our faith in the future of the business and its capacity
to take its place in the industrial life of the country as a major food
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processing and marketing company".
Furthermore,recognising the need for rationalisation was one thing for a
State company,implementing it was another,as the remarks made by the senior
civil servant accepting the 1972 Annual Report for the Minister for Finance
revealed:
"..the Minister considers that any programme for rationalisation of
production facilities should be implemented in the context of alternative
oportunities becoming available for growers and employees.The reduction of
losses will,therefore,be a gradual process,but the ultimate target for the
food project must be one of economic viability"
The Food Project and its effect on the internal management
of CSET - 1960-72.
The years 1960-72 were very significant in the life of CSET. The company
embarked on an ambitious and high profile diversification that kept it in the
national limelight throughout this period. The Food Project brought new
people with new skills and outlooks to CSET. How did the new business fit in
alongside the traditional protected Sugar business and what effect did the
Food Project have on the internal polity and culture of CSET generally?
At first the Food Project was spawned and grown organically within the
existing CSET structure.As one senior executive described it:
"It was called the Food Project for a long time before it was recognised as
Erin Foods.The factories were called canneries.The Food Project was started
directly within the existing structure and never really effectively left it
from an operational point of view.The food factory managers in the early
days still reported to the Area General Managers.
Where the first change occurred was when the (Project) started to expand and
the company went back to the State for more funds to fund this growth. The
State increased its shareholding but established an independent Board for
Erin Foods with the same kind of role as the Sugar Board and appointed by
politicians.The Board was established for Erin Foods with General Costello
as General Manager. .The advent of the Board brought more autonomy to the
Erin operation in day to day working. .While the day to day role of the Area
General Manager of Sugar became less clear,he nevertheless contrived to have
the same responsibilities in regard to the field work,trucks,casual labour
etc
The setting up of a separate ,independent board for Erin Foods did create
unintended difficulties and divisions within the company as this same
executive pointed out:
"The Sugar organisation was underwriting the (Erin Foods) operation. More
difficult to understand was that the Board of the Sugar Company was the
effective underwriter of the decisions of the Erin Board,and the only link
between the two Boards was the General Manager,General Costello. That wasn't
the best of arrangements.It led to the people(the professional managers) in
Sugar distancing themselves from Food.They felt that they were making the
money but they hadn't the decision on the spending of it...
The Sugar company was operating in a sheltered commercial climate.Erin Foods
was operating in a commercial environment that was exceptionally hostile to
it.The complication of the management structure did not make the direction
of Erin Foods any easier to achieve.
What was happening on the ground was that the big factories were the sugar
factories.Erin built up its own staff,its factory managers,its negotiations
with growers etc.It spored and built up its own kind of empire.It built up a
sales team which the Sugar Compamy never had before. That was the beginning
of the two ideologies(i.e. developmental v commercial).Even further back you
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always had rivalry between the chemists,the engineers and the
agriculturalists...You had an impreciseness in management.People who were
not exposed to commercial reality were driving a piece of the business which
was very commercial.."
It would seem that the advent of Tony O'Reilly only served to further
dramatise the different sub-cultures that were developing within CSET.
The memory of the O'Reilly days has been passed down to successive
generations of CSET executives. One who joined the company in the mid 70's
provided this perception on the O'Reilly period:
"There was a buzz in the place and a market-oriented approach to the
development of the Food business.Sugar receeded into the background and
seemed archaic by comparison to the brand new food factories that were going
up.Basically the Food people took over the company.If you wanted to be in
the fast track at that time you had to be in Food."
One who was there at the time confirmed this overall picture and elaborated:
"He(O'Reilly) was here for two and a half to three years.He did not change
the structure but he changed the relative influence of Foods and Sugar.It
brought another stage in this division of Sugar company types and Erin Food
types. .It was a time of vast recruitment in the company.One of the big
influxes was into Erin Foods.Chemists and Marketing men were speaking a
language etc not known in the industry.They looked differently,dressed
differently,and had different interests and pressures. This created its own
boundaries.Tony acted as God between these two separate empires.
The bright young lads in Sugar saw a challenge in Food and it was easy to
get them into it. .Food was new and clean in comparison to Sugar.
(O'Reilly) met the cold resistance of men in the Sugar division who did not
want to know.O'Reilly was an interloper to the Sugar division.O'Reilly went
with the areas where he was strong.Sugar was sufficiently strong to fund
Erin Foods.The Sugar executives were forceful and tough men who had fought
the battles and built the industry and Tony left them alone."
While the 'forceful and tough men' of Sugar maintained their operational
autonomy to a large degree,they had little or no influence on the transfer of
profits from their division to fund the Food business:
"The Area General Manager had no way of influencing the transfer of funds
from Sugar to Food. They were like innocents at large when it came to the
distribution of funds. The decision there lay beyond their ken and always
did. They made their yearly budgets for what they needed to run the factory
which got approval from the Board and that was it."
O'Reilly had two key managers helping him run the Food business that were his
men,hired by him after he joined CSET. These men were his Erin Foods General
Manager,and the Company Secretary to the Erin Board respectively. Both were
very influential executives ta CSET during O'Reilly's term. When O'Reilly
left in 1969 these men followed him out of CSET shortly afterwards and became
key executives in entreprises with which O'Reilly was closely connected
outside of his Heinz involvement. By 1972 the Food business was reintegrated
with the Sugar business under the one Board and management structure.The
Sugar men had regained control of CSET. A major episode in the life of the
company was at an end.
1969-74 B.T.(Bart) Daly - Stabilisation & Reassessment
When Tony O'Reilly left CSET to join the Heinz Corporation after only three
years as Managing Director "it was a major surprise to the politicians who
put him in..The politicians got such a land that the golden boy had (gone)
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off to give his talents to another company".The contemporary perception
within CSET was that at this point the politicians backed off and distanced
themselves from the affairs of the company.The young,high profile,managing
director that they had sent into CSET to turn around the nationally
high-profiled Food Project had left with the task barely begun and within
diminishing hopes of it ever succeeding. His departure was a political
embarrassment and the Food Project was becoming a political liability.
Industrial development policy nationally was shifting towards a strategy of
attracting foreign-owned high technology multi-national firms to set up
manufacturing bases in Ireland from which to supply the EEC market. The hope
was that manufacturing would be followed in time by R&D and Marketing
functions and that a process of technology transfer would take place that
would seed a newly emerging indigenous hi-tech sector. It was a bold move for
a small country with little industrial tradition. The Industrial Development
Authority,under the brilliant leadership of Michael Killeen,became the state
agency mechanism through which those industrial projects potentially
offering most to the national industrial development strategy were to be
targeted and attracted to Ireland with a customised package of state grants
and tax incentives. Throughout the 70's the IDA was to bring hope to many
localities across the nation in the form of new factories and new jobs.
Political interest in the industrial development potential of CSET waned
after O'Reilly's sudden departure.As one CSET executive recalled it:
"As the guys in Government lost interest,they walked away from it (CSET) and
were more interested in the IDA and Michael Kileen.They regarded a company
like ours as a kept woman.The old concept of the State company as an engine
for growth was lost. Our industry was old and dirty-a bit awkward-an
agricultural-based industry.A mohair suit would get dirty going up the
ladder of a sugar factory but was alright in a centrally heated hi-tech
company"
Such was the lack of political interest when O'Reilly left that no successor
was appointed.The company was left to its own devices. B.T.(Bart) Daly was
still General Manager of CSET and had been appointed to succeed the General
in 1966 before O'Reilly had been imposed on the organisation.On O'Reilly's
departure, Daly simply reverted to his 1966 role as head of the company.
O'Reilly remained on the Board until 1972,which maintained some degree of
continuity. In 1971 Daly was given the new title of Chief Executive.
Daly was a long serving sugar executive and was with CSET since the 30's.He
was very close to retirement when he took up the helm for the second time.
His period of leadership is remembered as one when the company 'ticked over'.
As one executive remembers it Daly "maintained the status quo.He did not
initiate any activities while he was here. .The company was ticking over and
making a profit but there was no reinvestment or innovation".
It was a period of reassessment. Firstly, the Food Project peaked in 1970/71
as a percentage of overall turnover at 28%.This was the highest it was ever
to be and it represented a significant turning point in the history of CSET's
long involvement in food. Though turnover was at a record high in 1971 the
losses in the Food Project had begun to rise again and this "forced us to
reappraise the direction we had been following in attempting to bring the
project to break-even"(Annual Report,1971;5). As we saw earlier, A.D.Little
were brought in to advise on a strategy for the Food business.They advised
CSET to concentrate on "added-value formulated goods, combined with selling
bulk products of high quality to specific major customers"(Annual Report
1973;4).In 1972 the decision was taken "to integrate the operations of the
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two companies (Food & Sugar) under a single Board" but "because of the
national position regarding unemployment,the planned rationalisation
programme was not implemented". The company's competitive position in Food
remained weak "because of the comparatively low scale of production,spread
over a multiplicity of factories,involving excessive overheads".
A refocused and descaled Food business looked like being profitable
but the implementation of the scaling down would have to "be implemented in
the context of alternative oportunities becoming available for growers and
employees. .a gradual process"(quotes from Annual Report,1972;3-5). A
milestone in the Food Project in 1972 was that Heinz-Erin,the joint-venture,
began to trade profitably for the first time.
A important environmental change for CSET happened during this period when
Ireland joined the EEC. This was to have major implications for the Sugar
business. The 1973 Annual Report heralded this development as follows:
"we are now entering a new era involving the termination of the monopoly
protection enjoyed in the sugar sector of our business.Our industry must
face the cold winds of competition and this will require a realistic
approach from our farmer growers towards the price of raw materials and
from our employees in exercising wage restraint"(p5).
Production was now to be constrained by a quota system.Ireland's allocated
quota on entry to the EEC was 150000tons. The company was already producing
at,or above,that level in the early 70's and Ireland's failure to get a
better quota at the time presented a major problem for CSET. It made the
company hesitant about capacity expansion. Production above the quota was
subject to a production levy that could not be matched by cheaper beet
because the farmer considered it uneconomical to grow beet for a lower price
than that prevailing at the time. This also introduced uncertainty into the
the supply side "due mainly to competition for land from other farming
entreprises,especially milk and beef production"(Annual Report 1974;3).
During the 60's there was little reinvestment in the Sugar business as all
available funds were being channelled into Food. By 1971 the Food business,
with 28% of the total turnover,had 49% of the company's net assets in plant
and equipment.In 1967 the net assets of Sugar and Related Activities were at
the level of 32% of turnover.By 1973 they were down to 18%.The asset base of
the Sugar business had gotten old and run down. The need for modernisation in
the Sugar business was recognised in the early 70's and a four year programme
of modernisation of the sugar factories was set in train.However,in this
period of stabilisation and reassessment a hesitant approach was
taken in the face of the uncertainties mentioned above."Because of this
uncertainty our capital programme is restricted to modernising our factories"
(Annual Report,1973;3) to be funded out of retained earnings.
B.T.(Bart) Daly retired from CSET in 1974.
1975-79 Modernisation of the Sugar Industry
Daly was succeeded as Chief Executive Officer of CSET by Maurice Sheehy. When
Daly had been first appointed General Manager of CSET when the General
resigned in 1966,Sheehy had been taken up from the Carlow plant to HQ in
Dublin to become Assistant General Manager. However his eventual succession
to Daly in 1974 was not automatic. It was in fact traumatic. After O'Reilly's
Unexpected departure the Government showed no active interest in leadership
succession at CSET but left the company to its own devices. What happened on
Daly's retirement,as a senior executive of the company remembered it was as
follows:
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"When Daly was due to retire you had a Board that realised that the
Government did not give a tinker's damn so they decided that they would
advertise the position in the Public Press. That was,in my opinion,the worst
investment that this industry ever made because all the confusion and the
trauma of the previous few years since the General left had brought a new
thing into existence (an overtly Political succession process) and while
several candidates existed there were several candidates from inside.Two
big camps emerged,the Sheehy and the Comerford camps....
The Board had offered the position to an outsider but the money would not
attract him in.They were faced with the reality that they had to settle for
someone within.The Board was almost 50/50 split between the two (Sheehy and
Comerford)".
The process by which the Board eventually came to their decision was loosely
structured and highly political. Behind the scenes lobbying of board members
was engaged in by both camps. This 1974 leadership struggle was to have
ramifications on the internal polity of CSET that were to affect it far
into the future. Inevitably the manner of the succession was to be most
closely associated with the personalities of the candidates. However,it
could also be said that these two able and ambitious men simply played out
a succession game the character of which was largely determined by a decision
context fashioned by the actions and inactions of the Chairman,his Board and
their Political masters.
In 1976 Denis Coakley became Chairman of the Board of CSET. Coakley was:
"A man of exceptional energy and of concern for the advancement of his
country and its people. .founder of one of Ireland's biggest wholesale
businesses. .while Chairman of the Sugar Company,gave it the benefit of his
exceptional business skills.."(Foy,1987;405)
The Coakley-Sheehy partnership is credited within CSET with having assessed
the full implications of Ireland's EEC membership for CSET and with having
taken the bold moves to secure the future of the company within this new
environment. EEC entry implied new success criteria for CSET's primary
business,sugar. Output was to be limited by quota. It was important that
Ireland try to secure a much better quota than it had on entry in order to
maintain grower confidence and to give the basic business the scope for
development. At the same time that output was controlled, protection
of the home market was removed and the primary market became more open to
other EEC producers. To maintain grower confidence the company had to
maintain attractive prices for beet as well as ensure that the quota would
not act as a disincentive to the efficient grower by penalising him for high
output. There was to be an increasing and persistent competitive pressure on
the supply side from attractive alternative uses for land. The future not
just of the company but also of the industry was challenged by EEC
membership. The central issue for CSET,as Coakley saw it,was to become an
efficient processor by international standards with all possible speed. These
concerns and priorities were clearly identified by him in his first Annual
Report as Chairman:
"Accompanied by the Minister for Agriculture and the Chief Executive,I have
studied at first hand the changing face of the European sugar beet industry.
By Irish standards the size of the investment currently employed,in
streamlining the factories there,is simply staggering.Because these
factories are potential competitors of ours we must remain conscious
of their pattern of development.That reality alone must ensure against
complacency and will continue-at least for some time-to make stiff demands
on capital.Our environment is now a European one and we must match-as far
as it is practical for us to do so-the standards of would-be competitors."
(Annual Report,1976;5).
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Competitiveness in an EEC context was to be a constant theme of his term as
Chairman.There were new and severe cost pressures in the mid 70's which could
not be passed on fully to the consumer in the form of price increases:
"We have been greatly affected in the 1970's by vastly increased fuel
costs,inflation,devaluations and our entry into Europe".(Annual
Report,1976;3).
And while he could see clearly the limitations of the Sugar business as far
as offering scope for future growth and development was concerned:
"It appears to me that EEC market price pressure,coupled with the the beet
and sugar price control of the Common Agricultural Policy,presage a low
level of of sugar profit in the years immediately ahead.With such a
possibility in the offing,we see a need to diversify into some
complementary area of the Agri Industry so that the long-term stability of
our Group is protected".(Annual Report,1977;3)
yet,he was making a massive recommitment to the core business even in the
light of the erosion in profit margins since EEC entry because:
"..we would be tempting fate;we would be risking the future of this industry,
if we were not to continue to invest in it".(Annual Report,1977;5).
During the Chairmanship of Denis Coakley CSET spent over £40m on modernising
its factories and at the end of his term in 1980 there were plans for a
further f5om of capital investment. The share capital in CSET was £6.5m in
1979,up from £4.5m in the early 1960's.The £90m capital investment programme
in the modernisation of the Sugar productive capacity was way beyond the
resources that were been made available from retained profits.Coakley went to
the Government to seek further equity participation from 'the shareholder'
but had to be satisfied with "letters of comfort" that would State-guarantee
any company borrowings to fund the programme. By 1978 the competitive
pressures of the new environment of the 1970's,which were described earlier,
were biting very hard into company margins. The high debt content of the
capital structure was placing an untenable interest burden on company
returns. The company was clearly undercapitalised by commercial standards for
a company of its size and nature of business.Company strategists were to
continue to press on the shareholder this need for a major injection of new
equity on into the 1980's.The issue of inadequate equity,which came to remain
near the top of the strategic agenda for years to come, was first flagged as
a major issue by Coakley in the 1979 Annual Report as follows:
"The accounts come to you in a format which very clearly emphasises the
impact of historically high interest rates on Group trading profits and
which identifies the problem of a sharply rising debt/equity ratio.The
latter problem reflects the Group's low share capital base,inadequate profit
levels in recent years and the necessity of funding essential capital
expenditure from borrowings. "(p4)
He reemphasised the essential nature of this capital expenditure in the
following year's Annual Report when,in reviewing the effects of the capital
programme,he said:
"At the factories the benefits of the capital investment programme are making
impact with generally increased throughput,faster turnaround times, an
increasing sophistication in handling and storage of products-in short, a
better service to growers. A factor of this capital programme,which we
probably have not explained sufficiently,is that it literally involves the
refurbishing of 50 year old factories-the useful lifespan of which had been
reached".
Denis Coakley resigned from his position as Chairman and from the Board of
CSET in 1980 to concentrate on his own business commitments.He took the
oportunity of his last annual report as Chairman to give a state of the
company message.In spite of the modernisation programme the company made a
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trading loss in 1979/80.The company was entering a period of overall losses
that was to continue for four years.This was the first time that the company
had gone into the red since the early years of the Food Project and it
reflected major changes that were happening in the company's overall
environment.Coakley had come into CSET fully conscious that he was to preside
over a period of major change in the company's history:
"I have come in as chairman at a time of great change in industry generally.I
accept the challenge that my present position presents and am prepared to
give whatever I can to ensure continued growth and prosperity of this great
industry"(Annual Report 1976;3).
He was leaving the company at a time of even greater change:
"There is a need for change in our industry;in fact severe change is called
for.We would be failing in a fundamental duty to the shareholder,and to the
people of Ireland whom he represents,if we did not fully recognise the
present problems and take the necessary remedial measures to set the Company
on a profitable course".(Annual Report 1980;9)
He reflected in the Annual Report of 1979 the growing concern that was
developing within the company about just exactly what was expected of it and
about whether these expectations were now changing in a fundamental way as a
reflection of some basic changes taking place in the wider environment:
"..we encounter all the general problems of manufacturing industries in
competitive situations.On the other hand we have responsibilities placed
upon us by virtue of the nature of our industry and what has been
traditionally expected of it.We,therefore,find ourselves engaged in regions
and activities which were,in the past at any rate,beyond the capacity or
interest of private entreprise..we are part of the fabric of local
communities and while it might be more profitable to excise ourselves from
such a role,the reality is tied up in history and in the continuing
expectations or wishes of the communities among which we work. ."(p4-5).
The trading loss in 1980 had the effect of focusing critical public attention
on the company and begging the question of just what are companies like CSET
all about in the 1980's.Was CSET's role primarily developmental or
commercial? This issue of the role of state entreprise in the Ireland of the
80's was to grow to become a important issue in the 1987 election campaign.
Coakley,in his state of the company review in the 1980 Annual Report again
took up this question as being central to CSET's future development:
"...now that organisations such as ours are subject to having their real
worth and contribution swamped in popular,sometimes shallow,criticism,it is
necessary to be emphatic on certain matters.
The Irish sugar beet industry retains,I believe,the best qualities of the
past.It is a foundation to build a future upon.
That future,however,must be different.Ireland is different.Our relevance to
that future will depend entirely on our attitude and response to the
challenges and problems which beset us at present-and not in reaction to
those who have little respect for,or understanding of,national entreprises
such as ours.I believe that all those who are genuinely interested in
national effort,and especially people in public life,should,at this stage,
respond to the reality of changed circumstances in organisations that have
served the nation well.Aims should now be restated,guidelines agreed and
ambiguity removed. .a review and statement of the Company's role is
essential, indeed urgent"(p4-5).
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CSET Rationalisation 1980 - 87 
The year 1979/80 was a watershed for the Irish economy generally,and for CSET
in particular. In that year all Western economies were hit with the second
major oil crisis in less than a decade and were thrown into recession. For
Ireland there were particular difficulties.In 1977 Fianna Fail had won power
in the General Election of that year on the basis of a manifesto designed to
stimulate the economy after a four year belt-tightening period following on
the 1973 oil crisis. The stimulus was to be one of consumer demand and it was
levered by foreign borrowing.As Neary(1984;69) evaluated it:
"It was a brave strategy but a risky one.It gambled on continued growth in
the rest of the world;and it gambled on Irish workers being willing to
accept lower wage increases than our competitor countries,so we could
increase our share of growing world trade.Regrettably,both bets lost.In
particular,the second oil crisis of 1979 plunged the Western World into the
worst recession since before the Second World War. Our exports faltered but
imports,fuelled by foreign borrowing,continued to grow".
In the period 1977-81 public service employment had risen by 13% in the wake
of the 1977 stimulus. When recession started to bite hard unemployment rose
rapidly from about 94000 in 1977,to 160000 in 1982,and to 208000 in 1984.
Most job losses occurred in the private sector as weak and inefficient
entreprises went to the wall. The burden of supporting the enlarged public
sector became more onerous on the private sector as this wealth creating
sector started to contract. Meanwhile,net foreign indebtedness,which in 1977
had stood at £78m,had risen to £1000m by 1979,and had reached £6700m by 1983.
Over the 1980-86 period the level of public indebtedness continued to rise as
a percentage of GNP,as the malaise grew from serious to critical. As the 80's
progressed more and more people in the community came to accept that the
high level of government borrowing was a critical road block to economic
recovery. The high level of this public borrowing was seen to keep interest
rates high while higher levels of taxation were needed from a decreasing tax
base just to try to maintain public services. Both higher interest rates and
higher taxation were disincentives to private investment and individual
initiative and only served to further depress the economy at a time of
general world recession. The deepening problem of the public finances came to
be the dominant issue in the Irish economy during the 1980's.
As the problem with the public finances deepened the environment of all
public service agencies became more stringent and more critical than at any
time in their previous history. Government,civil service and the community at
large began to take a closer interest in the activities of these agencies and
began to more closely evaluate their value to the community. As public funds
became progressively more scarce,the question of their allocation and use
became more closely scrutinised. This closer public scrutiny led on naturally
to an even more fundamental reassessment of the very role of these agencies
in the Ireland of the 1980's. The criterion of commercial viability began to
be applied more and more to the activities of State-owned entreprises and by
the middle of the decade the debate about the possible privatisation of some
of these entreprises began to gather momentum. Bristow(1982;173) noted this
change that was beginning to take place in the national mindset by the early
80's when he remarked that:
"..there can be no doubt that the general financial environment has
generated -in political and official circles and in the public media- an
increased questioning as to whether Irish society is getting value for
money from its state-sponsored sector".
198
A parallel shift in mindset took place within CSET over the 1980's which
was associated with these wider developments taking place in the country at
large. The exposure of the company to the full winds of competition after the
1972 EEC entry,and the hardening of the general international trading
environment in the late 70's,had the effect of stimulating the debate within
the company as to what was its primary role. The overall losses sustained
over the 1979/83 period,and the inevitable critical attention that they drew
towards the company and its management,were particularly instrumental in
helping to move the company internally towards a less developmental and more
commercial ideology. The arrival of James Fitzpatrick as the new Chairman in
1980 was also an important factor in catalysing this internal ideological
shift, As one senior executive characterised this change:
"The organisation has been going through a major mindset change from thinking
of itself as a development organisation towards thinking of itself as a
commercial organisation..
The company's view of itself and the civil service view of the company up to
then was that it was a beet processor.The dominant thinking was still that
CSET was a development company for the Irish Sugar industry.The company was
entering into a loss situation for the first time in its recent history.
When James Fitzpatrick came into the organisation as Chairman of the Board
he brought about what I think was a major change in the company's way of
looking at itself.The change was that there was less emphasis on the
performance of an activity as an end in itself and the future viability of
the business was the focus. He became an outlet for the commercial approach
to the company management.
As well as that it would be fair to say that Comerford was head of Planning
and that the ideas were coming forward from him as well.Also the company did
not like publishing losses. Some did not see this as a problem.They saw CSET
as a state company and felt that the losses could be covered by seeking more
equity.Others saw the situation in more commercial terms...
The commercial approach has been building up as far back as 1979 but has
been building up since 1981 onwards and is ongoing in that it has not been a
great surge which subsequently stopped...
..the mindset was changing within the Civil Service and this was also
important.Their reaction was a bit delayed in that they were operating a
couple of years behind us.The change would not have come about except that
it was happening in there also.There has been an overall change within the
Civil Service to the operation of the Semi-States.Rather than manage them in
such a way as to minimize political hassle they started speaking the
(commercial) truth and supported change to the Minister...
One other thing that must be said is that the Government were amenable to
change.If the Government wanted to focus on and emphasise employment we
could not have made the changes that we did."
In fact a number of state-sponsored bodies all started to record losses
around the same time at the end of the 70's. This refocused the attention of
the Government and the Civil Service on the whole semi-state sector after a
decade of arm's length management.The Civil Service began to demand corporate
plans from these bodies in the early 80's whereas up to then all they were
interested in seemed to be annual estimates. A joint committee of the
Oireachtais(representative of the two houses of parliament,the Dail and the
Senate) was set up to report on a number of state-sponsored bodies. They
reported on CSET in December 1980. The company,in preparing their submission
to the Committee,presented their financial statements in a format that
highlighted what were for them the two major contributing factors to their
bottom line losses. One was the 'Tuam Cost Penalty' of keeping the Tuam sugar
processing plant in operation of £2m per annum. The second was what they
termed 'The Shareholder Deficiency Account'. In this they highlighted the
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added burden on the bottom line that their debt/equity ratio of more than
double the commercial norm was having on the company's financial position.
The company's argument was that without the Tuam Cost Penalty and with a
proper equity base the company was commercially viable.
The report of the Joint Committee,in its conclusions,focused on:
"..three key areas of decision for the future of the company.These are: the
measures necessary to ensure the viability of the sugar operation; the role
of diversification in the company's future plans; and the weight to be given
to social and regional development responsibilities in the company's overall
goals" (p72).
In relation to the viability of the sugar business the report recommended:
that the company should in future concentrate its sugar operations
on its most viable plants..
..The company needs an immediate injection of £25 million in additional
share capital ..Additional capital will be required over the next three
years to support the prudent financing of the additional £40m investment
programme
The committee considered whether farmer growers should be invited to invest
in the Company as one potential source of additional capital. .Farmers might
not favour a minority stake in a state company whose objectives were wider
than pure profit-maximisation.."
In relation to the role of diversification the Committee concluded that it
was "unlikely to provide an answer to the Company's problems at the present
time". It recommended that the Company's efforts and resources should be
concentrated on making the sugar and related businesses viable. This was
significant because the Company's stated objective in pursuing
diversification was "to maintain employment on a company-wide basis and,if
possible,at all locations". The Committee rejected this as a realistic
prospect and by implication it appeared to accept that substantial job losses
were inevitable at CSET if the basic business was to be competitive under the
EEC regime.Furthermore it added that:
"..even if a profitable oportunity not linked to sugar is identified and it
is agreed that this oportunity should be developed within the
State-sponsored sector,it is not obvious why this task should be given to
the Sugar Company rather than to another State-sponsored company or indeed a
new company specially set up for that purpose.." (p76).
As regards the social and regional development responsibilities of the
company the report concluded:
"..there was frequent mention of the need to clarify the relative weight to
be given to social goals in the future strategy of the company.By social
goals was generally meant the Company policy of maintaining in operation
plant in scattered locations and of uneconomic size for the purpose of
providing employment in these areas..
The Committee accepts that the avoidance of unemployment in the future is a
reasonable and legitimate constraint on the activities of the Company.
However,it believes the fallacy in the Sugar Company argument is the
presumption that it itself must be seen to provide the alternative jobs.
This viewpoint looks at the responsibilities of the Company in isolation
from a strategy for the State-sponsored sector as a whole,or indeed from the
State's industrial policy in general.The Company pioneered rural
industrialisation in various localities when it established its plants.
It is more difficult to justify this pioneering role now given the diffusion
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of industrial employment oportunities throughout rural areas through the
last decade...
The Committee recognises however,from the State's point of view. .that it
makes no sense for the Company to close a plant until alternative employment
oportunities have come on stream.."
The report of the Joint Committee of the Oireachtais was to become an
important legitimising reference point for the Company in the 1980's as it
sought to secure more equity from the State and to close uneconomic
facilities. The report even considered the possibility of a widening of the
company's equity base. This,in effect, presaged a future debate about the
possible privatisation of CSET.
The Closure of Tuam
The seeking of additional equity from the State and the attempt by the
Company to close the uneconomic Tuam sugar processing plant were the two
primary thrusts of CSET strategy over the 1980-86 period. The company's
attempt to close Tuam took nearly 5 years from the time the initial
decision was taken by the CSET Board until the closure was finally achieved.
It took so long because the proposed closure became a regional and a national
political issue. The proposed Tuam closure forced CSET and the community at
large to confront the more fundamental question of what exactly the nation
expected from its state entreprises in the Ireland of the 1980's. As such the
closure was of national as well as company significance. The trajectory of
the Tuam closure is now briefly traced in the following paragraphs.
Armed with the backing of the report from the Joint Committee the company set
about closing the Tuam plant.The Board took the decision in September 1981 to
cease the processing of sugar at the Tuam plant at the end of the 1981/82
season.Tuam was losing money because there was insufficient acreage under
beet in its hinterland and the acreage was declining. To maintain factory
throughput,beet from distant regions was being transported into Tuam at a
substantial cost penalty to CSET. The announcement of the Company's decision
was followed by "thirteen days of controversy"(Foy,1981;161) which ended in
the Government deciding that the factory would remain in operation for a
further season. During these controversial days the issue was aired in the
national newspapers and on the airwaves. All kinds of arguments and
counter-arguments were put forward. There were delegations to politicians and
Ministers. Community and Church leaders got involved on behalf of the Tuam
employees.The closure decision had the effect of forcing on the public
consciousness the issue of the role of semi-states like CSET in the Ireland
of the 80's.The ambiguity within CSET was amplified by the ambiguity at
large. The editorial in the Sunday Independent 20/Sept/81 summed it up:
"The dilemma is this.Are semi-State companies to be run commercially or as
development agencies? Incredibly,as in the Sugar Company, nobody has
formally told them what role they are to play. If they behave commercially
and sack workers,all hell breaks loose. If they pursue social objectives and
lose money they get hammered. That's a catch 22 with vengence.Somebody had
better clear up this contradiction.."
Whatever about the ambiguity at large,within the Sugar Company in the early
80's the commercial viability ideology was becoming the dominant one.The very
survival of the Sugar industry was the concern that focused the minds
of those who knew the industry best.According to Foy(1981;161-2):
"Competitiveness,responsiveness to change appears to be all.The Sugar Company
has- in the circumstances-no choice but to change.That is its belief.Its
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responsibility is to the national sugar beet industry.And,in the mood and
tenure of these times,to protect that industry is to have it viable,
profitable and competitive".
In successive Annual Reports the Chairman,James Fitzpatrick,returned to this
theme again and again. The 1981 report,which reviewed the period that
included the controversial Tuam decision,delivered a clear message of the
dominant thinking within CSET:
"The Board's decision on Tuam sugar factory classically shows the difficulty
for us in such matters.I feel it only fair to appeal here for an
understanding from all interests,of the commercial pressures upon us-for we
are a commercial company. .in the Ireland of the 1980's the pressures are
such that this Company cannot,within its commercial brief,be expected to
maintain activities which are not viable.To attempt otherwise will bring
down the whole industry."(p6).
Tuam was to be closed eventually.It took another 4 years and another £8m in
cumulative Tuam Cost Penalty, but in a more supportive political context a
very direct managing director was to make the final move to close the plant.
In the end the closure was achieved in a relatively low key fashion given the
storm of controversy that was unleashed after the Board decision of 1981.
One senior executive succintly described the trajectory of the Tuam closure:
"There was an off-the-record effort to close Tuam in the late 70's. We
started putting it in documents in the 1980's.Then there was a 'maybe' from
Alan Dukes(the Minister-FitzGerald administration 1981/82) who said that he
would give it a year. Fianna Fail came back into power (Haughey
administration 1982) and kept it open. Then Deasy (the Minister-FitzGerald
administration 1982-87) said that of course he knew that it was not
commercial but that it would be kept open for social reasons. Then most
recently there has been acceptance of the closure...the key to the workers
acceptance of the closure was the company's claim that keeping it open would
involve a 7 month layoff in the year".
As the 80's progressed and Ireland's financial and economic difficulties
persisted it became harder and harder to sustain the argument for keeping
Tuam open on social grounds. Job losses were mounting in the private sector
and were becoming accepted with resigned inevitability. An overtaxed
community were becoming more and more unsympathetic to the idea of
sustaining of uneconomically viable employment at taxpayer expense. As the
economic argument for closure became stronger it became harder to generate
and maintain the regional and national political support to counter it. The
workers acceptance of the company position and terms of closure in late 1986
preempted any repeat of the storm of controversy of 1981. However it is
also the case that the timing of the final move for closure was a crucial
element in its success. It was done in the last months of the 1982-87
FitzGerald administration. As the problems with the public finances deepened
over the lifetime of the FitzGerald government,the influence of those in
cabinet who supported a more commercial ideology for state entreprise
steadily grew. Their position finally became enshrined as public policy in
their government's three year national plan for economic and social
development entitled 'Building on Reality 1985-87'. In this plan it was
declared that:
"the Government believe that if public entreprise is to make a major and
effective contribution to industrial and economic development in this
country,there will have to be an entirely new approach to the role and
function of public entreprise. Primary emphasis will have to be placed on
developing modern industry with emphasis on commercial viability and
profits" ('Building on Reality' :p67).
It was known that 1987 had to be an election year. It was also widely
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believed that the election would come early in the year and that the outgoing
administration would be defeated. The Fianna Fail party,which was expected
to be returned to power,had publicly associated itself with the opposition
to the Tuam closure in the 1981 controversy and had kept it open during its
brief term in office in 1982. CSET took the oportunity to make their decisive
final move on the Tuam closure at a time when the commercial rationale for
their action had strong support in cabinet. This support was not strong
enough prior to 1985 and could only have been counted on to survive until
1987,when a change in government was widely anticipated.
The Company rationalised many of its operations in the 1980's with a
number of facility closures. Most of these were achieved with relatively
little political and public controversy. This was a manifestation of the
changing mindset at large with regard to the purpose of,and expectations
from,semi-States. As one executive explained:
"Up to recently the politicians believed that State companies were political
instruments (to be criticised or praised publicly when politically
expedient). There has been a change right across the semi-State sector.The
semi-States are more able to stand as operational units. They can take
actions which are outside the scope of politicians to interfere with. An
example was that we closed Mattersons(a Limerick-based meat processing
acquisition). We did have soft interference but nobody said no!"
The closure of Tuam was controversial out of all proportion to the job losses
involved compared with other CSET rationalisation moves because the decision
was embedded in a context which gave it deeper meaning. It meant the
cessation of operations in one of the four historical development centres of
CSET and implicitedly abandoned the vision of a previous generation of
nation builders. Mattersons was a commercial company that CSET had acquired
when the Food project was at its zenith in the late 60's. It had been
acquired as a commercial proposition and its closure was more readily
acceptable on commercial grounds alone. The Tuam closure was of much deeper
significance. It provided a much tougher test of political resolve for those
in government,the civil service and the company who espoused the commercial
ideology for public entreprise. The ultimate acceptance of this plant
closure was an historic milestone in the company's ongoing transition from a
developmental agency to a commercial entreprise. The closing of any of the
four original development centres would have had this historic significance.
However,the closure of Tuam was particularly significant in this regard
because it was embedded in a deep emotive issue that has spanned Irish
politics since the foundation of the State, the relative neglect and
underdevelopment of the West of Ireland. It was never going to be simple. In
the end the closure took the best part of a decade.
In the 1980-86 period the Company managed to secure more equity from the
shareholder but not as much as it was looking for.The result was that the
modernisation of the Sugar facilities continued but at less speed than the
company would have wished for. Major rationalisation was carried out in
many of the Company's operations in addition to the Tuam closure.The widely
dispersed network of Food facilities that was built up in the 60's and early
70's was slimmed down to a "three plant configuration which is considered to
be appropriate to its scale of operation and which will permit future planned
development of the product range"(Annual Report,1983;6).
The average number of persons employed by the Group declined from 3615 in
1979,through 2864 in 1983 to 2205 in 1986. A reduction of this scale and in
this timeframe would have been unthinkable prior to the 80's. That it
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was achieved with relatively little public controversy,leaving aside the
special case of Tuam,is eloquent testimony to the changed context in which
CSET has been operating in since the late 1970's,and to the degree to which
the Company has been successful to date in getting national awareness of,and
acceptance for, its strategy for its longterm commercial viability.
Future challenges and oportunities
- CSET under Chris Comerford in the late 1980's
Maurice Sheehy retired as Managing Director of CSET in early 1985. He was
succeeded by Chris Comerford,his rival for the leadership in the 1974
succession contest. Sheehy,along with Coakley,is credited within CSET with
leading the development and implementation of the major modernisation
programme that helped to secure the basic sugar business in the face of the
intensification of comopetition that followed on from EEC entry. In one
capacity or another Comerford has also had a major,and an over time a
growing,influence on the strategic direction of CSET since the mid 70's. He
has been particularly influential in spearheading the transition within CSET
from a developmental to a commercial ideology. Comerford has been,and
continues to be,a major force in the rationalisation and realignment of CSET
throughout the 1980's to improve the quality of CSET earnings and to put the
basic business on a more secure and competitive commercial footing. He has
publicly advocated the privatisation of CSET in a Sunday Independent feature
on 22-Nov-87 where he said that privatisation:
"..would allow commercial decisions to be made in running the company,
particularly in regard to pay. It would also open up the possibility of a
link-up with another sugar industry to strengthen CSE(T) in protecting its
market"
The leadership contest between Sheehy and Comerford in 1974 was controversial
and divisive,as we saw earlier in the case narrative. The Board and the
senior management of the company were split in their support of these two men
for the leadership of CSET in 1974 and Sheehy won the decision of the Board
by a very narrow margin. The Board later appointed Chris Comerford to the
position of Deputy Chief Executive. When James Fitzpatrick became Chairman in
1980 he became aware of the difficulty faced by both men in this arrangement
when viewed in the light of the divisive nature of their earlier contest
for the leadership. He persuaded Comerford to move out of Sheehy's direct
line and to take responsibility for group strategic planning and corporate
development. His move to planning turned out to be of considerable benefit
to himself and his company. In the context of the early 80's,when CSET was
preparing a defense of itself for the investigation into its affairs and
activities by the Joint Committee of the Oireachtais,and when the company was
intensifying its efforts to secure a major fresh injection of equity from the
shareholder the planning efforts of Comerford and his staff proved to be
crucial. As one senior manager recalled:
"In the excellence of what they did in sophisticated 5 year planning etc.
they rapidly made the Management Committee irrelevant for the purposes of
this type of work..they won the right to bring their plans to the main
Board directly and to defend them at that level. They won this right through
the forcefulness of Comerford.. That planning thing under Comerford was
another phase in the company's movement towards its present management style
(the commercial ideology). It was on the strength of the planning
department's plans that we eventually got the equity that we were looking
for. That plan was sent out by Alan Dukes(FitzGerald's Minister for Finance) to
a firm of consultants to report on its viability and effectiveness and we
got by Act of Parliament exactly what we asked for".
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When Sheehy retired in 1985,Comerford succeeded him as leader of CSET.
Comerford is more committed to the commercial ideology for state
entreprise than his predecessor. His operating style is also more direct.
Sheehy "always tested the water everywhere before going ahead" and was more
"responsive to political persuasion" than his successor. Comerford and his
new Chairman,Bernard Cahill,were more prepared to take decisive commercial
action and deal with the political fallout on a post-hoc basis. In was in
this fashion that the final move to close the Tuam plant was taken under
their stewardship in 1986,though the nation had been well 'softened up' for
the closure by then. Since his accession to the leadership Comerford has
accelerated the rationalisation process at CSET and with Cahill has worked
strengthen the commercial viability of the company's overall operation. They
implemented rationalisation measures,including the closure of Tuam,which has
seen the workforce in CSET reduced from 2621 in 1984 to 1855 by the end of
1987. The Food business has been rationalised to a one plant configuration,
concentrating on branded business only. The shareholder has upped its stake
in the company considerably,from £6.5m in 1981 to £54m in 1984 and to £66m
in 1987,though still £9m short of its stated requirement and legally
authorised capital of £75m. Trading profits have improved from 5% of turnover
in 1985 to 10% in 1987,and net profit after interest inproved from 1% of
turnover to 5% over the same period. The operating and financial position of
the company has been strengthened and the short term outlook for the company
improved.
Further challenges lie ahead. Though the operating and financial position of
CSET has indeed been strengthened the rationalisation measures over the 70's
and 80's have had the effect of steadily increasing the company's strategic
dependence on the core sugar business. Sugar,which at one time in the 70's
went as low as 46% of total turnover,accounted for 75% of CSET turnover in
1987. Yet the EEC community is 150% self-sufficient in the commodity which
has major implications for CSET's future and this,as the Irish Times leader
writer pointed out on 18/Feb/87,places the company at a cross-roads in
its history as the 1980's draws to a close:
"It(CSET) is at a cross-roads because the EEC Commission will soon do for
sugar what it has recently done for beef,cereals and many other commodities.
Sugar production in the EEC is currently running at 150 per cent of the
Community's requirements. Sugar production continues to grow but sugar
consumption,mainly because of health fears,is not. The possibility of the
Commission deciding in favour of increased levies or reduced quotas-or both-
is considerable"
CSET in the late 80's faces the need to diversify away from its high level of
dependence on sugar. Nevertheless,the lessons learned from its last major
diversification in the 1960's have been burned deep into the culture and
strategic thinking of the company. In spite of the current sense of urgency
any major diversification will be undertaken only with extreme care.
The company is also moving ahead with its plans to concentrate its sugar
processing activity in a two plant configuration. This will involve the
closure of another of the four historic facilities,the Thurles sugar
processing activity. The FitzGerald administration that left office in
early 1987 was committed to policy of commercial vaibility for state
entreprise. There was growing support also within that administration for the
privatisation of companies like CSET. The policy of the incoming Fianna Fail
administration on both of these issue is still uncertain and ambiguous in
late 1988. Fianna Fail opposed the privatisation of state enterprise in the
1987 election campaign. In the same campaign the incumbent Minister for
Agriculture gave an election undertaking to the Thurles workforce that his
party would keep the plant,which is in his constituency,open if returned to
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office. However the company remains determined to press ahead quickly
towards a two plant configuration. The Fianna Fail administration itself has
embarked on a radical rationalisation of the public sector,with broad cross
party support in the Dail,in order to restore stability to the public
finances. Whatever about its pre-election stance the Minister's pledge now
seems at odds with the overall thrust of his Government's economic strategy
and with the prevailing sentiment within the country at large. Fianna Fail
have always been the party of economic pragmatism in Irish politics and the
Minister's pledge may now be quietly redeemed through the provision of some
viable alternative industry for the region. The next year or two should
provide some clearer signal as to just how strongly,and how permanently the
commercial ideology for public entreprise has taken root in the Irish
political and economic system. As far as Chris Comerford is concerned,
however,his company is looking forward to the 1990's with confidence,
regardless:
"(CSET) has survived the different roles and different jobs assigned to it
in every decade,and it will do the same in the nineties,whatever the
the Government decides"(quoted in the Sunday Independent,22/Nov/87).
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CASE STUDY - GOLDEN VALE COOP CREAMERIES LTD.
AND THE IRISH DAIRY INDUSTRY
This chapter presents the fourth,and final,case narrative and it brings
the data section of the dissertation to a close. The chapter covers the
historical evolution of the Irish dairy industry and it focuses in
particular on the genesis and strategic development of Golden Vale
Cooperative Creameries Ltd,one of the six largest processors in the
industry.
Introduction to Golden Vale Coop and the Dairy Industry
Golden Vale Cooperative Creameries Ltd is one of the big six producer-
cooperatives that have dominated the Irish dairy products industry since
the early 1970's. In 1985 it had a turnover of £141.4M in a f2B industry
which made it the 6th largest dairy coop and the 36th largest business
in Ireland. The company in the same year had over 7500 farmer
shareholders and 750 employees. Its main catchment area is in the south
west of the country serving counties Clare,Limerick and Cork. Its
headquarters and main processing facilities are located in the town of
Charleville(also known as Rathluirc) in north County Cork, close to the
Cork-Limerick county line.
The main activities of the company are dairy processing and store
trading. In 1985 it processed over 92M gallons of milk into 4.9k tonnes
of cheese,14.8k tonnes of butter and 36.4k tonnes of milk powder(both
for human and animal consumption). The company's main business
activities are derived from the major needs of their suppliers. Dairy
processing is the core activity but the company is also involved in
agricultural trading activities which include the supply and sale of
animal feeds,fertilisers and other inputs to the dairy farmer. Golden
Vale's trading outlets have mainly been located at branch creameries
and milk collection points.
Competition between the processors in the industry has been largely
confined to end products for sale on the home market. At various
stages in the company's history it has encountered competition for its
milk supply. This has involved it in so-called 'milk wars' with other
large processors. However,the long standing norms in the industry
have tended to restrain and discourage such competition for milk
supply. Most of the company's export sales have been channelled to date
through An Bord Bainne,the Irish Dairy Board and the industry's central
export marketing agency. These exports have been marketed under generic
Irish dairy product labels or they have been sold as commodities into
EEC intervention stocks under the CAP(Common Agricultural Policy)
The emergence of six large growth centres in the industry happened in
the early 70's. At that time the industry consolidated in order to scale
up to meet the challenges and oportunities presented by EEC entry.
In 1977 Golden Vale was the second largest dairy processor in the
industry in terms of turnover. However,events in the difficult 1980's
have led to some major changes in the relative ranking within the big 6:
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1987 1977 Capital
Expenditure
Turnover Rank (+%) Turnover Rank (1977-84)
Kerry 291M 1 (494) 49M 6 51M
Avonmore 257M 2 (278) 68M 4 51M
Waterford 228M 3 (240) 67M 5 49M
Mitchelstown 213M 4 (120) 97M 1 36M
Ballyclough 163M 5 (140) 68M 3 36M
Golden Vale 135M 6 (	 88) 72M 2 23M
Table 8.1. - The six biggest dairy processors in 1977 and 1987.
Employment among the big six rose marginally over the 1977-86
period from 7583 to 7672 but large rises in Kerry(+750) and
Avonmore(+292) were offset by contractions in Ballyclough(-70),
Mitchelstown(-112) and Golden Vale(-686).
The nature of the dairy industry
A special team,the Survey Team, was set up by the Lemass Government to
examine the affairs and activities of the industry in the early 1960's.
The report of this study group contained a description of some of the
special structural characteristics of this industry. Much of this
description has remained relevant up to the present. The following
selected extracts from the report provide a very useful introduction
to the industry in general.
Key position in the structure of Irish Agriculture:
"42. .In considering the importance of the Irish dairying industry,it is
necessary to have regard not only for the size of its output but
also the key position which it occupies in the structure of Irish
agriculture and the extent to which it is inter-related with other
agricultural entreprises. Dairying is in part the basis of the
largest item of agricultural production,cattle,since a high
proportion of the calves that mature into store animals in the
stock rearing and fattening areas are bred in the creamery areas.
It is no exaggeration to say that the economy of the beef
production areas is heavily dependent on the regular supply of
young cattle from the creamery counties"(p21).
Producer/processor relationship:
"73. .the milk producer and the creamery to which he supplies his milk
must be considered as a single unit rather than as two distinct
entreprises(which would be the normal practice in the case of a
manufacturer and a raw material supplier). In the creamery
industry,both producer and creamery have a common interest in
keeping the milk price as high as the economic running of the
creamery can possibly allow,whereas in most industries the
manufacturer endeavours to secure his raw material at the lowest
possible cost"(p34).
Competition for suppliers:
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"96. .For many years there has been an understanding between creamery
proprietors not to accept milk from one another's suppliers except
by mutual consent. This arrangement has been regarded by the
industry as essential to the proper organisation of creamery milk
supplies and in the best interests of the milk suppliers
themselves...
97. .This understanding is a restraint on competition and represents a
type of market sharing,which protects the less efficient creamery
and permits it to remain in business,when the normal circumstances
of free entreprise would not. Coupled with the price-support
arrangements.. it perpetuates widely-differing standards of
efficiency in the industry..It limits the normal operation of
economic forces,lessens the industry's dynamic and tends to keep
the structure unduly rigid..
98. .Weighty considerations are required to justify the continuation of
such a restriction. These considerations do exist and include the
following:-
(1) The creamery industry must purchase its raw material daily..
(so) if a creamery is to plan production rationally it must
be assured of continuity in its daily intake.
(2) If farmers were free to sell milk as and where they wished,
creameries that did not set high standards for milk quality
would gain at the expense of those that did. This would
militate against improvement in milk quality.
(3) The experience of the 1920's showed that regulation of the
market was necessary in the interests of all whose welfare is
involved in the industry. If creameries were free to compete
for milk there is a danger that competition would become
excessive,so inflating milk collection costs and inducing
creameries to pay more for milk than their capacity warranted.
While farmers,as milk producers,might gain from this in the
short term,in the long run,as owners of cooperative creameries
and as milk producers they would lose.
(4) Farmers can get financial accomodation from their local
creamery using future milk supplies as security...
(5) Effective control on milk transfers is necessary to the
organisation of large-scale bulk haulage or multi-can haulage
schemes.
(6) Dairying experts in many countries agree that regulation of
milk transfers is necessary and such regulation,in one form
or another,is operated in nearly all countries.
"99. .Considerations such as the foregoing justify the continuance of
restriction on milk transfers,but some mechanism is needed to
prevent the restriction becoming too rigid and causing hardship to
milk producers...
Seasonality of supply:
"111.The achievement of a high degree of plant utilisation in the
creamery industry involves difficulties not normally encountered
in other industries. The main limiting factor is the seasonality
of milk production;almost 60 per cent of the annual milk supply
is received in the four-month period May to August and only about
13 per cent in the five-month period November to March. The
creamery (manager) must gear his milk-handling capacity to his
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intake at the height of the milk season and this involves
considerable under-utilisation of capacity for most of the year..
The fact that the creamery (manager) must adjust his production
capacity to his raw material purchases-the level of which is not
controlled or fixed in advance-rather than vice-versa,also
militates against the intensive use of equipment"
Need to diversify production
"232.While emphasis has traditionally been on butter production,there
is a growing appreciation of the need to divert as much milk as
possible into products other than butter which for many years has
provided the least remunerative outlet for milk. The prices of
various dairy products are inter-related and where not controlled
are affected by supply and demand. It is necessary,therefore,to
have adequate capacity for the manufacture of non-butter products
so that the industry can take maximum advantage of short-term
fluctuations in the market prices of the different products. This
also involves maintaining at least a minimum volume of continuous
supply to retain a foothold in the markets..
Main phases in Golden Vale's history
Golden Vale Cooperative Creameries ltd. developed from a federation of
independent creameries formed in 1947 to manufacture and market
processed cheese. This in turn emerged from a dairy industry which by
the late 40's was dominated by the cooperative movement but which was
at that time highly fragmented.
1880-1947 Evolution of the basic character of the industry
Dairying has been a major activity in Irish agriculture for many
centuries. Up to the 1880's the production and processing of milk
was farm-based. Milk surplus to farm requirements was mostly converted
into butter. This butter was marketed in many ways. Some of it was sold
directly to local merchants and shopkeepers but the most common way was
to pack it in firkins and sell it on established butter markets,like the
Cork Butter Exchange,to merchants who then exported it to various
countries(Byrne et a1,1963). By 1883 the country was producing an
estimated 54000 tons of butter and exporting about 50% of
it(Lyons,1959).
It was the development of the mechanical cream-separator during the
1870's that made the large scale centralised production of butter a
possibility.Ireland was slow to adopt the creamery system.Early efforts
to develop proprietary creameries were sporadic and met with very
limited success. It was not until Sir Horace Plunkett introduced the
cooperative movement into Irish dairying that the creamery system really
became widely and firmly established within the country:
"Real progress was not made until the 1890's when Sir Horace Plunkett
introduced the co-operative system to the rural community;seeing that
the time was oportune and that milk was a suitable product around
which to build,he directed his efforts towards organising the farmers
in cooperative creameries"(Byrne et al.,1963;14).
After Sir Horace had overcome much initial resistance and sceptism,and
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had demonstrated success with his early establishments,the creamery
system expanded rapidily. By 1899 there were 374 cooperative
societies with 36683 members(Knapp,1964;13),mostly involved in dairy
processing.
Initially Plunkett and his associates began their work as a philantropic
effort to help certain local communities to help themselves in raising
their overall standard of living. As the work of the cooperators spread
to more and more parts of the country in the early 1890's it soon became
apparent that they were the potential catalysts for a major structural
transformation dairy industry nationwide and for a major socio-economic
movement throughout rural Ireland. In 1894 they set up the Irish
Agriculrural Organisation Society(IAOS) in order to establish their work
on a more formal basis. The purpose of the IAOS,as stated in the rules
of the society,were:
"To improve the condition of the agricultural population of Ireland by
teaching the principles and methods of cooperation as applicable to
farming and the allied industries,to promote industrial organisation
for any purposes which may appear to be beneficial,and generally to
counsel and advise those engaged in agricultural pursuits".
(quoted in Knapp,1964;9)
Plunkett had visualised that the IAOS itself would be replaced,as the
cooperative movement spread:
"In five years at the longest..our Society will no longer be required.
In its place,if our scheme works out,the farmers will have their own
body-their central Chamber of Agriculture,perhaps they will call it-
and through this body they will be able not only to safeguard the
general agricultural industry of Ireland,but also to attend to the
organisation of fresh societies.. ."(Annual Report of IAOS,1895).
In 1904,with 876 affiliated societies,the committee of the IAOS decided
that the time was right to turn control over to the member societies.
The rules of the IAOS were ammended to allow this to happen and the
committee was reconstituted to be elected on a provincial basis.
The blueprint for the activities of dairy cooperatives became
established from the beginning as the "joint purchase of farming
requirements and subsequently the joint sale of produce"(IAOS Annual
Report,1895).An early success which illustrated the power of cooperative
form of organisation in protecting the producers' interests was
described in 1897 Annual Report of the IAOS:
"These Societies have achieved a remarkable feat and have conferred a
permanent benefit on the farming community in bringing about the
dissolution of the Manure Manufacturers' Alliance,the body which was
virtually a ring of manufacturers to fix the minimum prices at which
chemical manures were to be sold...The result of the breaking up of
this ring has been that chemical manures are now being bought..at far
lower prices than they were ever sold before in Ireland"
One of the main activities on the trading side of the large cooperative
organisations in Ireland,to the present day,has been the supply of
fertiliser and feedstuffs to the producers at advantageous prices.
Furthermore,in 1898 the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society (IAWS) was
formed as a cooperative to carry on wholesale trading in agricultural
requirements,livestock and general agricultural produce.By 1985 the IAWS
had grown to a turnover of £88M with a staff of 250 employees.
The rapid growth in dairy cooperative societies in the 1890's convinced
Plunkett that the time was opportune for a major effort on a national
scale to improve the practice and productivity of Irish agriculture:
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"The new movement,six years after its initiation,had succeeded beyond
the most sanguine expectations of its promoters. All over the country
self-help was taking firm hold of the imagination of the people... The
time had come when a sound system of State aid to agriculture might be
fruitfully grafted on to this native growth of local effort and
self-reliance"(quoted in the Knapp,J.G.,1964;11)
Plunkett formed a committee of parliamentarians,comprising both
nationalists and Unionists,to advance the case for state involvement and
to try to determine what form that involvement could best take. This
committee became known as the Recess Committee because it had to conduct
its business largely during those periods in which the Westminister
Parliament was in recess.The Recess Committee reported to the Government
in 1896. As a direct result of their efforts a Department of Agriculture
and Technical Instruction(DATI) was eventually set up in 1899.
The intended nature of the relationship between the cooperative movement
and the State was clearly signposted in the report of the Committee.
"All through the Report it is enjoined that the new Department should
supplement the efforts of the voluntary associations but never attempt
to provide a substitute for them.."(Anderson,1935;97).
The relationship between the TAOS and the new DATI became difficult when
the TAOS became mainly dependent on a state subsidy for its own funding
needs. The subsidy was administered through the DATI and the "conditions
for obtaining the subsidy (became) steadily more onerous"(Knapp,1964;18)
leading Anderson(1935;132)to remark that the frustrations that came from
these restrictions "well-nigh killed all cooperative spirit and
enthusiasm in us who formed its staff". In 1908 the DATI withdrew the
subsidy and the IAOS,left to its own resourcefulness,enjoyed a new
period of vigour and independence. It attempted to secure its ongoing
funding from within the movement by operating a levy on all the
affiliated societies.This was never more than a partial success,however,
and this issue of funding and state support for the coordinating body
itself was to become a recurring problem.
The years between 1910 and 1919 saw the TAOS rise to the peak of its
influence and the Irish agricultural cooperative movement became the
centre of world-wide interest. The number of societies had exceeded 1000
by the early part of the decade. While this number did not expand
greatly up to 1920,the combined turnover of the societies rose
considerably from £3.6M in 1914 to £14.6M in 1920,a figure not to be
equalled again until 1944. Over 56%,or £8.2m,of this was in dairying
activities(Knapp,1964;25). As early as 1910 a major effort was made to
establish a national brand for Irish creamery butter to enable it to
command a premium price on the important UK market. While much of the
Irish creamery butter reaching the UK market at this time was of high
quality,there was also much of it that was inferior. This inferior
product was harming the general image and depressing the price.
Anderson(1935;185) described the thinking behind this early effort:
"Early in the year 1910,the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society
took a very important step in the direction of leveling up the quality
of the butter produced in the cooperative creameries to such a
standard as would permit a brand or label,guaranteeing its quality,to
be affixed to all that reached the required degree of excellence.. .The
text of the scheme itself describes it:..'The object of the scheme is
to establish a national brand for Irish creamery butter, of guaranteed
purity and uniform excellence of quality for the exclusive use of
selected cooperative creameries,affiliated to the IAOS, which are
prepared to comply with the rules and conditions herein set forth,
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which have been laid down by the creameries themselves and have been
approved by the Control Committee,in order that the product of
creameries participating in the Control may realize its full market
value and ultimately obtain such recognition as will secure special
classification in the markets of the United Kingdom".
This scheme lasted until 1924. It was allowed to lapse in the difficult
market conditions of the 1920's,but not before it had demonstrated its
value.The IAOS found that it was no longer able to carry on this work
and as the State did not step in so the scheme was discontinued.
Further attempts were made in the late 20's,and again in the mid 30's,to
coordinate the marketing of Irish butter exports,the first by the
cooperative movement and the second by the State. However,a generic
brand for Irish dairy produce was not successfully established on the
export front until An Bord Bainne(The Irish Dairy Board) was set up by
the Lemass administration in the early 60's to coordinate the export
marketing of the dairy industry. It was An Bord Bainne that launched
the now famous 'Kerrygold' brand as the generic brand for the industry
on all overseas markets.
Up to the 1914-18 war the exports of Irish butter to the UK continued at
a level of 40k tons per year. Between 1915 and 1919 there was a steep
decline from over 40k tons to around 17k tons in response to price
controls that kept the price low. However during the same period the
price of cheese soared on the UK market and the export of Irish cheese
rose from .25K tons to 15k tons in response(Byrne et a1,1962;15).While
having a basic flexibilty to change quickly from butter to cheese
production,the industry as a whole was not sufficiently diversified and
flexible. It was overdependent on the markets for these two
commodities. Prices fell dramatically on the UK market in the early
twenties. The War of Independence further increased the difficulties of
the industry by disrupting business and further depressing demand for
Irish goods in general in the UK. Irish exports of dairy products
dropped considerably,especially exports of cheese which quickly returned
to the low pre-1914 level. The industry and the IAOS remained in the
doldrums until 1926 when Dr. Henry Kennedy became the new Secretary of
the IAOS.
In November 1922,the first year of the new Free State administration,the
Minister for Agriculture,Patrick Hogan,appointed a commission to study
the depressed state of agriculture and to offer recommendations that
could provide a basis for its expansion and prosperity. The Commission's
report,which was submitted to the Government in 1924,provided a
contemporary analysis of the state of the dairy industry,its structure
and its prospects,as they stood in the early years of the new Irish
Free State:
"19. .We firmly believe in the co-operative system,as calculated to
promote better business methods,and,we consider that the State
may,with advantage,spend substantial sums in the teaching of
practical cooperation..
47. .The present system of marketing farm produce is wasteful and
uneconomic,and a great extension of cooperative marketing is
desireable.If farmers were to combine to sell their produce in
larger quantities than at present,many of the economies inherent
in large scale transactions could be effected. .We merely wish to
draw attention to the method of 'self-help through mutual help' as
a possible solution to the problem of marketing agricultural
commodities..
83....education in the true spirit and practice of cooperation is a
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proper case for State aid..
84. .In arriving at (our) conclusions., it has been our object to
discover methods of control (over State aid) which will ensure
efficiency without unduly hampering the discretion and initiative
of the cooperative movement. We fully realize the immense
advantages of unrestrained voluntary effort,and we wish to give
them the fullest scope.
87... .In the past a substantial number of societies have been promoted and
operated with insufficient regard to sound financial practice.A
negligible quantity of share capital has been subscribed by
members,but the bulk of it has been borrowed from banks and
secured by joint and several guarantees.In practice,this means
that the burden of financial responsibility is borne by a few
'strong men'and the greater part of the members have no real
financial responsibility toward the society. In practice,moreover,
societies have been too willing both to give and receive credit..
We consider this laxity in finance a negation of the true purpose
of cooperation..
89.. It is well-known that the unbusinesslike methods of many
societies are evidenced by the imperfection of their accounts..
95. .The fact that we find ourselves compelled to make these
recommendations leads irresistibly to the conclusion that
cooperation is imperfectly understood and practised in Ireland.."
It is clear in the above extracts from the Commission's report
that many of the problems that have beset the cooperative movement and
tha dairy industry over the years were already very much in evidence at
the time the new State was founded.
Much had already been achieved in the area of technical education for
the dairy industry through the efforts of the IAOS and the DATI by the
time the Irish Free State came into being.In 1886 the Commisioners of
National Education had extended their courses in home dairying for women to
include practical instruction for men in the working of creameries. In
1894 special courses were initiated to be held during the low production
winter months to train men for positions as creamery managers. About the
same time the courses for the women were updated to allow some of the
girls to be trained in creamery butter-making. When the DATI was formed
in 1900 it extended these training activities and introduced a scheme to
award certificates of competence to creamery managers who successfully
completed an approved programme of professional training(Byrne et
a1,1962;17).In the wake of the 1922 Commission's report and through the
efforts of the IAOS and the Irish Creamery Managers' Association(ICMA)
a programme for the training of creamery managers was set up in
University College Cork,where 4 Faculty of Dairy Science was set up in
1926.There was,however,one major weakness in this impressive training
effort as Knapp(1964;31) has pointed out:
"Unfortunately,the emphasis was placed upon technical education and
little or no instruction was provided in business subjects or in
agricultural cooperation".
This difficulty still remained on through to the 1960's as the report of
the Survey Team on the Dairy Products Industry(Byrne et a1,1963;119) has
clearly shown. A significant development in 1924 was the passing of the
Dairy Produce Act which according to Byrne et al(1963;17) was:
"..a comprehensive measure covering all creamery operations and
designed to ensure cleanliness and freedom from contamination at every
stage of dairy produce manufacture. It provided,inter alia,for
registration of creamery premises, prescribed conditions of
cleanliness and order,standards of water-supply and equipment,
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technical qualifications of creamery personnel,inspections of premises
and plant and quality control on the dairy produce at all stages of
production and marketing"
This piece of legislation has made a significant contribution in the
establishment and maintenance of a high standard of quality of dairy
produce.
In the expansionary period that the dairy industry enjoyed up to the
early 1920's the number of creamery premises,both cooperative and
proprietary,proliferated,with no overall industry coordination. By 1926
there were 580 central and auxiliary creameries in the Irish Free State,
of which 400 were c000peratives. Of the 180 proprietary creameries, 144
of them were controlled by the Condensed Milk Company(CMC). One of the
major shareholders in this company was the large British wholesale firm
of Lovell&Christmas. This connection gave the CMC favoured access to
the important UK market and an distinct competitive advantage vis-a-vis
the cooperatives in any competition for supply(Bolger,1977;216).When the
post-War depression arrived there was a situation of over-capacity in
the industry. Competition for milk supply,or so-called 'milk wars' ,broke
out,mainly between the cooperative and the proprietary creameries,but
often,unfortunately from the IAOS's point of view,between the coops
themselves,with "the stronger often tending to encroach on the supply
area of the weaker societies"(Bolger,1977;205).The industry as a whole
was suffering from excessive capital outlay,inflated overheads and
running costs at the expense of the producer who was suffering in his
milk price.There was clearly a need for rationalisation in the industry
to put the whole industry on a sounder footing. Indeed,by 1926 as the
milk war came to a head the future role of the cooperative movement in
the industry was in serious doubt,as Hoctor has recorded(1971;153-4):
...many creamery societies found themselves going deeper and deeper
into debt,and when refused credit by the banks,they appealed to the
government for aid.Towards the end of 1926 the trade war reached its
climax and the outlook for cooperative dairying was dismal indeed..
A decision had to be taken as to whether the law of the jungle should
be allowed to prevail.If allowed,the result might well be the
extinction of cooperative creameries and the transfer of the industry
to British capitalist concerns".
The intervention of Dr.Henry Kennedy,who became Secretary of the IAOS in
1926,was crucial. Kennedy was a brother-in-law of the no-nonsense
Minister for Agriculture in the first Free State administration, Patrick
Hogan.Working in tandem Hogan and Kennedy brought about a reorganisation
of the dairy industry which in Bolger's(1977;144)view "saved the
cooperative movement from disaster,if not extinction" and secured for
the movement its central role in the future development of the industry.
Kennedy persuaded the Government to fund a rationalisation programme for
the industry which involved the setting up of the state-sponsored Dairy
Disposal Company(DDC) in 1927. The DDC bought up most of the proprietary
creameries and also took over cooperative creameries that were in
severe financial difficulties.It closed down those that were moribund
or unnecessary and continued to manage those that were viable until
arrangements could be made for an orderly transfer of the latter to
cooperative ownership. The Condensed Milk Company, the largest
proprietary concern in the industry at the time,had by 1927 grown weary
of the milk wars in spite of its advantage. It was easily enticed to
sell its interests to the DDC.The Government brought further order to
the industry by enacting the 1928 Creamery Act which gave the Minister
for Agriculture the power to control,by licencing,the establishment of
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any new creameries.As well as being a vehicle for closures and
consolidations the DDC afforded a means for extending the creamery
system,for both social and economic reasons,into parts of the country
not previously served.In the 1943 Creameries(Aquisition) Act the Dairy
Disposal Company was empowered to purchase compulsorily the remaining
proprietary creameries. At this point the industry came totally under
the control of the cooperative movement with residual,and intendedly
transient,state involvement through the Dairy Disposal Company.
With major rationalisation of production and processing well underway
Kennedy and the IAOS turned their energies towards the finance and
marketing areas.In 1927,under a great deal of personal lobbying from
Kennedy,the Government set up the Agricultural Credit Corporation as a
state agency to provide the much needed development capital for Irish
agriculture. This capital was not being made available in sufficient
quantity through the existing commercial channels.They then turned to
marketing. In 1928 a new federal organisation,the Irish Associated
Creameries Ltd(IAC),was formed to market Irish creamery butter in the
UK. The new federation was set up through a 'binding,terminable and
renewable contract' which was to run initially for three years(Knapp,
1964;32). The idea was that all butter produced by the members of the
federation for export to Great Britain would be marketed through the
IAC. This offered all the advantages of pooled and concentrated
marketing resources and economies of scale that such a c000rdinated and
unified effort should entail.After many meetings and an intensive
sign-up campaign roughly 80% of the cooperative creameries joined the
scheme. Unfortunately this attempt to market a generic Irish brand in
the UK, like its predecessor in 1910,did not last. According to
Knapp(1964;33) it was a "noble experiment" that might have survived in
less difficult economic circumstances:
"Unfortunately,the great hopes of the IAOS for the IAC were not to be
realized.Not all of the cooperative creameries joined in the effort
and it was not able to achieve the spectacular results that had been
anticipated.The scheme was struck a heavy blow in 1930 by the fall of
dairy prices in England-and rather than attempt a re-sign up the
organisation was discontinued in 1930"
In spite of all the progress that had been made around quality there was
still insufficient standardisation in process and product to the degree
necessary to successfully market the produce of many different
cooperative entreprises under the one generic brand or label.
Furthermore,the lack of cooperative solidarity undermined the initiative
and was a major dissappointment to the cooperative idealists.
Bolger(1977;220) was much less generous than Knapp in his assessment of
the IAC failure:
"The IAC affair was the one really disgraceful episode in the
cooperative story.The debacle took place when there were few
extenuating circumstances. .There was a Minister and a Department of
Agriculture very favourably disposed to them.But most of all,
cooperative idealists took it particularly hard that the creameries
showed such disloyalty and disarray in the face of falling markets and
the tough times that were so obviously ahead".
The cooperative form of organisation,it seems,was viewed by many of
those involved as mainly a pragmatic expedient that was suited to the
operation of Irish creameries.There were still many in the movement who
were hot sufficiently educated in the principles of cooperation or
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imbued with the cooperative ideology. This was to be an ongoing problem
right up to the present day. As lately as 1987 a radio magazine
programme, 'Live Line' on RTE radio 1, found the question of 'how
cooperative are the cooperatives' to be alive and well as an issue of
topical interest and general concern.
The years between 1930 and 1948 were particularly difficult years for
the industry. There was a sharp decline in butter prices on the British
market between 1929 and 1931 as the great depression took hold. The
early 1930's heralded in a new era of protectionism in western
economies. The arrival of the first Fianna Fail government in the Free
State in 1932,an administration committed to a policy of economic
self-sufficiency for Ireland,signalled a major change in government
policy towards the industry. Price support measures were introduced in
the 1932 Dairy Produce Act to maintain the price of butter on the home
market.Under this legislation imports of dairy produce were prohibited
except under licence and levies collected on all creamery-made butter
were used to subsidise butter exports.When the 'economic war' with
Britain broke out over DeValera's with-holding of the land annuities,
Britain subjected Ireland's dairy products along with all her other
Irish imports to an ad valorem duty of 20%,later raising it to 40%.
Creameries were encouraged to diversify by special export subsidies made
avaliable for cheese, condensed milk, dried milk and cream.
One of the initiatives taken during this period was the establishment by
the Minister for Agriculture,Dr. James Ryan,in 1936 of a Butter
Marketing Committee to coordinate and organise the export marketing of
creamery butter. The approach of the committee was to encourage Irish
butter exporters to link up with British importers of their own choice
who were known to be willing to pay a good price for Irish butter if
they could be guaranteed a steady supply.There was some initial
wrangling with the cooperatives about representation on the committee
and there was a certain amount of discontent and distrust of growing
state involvement in the operation of the industry(Bolger,1977;222).
The committee was just getting into gear when the Second World War
broke out and altered the whole marketing environment.During the
'emergency', as this period came to be known in neutral Ireland,there
were many difficulties for the cooperative movement and the industry.
There were scarcities of supply,fuel shortages and a serious outbreak of
foot and mouth disease during this period. Furthermore butter was
rationed, prices were controlled and compulsory tillage was in
operation. During the war years the milk supply to the creameries
remained low at around 130M gallons for most of the 1940's. This was
just 30% higher that the level operating in 1922(Bolger,1977,231&223).
The industry went through some significant changes during this 1930-48
period. The process of rationalisation that had begun in 1927 with the
establishment of the Dairy Disposal Company continued. The industry's
throughput of milk may have risen by only 30% between 1922 and 1948 but
the share of that being processed by creameries and by cooperative-owned
creameries increased considerably. In addition,many of the cooperatives
expanded their stores trading activities so that there was considerable
growth in overall cooperative turnover over these two decades.
Furthermore,there was considerable consolidation of processing capacity
within the'industry. The difficult market conditions during these years
left many marginal operators in a weak state and vulnerable to takeover.
Consolidations through take-over were actively encouraged by the IAOS:
"Henry Kennedy disapproved of the idea of creameries at every
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crossroads and set out to build on the foundations of existing strong
societies,encouraging the big to absorb the smaller,weaker units and
achieve a size where they could be really effective in processing and
marketing"(Bolger,1977;225)
Though the industry was yet to enter its major growth phase,a seven-fold
increase in milk processing throughput over the 1950-80 timeframe, yet
the pattern for that future growth was already clearly emerging from
the developments in this period.As Knapp(1964;36) described it:
"There was a marked consolidation of societies and many made gains in
operating efficiency and in financial strength under the inspiring
leadership of such able general managers as P.J.Power of the
Ballyclough Cooperative Creamery;the late Eamonn Roche of the
Mitchelstown Cooperative Agricultural and Dairy Society,Ltd.;the late
M.McNamara of the Drinagh Cooperative Creamery,Ltd.;and the late
E.Maher of Dungarvan Cooperative Creamery,Ltd...Of particular interest
was the expansion of general purpose societies,which combined
marketing with a business in agricultural goods.In 1920 only 13 per
cent of the turnover of creameries was represented by agricultural
goods. .by 1940	 it was 32 per cent.."
The number of creameries was down from 274 in 1929 to 193 in 1951 but
turnover had increased from £4.7M in 1931 to £23.8M in 1951. The 46
largest cooperatives together accounted for just over 60% of this
figure while the five largest -Mitchelstown, Ballyclough, Dungarvan,
Killeshandra and Drinagh- accounted for over 20%. These larger
societies were growing faster than the industry average over the 30's
and 40's. In 1985 Ballyclough,Mitchelstown and Dungarvan(now Waterford)
were in the top six and were ranked 5,4 and 3 respectively, while
Killeshandra ranked 9th and Drinagh 11th.
By the late 1940's the industry was poised for major growth. In 1948 a
New Zealand grassland expert stated publicly after a visit to the
country that Ireland's grasslands were producing the minimum possible
under an Irish sky. With the help of the Marshall Aid programme various
schemes were initiated to redress this situation.The soil had become
overworked and undernourished during the war years.A technical
breakthrough at this time was the emergence of ground limestone as
suitable and economic fertiliser for grassland. A transport subsidy was
used to encourage the liberal use of ground limestone by enabling
farmers,wherever they lived,to attain it at the same cost. The Friesan
breed was introduced into the country at this time and proved successful
in improving milk yields. Various land reclamation and disease
eradication programmes were undertaken.A new state-sponsored
research institute,An Foras Taluntais,was proposed for the provision
research backup to the industry. The extension of rural electrification
to all parts of the country made milking machine technology feasible.
This was at a time when agricultural labour was becoming scarce as the
flight from the land and emigration rose to heights unprecedented since
the foundation of the state. The widespread adoption of the milking
machine was a major breakthrough in production because it enabled the
farmer to milk an expanded herd with minimal labour and have more time
free from the milking activity to concentrate on other related farm
activities and to improve the efficiency of his overall production
system. The milking machine,if managed properly,promoted hygiene and
consistently high quality and increased his return from each gallon of
milk. Expansion In the processing side(outside the farm gate)was heavily
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dependent on expansion in production(inside the farm gate). This in
turn could only come from increasing the size of the national dairy herd
and/or increasing the milk yield per cow, and it was widely believed in
the late 40's that there was considerable room for both.
Golden Vale - Formation and Early Growth 1947-68 
In the late 40's,as we have seen,the industry was poised for expansion.
By this time also,a number of industry leaders had emerged and these
were continuing to grow at a faster rate than the industry.The five big
players at the time were Mitchelstown, Ballyclough, Dungarvan,
Killeshandra and Drinagh and their emergence as industry leaders was
attributed by Knapp,as we noted earlier,to the inspiring leadership of
their general managers. At this formative period for the industry as a
whole the quality and vision of the creamery manager,it seems,was a
critical factor in determining the future growth centres for the
industry. As one of the interviewees,a former Secretary of ICOS said:
"How good the creamery manager was determined to a large extent
the prosperity of the local community...the influence of the creamery
manager was such that to a large extent the reason why some coops grew
and others did not was directly related to the abilities of these
people"
Another critical factor was the concentration of dairy farming
and in this the areas around Cork, Limerick, and Waterford in the south
of the country had a distinct advantage. Dairying was less developed in
other parts of the country and least of all in the West. Mitchelstown,
Ballyclough and Drinagh were all County Cork creameries and Dungarvan
served County Waterford. Killeshandra was the exception in the big five
being located in the northern county of Cavan.
Golden Vale Cooperative Creameries,as it is known today,did not develop
from one of the big established centres of the late 40's. It was formed
in 1947 largely on the initiative of Captain David John Barry,who was at
the time the Secretary of the Irish Creamery Managers Association. The
researcher was fortunate enough to secure an interview with Captain
Barry,now in his eighties,and the following description of the formation
Golden Vale,"now part of the history of the Irish dairy industry" as the
leader-writer of 'The Kerryman' put it on the 6/Nov/81,is in the
interviewee's own words:
"The circumstances were these. Around 1933/34 the head of Mitchelstown
was a man called Eamon Roche,a man of outstanding initiative,a member
of the Dail who had fought against the Treaty(Note:Captain Barry was
also on the anti-Treaty side).He investigated the processed cheese
business on the Continent and got a license to manufacture it. He had
a monopoly up to the time that Golden Vale started in 1948.
Most of the creameries within a 15 to 20 mile radius of Charleville
were selling milk to Ballyclough for the manufacture of milk powder
and chocolate crumb,to Rathmore for the manufacture of chocolate
crumb,to the Condensed Milk Company in Limerick for the manufacture of
condensed milk and to Mitchelstown for the manufacture of cheese.The
prices being paid by some of the larger processors were somewhat
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greater than it was possible for any of the relatively smaller butter
or cheddar cheese making creameries to afford. The farmers supplying a
number of the creameries within a 15 mile radius of Charleville
began organising to send lorryloads of milk to the large processors to
get the better prices.
In 1945 I became Secretary of the Irish Creamery Managers Association
and automatically then also Secretary of the Irish Cheese
Manufacturers Association for the manufacturers of cheddar cheese. I
convened a meeting for Charleville in 1947,in my capacity as Secretary
of the Cheese Manufacturers Association,at which concern was expressed
regarding the potential loss of milk supplies to some of the large
processors,i.e.Ballyclough,Mitchelstown etc. The Secretary(the
interviewee himself) suggested forming a federation of cheese
manufacturers to establish a processed cheese factory and expressed
the opinion that a license could be obtained from the Department of
Agriculture. The creamery managers present requested that they be
allowed to put this suggestion before their respective committees and
to arrange to have their chairmen at the next meeting. The next
meeting was held shortly afterwards and it was unanimously decided to
make representations with regard to a license and to ascertain the
approximate cost of buildings and process cheese-making plant. At
a subsequent meeting it was decided that a total of £30000 would be
subscribed in paid-up share capital.
We approached the IAOS and Kennedy said that we were daft and he
refused to support it. Mitchelstown were paying £1000 per annum into
the IAOS (whereas) the smaller cooperatives were paying maybe £20 per
annum. Two professors from UCC,Professor Lyons(Dairy Technology) and
Professor McGrath(Engineering) did up the plans and specifications.
The rules for the federation were drawn up by Owen Binchy and myself.
We could not affiliate to the IAOS because of the 1927 episode(the IAC
episode)-feelings were (still) high. We affiliated to 'an Irish
cooperative society'.
The plans were provided by Lyons and McGrath and the assistance
of Mr.Sean Moylan,Minister for Lands(in the DeValera administration of
1944-48), was most essential.Moylan was a native of Kilmallock in
North Cork(6 miles from Charleville) where he had been active in his
IRA days. His representations and those of Donacha O'Brien TD for West
Limerick were very important. We had to use this to counteract Roche
(of Mitchelstown). Roche was in the IRA and had taken part in a hunger
strike in England,a hunger strike during the Civil War. We felt that
he would go to Dev to block it,he was well in with Dev,but Dev would
not let the monopoly go on forever. We got the license from the
Minister. The factory was opened in 1948 by Mr.James Dillon,Minister
for Agriculture(in the first interparty coalition government)".
In all twelve cheese producing cooperatives federated initially to
form Golden Vale Food Products Ltd, located at Charleville in north
County Cork. As Golden Vale grew and incorporated more member
creameries,first through an expansion of the federation and later
through amalgamation,these twelve founder members came to be known
within the group as the 'twelve apostles'.These founder members were
Ballyagran, Drombanna, Effin, Feenagh, Freemount, Glin, Herbertstown,
Kantoher, Kilmallock, Milford, Newmarket and Shandrum.At that time
around a third of the milk supply of these creameries was being used for
the production of natural cheese for the home market and for export.
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The quality of the milk was not always of a sufficiently high standard
for cheese and the end product was not always first grade. The
downgraded volume was often 5 or 6% of total output. When blended
with first grade cheese and reprocessed,however,the output was
marketable as processed cheese. Furthermore,processed cheese had by this
time achieved a high degree of consumer acceptance in the Irish market.
It had made considerable inroads into the market for natural cheese
since Mitchelstown first introduced it onto the Irish market some years
earlier. By setting up Golden Vale Food Products the founder members of
the federation had established their own production capacity for
processed cheese,along with a marketing organisation through which to
channel much of their other cheese production as well. In this way they
were able "to improve their profitability and to take (themselves) out
of the grips of a small number of cheese brokers who were giving them a
miserable price".This in turn allowed them to pay a better price for
milk and so protect their milk pool.However they still continued to
operate independently in the manufacture of their butter and in the
disposal of their excess whole,and skim,milk.
This period in the late forties and early fifties is remembered in the
history of the cooperative movement as a period in which there was a
burst of federal activity.Close on the heels of the Golden Vale
initiative another major federal development took place in 1951 when 38
cooperative creameries in the Carrick-on-Suir area joined with a number
of English capitalist interests to form a kind of federation,called the
Miloko Cooperative Society Ltd.,for the manufacture of chocolate crumb.
The new federation recorded a turnover of £5857 and a loss of £974 on an
asset base of £52414,funded by £15377 in share capital and £29288 in
bank overdraft, in its first year of operation in 1948. By 1955 it had
grown to a turnover of £436694 and a profit of £5396 with assets of over
a quarter of a million pounds, £50578 in share capital and £131696
in overdraft. The first two managers at the helm of the new federation
were essentially technical men. Magrath,the first manager,"had made
processed cheese before in England and in New Zealand. He was a
production manager more than a people manager" as one interviewee
recalled. After a successful performance in 1949,in which the
business appeared to be taking off,the turnover and profitability of the
business fell in 1950. Magrath was then replaced by John O'Mahony and he
remained at the helm until 1956. Like Magrath before him,0'Mahony's
expertise was mainly technical. By the mid-fifties it was felt that the
business was not developing to its potential under his leadership
and O'Mahony was replaced by Dave O'Loughlin in 1956. O'Loughlin
remained as general manager of the federation until his untimely death
in 1971.Dave O'Loughlin is the legendary figure in the history of Golden
Vale. He is generally credited with the main developments that set the
company on the road from being a small joint venture of 12 cheese-making
creameries,with a turnover of less than half a million,to becoming
number two in the industry by the mid 70's with a turnover of over £70M.
O'Loughlin's father was the manager of one of the federated creameries
so that Dave had a background in the industry. He had an MSc in dairy
science and had been a senior representative with a dairy engineering
firm,that supplied plant to creameries,before joining the federation.
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The O'Loughlin Years 1956-68 - Golden Vale's Rise to Prominence 
O'Loughlin's first venture as the head Golden Vale Food Products was to
develop an engineering division. He began this venture in 1956. In that
year the turnover from engineering was £37000. By 1958 it reached over
£166000,and by 1974 it had become a £3M-plus business. There had been a
small engineering activity at Golden Vale before he took over as general
manager but "O'Loughlin developed this at a fierce rate,a rate of
knots".He did this by being able to exploit oportunities that were
being created by changes taking place in the industry at that time.
One senior executive described the early nature of this engineering
business and its development in the context of the time as follows:
"In 1956 Golden Vale Engineering was established doing various bits and
pieces of stainless steel installations. There was a change of
regulation concerning pasteurisation so that stainless steel had to be
used for pumps,tanks,piping etc.,throughout the whole industry.Also,
there was a little bit of building for the future- Mitchelstown,
Ballyclough, the Condensed Milk Company at Landsdowne-those places
were building for spray-drying of skim-milk powder and/or full cream
milk powder. That gave oportunities for rapid development of the
engineering idea. They got a few agencies for valves and pumps and
they started fabrication. It grew like topsy for a few years.The major
chunks of significant processing equipment were imported so they never
got into this specialised area.Engineering developed away throughout
the early 60's and had involvement in cheese-making plants. There was
also a lot of reequipment of cheese factories because of new
regulations"
Captain David Barry,the man on whose initiative Golden Vale Food
Products was set up in the first place felt that the development of an
engineering capability should have been "set up separately as a national
effort (ie.a central engineering resource to benefit the whole dairy
cooperative movement) but the managers wanted it kept within the
federation".Captain Barry gave this as an example of a central tension
that ran right throughout the cooperative movement,the tension between
parochial interests and cooperative ideals.
The three decades between 1950 and 1980 saw a major expansion in dairy
production at the farm level with the national milk pool available for
further processing into manufactured dairy products rising from 130M
gallons in late 40's to 860M gallons by the late 70's. This change had a
significant impact on the development of the industry as a whole and on
its evolving structure. It came in three waves which more or less ran
into each other and gave rise to an unrelenting expansion up to 1978.
The first wave came in the 1948-58 period. The industry during this
period emerged from its contracted and entrenched position of the war
years when the level of milk production was "the lowest possible under
an Irish sky". The availability of a plentiful supply of relatively
inexpensive fertiliser,the growing adoption of the milking machine, the
development of infrastructure especially road improvements and the
extension of rural electrification, developments in farm mechanisation
generally and the spread of motorised transport with cheap fuel,
developments in the education of farmers and the establishment of a
dedicated national research back-up, all contributed to a growing
confidence among producers in their industry and its potential future
and to a gradual but steady increase in milk production. This expansion
was accelerated in the climate created by the Programmes for Economic
Expansion in the 1958-68 period and then accelerated further by
Ireland's anticipated and eventual entry into the EEC in 1972.
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At the farm level producers became more specialised in dairying,a
development aided particularly by the widespread adoption of the milking
machine as well as by the other infrastructural developments mentioned
above.At the level of the individual creamery this development had two
effects.Firstly the level of the milk supply from their shareholders and
traditional suppliers increased beyond their capacity to process
it. Secondly,as the dairy farmers became more specialised they tended to
decrease their calve and pig rearing activities and had less use for the
skim milk that the butter-making creameries normally returned to them.
The creamery manager came under increasing pressure from his suppliers
to find outlets for disposing of excess whole and skim milk supplies.
For many of the smaller creameries this meant a reliance on the larger
processors like Ballyclough. However the larger processors gave
preferential treatment to their own shareholders and traditional
suppliers. Non-affiliated creameries had to be satisfied with a quota
from the larger processor which usually did not cover their full output
and which came with terms more favourable to the processor than to the
supplier. The creameries within the federraticin "were imNolved in trying
to get rid of milk other than through processed cheese.The 12 creameries
were dependent on Ballyclough and Ballyclough was only giving them a
quota so there was still much surplus to be taken care of.Inevitably
they turned towards doing their own processing". The federation, under
O'Loughlin's leadership began to expand their processing capabilities in
the early 60's. A grading system introduced by the Department of
Agriculture around this time to improve the quality and consistency of
Irish cheese in the marketplace meant that cheese making became rather
difficult for the small cheese-maker who did not have the volume
necessary to keep up with the technology. So Golden Vale established a
central facility for the production of natural cheese in 1960. Then,in
1962,0'Loughlin took the first small,but significant,step towards
diversification when he invested in a skim-milk powder processing
facility,designed around a Silke-Borg drier,at the central Charleville
site.
At this time in the early 60's there was a general feeling of momentum
in the industry,a feeling of an industry really on the move.
Irish Milk Powder Exports Ltd. ,a small cooperative marketing agency,was
set up in 1959 by Ballyclough,Dungarvan and Mitchelstown to market their
output of powdered milk products. They were joined later by the Dairy
Disposal Company and in 1962 by Golden Vale when O'Loughlin diversified
into the powder area. By this time the combined volume was large enough
for Irish Milk Powder Exports Ltd. to coordinate the marketing of Irish
milk powder in Britain through association with the giant Unigate
company. Unigate,like a number of other foreign concerns,already had
long associations with the Irish dairy processing sector.During the
self-sufficiency era,when the Irish market was heavily protected with
tarrifs,this company and others maintained their access to the Irish
market by licensing the manufacture of a range of their products to the
larger Irish coops. These links were strengthened in the late 40's when
the first interparty government came into power and the industry became
accessible to foreign investment. For many of the UK concerns that
invested in the industry in the late 40's and early 50' the immediate
attraction was the strategic access to sources of supply outside the
UK in a country with a declared policy of neutralty. Companies like
Unigate,Cadburys,Bordens and Rowntree Mackintosh had been severely
affected by the restrictions and rationing on milk that operated in
Britain during the War and were anxious to spread their risk for the
future.When the self-sufficiency policy was officially abandoned in
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the late 50's,not only was the industry made more accessible to foreign
capital but foreign investment was actively sought and encouraged
for export-oriented projects through export tax relief and other such
incentives.By the early 1960's these companies,and others like Glaxo,
were an important element in the expansion of dairy processing capacity
in the industry,often through the mechanism of joint-venture with large
cooperatives. Ballyclough's joint ventures with Unigate and Rowntree
Mackintosh,and Waterford's links with Unigate were among the more
prominent examples of this development.
In 1961 the Butter Marketing Committee was replaced as the central
marketing coordinator for Irish butter by An Bord Bainne,the new
semi-state agency set up during the First Programme for Economic
Expansion to intensify dairy export marketing efforts and to accelerate
export expansion.One of the first major efforts of the new agency was to
develop and establish a generic brand for Irish creamery butter on the
important UK market. Under the leadership of Tony O'Reilly (later to
become Managing Director of Comhluct Siuicre Eireann Teo.) An Bord
Bainne achieved a successful launch for the Kerrygold brand and moved
Irish dairy products into a higher quality/price segment in the
marketplace. The sector was gearing up quickly at this time for entry
into the EEC. When Ireland's first application was turned down along
with that of Britain the Lemass administration concentrated on securing
free access to the important UK market as an interim step. This was
achieved through the terms of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of
1965. Free access to the British market and the expectation that EEC
entry would be achieved before the end of the decade created within the
industry a climate of confidence for further investment. All in all,the
industry was characterised,at the time,by a pervading sense of flux and
momentum as the following description by a senior executive of Golden
Vale graphically portrayed:
"..there was a hell of a development in the Dairy Industry generally.
Volumes were increasing and ..there was a big drive to add value,to
upgrade the industry and at that time you had the formation of An Bord
Bainne..Bord Bainne gave a big impetus and there were probably a few
significant people who gave a lead. Power of Ballyclough was regarded
as the 'Dean of the Industry'.Godsil went to Rathmore,to Cadbury's.
There was a background,there were people who gave a lead,and economic
circumstances- 'the rising tide i (note:this is a reference to Lemass's
favourite metaphor to describe his expansionary economic strategy.The
full expression was that 'the rising tide lifts all boats'). .Round
about this time there was a surge of forward thinking...The managers
were developing the thinking. .An element of credit must go to
Davy-John Barry(Capt. Barry,founder of Golden Vale and Secretary of
the Irish Creamery Managers Association at the time) for this. He
encouraged them to go on Irish Management Institute courses and
encouraged them to go on overseas trips in the late 50's.This was a
real eye opener to some of them. They had an oportunity to see what
was happening in Denmark,even in England. This accelerated and
encouraged their thinking."
The new outward-looking empiricism that was developing throughout the
national socio-economic life in the Lemass era was clearly reflected in
the change in outlook developing within the dairy industry generally at
this time.
Golden Vale expanded under O'Loughlin throughout the 60's in all of its
major product lines. Turnover increased by 473% from just under £.55M to
almost £2.6M in the 1960-66 period. The 1966 Annual Report highlighted
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the growing demand for cheese products on the domestic and export front,
and the winning by Golden Vale of the "accolade for the best European
Cheddar Cheese at the World's Cheddar Cheese Contest in Wisconsin".It
reported on the continued growth in the Dairy Engineering Department
that necessitated an extension of facilities to cope with rising demand
and oportunities. Not only was the general expansion in the Dairy
Industry creating oportunities for Golden Vale Engineering but the
company was "awarded major industrial contracts from Cork Distillers and
Mineral Water Distributors Ltd.," which were cited as evidence of "the
high quality of our stainless steel products,allied to the unique
technical and marketing skill of the personnel" in this area. The report
also highlighted the commissioning of additional milk drying capacity in
1966 as "against a background of increasing milk yields,and conscious of
the necessity to maintain a consistently high return for every gallon
of milk received,the Board of Golden Vale continued to endorse its
established policy of active diversification".
The oportunities opened up by Golden Vale's diversification into the
skim-milk powder business enabled O'Loughlin to offer the benefits of
federation to a wider number of cooperatives,including those that were
not in cheese production by the mid 60's. He also sought to extend the
federation at this time to secure Golden Vale's future in an industry
that was beginning to undergo a significant change in structure. In the
mid 60's the final shape that this change was to take was still
uncertain. The industry was in flux and 'up for grabs'. Three important
reports on the industry,all commissioned by the Minister for
Agriculture,were published during the 1962-68 period. The Government
was looking to the dairy sector to play a major role in their overall
economic strategy for export-led expansion of the economy,and it was
anxious to strengthen the industry's overall structure and to improve
its international competitiveness. The three reports that the Government
commissioned were the Survey Team Report(1963) on the 'Dairy Products
Industry',the Knapp Report(1964) on 'An Appraisement of Agricultural
Cooperation in Ireland',and the Cook & Sprague Report on 'Irish Dairy
Industry Organisation'. All three reports identified the lack of
concentration as a major structural weakness retarding the industry's
growth and undermining its competitiveness. They argued that more
concentration of capital was needed in the industry to achieve
economies of scale,and to maintain sufficient reinvestment levels in
technological developments,to become,and to stay,cost competitive in
international terms. Concentration of capital was also needed to fund
the substantial R&D and marketing expenditures that were key to the
development and promotion of high value-added branded products,the type
of products that offered the best means of securing the industry's
fortunes from the uncertainties of commodity markets.
Some of the more farsighted and ambitious players in the industry were
taking steps to secure their position in the shake-up that,in one form
or another seemed to be inevitable. O'Loughlin could see that capital
was already concentrating in certain quarters of the industry by the mid
60's and some of the future growth centres were beginning to emerge.
In 1964 Dungarvan Cooperative doubled its milk supply by amalgamating
with four smaller coops in its hinterland to form the Waterford
Cooperative Society Ltd. Ballyclough had by 1966 emerged as the largest
creamery organisation in Ireland through a long series of acquisitions
of smaller units that began as far back as the 1927 rationalisation and
continued at various intervals into the 1960's.Mitchelstown invested £2M
in a major extension to their processed-cheese manufacturing capacity in
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1964. In 1965 it began a series of acquisitions and mergers of smaller
units so that by 1969 it had 17 branch creameries and was purchasing
milk from another dozen or more independents. In order to develop
further processing capacity O'Loughlin had to be sure of a larger milk
pool and to this end he approached and persuaded 9 additional creameries
to join the Golden Vale federation between 1964 and 1966. The additions
were Askeaton, Belville Deel Bridge, Boherbue, Bruree, Castlemahon,
Clouncagh, Glenwilliam, Greybridge and Shanagolden.
The manager of one of the nine newcomers to the federation recalled in
interview how he viewed the prospect of federating at the time:
"The Auditor of Golden Vale approached me and recommended that we join
up with Golden Vale in a federation rather than an amalgamation. The
concept seemed to have a lot of appeal to the managers of the
individual coops because we had been depending for 10 or 12 years on
Ballyclough over whom we had no control. .About nine creameries came
together in a group and decided that we had nothing to lose by joining
this federation. .We were happy with this situation.We were having all
our skim processed by Golden Vale..".
He also recalled the developments that influenced O'Loughlin to extend
the federation:
...amalgamations were taking place on a small scale.There were a
number of creameries going in with Ballyclough for example...you had
the IAOS plan for rationalisation. .Golden Vale and its 12 creameries,
with O'Loughlin as manager,were aware that things were going to change
with amalgamations. They could see that things were going to change
anyway and that if they did not develop they would lose out. They
brought the creamery managers behind (them).They tried to extend the
federation".
Many of the smaller creameries felt that they had no secure long-term
future in the industry as independents and that some form of association
with one of the larger processors was almost inevitable.Many were
courted by a number of suitors and neighbouring creameries often decided
to throw their lot in with different processors with little regard for
what made the most rational geographical sense.The same interviewee
recalled his own experience in this regard:
"Nine of us federated with Golden Vale.. .With that much milk Golden
Vale began to be noticed by Ballyclough etc.I was approached by
Mitchelstown with a very attractive offer.It was a concept that was
catching on.Ballyclough and Mitchelstown both began to get concerned
at the development of Golden Vale...A neighbouring manager to me did
it(went in with one of GV's major competitors) and was paying a much
better price for milk that was embarrassing to me being alongside him.
When a creamery went into a relationship with Mitchelstown(for
example) it neglected (to develop its) separation and churning and
found it hard to go back later.. locked in".
The large processors were jockeying for position in any restructuring of
the industry that might be evolving.Control over milk supply would be a
major factor in determining which organisations would come to prominence
in the restructuring.The smaller creameries were expecting some
rationalisation and were hedging on reinvestment in their existing
facilities.This in turn was constraining their capacity and pressurising
them into actively seeking an association with a larger concern.
Having extended the federation to 21 creameries O'Loughlin then
diversified into what was to become Golden Vale's main product line,
fat-filled milk powder. To produce this product cream is first
separated from the whole milk and made available for the manufacture of
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butter in the usual way. The next step is to add back a cheaper fat,for
example sunflower oil or the like,to the skim-milk and then to dry the
fat-filled milk into a powder. Fat-filled milk powder manufactured in
this way was a very acceptable substitute for whole-milk powder in
human and animal applications. One important application was as a
milk-replacer for new-born calves. Used in this way the whole-milk
normally consumed by new-born calves,a substantial gallonage when
aggregated over all milk suppliers,became available to the industry for
further processing. The 1967 Annual Report noted this important
strategic development for the federation:
"The quantity of milk processed was a record.To cater for the
increasing volume,the Board in keeping with its policy of active
diversification,has decided to extend into the specialised field of
edible 'filled' milk products, in which skim milk will be the main
constituent"
The first fat-filled processing unit,the NIRO 1,came on stream at the
end of 1968. Golden Vale,backed by this new development,brought onto the
Irish market a milk-replacer for calves which was an immediate market
success. Their 'Golden Maverick' milk-replacer has remained their
flag-ship brand,and market leader,on through to the late 1980's.
By 1968 then Golden Vale had made two significant strategic moves that
were to have a bearing on their future role in the restructuring of the
industry. They had expanded their potential milk pool through expanding
the federation and they had established an important first successful
market presence in a specialised area of dairy processing with a
strong future market potential. By this time the talk of possible
amalgamations had gone beyond speculation and as the 1968 Annual Report
records was "under active consideration" with the IAOS proposals on the
rationalisation of the industry as the main working blueprint. Impending
EEC entry was the environmental catalyst that gave urgency to the
discussion and movement towards rationalisation and the major players in
this lead up period were jockeying for position. A senior executive
provided the following description of what was happening in the industry
at the time:
"Everybody was getting themselves ready and jockeying for position for
the EEC entry.The foreplay for the amalgamations was taking place. No
significant(developments took place) in the amalgamatins area until
the 1970's. In readiness for the EEC,fellows were jockeying for
suppliers,jockeying for product dominance and all trying to anticipate
where our development should be- i.e.what products to be in.
Preliminary talks about amalgamations were taking place in the IAOS
and in the ICMSA.The industry would have been looking around to the
managers of these big processors for a lead and each of the big
processors would have been presenting himself as the best. Preliminary
indications might have been coming out about the amalgamation."
The 1968 Annual Report commented on the rate of development at the time:
"As you know,Golden Vale has had some very strenuous years,major
expansions and development going ahead uninteruptedly. Investment in
buildings,plant and machinery in recent years amounted to £1.6M.."
During the 1968-75 period this expansion was to intensify considerably
as Golden Vale's turnover grew from £3.5M in 1968 to £45M in 1975 and
a capital investment programme of over flOM implemented. The major
capital projects involved included a fat filled 'milk plant;a process
cheese factory;two drying plants,NIRO II and NIRO III; a milk
intake/butter factory;a central laboratory;two stainless steel
factories;a valve factory and an administration block. This major
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investment programme in physical assets was the major physical
development phase in the company's history. It was planned,initiated and
progressed during a period in which Golden Vale was going through, and
growing through, a process of amalgamation that was part of the
nationwide rationalisation of the industry.
Amalgamation and Physical Development - 1968-74
Throughout the 1960's there had been much discussion in national circles
about the need to rationalise the dairy industry.The focii for these
discussions were three important reports which appeared during the
decade and mentioned previously,namely,the Survey Team Report(1963),the
Knapp Report(1964) and the Cook and Sprague Report(1968). The catalyst
for this activity was the application of Ireland to join the EEC which
was first made in 1961,vetoed along with that of Britain by De Gaulle
in 1963 but not withdrawn. The applications of both Britain and Ireland
were reactivated in 1967 and both finally signed the treaty of accession
in 1972. In Ireland the prospect of Irish participation in freer trade
with Europe was raised to national attention in Whitaker's(1958)
document 'Economic Development':
"The establishment of a Free Trade Area in Europe will,whether we join
or not,and irrespective of the conditions on which we become a member,
call for a special effort on our part if output and living standards
are not to lag behind those of neighbouring countries"
The Lemass Government in adopting the Whitaker analysis officially
abandoned the self-sufficiency policy and began the process of
preparing Ireland for an outward-looking economic strategy. They
signalled their intention to apply for membership of the EEC and they
commissioned a number of studies to determine Ireland's readiness for
this important step and to prepare the country's economy for EEC
membership. The Survey Team Report(1963)on the 'Dairy Products Industry'
was one of these studies and the introduction to the report clearly
indicated the brief:
"The Dairy Products Survey Team was appointed to make a survey of the
Irish dairying industry in relation to the country's application for
membership of the European Economic Community. The purpose of the
survey was to appraise the efficiency of the industry,to examine the
difficulties that it might experience in Common Market conditions and
to formulate,where necessary,measures of adjustment and adaptation"
The Survey Team's study was extensive. It surveyed 210 processors in the
industry and examined the dairy industries of the six EEC countries and
those of the UK,Denmark and Norway. France,West Germany,Holland and
Denmark were investigated 'on-the-spot'. The recommendations in the
report were wide ranging and covered many issues from product quality
and standardisation to the education and training of creamery staff.
The report in one of its major recommendations called for a
reorganisation of the industry.The Survey Team found "a pronounced trend
towards rationalisation and concentration in the creamery industry" in
countries like Holland,Denmark,Germany and France and added:
"The tendency in all cases is to get away from the concept of the
'village' creamery which for so long has restricted the industry's
economic development.It should be stressed that the main motivating
factor in the trend towards concentration has not been to secure a
saving in operating costs. .What is principally being aimed at is a
flexible and cohesive dairying industry,based on a relatively small
number of large units,and strong financially,organisationally and
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administratively in a way that the traditional type of organisation
has not allowed.The advantages of such a structure are many.The prime
advantage is flexibility."(Par:135)
The Survey Team stressed the urgency of the need to rationalise the
industry by referring to the speed with which these structural changes
were happening elsewhere and to the dangers of being left behind:
"The zeal with which these organisational developments are being
tackled in Holland and Denmark,for example,is in our opinion very
significant.The dairy industry in each of these countries is more
closely integrated than the Irish one. .If therefore the arguments for
concentration have proved so compelling in the circumstances of their
industries,we are strongly of the opinion that they have even greater
relevance for the Irish industry.It would be near folly for it to
persist with a structure that is rapidly becoming out of date in
competitor countries;to do so can only result in its being at a
serious disadvantage in the approaching conditions of freer trade.
When Western European countries last made inroads into what had been a
traditional market for Irish dairy produce,it was because the Irish
dairying industry had remained more or less static in a period of
transition.We must not allow ourselves to lag behind again"(Par:64)
The Team recognised that "it was one thing to decide that reorganisation
of the creamery industry is necessary,another to have to put it into
effect". It saw "little prospects" of it happening on a "purely
voluntary basis" and felt that what was needed was "a method that would
have the confidence of the industry and in which the industry would play
a significant part,but which at the same time would have the power to
generate the necessary driving force to get the reorganisation carried
out quickly and effectively". It recommended the formation of a
permanent "superstructure" for the industry which should have "adequate
independence,virility and power" and added significantly:
"We are slow to recommend compulsory powers for this body,but should
they be found necessary they should be provided.This body would have
the responsibility of promoting and coordinating reorganisation,of
seeing that it is carried through efficiently and of providing
assistance and guidance in this connection. The actual reorganising
would,however,be carried out by the industry itself.What we envisage
is that under the stimulus of the guiding organisation and of (state)
financial aid..,creameries would come together in suitable groups and
merge to form large co-operative undertakings to carry on jointly the
business of the individual societies."(Par.138)
The larger groupings would be based on combined milk supply and the
Survey Team envisaged the then national milk pool of over 300M gallons
being organised into 30,or so,large units controlling from 10-15M
gallons each.In relation to the superstructure which was a key element
in their proposal the Team said that "it would be invidious for us to
express a view on the appropriateness of any existing organisations in
the dairying industry to undertake the reorganisation"(Par.138) but it
nevertheless went on to comment on the fitness of the IAOS for such
role
"We are aware that the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society Ltd.,
has done valuable work in organising the co-operative creamery
movement and in promoting moves towards joint creamery efforts but its
powers over its affiliated co-operatives are very limited. Some
creamery societies are not affiliated to it at all.Without a
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fundamental alteration in its constitution,including the vesting in it
of an extensive measure of control over co-operative societies,it is
doubtful whether it can provide the super-structure which is
needed"(Par:140)
The Survey Team Report was published in February 1963. The Lemass
Government immediately set about commissioning "a general appraisement
of the present position of the cooperative movement in (Ireland)" and
involved the IAOS in the choice of consultant. The IAOS recommended
Dr.Joseph Knapp,an American who had been closely connected with the
development of American farmer coperatives in a research and educational
capacity for almost 40 years and who had active links with the movement
in Ireland. Knapp was approached by the Government in April 1963 to
carry out this appraisement and "to make such recommendations as he
might deem desireable with a view to further strengthening the movement
and increasing its influence".Knapp reported in November 1963 and the
sense of urgency surrounding his task was revealed an accompanuing
letter in which he said:
"I know that time is running swiftly in Ireland today and that you
would have liked to have my report at an earlier date.However the
subject assigned to me is so important to the future of your country
that I could not rush the job more without injury to its helpfulness".
The Knapp Report was published in January 1964. Knapp's brief was wide
ranging with respect to the cooperative movement but a major section of
his report was devoted to 'The Dairy Reorganisation Plan'. Knapp
accepted that rationalisation was necessary but he differed from the
Survey Team on the question of how it should be done(pp70-71):
"It is believed that an alternative programme to the one proposed can
be suggested that would work from the known to the unknown or from the
bottom up rather than from the top down.This would accept the idea of
consolidation as desireable-and in fact no one questions this- but it
would achieve this through giving cooperatives encouragement to
consolidate or federate or otherwise to strengthen their existing
organisations. Studies would be made for logical areas to determine
what advantages could be achieved through better combinations or
better organisation.This approach has proven very useful in bringing
about desireable consolidations in other countries."
Knapp felt that there were some basic flaws and dangers in the Survey
Team's approach to rationalising the industry. In particular,he thought
that the Team had overrelied on the "fatalistic" argument of economic
imperative to convince the industry to restructure and had largely
ignored the important political task of how to build up the necessary
support within the industry to make the consolidations a reality:
"It is difficult to see how mergers can be consummated unless members
are given assurance that they will benefit in some tangible way.Few
farmers will support merger proposals just to belong to a larger
organisation...
Motivation to gain acceptance for this programme,other than its
necessity for survival is lacking.Efficiency as a goal in itself,
rather than benefits to producers,seemed to be the aim of the Team...
The report provides little information to show how the creameries are
located,how they might be grouped,or anything on their operating
character.It does not recognise the existence of such strong
cooperative organisations as Mitchelstown,Dungarvan,Ballyclough;
Drinagh and Kileshandra,and the productive developments taking place
in them. Such strong and promising federations as Golden Vale and
Miloko are also ignored...
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Knapp's main recommendations in relation to the restructuring of the
dairy industry was "that the IAOS should be given full responsibility
for working out general reorganisation plans for the industry" in the
belief that under its leadership "the dairy cooperatives have the
ability to achieve the consolidations and mergers which are required to
improve the structure of the dairy industry".He called for "analytical
studies of merger possibilities and careful negotiations between
interested cooperatives" to be got underway in order to progress the
restructuring that was generally recognised as necessary.
He made several recommendations in relation to the restructuring of the
IAOS itself to strengthen its central role in the future development of
the cooperative movement.
After the publication of these two reports the IAOS came under
increasing pressure to develop a set of proposals for the restructuring
of the industry. Lemass,the Taoiseach with his corporate approach to
the nation's economic management,was anxious that the work commence.He
was convinced by the Survey Team's economic argument and of the urgency
of the need. Furthermore rapid expansion in dairying and particularly
in dairy exporting was fundamental to his overall economic strategy of
of export-led growth.He was also aware of the political difficulties
inherent in any imposed restructuring raised by Knapp and would clearly
have preferred to build on the work of the cooperative movement that was
there already. In the Second Programme for Economic Expansion the IAOS
was charged with the responsibility of "encouraging the co-operative
creamery societies to achieve such voluntary consolidations and mergers
as are designed to bring to the industry the operating and marketing
advantages to be gained from economies of scale and diversification of
production"(Chp9,VII).However it was clear to the IAOS that if they did
not move on it soon then the Government would achieve its objectives for
the industry through some other mechanism. The State was already
directly involved in the industry through the activities of two state
agencies,the Dairy Disposal Company as a dairy processor and An Bord
Bainne as the central marketing agency for the industry.It can be safely
said that the future character of the industry was on the line at this
time. As one senior executive of IAOS remembered it:
"Sometime in 1965 the Minister for Agriculture was saying that we could
not sit our hands forever and that if we were not going to do it then
he was going to do it(restructure the industry),by mandatory
legislation if necessary. We were getting quiet but firm warnings that
if we did not do it then they would. Lemass was thinking that the
alternative to the coops doing it was state entreprise.Lemass's
philosophy was never far removed from state entreprise.We were
confronted with a dual threat. One was that the Department(of
Agriculture) might publish its own document and two that they might go
for state entreprise. We were leaked a copy of what the Department
were doing (in their proposals) when we had just finished our own.The
two plans were very close(in terms of the proposed groupings,the means
to achieve them i.e.amalgamation,and the philosophy in terms of
product range and flexibility for the amalgamated units).This gave us
the confidence that we were going the right way and that we would get
Department support.
Our document went three times to our Council. I remember Paddy Kelly
(Secretary of IAOS) saying 'this is your last chance-if you don't
publish after today's meeting the Minister will publish (his
document). The Department was the licensing authority,it could
influence 100% where the grant aid from the IDA was going and the
industry was heavily subsidised. These were the pressures on the
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industry to get into line in a voluntary way. It would not have been
impossible to see the Department nationalising the cooperatives under
the Dairy Disposal Company. The Government's attitude then to state
entreprises was pragmatic,not philsophical,the same as it is today".
The IAOS published its first 'Proposals for Re-Organisation of the
Dairying Industry' in February 1966. It proposed a total of 19 groupings
for amalgamation,ranging in milk supply from just 2.1M Gallons for
Group III in the North Western Area,where the density of existing
creameries was very low,to 38.7M Gallons for Group VII in the Midland
and South Eastern area,where the density of existing creameries was very
high. It was clear right from the publication of these proposals that
the process was going to be difficult. Up to this point the discussions
had been around general principles and policies. These proposals
attempted to get down to the specifics and all the interested parties in
the industry could now begin to see more clearly the implications for
their own future. As a senior executive of the IAOS,who was associated
with the production of the proposals,said:
"No sooner had we got our document out than the big opposition from the
committees of management of the dairy coops and also of the industry,
particularly the ICMSA (began)".
With Ireland's entry to the EEC blocked,at least for the time being,the
'imperative' that had helped to focus the minds of those involved was
temporarily removed. Furthermore,Lemass had retired in late 1965. His
successor did not have the same driving,corporate style of economic
management for which Lemass has become legendary.The pressure from the
Government then began to come mainly from the Department. Progress on
actual amalgamations was painfully slow. In 1967 Ireland's application
for membership of the EEC was reactivated and entry was then expected
before the end of the decade. In this context the Minister for
Agriculture commissioned a further study on the industry. The two
American consultants Cook and Sprague were asked "to examine the present
organisation of the creamery and milk processing industry in Ireland and
make recommendations as to the type of reorganisation best calculated to
meet the needs of the future". They reported in July 1968.
The dairy industry in Ireland and abroad had been growing rapidly
throughout the 60's and technological developments in butter-making and
cheese-making since the two previous reports pointed to the necessity
for even larger consolidations than had previously been envisaged.Cook
and Sprague also highlighted the strategic importance of the develpment
of skim-milk processing capacity and its location in the future
development of the Irish dairy industry. However on the major question
of reorganisation the report reaffirmed the desireability and urgency of
rationalisation.The IAOS issued a memorandum as a considered response
to the report in September 1968. In it they concluded:
"There is one point that comes out clearly and decisively from the text
of the Report and from the recommendations and that is the urgent
necessity for re-organisation and rationalisation in the Irish dairy
industry.This confirms in principle the conclusions arrived at in the
Report of the Survey Team and the IAOS proposals..(p7)
The necessity for rationalisation is now confirmed from the expert,
independent and unbiased source that some have demanded.Amalgamations
of Societies is the procedure recommended.The arguments which clouded
these issues should now cease.The aim should be to accept the overall
principles and to concentrate on the detailed procedures to ensure
that the work will be accomplished in the most efficient manner
possible and in the best interests of the farmers involved"(p24).
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Elsewhere in the memorandum there was evidence that the support for
amalgamation was slowly building up and the need for it was beginning to
percolate more rapidly throughout the tndustry.In this context,mhile
saying that "the Report does not add anything new"(Par.57),the IAOS
welcomed it as a timely addition to keeping the issue alive and keeping
the momentum going:
"..the timing of the Report was important,particularly from the point
of view that since the publication of the IAOS proposals in February,
1966,there has been a change in attitudes in the industry from
outright rejection in many instances,to a willingness to examine the
ideas put forward in a more positive and constructive manner.This
would seem to indicate that the main conclusions in the Consultants'
Report,namely the necessity for rationalisation,will have a greater
chance of general acceptance through the work that has already been
accomplished by the IAOS and the Societies. Interest in varying
intensity had already been expressed by the majority of Co-operative
Societies in the amalgamation proposals and by the end of 1967, a
number of amalgamations in accordance with the proposals had already
been accomplished"(Par.8).
When the IAOS amalgamation proposals came out first Dave O'Loughlin
opposed them.A senior executive of the IAOS recalled in interview that
the general meeting of IAOS in the year that the proposals were
published "was a fairly tough one with the amalgamation quite vehemently
opposed at the General Meeting".The opposition had come from the ICMA,
individual creamery managers and the ICMSA,among others. He recalled
that " O'Loughlin on the surface vehemently opposed it because his own
owners(the creamery managers and their committees in the Golden Vale
federation) vehemently opposed it" but "he very quickly saw the
advantages in amalgamation because he saw it as strengthening Golden
Vale Food Products by (means of) a reverse take-over of his owners".
O'Loughlin was in the peculiar position of having some processing
capacity but no committed milk supply.There was a shortage of processing
capacity in the country at the time and if O'Loughlin wanted to take
advantage of that situation to develop Golden Vale then he needed to be
sure of a greatly expanded milk supply.His experience with the federal
type of organisation was that it did not give him the kind of control
over supply on which to base a major development programme and he had
plans for major development.
Having decided that he wanted to form a consolidated unit around Golden
Vale Food Products O'Loughlin approached the IAOS for their professional
help in bringing the amalgamations about. A senior executive of the
IAOS,Mr Gerry Curley,was placed at his service on a full-time basis to
pursue this task. Gerry,in interview,gave the following description of
how they went about,and finally succeeded in,their endeavour:
"We started early in January 1968. In 5 days we had meetings with
members of about 20 member committees. We got a reasonable reception
from them but there were a lot that were totally opposed to it.It was
a general softening up situation.What O'Loughlin did was that he got
the idea and started to do lots of homework..sort of what would happen
if we got all the milk supply. .what sort of facilities would be needed
here. .what would it cost and what were the benefits.
O'Loughlin took the bull by the horns and more or less decided that he
was going to provide the facilities anyway. Again,at the same time,he
was developing the 'Maverick' fat-filled products.He was in more and
more need of milk. The people outside(the small creamery managers)
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were beginning to let their plants run down with all the talk of
amalgamation,consciously or unconsciously. O'Loughlin then set up the
Structural Subcommittee chartered to progress the amalgamation. It
consisted of the managers and chairmen who had agreed to look at the
possibility of amalgamation.While ostensibly the purpose was to
progress amalgamation,it was really to indoctrinate the chairmen and
societies who were leaning towards,waivering towards,amalgamation on
the benefits of amalgamation.It also very unwillingly consisted of the
Auditor. .who was auditor of about 80% of the member societies.During
that time the Structural Subcommittee was discussing structure and
tactics.At the same time O'Loughlin,Hyland and Curley were going to
the AGM's of the member societies to get the 'principle'
accepted,never forcing a vote if we thought it would go against us.
While the end result was economic in its nature the means by which we
did it was political. All the time we were trying to get the thought
leaders committed all along the line,a sort of preaching the gospel
effort. That went on for three years before we got any real breaks. At
the same time this complex was being developed and he(O'Loughlin) was
pushing forward with that and sailing very close to the financial
wind. He had an extraordinary capacity to take risks,pushing it to the
limit. .The total initial share capital was £120000. He was pushing the
debt/equity ratio at an enormous rate.
There were at the same time the amalgamation efforts going on in other
areas;Avonmore, Waterford etc. Whatever progress was being made was
being made here and mainly on a propaganda basis. The burden on
O'Loughlin and Hyland was very heavy at that time. They were under
enormous pressure in their day to day work,developing a totally new
business and totally new products and at night they were out on one
amalgamation junket after another. At the same stage he was developing
engineering...
Many of the better (creamery) managers saw that this was coming and
saw their future in the larger organisation. We worked on these
groups. .Generally speaking there were a number of them who could see
this and others with a quite disinterested view supported it. We were
always afraid to go for a critical breakthrough.It was attrition the
whole time. Often you had a guy 5/8ths of the way and he would fall
back to 4/8ths. You just kept at it and at it. Between O'Loughlin,
Hyland and myself we must have attended 500 meetings.To give you an
example of O'Loughlin's attention to detail.We were coming home from a
meeting and we went into a pub. .He started chatting with the publican,
started telling her the benefits of amalgamation.He never missed an
oportunity to progress amalgamation.The critical thing was
O'Loughlin's initial decision to develop the place with large scale
capital expenditure and an uncommitted milk supply.
Eventually how it all came into being was this. When we were really
satisfied that we had it fairly well wrapped up before moving(on it)
we went out and brought in an independent auditor..and we valued all
the assets in each place...In May of 1971 we made a decision that we
would start the amalgamation procedure in August of that year - we
felt that we had it.On July 14th ..Dave O'Loughlin died suddenly on
holiday. .There was quite a gap before O'Loughlin's successor was
appointed..The (formal) amalgamation started in April 1972 and went on
until 1974".
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The process by which the amalgamations were brought about was long and
arduous for the principals concerned as the above description reveals.
The change that was taking place in the industry at that time had
significant sociological,as well as economic implications,and it is
little wonder that the process of structural change proved to be
difficult. The evolution of the creamery system in the late 1800's had
been parish-based. Initially the logistics of transporting a highly
perishable commodity by horse-drawn cart dictated that it had to be so.
Creameries typically served a hinterland within a 4-6 mile radius of the
facility. Since mass transportation did not develop in any significant
way in rural Ireland until after World War II the parish creamery
structure became interwoven with the social structure of parish life.The
creamery manager was part of the parish elite. As one senior executive
described it:
"They were. .very important people in their rural parishes.After the
parish priest came the creamery manager,the teacher and then the
biggest farmer.They had a certain status.It brought another kind of
graduate to the parish.Their advice was sought..".
Moreover the local creamery manager served as a banker for many of his
farmer suppliers. His knowledge of the cyclical pattern of their cash
flow made him a comfortable extender of credit on no other security than
the good name of the farmer. The local creamery was a place where the
farmer was known personally and over which he felt some influence.
Furthermore,the delivery of milk to the creamery was partly a social
occasion where neighbouring farmers caught up on the local news. The
rationalisation of the dairy industry that was been brought about by the
amalgamations was accelerating the decline of a way of life that was
still valued by the older generation of milk producers and creamery
managers. A senior executive described the difficulties of selling the
amalgamation in this way:
"Essentially the amalgamation process was going to take everything away
from the small coops,the creamery manager and the farmer
representatives. It was going to take away their status. These were
people of standing in their own localities. .The problem with the
amalgamation was to persuade them to give up everything in order to
come in to the colossus. .there was a need to place these people in
various jobs in the structure of Golden Vale that did emerge".
The farmers were split on the issue. The younger,more specialised,
farmers were attracted to the economic advantages of the bigger units.
The older farmers were concerned about the passing of a way of life.
Their representative organisations were split on the issue with the
National Farmers Association(NFA) backing the rationalisation process
and the ICMSA opposing it. Many of the creamery managers,mostly the
younger ones,perceived more interesting and more enhanced career
prospects for themselves in the larger units. Others,mainly the older
ones,did not relish the change in their social position and influence in
the communities into which they had settled as part of the older social
structure. Golden Vale had to face two particular difficulties.
Firstly the ICMSA had a higher than normal representation on the Golden
Vale management committee because the organisation was particularly
strong in the Golden Vale hinterland. Secondly,there was a ready-made
federal alternative which complicated the amalgamation debates. One of
the creamery managers in the Golden Vale federation at the time
recalled,in interview,how the issues looked from his point of view and
how his own creamery eventually made its decision:
"On the Board (of the federation) you had chairmen who were pushing for
amalgamation.The ICMSA were taking the federation view. There was
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disappointment at the lack of progress and cross purposes in the
federation thing. A number of creameries left the federation.This was
a body blow. .The strategies were forced upon us by the speed at which
the Ballyclough and Mitchelstown (developments) were happening. He
(O'Loughlin) saw the possibility of massive amounts of milk committed
elsewhere so that he could see himself with not enough to keep the
processing facility going..
The decision came from various sources.It was pretty unanimous when it
did come. It came from within the small coops and their own boards.
The managers were pushing for it. .A lot of the old committee
members,the hierarchy of the parish,were going to be upset by it
all.I was always called Sir and Mr.. in the parish where I came from.
There were a lot of creameries that stayed on their own and did
benefit.My own view was that the federation could have worked but we
were not capable of it because of the politics of the situation..
After my experience with the federation I could see that it was not
going to work. .because of selfishness within the original 12
creameries who saw Golden Vale as theirs. .The original 12 were always
reluctant to take in more because they would be outvoted on the
Board..There were too many personalities with too much say in the
federal set-up..In the federation the decision making was too slow.It
left a mark on the industry.It was seen as a federation experiment
that failed.It was not capable of being controlled effectively... We
were a relatively small creamery.The chairman and the majority of my
committee could see that the federation was not working.Two of them
adamantly stuck it out.The other 10 rowed in with the concept(of
amalgamation)..".
In 1972 the IAOS,to encourage the process of rationalisation throughout
the industry,issued a second set of proposed amalgamations. Since 1966,
the scale of the industry had changed and EEC membership was imminent:
"The tremendous escalation of the cost of building and equiping milk
processing plants,the great strides in dairying technology and the
decision on EEC membership have..all helped to confirm the view that
the 1966 proposals are now seriously out of date..
It is becoming increasingly evident that if the smaller type groups
proposed in 1966 had to equip themselves for processing at this time,
they would be placed at a serious disadvantage in relation to existing
processing Co-operatives which are well established and have
considerable financial resources built up over the years. The IAOS
believes that as far as possible development of milk processing should
be based on expansion of existing processing Co-operatives rather than
on the establishment of new Co-operatives for this purpose".
The 1972 IAOS rationalisation plan proposed the formation of 8 large
units organised largely around the emergent growth centres of the
period. This contrasts with the 19 proposed in 1966.The milk pools to be
associated with these groupings ranged from 24.5M gallons to 90.6M in
contrast to the 1966 range of 2.1M to 38.7M. Furthermore the groupings
in the 1972 plan were clearly identified with existing processing
centres unlike the case in 1966 where the groups were presented as
simply rational geographical groupings with no preeminent organising
core. The 1972 group of 8 and their assigned milk pools were:
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Group No.of Societies
in amalgamation
Milk Pool
(M Gallons)
BALLYCLOUGH 10 90.6
GOLDEN VALE 36 74.5
AVONMORE 29 61.9
MITCHELSTOWN 6 56.4
WATERFORD 4 49.6
CLARE-GALWAY-N.TIPP 4* 40.9
NORTH KERRY 13 39.3
SOUTH KERRY 5 24.5
(* This includes the Dairy Disposal Companies in Clare as one unit)
Table 8.2 - Milk pool allocations in the 1972 IAOS plan.
This 1972 plan reflected the evolution of the industry since 1966 and
largely confirmed the preeminence of five of the current big six.The
only surprise in terms of what was to happen subsequently was the
emergence of one large grouping in Kerry. The amalgamation process
accelerated within the industry during the 1972-74 period. The end
result was the emergence of six large units;BALLYCLOUGH, GOLDEN VALE,
AVONMORE, MITCHELSTOWN, WATERFORD and KERRY and to this extent the 1972
TAOS plan was realised. However the process was,as we have seen,far from
smooth and there were many problems and disappointments. Many large
societies like Drinagh(assigned to Ballyclough)and Kantogher (assigned
to Golden Vale) chose to remain independent. There were many tug-a-wars
over the destinations of other societies in the competitive scramble to
secure milk supply and the outcome often did not make geographic sense.
A senior executive of the TAOS recalled one of the major conflicts as an
example of this problem:
"The biggest row that broke out initially was between Waterford and
Mitchelstown over Castlelyons. Castlelyons was allocated to
Mitchelstown and was negotiating with Waterford at the same time and
eventually went to Waterford against the geography. Mitchelstown
retaliated by taking Imokilly which (on any rational geographical
basis) should have gone to Waterford".
One of the major disappointments from the IAOS's point of view was the
failure to consolidate in the northern half of the country,particularly
in the North East. The same senior executive of the IAOS gave the
following explanation with his view of the consequences for the
industry:
"Virtually nothing happened in the northern half of the country and
nothing in the North East. As a consequence of not doing anything,most
of the processing in the North East is (now) owned by the Express
Dairy Company which is part of the Grand Metropolitan Hotels Group.
The same group is in West Cork where no movement on amalgamation took
place either.
It did not happen in the North East because you did not have the
leadership at management or board levels at the time. The philosophy
was to let the multi-nationals do the processing and the cooperatives
would bargain on price. For example,John O'Neill of Kileshandra used
'to claim that 'the farmers' money was best reinvested in his farm and
not in milk processing.Let the capitalists do that'".
If there were disappointments for the IAOS in the way that some elements
of the rationalisation process turned out,there were also some welcome
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developments. The issue of the Dairy Disposal Company was finally
resolved during this rationalisation process. The DDC had,as we saw
earlier,its origins in an earlier rationalisation of the industry in
1927.It was always intended that it should be 'cooperativised'. Yet in
over 40 years this had failed to materialise and it had remained a
contentious issue between the State and the cooperative movement.The DDC
became,in effect,a bargaining chip in the rationalisation of the
industry that started in the late 60's. It was both a bait and a threat.
The threat was that the State would use the DDC as the means through
which to force rationalisation with the probability of extending state
involvement in the industry if the cooperative movement failed bring
about the desired consolidation itself. On the other hand the Minister,
in the early 70's reconfirmed that the State's involvement in the
industry was pragmatic and not philosophical. As a senior executive of
the IAOS put it:
"Once the industry showed that it was going to get its own house in
order the Minister said that the Dairy Disposal Company was yours (the
movement's) whenever you want it".
The Dairy Disposal Company disappeared as an entity in the 1972-74
rationalisation process. Its main concentration had been in Clare and
Kerry in the south western area of the country The Clare DDC creameries
were acquired by Golden Vale and the Kerry DDC creameries became an
integral part of the emergent Kerry cooperative consolidation.
For Golden Vale the rationalisation of the industry confirmed its status
as one of the major future growth centres. This was a significant
achievement for an organisation that came on the scene late on in the
industry's evolution and which grew as the joint-venture of a federated
group of relatively small players in the industry. However,the
amalgamation was not a total success for the company. Quite a number of
the 36 societies allocated in the IAOS plan to the Group stayed
independent or went elsewhere. In addition to the political difficulties
inherently involved in the process,the federation were faced with two
other problems. Firstly, Golden Vale was late in establishing a central
facility for butter production and one executive,then a creamery manager
within the federation attributed this to the federal structure:
"We did a stupid thing in Golden Vale within the federation.We decided
to keep separating and churning in the local creameries but this had
the effect of not being able to attract those creameries with no
separating or churning.The management of Golden Vale realised this
mistake and wanted to set up centralised churning. The federated
creameries did not want it. A decision at one meeting was overturned
at a follow-up meeting in the late 60's".
It was 1973 before this facility was established and there seems little
doubt that the failure to provide it earlier led some of the targeted
societies to seek amalgamation with other processors. The other
difficulty that caused these coops to look elsewhere was the perception,
prevalent at the time that the amalgamation process was getting
underway,that Golden Vale was not in a financially strong position. This
problem was significant enough for the chairman to refer to it in the
1968 Annual Report:
"I feel that a statement on the financial position is necessary at this
point of time,to counter rumours which appear to have originated among
propagandists,who appear to lack pride and satisfaction in the
achievements of Golden Vale".
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The upshot of all the difficulties was that 12 of the societies
allocated to Golden Vale under the 1972 IAOS proposals on
rationalisation did not amalgamate with it. Four of the twelve were
previously members of the federation and their failure to amalgamate was
particularly disappointing. These four chose to remain independent. Of
the eight others,originally designated for Golden Vale in the IAOS
plan, five went to Ballyclough, two to Mitchelstown and one amalgamated
with Nenagh Cooperative. In all 25 societies,including one not allocated
to it in the plan, amalgamated to form Golden Vale Cooperative
Creameries Ltd. The combined milk pool of the new entity was 47M
gallons; this was 30M short of the total proposed for Golden Vale under
the IAOS blueprint. Since the company had been actively expanding milk
processing capacity over the period in which the amalgamation process
was taking place,in order to be ready to process to a level of 77M
gallons, the 30M shortfall gave rise to a serious over-capacity
situation. Golden Vale acquired Clare Dairies in late 1974 from the
Dairy Disposal Company in a somewhat desparate move to secure an
additional 19M gallons for its milk pool.
The Lenihan Years 1972-80 - Financial Crisis,Turnaround and Expansion
Dave O'Loughlin's sudden death in 1971 gave rise to major difficulties
for Golden Vale. The amalgamation process was reaching a critical and
decisive stage.The momentum had been built up to the level where
O'Loughlin was almost ready to move on the formal procedure. Moreover
the groundwork for a major capital development programme to provide milk
processing capacity at a level in excess of 100M gallons,the level that
Golden Vale expected to exceed by the latter half of the decade, had
been laid. To make matters worse O'Loughlin's heir apparent, Jim
Hyland, had become ill a short time earlier. It is believed by
some executives that the enormous pressures and burdens of the period
had taken a heavy toll on both men. Hyland was offered the job as
O'Loughlin's successor but had to decline on the insistence of his
doctors. The company spent some 6 to 8 months looking for a new
chief executive,searching extensively externally as well as internally.
One senior executive gave this perception on the succession search:
"There was an interregnum period while there was jockeying for
succession. The 12 'apostles'(the original members of the federation)
held control. You can imagine the shemozzle and the canvassing that
went on for the job".
Early in 1972,they appointed Michael Lenihan to the position.
Mick Lenihan was the manager of the Shandrum Coop,one of the larger
creameries in the federation. He was not as well qualified academically
as O'Loughlin and he was not perceived to be a builder or a strategist
in the O'Loughlin mold. However he was a successful operator as was
evidenced by the success of Shandrum and he was well versed,from this
experience,in the politics of the farmer-processor relationship.
Furthermore he was well respected by his peers in the federation who
recognised him as a successful creamery manager in his own right.
Lenihan is mainly credited within Golden Vale for his part in
implementing the amalgamation. According to one senior executive:
"They appointed a guy called Mick Lenihan who was one of the creamery
managers. Politically that was one of the things that moved the
amalgamation forward. Lenihan was one of their own. O'Loughlin was
dynamic but was perceived as being a bit threatening...he was a very
dogmatic man and he was not one of the creamery manager types.. .Mick
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Lenihan did a lot of those deals (with the creamery managers) on his
own personal touch 'over pints'.. .He knew what made them tick. He knew
how to allay their fears".
However he was generally viewed to have been a conservative choice by
Golden Vale,chosen to implement the grand strategic blueprint that
O'Loughlin had drawn up for the company's future.According to another
executive:
"Lenihan's tenure of office here was very much as an interim pope. .(He)
did not carry the same clout that O'Loughlin did. On the other hand,
Lenihan was more acceptable to the creamery managers - he was one of
their own...Lenihan looked at his whole function as carrying out
O'Loughlin's plan".
O'Loughlin was an entrepreneurial leader who dominated his Board and his
senior management team. "The general perception was that Dave 0' was
standing way above the whole lot" as one executive recalled. Another
described O'Loughlin as "very much the boss..forceful,driven,a
risk-taker (whose) basic strategic decisions were very right". Lenihan,
on the other hand,was not as powerful relative to his management team,
which he had inherited from O'Loughlin,or to his Board. The management
team were perceived as having been "highly articulate,aggressive and had
worked together" and to them Lenihan was "an outsider". Without the same
dominating position as his predecessor Mick Lenihan survived at the top,
it would seem by operating a more political style of management.
"Lenihan in some ways was very cute,he rarely gave explicit direction to
the guys.." was how one senior manager perceived him,and it appears that
Lenihan was often able to use the ambiguity that his style created to
disperse the political fallout whenever problems arose.Another
remembered him as "not really as technically strong as O'Loughlin
but. .probably more astute. .a political man" and added this further
insight into Lenihan's approach to the business:
"His perception of the critical issue was the farming community and the
holding of the milk supply. Custom and practice did not allow for
major transfers at the time but part for the reason that (the milk
pool) was not under threat was because of his ability to hold
'gentleman's agreements'. This was the sound man concept. Here it is
mainly a sound man business. Agreements are not worth the paper they
are written on.."
It was during Lenihan's term as chief executive that Golden Vale faced,
and survived,its biggest crisis.
Financial Crisis and Turnaround
The failure of Golden Vale to bring about the scale of amalgamation
designated to it in the IAOS plans left it with a major shortfall in
anticipated milk supply. At the same time the company had invested
heavily in new capacity to provide for a milk pool that was supposed to
be 74M gallons by the completion of the amalgamations in 1974 and was
expected to rise with a general expansion in dairy production to over
100M by the end of the decade. The shortfall in milk supply and the
heavy investment in physical assets together put the company's
inappropriate financial structure under severe pressure. This led to a
major liquidity crisis for Golden Vale in early 1975,after barely one
year in its new form as an amalgamated entity. The events leading up to
the crisis and the management of the crisis itself are now described.
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By January 1973 a total of 25 societies had amalgamated to form Golden
Vale Cooperative Creameries Ltd. Golden Vale now had a committed milk
supply for the first time. The group also had access to the milk of a
further 6 societies in 1973 and the total milk processed by the group in
that year was 66M gallons. This was stretching to capacity the existing
centralised processing facilities of the new entity. The expectation
within the industry generally,at that time,was that milk yields would
rise substantially in 1974,and throughout the rest of the decade,in
response to the higher prices and expanded market offered by EEC
membership.On the basis of this expectation the Golden Vale board and
management decided to proceed with their longterm investment plan and
they commissioned the large NIRO III drier to bring the total capacity
up to 94.5M gallons.This new drier became operational in May 1974 at a
cost of £1.9M. There was a general mood of optimism surrounding the
company at this time. The substantial increase in milk price that was
made possible by the EEC intervention system led to a total -Imo-tease of
6% in milk production that year. The new Group,in its first annual
report as Golden Vale Cooperative Creameries Ltd. was "pleased to
announce substantial growth in sales of all milk products" both on the
home and on international markets. It was also pleased to record the
successful introduction of new premium fat-filled milk products which
led them "into new and exciting markets" and "the most successful year
ever enjoyed by" the Engineering Division.
Late in 1973 the Group found itself having to accelerate its
investment plan for a new milk intake and centralised butter plant to
align with the skim milk processing facilities.The timing of this
investment was to a large degree forced on the company by the Department
of Agriculture. The Department was unhappy with the temporary facilities
that had been set up in Charleville and were threatening to withdraw its
license unless the new facilities were provided. These new facilities
became operational early in 1976 at a capital cost of £2.9M.
Milk yields were down generally in 1974. In addition,5 of the 6
societies that had been supplying Golden Vale as independents decided to
amalgamate with other processors and the company lost their milk supply
permanently. Golden Vale had access to 8M gallons of skim milk from
Clare Creameries,part of the Dairy Disposal Company. They also faced the
possibility of losing this supply if the Department of Agriculture
decided to sell off Clare Creameries to some other processor as part of
the overall rationalisation happening in the industry. To defend this
supply and to make up for some of the shortfall that resulted from
amalgamation process,Golden Vale bought Clare Creameries,including a
processing facility at Landsdowne in Limerick, from the state for f1M.
This purchase "added 18 million gallons to our milk 'pool' ,but
also consolidated 8 million gallons which we had already been purchasing
from Clare"(Annual Report,1974;3). The end result of all these
developments was that the total milk processed was only 61M gallons,an
8% reduction on the 1973 level as against a budgeted increase of 10%.
The 1974 Annual Report heralded the difficulties facing the company as a
result of these developments:
"Agreed IAOS rationalisation plans have been shattered - as a result of
which substantial quantities of milk are now moving from West and East
Limerick to distant processing centres.Because our long-term plans had
been based on an acceptance of the TAOS rationalisation plan,its
failure undoubtedly means a temporary setback..
The effects of inflation and the very size of our Group have imposed
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enormous financial demands,in terms of both fixed and working capital.
The effect of this has been a marked deterioration in the relationship
between the Society's equity.. .and total borrowings. The ratio is at
an unacceptable level of 1:2.96; to preserve ownership interest in our
Society,this imbalance will need to be adjusted - either by capital
injections or profit retentions. The alternative is that control of
the Society will be held by outsiders whose policy motives may not be
the same as the Society's suppliers and shareholders"
Early in 1975 the Group found itself in financial crisis. Over the
1973 to 74 period turnover had increased from £21.7M to £26.1M but
trading profit had fallen from £1.3M to £1.0M. Over the same period
the burden of interest payments rose sharply from £0.256M to £1.06M,
exceeding the trading profit for that year. The Group was seriously out
of gear with £15.4M in borrowings,f10.5M of which was in the form of
bank overdraft,and only £6.3M in shareholders' funds. There were in fact
several major difficulties giving rise to the liquidity crisis. One
was the capital structure of the Group which was too heavily based on
borrowings,and mainly short-term borrowings at that, to fund the major
long-term physical development programme. Another was that up to early
1975,while amalgamation had taken place,very little in the way of
downstream rationalisation had been attempted.Furthermore, the new Group
had failed to develop the systems and structures appropriate to its
larger size and more diversified activities. The crisis was the catalyst
for an outburst of frenetic activity on a number of fronts in an effort
to come to terms with these major issues. As one senior executive
remembered it:
"The bankers came in first.They were toing and froing with rapid
speed for about six months. .There was a need for systems.The place was
overrun with consultants recommending this,that and the other about
organisation,accounts,procedures,financial structure ,board structure
etc"
It was a critical milestone in Golden Vale's history. The risk was great
that the company would lose the backing of the banking community and the
confidence of its own supplier-shareholders. To many of those involved
the steady hand at the tiller during this stormy period was the
Chairman,Martin Flanagan. Flanagan,a farmer from West Limerick,had just
taken over as chairman in 1974,shortly before developments had reached
the crisis point. He had been described to one senior executive by a
partner in a major consulting firm 'as a man who would grace the board
of the largest Irish company and do so with tremendous effectiveness'.
The same executive went on to describe the significance of Flanagan's
chairmanship at this time of crisis:
"During the crisis period it was the bank's confidence in Flanagan that
persuaded them to continue their support of Golden Vale - no doubt
about that whatsoever. I would put Flanagan's contribution to this
place on a par with O'Loughlin's.(He was) the outstanding chairman"
There was pressure on Lenihan's leadership from the shareholders and a
deputation of farmer-shareholders wanted to table a resolution calling
for his resignation.The Company Secretary recalled that Flanagan's
immediate response to this request was to the effect that:
'I was expecting that (but) over my dead body! I don't blame management
for the problems that we have but I believe that they can get them
right'
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and the same executive added that:
"Flanagan looked at the Board of Directors as having the power in the
Society and that the BOD's job was to create an environment where the
managers could manage without interference".
The Board and management of Golden Vale moved quickly under these crisis
conditions to implement rationalisation and refinancing plans that were
drawn up with the help of the bankers and some external consultants.
The crisis situation itself,which in 1975 was public knowledge and
widely reported in the media,had the effect of waiving or mitigating to
a large extent the perceived political difficulties that had discouraged
earlier action. A consultant's report,which provided the following
succinct summary of the company's problems,referred to these
difficulties:
"The physical characteristics of Golden Vale are such that it has a
costly milk assembly system resulting in higher labour,transport and
administration costs as compared with other processors.
Interest charges are high due to the use of short term borrowings to
finance new plant...
We have been informed that,while there was an awareness of the
detrimental effects of these factors on the operating performance of
the (company),it was not possible to introduce proposals for
rationalisation of its operations at an earlier time. This was due to
the pressures of the amalgamation negotiations and also the necessity
to maintain the confidence of the amalgamating societies and
suppliers.
The over-riding objective of the Group since 1973 appears to have been
the development of a substantial milk pool for the long term benefit
of the society irrespective of the short term effect on the operating
performance".
The comparatively costly milk assembly system,referred to in the above
extract,arose largely from the nature of the amalgamation plans for
Golden Vale in the IAOS proposals and from the actual course that the
amalgamation process eventually took.Golden Vale had been allocated
36 creameries with an average gallonage of 2.06M per creamery .This
contrasts,for example,with the cases of Ballyclough,allocated 9
creameries with an average gallonage of 4.77M;and Waterford,allocated
3 creameries with an average gallonage of 4.33M. The reason for the
smaller,more concentrated allocations to Ballyclough and Waterford was
that they represented additions to an substantial existing committed
milk supply in both cases.When Golden Vale failed to secure the
amalgamation of 12 of the allocated creameries it found itself,as we saw
earlier,forced to buy Clare Creameries as a rearguard action. This added
38 branches to the Golden Vale milk supply network that were more
distant from the processing centre at Charleville than the 12 that were
in the original plan. By the end of the consolidation moves Golden Vale
had a total of 84 branch creameries spread over a wide catchment area,
with one of the lowest bulk collection rates in the industry at only 17%
of total supply.
At a Board meeting in August 1975 the Chairman tabled major
rationalisation proposals for the Group. The preamble in the recorded
minutes revealed the general tone of the meeting:
"The chairman stated that the discussion which will be taken today
under rationalisation proposals will be the most important discussions
ever taken in the Society. .He commented on the pressure put on the
Committee by organised meetings of suppliers.
The chairman referred to his meetings with the banks - A.I.B. have
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every confidence in the business and in the dairy industry in general
due mainly to the confidence by the banks in our executives - because
in the view of the bank,there is not adequate support from the
Committee. It is the duty of the Committee to run this business on a
business-like footing. We have got to get a global understanding of
the problems not a parochial one. The Committee must stand over their
decisions and these must be business decisions"
The tough 'business decisions' taken at that meeting were summarised in
the Annual Report of 1975:
"Following a detailed study of the structure and capitalisation of the
Group your Board of Directors made the following major policy
decisions in October 1975.
1. All processing activities to be centralised at Charleville and
Landsdowne,where growth in milk supplies could be handled without
additional cost.
2. All uneconomic activities to be discontinued. These included
condensed milks, sterilised cream and yogurts.
3. The number of people involved in dairying and trading activities at
each milk intake point to be reduced(there are 84 milk intake
points).
4. An extensive programme of rationalisation to be undertaken in the
assembly and handling of milk throughout North Cork,Limerick and
Clare. The distribution fleet to be reduced drastically in the home
market.
This programme was implemented between October 1975 and March 1976,and
so was completed before the commencement of the 1976 season. The
result of this total programme led to some 400 people becoming
redundant,at a net cost to the Society of £1.3 million".
The Board and the management sought to complement this rationalisation
plan by tackling the related issue of the poorly geared capital
structure of the Group. The difficulty in increasing the equity in a
producer cooperative like Golden Vale was that there was no effective
market for the equity to be traded in. Furthermore,the producer was
primarily rewarded in the current price of milk and not in dividends
awarded on company profits. The low participation of farmer-producers in
the shareholdings of their cooperatives,which has remained a notable
feature of the dairy cooperative movement in Ireland right up to the
late 1980's,clearly indicated that the benefits of shareholding were not
convincing to the producers. This made the raising of further equity
through additional share offerings difficult to achieve.There were also
difficulties in any scheme based on a levy system,where a portion of the
producer's current cash flow would be 'commandeered' in order to protect
and enhance his future cash flow prospects. Since the producer was not
fully locked-in and since his supplier relationship with his coop was
not a tradable commodity,those making the current sacrifice might not be
one and the same as those who would come to reap the future benefits.
The Board "unanimously agreed" to introduce a Revolving Fund(5% of the
milk value)in order to reduce the dependence of the Society on outside
borrowings.This proposal was "narrowly defeated" at a Special General
Meeting of shareholders on the 11/3/76(Annual Report 1975). The Board
did manage to get a meeting of the shareholders to agree to appoint a
consultant "to examine the financial position of the Society and the
effect of the proposed fund". The scheme eventually accepted by the
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shareholders was "a 10% Convertible Loan Stock under which the suppliers
will be allotted £900,000 per annum for four years" and beginning with
the "declaration of a retrospective milk price bonus of £1.3 million
for 1976 by way of 10% Convertible Loan Stock..included in the milk
price charged to the 1976 Accounts"(Annual Report 1976). This scheme was
intended to run until 1980 and to bring in an additional £4.9M.
The rationalisation programme had an immediate impact and,even before
the new financing arrangement took effect,the pressure on the Society's
liquidity eased considerably. With the application of the Convertible
Loan Stock to the 1976 Accounts,through the retrospective £1.3M milk
price bonus mechanism,the Group was able to report on its healthy return
to profit with a strengthened balance sheet. The trading loss net of
interest payments of £1.38M in 1975 had been turned around to a profit
net of interest payments of £1.98M. The relationship between
shareholder's interest and total borrowings at 31/12/76 was 1:1.6, in
contrast to the 31/12/75 ratio of 1:4.34. Group sales in 1974 were
£26.2M on a total asset base of £23M, in 1976 they were £54.9M on a
total asset base of £19M. The Annual Report,with much justification,
made reference to the "dramatic turnaround" that had taken place and
went on to conclude:
"1976 may come to be regarded as a landmark in our Society's history.
Major changes were achieved - all done in the glare of national
publicity which only made these changes more difficult".
The crisis period brought with it some changes in the internal polity of
the organisation. The first development was that two outside directors
were appointed to the Board on the advice of the consultants that had
helped the company with its refinancing package. An Irish Times(20/7/77)
feature on the appointments reported that the management of the society
was "none too happy with the decision to go ahead with the appointments"
nor was the IAOS. The consultants had argued that:
"to survive economically it is essential that the board should have the
required expertise at its disposal. .people whose range of experience
reflect the fact that the complexity of a large modern business unit
requires a variety of business skills"
The two appointees were well known senior business executives in the
Irish business community; Mr. Martin Rafferty,Chairman of the
Brooks-Watson Group and Mr.John Moore,Managing Director of Hygeia.
Their presence on the Board reflected the Chairman's determination to
"run the business on a business-like footing". Also around this time
there emerged a group of relatively young farmer-producers who formed
themselves into a pressure group which became known as 'The Study
Group' .One executive remembered this development:
"In Lenihan's time there developed an outside group who were very
enthusiastic but not popular enough to get on the Board.They formed
themselves as a study group,as a watchdog committee of shareholders.
The Board resented them but Mick had to try to work with them..They
were a most unlikely bunch.The one thing that they had in common was
that they were interested in figures.They started off by attending
General Meetings and then occasionally asked for meetings with
Management.Ultra-right wing would be a good description,and they were
younger than the Board".
Many of the study group were typical of a new breed of dairy farmer that
was emerging as the industry grew and dairy farming incomes with it.
These specialised dairy farmers were becoming substantial businessmen
with significant turnovers.They were better educated than the previous
generation and more articulate. Though still in a minority,and finding
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it difficult to get elected to the Board,they were determined to be
active shareholders and to assert their views on the policy and
management of the Society. They became "the bane of the lives of the
managers" and a new and difficult element in the farmer politics of
Golden Vale.
Within the organisation itself this period saw the rise in influence of
the Finance Department. The Financial Controller,Tony Curtin,had joined
Golden Vale as Chief Accountant in 1972. He became Group Financial
Controller in 1975. "It was Curtin",according to a senior executive,"who
diagnosed the (liquidity) problem straight away".The same executive went
on to describe the effects of the period on Curtin's standing:
"During the rationalisation and refinancing period the refinancing
package was largely done by Curtin and his star began to rise. At that
stage the 'ism' that was in was rigid financial controls and the
accountant was God. The 'ism' before that was technical people - today
probably the 'ism' is marketing. The turnaround was quite dramatic.
Curtin got enormous credit for that".
In 1978 Tony Curtin was appointed Assistant Chief Executive.In 1980
he succeeded Mick Lenihan as Chief Executive of Golden Vale.
While finance's star was clearly on the rise in the mid to late 70's the
same period witnessed the fall from grace of the Engineering Division.
The Engineering Division had been O'Loughlin's first major
diversification and,during his time at the helm,it was the jewel in the
crown. The rationalisation exercise and the introduction of some
sophistication into the management accounting reporting systems began to
expose some problems in the Engineering business. Up to then the
Division had become very powerful and very autonomous under the
aggressive and somewhat cavalier leadership of Denis Murphy.
According to one senior executive:
"My perception was that Engineering was driving the business I would
guess from about 1968 to about 1972 and the power did not begin to
wane until 1974. The personality associated with that was Denis Murphy
who headed up Engineering..
(In 1974) Engineering was still going great guns and had a high
profile to the extent that they bought a site out at Kanturk so that
they would not be fettered by strikes in here - they were doing a kind
of UDI thing on us.Yet by the end of 1975 and the beginning of 1976 it
became apparent that they nearly had us broke...
(During the crisis) Engineering was told to conserve its resources and
we were told to feck off - they would not be fettered by our
bankruptsy but in fact Engineering were guzzling a lot of working
capital..
From very modest beginnings in the mid fifties Golden Vale Engineering
had risen to some great achievements by the mid-70's. It had developed
to become the major indigenous engineering activity in the Irish dairy
industry and had played a major role in the major physical development
of the industry throughout the 60's and into the 70's. By then it had
diversified into serving the UK dairy industry and had contracts in the
brewing,soft drinks and chemicals areas. However it had grown arrogant
with its success and when the big physical development phase in the
industry was over and some of its major markets declined,the Division
had few outside supporters left to help it revive its fortunes. Another
senior executive recalled the change in Engineering's situation in
the late 70's:
"Engineering was building up an empire.There was no control of
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Engineering and no reporting of Engineering...Technologically it was a
superb outfit. But the farmers were very critical of it.They saw it
(as) siphoning off funds from the milk division which was theirs.
Engineering was totally autonomous from here. Murphy was aggressive
and strong at protecting his own group's autonomy. Curtin was becoming
very critical of the lack of control and integration of the
Engineering Division. Curtin began to get very worried about
Engineering in Lenihan's last few years".
The 1977 Annual Report recorded that:
"The division is under close scrutiny in relation to its various
activities and careful attention is being given to its future role,
to ensure its viability".
The following year the Chairman was able to announce,in the Annual
Report,that "the role and the scope" of Engineering had been "clearly
defined" and that the management structure had been "reorganised".
Engineering was reined in and Murphy resigned.
The 70's were a time of major growth in the dairy sector. 1974 had been
a temporary setback in production for the industry as a whole. This was
due to the uncertainty that was prevalent in the immediate aftermath of
the 1973 Oil Crisis,which unleashed a steep rise in the price of inputs
and a period of rampant inflation. By 1975 the industry was back on a
rapid growth path as the dairy industry settled down to cope with the
new economic environment. The beneficial effects of EEC membership,on
which the industry had been banking when it invested heavily in physical
capacity in the early 70's,were only temporarily masked by the Oil
Crisis. Milk production at Golden Vale grew from 61.3M in 1974 to 93.7M
in 1978. Turnover at the Society grew from £26.2M to £89.2M over the
same period. Even allowing for the rapid inflation of the time this
still represented a doubling of the turnover in real terms over the
1974-78 period. Once Golden Vale had implemented its rationalisation
programme and strengthened its financial base it literally grew
out of its problems with the growth in the industry. The O'Loughlin
blueprint,which had almost brought the company to its knees in 1975,was
by 1978,a major retrospective success. Even the decision to expand
capacity to 94M gallons in the early 70's,when the milk supply was
still uncommitted and the amalgamation process was largely incomplete,
turned out to be a retrospective boon. It was through proceeding with
this major capital expansion in advance of a committed supply that
nearly drove the company under in the 1974/75 period. Yet,the same
pre-emptive capital expansion programme,which was largely completed
before the period of high inflation began,ultimately came to be seen as
a 'bargain' when viewed at 1978 prices,as the Society's merchant bankers
pointed out in a report to the Society in February 1977:
"The substantial investment in facilities since 1971 totalled
approximately £10,000,000.
This plant,built at prices which would not now be possible,in our view
represents an outstanding investment for the member/suppliers. As the
milk supply rises in the years ahead we are certain that this will be
appreciated by all concerned with the Society"
The Society made over f7M in profits during the 1976-78 period. The
Chairman was able to report that the Society was "in a strong financial
position" with the shareholders "firmly in control". The shareholders'
funds to borrowings ratio was 1:.55 and the company Board and management
felt in a strong enough financial position to decide to discontinue with
the Convertible Loan Stock scheme after only £2.9M of the targeted £4.9M
had been collected. In retrospect some senior executives saw this as
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having been a major strategic mistake. According to one of them:
"There was a strategically bad decision made to discontinue the loan
stock. The Society had become so profitable at that stage that a
political decision was made that we decided to discontinue it. .All
that happened was that the D/E ratio had returned to 1.Discontinuing
it did not take into account any new development that Golden Vale
wanted or needed to do. Having put it in in the first place with great
effort,it was let go too easily. It stopped the idea that farmers
should finance their own cooperative - we threw away the victory.
We perpetuated the idea that we could fund development with cash
flow".
In spite of the dramatic turnaround and the strong financial position of
the Society,the financial crisis had left its mark on the attitude
within the organisation to further investment.No major new projects were
initiated in the post-1975 period of Lenihan's leadership. The three
main product types were cheese,butter and milk powders and the product
profile of the Society had changed considerably since the early 70's.
Between 1973 and 1979 the manufactured output of cheese decreased from
11293 to 8239 tonnes,that of butter rose from 4912 to 11502 tonnes and
of powders from 18097 to 40053 tonnes. Over this period however the
Society had shown a fair degree of flexibility in being able to alter
its product mix to take advantage of short term price variations in its
major markets. The addition of a casein processing capability would have
greatly increased this flexibility and market responsiveness. While the
idea was mooted in some quarters of management,an investment in a casein
plant had little chance of being approved in the late 70's. According to
a senior manager:
"From the mid-70's experiences we were always on the defensive. Our
farmers were restless and there was always a fraction on the Board who
were uncomfortable. A strategic investment was out of the question
because (these people) would have gone banannas"
The Society was to have ample reason in the early 80's to regret their
passing up of at least one major investment oportunity that presented
itself during this period. The same manager went on:
"We were offered Limerick Dairies - a private liquid milk operator -
(for £300,000). After the battering that we took in 1975/6 we were
reluctant to buy it. We had the money but we did not have the bottle
to do it. It would have been difficult with the Board,and it was a
scene that we knew nothing about. Lo and behold Kerry bought Limerick
Dairies and then in quick succession bought Deal Dairies.This was the
launching pad for Kerry to start poaching some of our milk suppliers..
It was the advent of the change in the liquid milk scene that heralded
the milk wars."
The Society did enter the liquid milk business in 1979 by the eventual
acquisition of a 50% share in Clare Dairies.
Mick Lenihan retired from his position as chief executive of Golden Vale
in 1980.He left the Society in a year in which it had a trading cash
flow of £6.2M and its shareholder funds to borrowings ratio was 1:.80.
However,by 1980,the signs of difficult times ahead were already visible.
Milk supply had peaked in 1978 at 93.7M gallons.By 1980 this had dropped
back to 84.9M. In the 1978 Annual Report the Chairman first signalled
the Society's awareness of "the actions being taken by the European
Economic Community to deal with the surplus of Dairy Products within the
Community" and of the need for steps to be taken in company strategy to
"minimize the effects of these actions and to maximise returns from our
products". Commodity surpluses in the EEC and the slow down in economic
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growth in the wake of the 1979 Oil Crisis heralded tough times ahead. The
Chairman,in the 1979 Annual Report,gave this clear indication of an
industry about to undergo a major transition:
"Ireland's entry and accession to full membership of the European
Economic Community resulted in a significant growth in milk production
and milk prices. Green Pound adjustments and market price increases
raised suppliers' incomes and enabled our Society to withstand the
effects of high inflation and escalating costs. The last two years saw
a slowdown in these price increases,and the introduction of the
Co-responsibility Levy. We must now face a period when increased
benefits to suppliers may be influenced to a greater extent by their
own and the Society's efforts, rather than by political decisions in
Dublin or Brussels...
There are challenging times ahead. These challenges confront not only
Golden Vale but the entire Dairy Industry. It is reassuring that we are
entering the difficulty 1980's backed by a strong Society."
The Curtin Years 1980-85 - Low Growth,EEC Surpluses and Milk Wars
Tony Curtin took over the leadership of Golden Vale in 1980 when Mick
Lenihan retired. While Lenihan was able to depart "in a blaze of glory"
with profits of £3.7M on a turnover of more than £100M,it was already
clear at the time of his departure that the environment of the Society
was changing significantly. The oil crisis of 1979,the second oil shock
in less than a decade,heralded a new stringent environment of depressed
demand and escalating costs in Western Economies. The Chairman,in the
1980 Annual Report,clearly recognised a turning point in the Society's
environment when he said that the year 1980 was "a difficult one and was
a complete change from the buoyant conditions of the late seventies". He
acknowledged that Curtin was taking on the task of chief executive "at a
difficult time for the industry". Curtin had come to prominence within
the Society during the financial crisis of the mid-70's. The Cork
Examiner,in an article(14/May/85) reporting the news of his succession,
publicly acknowledged his "key role in directing Golden Vale's
financial policies after the Society encountered difficulties in 1975".
Yet,in the difficult 1980's the Society was to once more face financial
crisis.In 1985 the Society's shareholder's funds to borrowings ratio
fell to 1:1.5 after two successive years of losses after interest.Tony
Curtin's leadership did not survive this crisis and he resigned in
December 1985.Developments within Golden Vale during the Curtin period,
and since,must be viewed in the context of an industry undergoing
major environmental change from conditions of growth and benignness to
those of retrenchment and competitiveness,and it is to a description of
this major change that we now turn.
Low Growth and EEC Surpluses
The steep pattern of growth in output and prices that characterised the
industry in the 1974-78 was not sustained into the early 80's as can be
seen in the table below:
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73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85
Milk Prod.
Total 599 571 625 675 735 841 864 837 825 890 958 1005 1038MGals
Milk Prod. 66 61 73 82 88 94 91 85 85 89 91 92 93MGals
Golden Vale 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9%
Price/gal 21 27 31 35 49 52 53 54 61 67 71 73 77p
Table 8.3 - National milk production and milk price 1973-85.
The national output of milk for manufacturing peaked in 1979 and then
declined until 1982. The weather conditions operating in 1979,'80 and
'81 were unfavourable to dairying and this in itself affected output.
In addition,the increases in the price supports of the CAP did not keep
pace with the rate of inflation operating in Ireland and farm incomes
from dairy production fell considerably in real terms.Producer
confidence in the industry suffered and this was also reflected in the
sharp decline in national output levels.An improvement in weather
conditions in 1983,coupled with the continued exhortations of industry
leaders that the farmers' best prospects for increased income still lay
in increased production even under smaller margins,encouraged the
recovery in output that characterised the 1983-85 period.While output in
1984 exceeded the 1000MGal mark for the first time,the 'euphoria' that
characterised the industry in the 70's was clearly a thing of the past.
When Ireland was planning its entry into the EEC in the late 60's the
expectation then was that the 1000MGa1 mark would have been exceeded by
the mid to late 70's,and that the full potential of the industry would
far exceed this level.As it turned out,in 1986 output was back down to
958MGals in response to EEC-imposed restrictions.
The international situation in the industry in the 1980's has broadly
been one of increasing supply and falling demand.This had,as An Bord
Bainne(The Irish Dairy Board) in its 1985 Annual Report pointed out,
"led inevitably to a scramble for market share amongst the major
producing blocks".The major producing blocks referred to were the EEC,
the US, Australia and New Zealand. The Report also pointed out that the
EEC share of the world market had been slowly declining for some years
up to 1985. The Community has been over 100% self sufficient in dairy
products since the late 1970's and the disposition of the progressively
increasing surplus had been a growing problem. The Community's price
support system,which was designed to ensure that marginal dairy
farmers had a reasonable income and living standard,had encouraged the
more efficient farmers in the EEC to over produce.In the early 80's
cheaper forms of animal feed,most notably corn-gluten from the US,became
available in abundance.As An Bord Bainne's Annual Report of 1982 pointed
out the combination of high price supports and cheap feed made "large
scale concentrate feeding of cows an attractive financial proposition
in other member states",and it went on to say that "this factory style
production in turn creates large structural surpluses which work very
much against (the Irish dairy industry's) long term strategic
interests".
In the context of declining world demand and rising world production,it
was becoming increasing clear that the Common Agricultural Policy was
not coping with the situation. Rising production within the Community
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drove up the cost of the CAP in the EEC budget. For some
years the EEC Commission tinkered with the price support system to
try to reduce its its overall cost to the Community's budget by reducing
the effective level of price support. It did this,for example,by
increasing the stringency of its quality acceptance standards and by
extending the credit period before paying the processor. Then,in
1984,the Council of Ministers decided to impose production quotas on the
member states with a superlevy penalty on producers that exceeded the
quota.The situation which had resulted in this drastic action was the
alarming growth in milk products that were stockpiled in the Community's
intervention system. In the Irish dairy industry's main product
category,butter,the stockpile in intervention between 1977 and 1982 had
not exceeded 300 tonnes.In 1982 it was at a level of 100 tonnes.By
1983 this had risen alarmingly to exceed 800 tonnes.Even with the
superlevy in place it had risen to over 1200 tonnes by 1986. In
December 1986 it became necessary for the Council of Ministers to impose
a cutback of 9.5% in Community milk production over a 3 year timeframe.
The Irish dairy industry was particularly hard hit by these developments
in world market conditions and EEC policy changes. The industry in
in Ireland was still underdeveloped in EEC terms with lower milk yields
per cow than the EEC average. In 1973,the year after Ireland joined the
EEC the yields,in gallons per cow,were Ireland-563 and EEC(9)-765. By
1986 both had risen substantially to Ireland-801 and EEC(10)-917. The
gap,though significantly narrowed in the intervening period,still
indicated some further room for development. If milk yields were to
continue to rise,as dairy farmers tried to improve their productivity,
then the national dairy herd would have to contract in order to cut back
on overall production. The Irish dairy industry was also very dependent
on intervention type products.The seasonality of the production pattern,
the high proportion of production for export and the geographical
remoteness from these export markets had directed Irish processors
towards milk products with long shelf lives. They were encouraged in
this by the Community's price support mechanism which made the
production of these products throughout the 70's most attractive.
As the nature of the industry's environment began to change in a
fundamental way in the late 70's and early 80's,interested parties,like
An Bord Bainne in its 1982 Annual Report,began to alert the Irish dairy
industry of the need for a major strategic reorientation,though it
recognised that the changes that were needed would not be easily brought
about:
"It has become evident in 1982 that we are far too dependent on
intervention-type products that are highly susceptible to political
interference. We have an urgent need to change the product profile and
manufacture more products that are in demand by consumers.The
seasonality profile of milk production,coupled with the substantial
investment in central processing facilities for intervention style
products,militates strongly against the type of diversification needed
over the next decade".
The Irish dairy industry's product mix had not changed to any
significant degree since EEC entry in 1972. In 1972 butter accounted
for approximately 70% of wholemilk utilisation with cheese and other
wholemilk products accounting for the rest. In 1984 this relationship
had become even more butter dependent at 78% to 22%. The IDA in the
early 80's echoed the concern of An Bord Bainne about the vulnerability
of this product profile and the about the high proportion of the
industry's output that could be classed as commodity.The 1980 position
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was an 83% commodity to 17% higher value-added product mix.The IDA,in
1982,set the industry a goal to shift this profile by 1990 to a 65%
commodity and 35% higher valued-added mix. An industry expert,in a state
of the Irish dairy industry analysis in 1984(Keane,1984;18),concluded
that:
"the outstanding imbalance in the Irish case is seen as the lack of
sales of branded consumer products in Continental EEC countries".
Milk Wars,Engineering and Castlemahon
For the Irish dairy industry as a whole the environmental developments
reviewed above had a number of industrywide implications.It became
clear early in the 80's that aggregate milk production would be
constrained by EEC and market forces at a level way below that which the
industry,as a whole,had geared itself up to in the major physical
expansion that took place in the previous decade. The industry had
excess capacity and a cost structure that was becoming more and more
untenable as world markets hardened,price supports weakened and margins
tightened. Investment oportunities that would provide future profit
stability and growth in the new situation were becoming difficult to
identify and carried higher risks than those prevailing when the
industry was expanding rapidly in the 70's.
In the new environment of the 80's,competitiveness between the major
cooperatives intensified at the margin of their activities. The industry
had excess capacity. Each major processor had a high effective
breakeven point,because of the high fixed costs that typically reflect
a capital intensive operation.They also had a tradition of rewarding the
producer-owner through the price of the main input,the milk supply. The
cost of the main input was effectively determined by the industry and
the individual processor had little leeway in that area. All these
factors combined with the excess capacity to give marginal gains or
losses to milk supply or to market share a major leverage effect on
company cash flow and profitability. On the marketing side the bulk of
Irish dairy products were exported through the central agency of An Bord
Bainne. The one area where the processors marketed directly was to the
Irish consumer and competition on the home market intensified
considerably. By the mid 80's most of the major processors had extended
their activities into the liquid milk area and this further intensified
the competition in the domestic market.
Up to the early 80's the norm in the industry was that the processors
confined their competition to end products and did not compete for
supplies. From 1979 to 1981 the milk supply nationally fell by 40M
gallons and all processors felt a consequential squeeze on profits.
Supplier loyalty had been weakened by the substantial drop in farm
incomes which accompanied the drop in output,and by the failure of the
price rises from the CAP to keep any close relationship with high
inflation.The ratio of average farm income to average industrial wage
had fallen dramatically from 1.04 in 1978 to 0.55 in 1981. Producer
confidence in the industry had plumetted from the euphoria of the late
seventies and a substantial number left the industry. The 'gentleman's
agreement' between the major processors which had restricted and
regulated the transfer of suppliers between them began to break down.
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Producers were more active in seeking transfers where they perceived a
major positive impact on their ultimate receipts.Exhortations not to be
tempted by short term gains and to put their longterm welfare first cut
little ice with many producers that felt themselves already struggling
to survive. The 1980's saw the outbreak of a fresh wave of milk wars
between the major processors.
Tony Curtin was only a matter of months in the job as chief executive of
Golden Vale when the first major milk battle with the neighbouring Kerry
Cooperative broke out. Kerry served notice on the industry early in the
'80s that it was not going to be bound by the traditional 'gentleman's
aggreement' from expanding and took a competitive 'business is business'
approach to the question of milk supply. Over the 1980 to 1985 period
Golden Vale was to lose an estimated net 13M Gallons in milk wars ,mainly
to Kerry but also to other processors,most notably to Kantogher. When
milk leaves the pool like this the effect perpetuates since that supply
becomes committed elsewhere.The annual effect of this loss on the bottom
line was estimated by one senior executive to be around £1.3M. An
opportunity to end the milk war before it had really begun in earnest
was lost in early 1981. The boards and senior management of both Golden
Vale and Kerry Cooperatives met at a Limerick hotel to try to resolve
the situation. It was Kerry's purchase of Limerick Dairies that had
brought it operationally into the Golden Vale catchment area and it had
become the "launching pad" for the milk war between the two. An
understanding was arrived at in which the agreement by Golden Vale to
purchase Limerick Dairies from Kerry for just under flM was central.
Kerry's chief executive,Denis Brosnan,was reported in the Irish Press of
22-Feb-81 as having described the deal as "the final permanent solution"
to the milk war.The deal subsequently fell through. According to one
senior manager,the deal fell through as a result of mutual distrust
between the two chief executives arising from "a total clash of
personalities":
"Curtin took three months to assess it until Brosnan turned around and
said he wasn't going to do it. Curtin had to do the figures...
Brosnan's distrust of Curtin was that Curtin was delaying,and Curtin
was afraid that Brosnan was selling him a pig in a poke. .1 believe
that a deal could have been done with Brosnan at that stage. He was
not financially that strong and was vulnerable"
The two men never developed a personal rapport and the relationship
deteriorated after this episode as the milk war progressed.
In 1979 the Board and management of Golden Vale had set up a 'milk
development fund'. They had reserved £2.5M from the £3.1M profits for
that year in order to "protect suppliers' incomes by encouraging growth
and helping milk prices. .realising that escalating costs and difficult
market conditions would adversely affect milk supplies in 1980". A
further £2.0M was reserved in 1980. This investment of £4.5M in total
was applied to support milk production over the 1980-83 period.
Having invested so heavily in trying to protect and expand its milk pool
in such a difficult period,it was particularly frustrating for Golden
Vale to see this effort largely negated by its losses in the milk war.
It was not surprising,therefore,that the milk war did give rise to such
bitterness and that relationships with Kerry did deteriorate in the way
that they did.
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Golden Vale's ability to ward off the aggressive attacks by others on its
milk pool was weakened by a series of difficulties that put an
increasing strain on its financial reserves and performance.The accounts
for the period 1981-85 show the following provisions under the label of
extraordinary items:
YEAR EXTRAORDINARY DESCRIPTION TRADING TRANSFER TO
ITEM PROFIT(LOSS) RESERVES(-)
1981 0.886M redundancy (0.110M) (0.121M)
1982 £2.579M engineering (0.824M) (£2.086M)
1983 £1.276M castlemahon 0.901M 0.245M
1984 - (0.471M) (0.238M)
1985 £1.346M redundancy (0.505M) (£1.270M)
Table 8.4 - Golden Vale accounts 1981-85, extraordinary items.
The fall in national milk supply of 40M gallons between 1979 and 1981
affected the performance of all the major cooperatives. As the farming
correspondent of the Irish Independent reported on 24-Oct-81:
"Boards of Management of the country's major co-operatives are
considering draft plans for the laying off of employees,working short
time and temporary close-downs to cut costs. Development or expansion
plans by the societies have been shelved. Capital expenditure is to be
restricted to the maintenance of existing plant. .most of the
cooperatives now operating at between 65 per cent and 75 per cent of
capacity"
As late as February 1979,Golden Vale had been planning a £25M expansion.
Not only were these expansion plans shelved in 1981 but the need to
rationalise the milk assembly system had become more urgent.The
rationalisation involved the move to bulk collection and the termination
of milk processing at branch creameries. The branch creameries were to
be reduced to collection points or to trading store centres only.This
involved the Society in difficult local politics and progress had been
slow when the total supply was expanding and the profits were still
healthy.With rising overheads and a smaller throughput in the post 1979
period the issue had to be confronted. In 1981 Golden Vale made some
progress in this area and shed 70 of its 1320 workforce in the process.
The cost of these redundancies left the Society drawing on its reserves
to the tune of 0.121M.
In 1981 and 1982 the Society suffered cumulative trading losses on its
engineering activities of £1.55M. Engineering's performance had been
erratic since the mid seventies.The business suffered severely from the
cut back in capital investment in industry generally and in the dairy
industry in particular in the post 1979 recessionary period.It was
nevertheless difficult,"psychologically" for the Board and management of
Golden Vale to finally axe it since it had been the first major
diversification in the Society's history and a major factor in its
early growth. Golden Vale finally took the difficult decision to close
its engineering activities in 1982 at a winding up cost of almost £2.6M.
Its total drain on the Society's resources over this two year period was
almost £4.2M.
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In 1983,when its cash flow and balance sheet should have improved
significantly as a result of the rationalisations of '81 and 182,the
Society was faced with a further difficulty. In late 1980 Golden Vale
had invested flM in a rescue package for the troubled Castlemahon
Poultry Products company. Four months afterwards the annual audit of the
company revealed Castlemahon's financial situation to be much worse than
Golden Vale had realised. Golden Vale subsequently took a legal action
for negligence and breach of contract against Arthur Andersen and Co.,
for alleged wrongful advice in regard to the investment. Tony Curtin,in
giving evidence in this action in 1986 was reported (Cork Examiner,
19-Jun-86) as having been 'staggered when he became aware of the losses'
that the annual audit of the company had revealed. Andersens based their
defense on their claim that Golden Vale 'had told them that the
acquisition of the poultry company was not primarily investment but a
"defensive measure" to prevent the company being acquired by a
competitor,..Kerry Cooperative Ltd'(Irish Times 10-Jul-86). In 1983,
Golden Vale had to write off its total financial investment in
Castlemahon,which by that time had amounted to almost £1.3M.
The financial difficulties associated with the termination of its
engineering activities and the write off of the Castlemahon investment
led to a growing erosion of supplier confidence in the Society's
stability and in its management. The equity to borrowings ratio had
deteriorated from 1.35 to .82 over the 1979 to 1983 period. Kerry
Cooperative,which had stepped up hostilities in the milk war after the
Limerick meeting of 1981 had ended in failure,took further advantage of
Golden Vale's difficulties and made a bold take-over bid in 1983. One
senior executive gave the following account of this dramatic episode as
he remembered it:
"Denis Brosnan let it be known in a lot of circles around that Golden
Vale was on its way out. He whispered sweet nothings that it wasn't
going to last. This sort of stuff went on. It created a crisis of
confidence with the farmers,along with the fact that we weren't making
money. He let it be known that he would welcome all suppliers..
Brosnan was destabilising the situation and it came to a head when
(he) came in with Jim Moloney of ICOS to make an offer for this place.
The milk war was a softening up process for a takeover. He came with
his chairman to meet with Curtin and our chairman..Jim Moloney
proposed amalgamation and Brosnan jumped in immediately to explain the
detail of what it meant and would entail. (It became evident that) he
wanted nothing short of takeover,not cooperation or federation.Golden
Vale had not anticipated what was coming..(Our chairman) walked out of
the talks. .That finished that solution."
An Irish Press report(29-Sep-83) on the publication of Golden Vale's
interim report for the year quoted Tony Curtin as saying at the
announcement of the results that "Golden Vale is not for takeover by
Kerry,or anybody else". The interim report decried what it termed as
the "gross lies and malacious rumours" that were being spread within the
industry concerning the financial position of Golden Vale "to attempt to
undermine milk suppliers confidence in their society". The Irish Press
article went on to report that the Golden Vale board of directors had
"unanimously rejected an ..ICOS proposal that they have the feasibility
of a merger with Kerry examined" though the Society was "anxious to have
talks with Kerry on areas of possible mutual cooperation,including the
Munster liquid milk market".
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Golden Vale's bankers began to get worried about the Society's financial
position in early 1984. In February of that year the Society closed its
marketing office in London,which it had first opened in 1971. In spite
of this further effort at rationalisation,the Society recorded a trading
loss of almost £0.5M in 1984. The introduction of the milk Super Levy by
the EEC Commission led to an intensification of the milk war in 1985.
Under the Super Levy regime each milk producer was assigned a quota.
Production in excess of this was to be penalised financially. The
processors no longer had the same scope as previously to increase their
milk supply by encouraging their suppliers to intensify their production.
However,suppliers who transferred between processors brought their quotas
with them.Furthermore the new regime allowed for a certain amount of
transfer of slack between suppliers without super levy penalty provided
the aggregate quota was not exceeded. High volume suppliers could be
enticed to transfer not only for more attractive prices but also by the
promise of slack transfer. By mid 1985 the milk war hostilities with
Kerry had reached new and alarming proportions. In the words of one
senior manager Golden Vale's rate of milk loss to Kerry had become a
"haemorrhage". By April of 1985 the Irish Press(10-Apr-85) was reporting
that:
"Rapid expansion by...Kerry. 	 Coop in recent months has raised major fears
that one of the 'Big Six' dairy coops may go under and there is now
strong speculation that the victim would inevitably be Golden Vale.."
Shortly afterwards,on 20-Apr-85 the Irish Times reported the Golden Vale
reaction to the treat to its survival:
"The chairman of Golden Vale. .yesterday launched a stinging attack on
'inter-cooperative rivalry' ,which had led to the poaching of members
with their valuable milk quotas. 'Some societies,' Mr.Pat Johnston
declared, 'seem to be hell-bent on the destruction of others. .Do they
want to destroy Golden Vale? If so are we to believe that one group of
farmers are actively trying to destroy the work of another,undermining
their cooperative and ultimately their livlihood and that of their
families".
On the same day the Cork Examiner carried the news that Golden Vale had
developed a new price structure which provided for a competitive rate of
77.6p per gallon but which included collection and service charges.The
collection and service charges were applied in such a way as to penalise
the less efficient forms of milk assembly. It was,in effect,an indirect
way of paying the larger producer more per gallon than the norm in an
attempt to keep his supply. The large producer was the one most likely
to move to a different processor,being economically stronger and having
more bargaining power than his smaller counterpart. The new pricing
structure was a flawed response to the milk war because it damaged the
loyalty of those most likely to stay,while not having a great impact on
those most likely to play the market. In particular,Golden Vale lost an
estimated 2.5M gallons from about 200 farmers in the Clare area and the
collection charge was "the reason for the change",according to a Sunday
Tribune article on 7-Jul-85. One of the weapons that Kerry used in the
milk war was the operation of a flat rate for milk regardless of fat or
protein content. This was a further breach of industry norms and was of
questionable legality. Legislation dating back to the 1920's had been
enacted to prevent the payment of the flat rate in an effort to encourage
a general and sustained upsurge in quality throughout the industry in the
national interest. This legislation was hopelessly out of touch with the
reality of the 1980's and it provided for a maximum fine of only £20.
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The unanticipated loss of revenue through the milk wars forced Golden
Vale's management to step up their rationalisation efforts. The
rationalisation plans involved further redundancies and the milk war
became an issue of national concern. The Minister for Agriculture was
asked by the company to intervene. His first response,as reported in the
Cork Examiner on 2-Jul-85,was that "we live in a country where free
entreprise is the norm and if people adopt normal trading practices there
is very little that I or the Government can do". The President of the IFA
supported the Minister's view and was reported in the same article as
having said that "to describe this as a milk war or poaching is wrong
when in fact all farmers are doing is exercising (their) most basic and
fundamental right...(to dispose of their produce) to whatever outlet they
think fit". However within days of this report an Irish Times article
(5-Jul-85) reported that the Minister,under mounting "pressure from the
trade unions representing the cooperative workers" was "understood to be
considering action to limit the drastic economic effects of transfers if
they continue". The action being considered was to seek,through EEC
regulation,to have the period of notice for transfer extended from three
to twelve months and the updating and enforcement of the legislation on
the flat rate payment method. The milk war,which at one level was a
commercial competition between two large milk processors for a limited
and restricted supply,had become at another level an issue involving
directly the livelihoods of two distinct groups,the farmers and the
cooperative workers. The Sunday Tribune,in an article on 7-Jul-85,saw the
milk war issue as one in which " the farmers can't lose" and "the workers
can't win" .The same article decried the milk war as having "made a joke
out of the whole concept of the cooperative movement" and having led to a
situation where "tankers from six coops are constantly crossing each
other's collection paths" making "milk collection as a whole. .so
inefficient that thousands of gallons of diesel are being wasted every
week with up to four or five trucks collecting milk from the same area".
The article went on to warn that,in the wake of the close down of Golden
Vale's engineering activities in 1982 with a loss of 250 jobs,further
large scale redundancies as a result of milk war continuing would turn
Charleville into "a ghost town".
By the end of 1985 Golden Vale had lost close to 6M gallons in milk wars
with Kerry and Kantoher,with an estimated impact on trading profits of
£0.6M. The Society reported a trading loss of £0.5M. The rationalisation
undertaken during the year cost a further £1.35M and the net total drain
on reserves after minority interests was £1.27M. The ratio of
shareholders funds to borrowings reached 1:1.49 and the banks were once
more concerned about the Society's viability. The rationalisation
involved a total of 232 redundancies.The failure to hold on to milk
suppliers was depressing returns and leading to financial pressures
that were damaging the confidence of the remaining suppliers,leaving the
Society even more vulnerable to further poaching. A vicious down-spiral
was in motion and had to be arrested quickly if the Society was to
survive. When this down-spiral accelerated alarmingly in 1985 the General
Manager's position became untenable. Insiders readily acknowledge the
great talents and abilities of Tony Curtin and his major role in the
dramatic turn-around of the mid 70's. However the situation that Golden
Vale faced in the '80's called for a different approach and different
management skills at the top. The cost control approach that worked so
well to improve the bottom line dramatically when the milk supply and the
processing industry was growing,was inadequate to the demands of the
harsher environment of the 80's.
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Tony Curtin was the first general manager of Golden Vale,and one of
the first in the whole industry,to have come up without a background in
dairy science or processing management experience. Insiders recalled
his style as "very analytical,not intuitive" with a tendency to see the
business "mainly in terms of accounts" and not with a full "appreciation
of the technology or of the key relationships". His strength was seen to
be more as as a "cost-cutter rather than (as) a revenue-raiser" and he
was "certainly not a politician". The picture that emerged from a number
of such interviewee cameos is of a high rational-analytical manager who
was able and willing to implement the tough decisions on downstream
post-amalgamation largely avoided during the Lenihan period. The picture
is also,however,one of a leader who was impatient and uncomfortable with
with the important,and in this period critical,non-rational elements and
elements and demands of the business. As one executive explained:
"Tony Curtin was a very capable man,very hard working,but he did not
understand the politics of farming. He was politically too straight,if
anything.Tony was faced with most of the internal rationalisation
problems. His biggest weakness was that he was not able to convince
farmers that we were paying a good price for milk. He would introduce
schemes that I would have known were unacceptable to farmers. The
stop-charges(the collection/service charges) on milk was one of the
things...
The politics of farming - you are as good a manager as your last
month's price for a gallon of milk. This is a very basic thing. This
puts you under a lot of pressure. You must appear to be paying a good
price - you may be. There are times of the year when farmers are very
sensitive to price.You could pay a good price in February and a lesser
price in October. These seem small but they are critical. You need to
understand the farmer's own cash flow pattern and his needs.
You have to be seen to be able to keep some people under control and
to be able to stamp your authority on them - they respect that. They
expect you to be able to cope with their pressure and for you to hold
your own.They do not have time to come in and study the books etc. The
only thing they can do is to put on pressure and put in the boot and
see how it goes..."
The manner of Tony Curtin's selection for the top post made it difficult
for him to complement his skills effectively with those of his senior
staff. The post of chief executive,on Lenihan's retirement,was advertised
and outside candidates had been encouraged to apply. In the end there
were three candidates short-listed,all internal executives. The two
unsuccessful candidates remained on Curtin's senior management team and
undoubtedly had complementary skills in key areas of the business,one on
the technological side and the other in the area of farmer politics.
However,the succession contest had strained the personal relationships
between Curtin and these two senior executives,and the new chief
executive was never fully able to "create a management team" approach to
the management of the business. The fallout of the succession contest and
the chief executive's difficulty in subsequently mending the fences only
added to the difficulties that he faced as he attempted to lead the
company through the harsher environment of the early 1980's.
The O'Mahony Era - 1986 to the present 
In 1986 Golden Vale hired Jim O'Mahony as chief executive. O'Mahony was
attracted to Golden Vale from his previous position as the chief
executive of North Connaught Farmers Cooperative,which he had
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successfully managed since 1972. North Connaught Farmers was the seventh
largest dairy cooperative with a turnover of £108M in 1985. He was firmly
rooted in the dairy industry,his father was deeply involved in the dairy
cooperatives before him. He had a dairy science degree from University
College Cork,and an MBA from Dublin University (Trinity College). He was
a contemporary of Denis Brosnan,the Kerry Cooperative chief executive,at
university.
O'Mahony identified the major challenges that faced him on taking over
at Golden Vale as the erosion of milk supplies, the high cost of milk
assembly,and the lack of farmer confidence. He arrived at Golden Vale in
March 1986 just as 200 suppliers were about to transfer their 3.5M
gallons of milk to Kerry. O'Mahony moved directly to meet the suppliers
individually and in groups. His message,as reported in the Cork Examiner
on 30-Apr-86 was 'give me one year to make Golden Vale's milk price one
of the best in the land'. As a result of his meetings he managed to save
2.5M of the 3.5M that was about to leave the cooperative. The Golden Vale
that O'Mahony inherited was one which employed 750 people,compared with
1800 in the immediate aftermath of the amalgamation and had 5445
suppliers compared with 8180 almost a decade earlier. One executive
recalled his arrival on the scene in this way:
"The new manager came in and he was prepared to show strength straight
away. He went out and met the farmers and convinced them that he was
going to put things right and he won back the farmers' confidence. He
is politically more astute than Curtin".
O'Mahony went on record early on about his approach to the long standing
poor relationship of Golden Vale with Kerry and with its chief executive:
"As far as I am concerned,the objective is to make as much money as
possible for the farmers and Golden Vale cooperative. If that can be
helped by cooperating with anybody,no matter who it is,we'll cooperate.
I have no hang-ups about personalities or opinions. Facts and figures
dominate decisions,but I am not going to let him get any more milk".
National milk production was down in 1986 to 985M gallons in response to
EEC cutback policy. Golden Vale was affected by this general cutback and
had some further losses through poaching though these were much lower
than in 1985. However the combination of the two effects left it with
only 84.1M gallons to process,its lowest level since 1976. In spite of
this Golden Vale was able to report retained profits of flM and
strengthened balance sheet with shareholders funds to borrowings ratio at
1:0.89. The rationalisations carried out under Tony Curtin and paid for
during his tenure of office must be partly credited for the return to
profit in 1986. In addition,0'Mahony's moves to stem the milk haemorrhage
and to further rationalise the milk assembly system were also reflected
in Golden Vale's return to the black after 4 successive years of losses.
The number of branches was reduced from 63 in 1985 to 28 in 1986,with
many of the branches being turned into simply collection points. The
number of trading stores had been reduced from 64 to 30.
Jim O'Mahony brought the milk war to Kerry in December 1986. An Irish
Times article on 3-Mar-87 focused on the latest clash and reported that
Golden Vale had "hit back hard at Kerry Cooperative's attempts to 'poach'
its milk suppliers". The article went on to report that Golden Vale's
gain from the latest war was a transfer of 171 suppliers from Kerry with
a milk supply total of 6.2M gallons. Kerry,for their part,had taken 45 of
Golden Vale's suppliers with 0.7M gallons in total. Overall this latest
skirmish represented a new aggressiveness on the part of Golden Vale and
a substantial net gain to them. O'Mahony had served notice to all and
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sundry that further attacks on his milk pool would be met with swift and
strong retaliation. Furthermore,the personal animosity that characterised
the Curtin-Brosnan relationship does not appear to be a feature in the
O'Mahony-Brosnan case.In fact,a Business and Finance article on 24-Sep-87
(p34) reflected on the change in the Golden Vale-Kerry relationship since
O'Mahony's arrival on the scene as follows:
"These two (Kerry and Golden Vale) were pirating each other's farmers
goodo up until last year. All that has changed since Jim O'Mahony
arrived from North Connaught Farmers to take over as chief executive at
Charleville last year.Just how the change in relationship has come
about is difficult to say. It is not even clear whether it originates
from O'Mahony's diplomacy or a change of heart by Denis Brosnan.
Whatever brought it about,however,the two organisations trade with each
other now,with Kerry buying milk powder from Golden Vale and selling it
on. Brosnan has also declared publicly that he does not intend to poach
any more farmers".
O'Mahony has been quoted as saying that "the national reduction in milk
supplies will give the coops time to think on the benefits of
rationalisation and improved marketing"(Co-op Ireland,May'87;11).The
internal changes taking place in Golden Vale since his arrival on the
scene have reflected this thinking. He has retained two of the senior
executives that he inherited from Curtin,the Company Secretary and the
Financial Controller. He has made his own selections for the key areas of
Production and Marketing and has added a new hire and a new position to
the group executive,the Liquid Milk and Milk Assembly function.This
involved the resignation of the senior executive that held the combined
Production and Marketing portfolio under Curtin. He has created a more
visible Strategic Planning function and placed it,significantly,under
Marketing. He has "moved a lot more fire power" into the marketing area
with almost twice the number officially identified with marketing than
there was under Curtin. The group has developed and is currently working
to a corporate plan,though understandibily the details are company
confidential. The company "is moving towards (being) market-led,
market-driven" in the words of one executive. A major internal renewal
and culture change is being attempted to restore the confidence of the
staff in their own ability and potential following the morale damaging
loss-making years,and to educate executives at all levels on the new
business realities and the need for new departures from the customary
ways of managing the business. A 'live-in' business consultant has been
engaged to help the company with this process of renewal. No dramatic
short-term results are expected from these changes. The company is
positioning itself for the longer haul. As one senior executive put it:
"Basically the idea is to get ourselves more profitable by one means or
another,and no big committments until we have built up a reserve. There
wont be any great improvement in borrowings in 1987 because of our
capital programme,but a significant improvement (is expected) in 1988
and 1989 if the Corporate Plan works".
At the end of 1987 Golden Vale was able to report a trading profit of
close to £3.5M on a total turnover of £135M. This represented a recovery
to a profit level more normal for the industry,as the changes introduced
by O'Mahony have already begun to show an impact on the bottom line. The
company is still a long way off the pre-eminence that it enjoyed in the
industry for most of the 70's,but it is leaner and stronger than it was
when O'Mahony took over and is looking to the future with a renewed
sense of confidence.
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The Industry in the '80s - General developments and prospects 
The 1970's was a period of rapid expansion for the dairy processing
industry. Under the CAP regime there was a guaranteed demand for Irish
dairy products,at acceptable prices,that continued to lead the industry's
combined capacity to supply it. This situation continued for most of the
decade up to 1978/79. Notwithstanding Golden Vale's temporary financial
crisis in 1974/75,all of the major processors grew with the market.
Competition between them was comparatively benign with plenty of room for
all players. The environment of the 80's has been very different and has
presented processors with more difficult challenges than before. The fall
in national production in the early 80's and the mounting stocks in EEC
intervention clearly signalled that the market ceiling in dairy
commodities for Irish processors would be much lower than the industry
had been gearing up for throughout the previous decade.
The new challenges of the 80's had the effect of 'sorting out' the
industry as the different processors tried to meet these challenges,each
in their own way. All of the big six cut back on capital expenditure in
the early 80's. All of them felt the pressure on margins from static
growth in milk processing coupled with rising costs. Most of them
implemented major rationalisation programmes and improved their cash flow
and strengthened their balance sheets in the process. While there were
similarities in response,there were important differences also. The
'prism effect' of the challenging 80's can be appreciated when the
relative performances of three of the big six are briefly compared.
The most spectacular performer of the 1979-86 period was undoubtedly
Kerry Coop.In terms of turnover it moved in that period from number 6
to number 1. In the 1979-86 period its turnover increased by 541%,from
£49M in 1979 to £265M in 1986. When national milk production began to
fall in the early 80's Kerry broke away from the industry norms to
maintain its throughput and protect its profits and its cash flow.It
aggressively canvassed the milk suppliers of other coops,mainly those of
Golden Vale and Ballyclough. Furthermore it broke with tradition,and some
would argue with the law as well,to pay a flat rate for its milk supply
which was very attractive to the smaller supplier in particular. It was
quick,however,to recognise that its milk processing business was no
longer a major growth area but having moved to protect its cash flow from
this activity it began a major diversification programme in 1981. This
programme took Kerry mainly into liquid milk and meat processing,both
pigmeat and beef. In 1985 food activities accounted for £62M of £211M
turnover,almost 30%. In 1986 Kerry broke new ground for the dairy
cooperatives when it sought a quotation on the stock market in order to
attract institutional investors to the group. In 1987 further new ground
was broken when the group made an investment in casein processing in
Wisconsin.They have built up their resources in marketing,both in the UK
and US,and also in R&D in recent times. It was one of the first of the
big six to develop a formal strategic plan and towards the end of 1985
the Board approved a plan for 1986-90 "which set new goals and ambitious
targets. .(to) turn Kerry into an international food organisation
researching and processing Ireland's natural resources at home and
exporting and marketing them to the centres of population throughout the
world" (Annual Report,1985).
At the other end of the spectrum was Golden Vale. We have already
reviewed in some detail the troubled history of Golden Vale during this
challenging period for the industry as a whole. While Kerry was expanding
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rapidly,Golden Vale was fighting for survival,and it slipped from number
two in the industry to number six in terms of turnover. In 1977 the
turnover at Kerry was about two thirds that at Golden Vale. By 1986 the
turnover at Kerry was over twice that at Golden Vale. In between was the
case of Mitchelstown. Mitchelstown,like the other processors,went through
programme of rationalisation during the early 80's. It did not experience
the kind of difficulties that dogged Golden Vale and but it did not
attempt to emulate the growth of Kerry. It developed steadily but
unspectacularly during the early 80's and it slipped from number 1 in
terms of turnover to number 4 over the 1977-86 timeframe. Its
rationalisation and consolidation strategy was effective.Its 1986
results reflected a very healthy company with considerable
potential for future growth. Its profit margin of 2.23% compared very
favourably with that of Kerry as did its operating cash flow as a
percentage of sales at 4.1%. Its debt as a proportion of shareholders'
funds was low at 20% so there was considerable capacity for further
borrowing. Their chief executive recognised the company's growth
potential but clearly preferred a slower,more careful and controlled
path to future development with "modest ambitions compared with
Kerry"(quoted in Business and Finance 7-May-87;17).
Industry experts have,since the early 80's,been making the case that the
longer term future and stability of the Irish dairy industry rests on
"the development of branded,consumer-ready products for markets not
requiring institutional support,where the element of security lies
ultimately in the confidence of obtaining repeat purchases from satisfied
customers"(Keane,1984;15).To help the industry make this strategic shift
to a long term committment to the sales of branded consumer goods within
the EEC,An Bord Bainne instigated a Market Development Fund for the whole
industry in 1985,to be levied as a 0.7% charge on the milk price. The
purpose of the fund was to "provide market support to expand existing
branded products in existing markets,provide market support for existing
products in new markets,and develop and launch new products"(Dairynews,
Jan-84;3). In its 1986 Annual Report An Bord Bainne devoted a full
section to a consideration of the strategic direction for the Irish dairy
industry. It reaffirmed that "our best long term interests will be served
by increasing our European presence and reducing our dependence on export
refunds or production aids for Third Countries". It noted the consensus
that was emerging within the industry about the desired direction.
However,it warned that "if profitable diversification were as easy as
(some) commentators would have us believe it would have happened a long
time ago",and it called for a "more reflective and realistic approach".
The process of bringing about a strategic diversification in the
industry,the Report predicted,would be slow,arduous and cumulative but if
carefully selected and executed it could have a major impact. The current
low cost seasonal production pattern was still the major factor that
tended to keep the industry concentrated largely on long-life storable
milk products. Diversification into fresh milk consumables,which many saw
as providing a major market oportunity,would require a much flatter
national production pattern and would only be attractive if the overall
production economics were right. Diversifications would need to be of a
type that "either conformed to our present low cost production pattern or
provided a sufficient premium to shift producers in Ireland on to winter
production".The Report also addressed itself directly to the processors:
"Having regard for the substantial cutback in milk production due to EEC
policy decisions,our industry needs to be ruthless in pruning
unnecessary and excessive costs in every way open to it...
At the processing level,we need to reflect the lower level of
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production with rationalisation,cost reduction and processing
cooperation.The time for running personal fiefdoms has long since
passed...The real competition is overseas and not (between ourselves)
here at home.The tendency to compete with each other at the ultimate
expense of our producers is foolish..(We) hope to see a more
enlightened approach being developed as our industry matures"
In July 1987 the Irish Cooperative Organisation Society published their
"Strategy for the Irish Dairy Industry" blueprint. In it they summarised
the major issues facing the industry and proposed a radical restructuring
in both processing and marketing. Their identification of the major
issues facing the industry echoed closely that of An Bord Bainne reviewed
earlier. In a nutshell the ICOS analysis was that the industry had excess
capacity and a high (overall) cost structure as it faced into the late
1980's and beyond. Moreover,the industry as a whole was undercapitalised
and had inadequate cash flow and profit margins. There was insufficient
investment in product and market development and it was over dependent on
intervention type products and on EEC support mechanisms and grant aids,
which were declining. The industry needed to achieve a much greater
concentration in its resources if it was to remain competitive in
European and World terms,and if it was to be able to generate the level
of funds needed for reinvestment in market,product and process
development on the scale being achieved by its major international
competitors,i.e.the dairy industries in Denmark,Holland,New Zealand etc.
Resource power in the industry was currently being under-utilised and
dissipated by excessive home market promotional competition between
processors,by the maintainance of separate milk assembly and home market
distribution operations with large untapped potential for scale
economies,by aggregate excess processing capacity without the flexibility
of an intergrated multi-purpose processing structure,and by the
continuation of the practice whereby processors compete in some lines on
international markets with the industry's centralised marketing agency.
The main proposals in the ICOS strategy were:
"- Three Regional Dairy Co-operatives to be established and to acquire,
manage and control all milk and milk related assets in their area.
- Each Regional Co-operative to be controlled by one Board of not more
than 12 members. This Board to appoint a Chief Executive and to
establish clear objectives for the cooperative.
- Each Regional Co-operative to pay for milk based on a common milk
price structure.Payment will be made directly to all suppliers in its
region on this basis.
- Central export marketing of dairy products through An Bord Bainne
should be continued and developed. To be effective this must
incorporate a radical change in the structure of An Bord Bainne.
- There will be a changed structure and role for ICOS consequent on the
restructured industry."
(from "Strategy for the Irish Dairy Industry":ICOS,Dublin 1987;4)
For the processors what was being proposed was further amalgamation on a
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grand scale. The ICOS proposals have remained under review by the boards
of the major processors since they were published in mid-1987. In late
1988,they are still an inherent part of the ongoing dabate on the future
strategy and structure of the industry,a debate which has taken on an
increased sense of urgency in the run up to the proposed completion of
the EEC internal market by 1992.
The ICOS blueprint for the future structure of the industry envisioned
the formation of three major consolidations,as noted above. These
consolidations included a Southern Dairy Co-operative to be formed
through the amalgamation of Kerry,Mitchelstown,Ballyclough and Golden
Vale,along with twelve smaller processors,into a total unit controlling
over 500M gallons; an Eastern Dairy Co-operative amalgamating Avonmore
and Waterford,with ten smaller processors,into a single unit controlling
435M gallons; and a Northern & Western Dairy Co-operative involving the
amalgamation of twenty one processors,outside of the current big six,into
a unit with the control of 229M gallons.
The Irish dairy industry appears to be once more in flux as the 1980's
draw to a close. In late 1988 the issue of consolidation remains alive.
However,it now seems very unlikely that the detailed ICOS blueprint will
be followed to any significant degree. During 1988 there were two
historic developments that are likely to ramify far into the future and
that contribute to the current sense of flux and structural evolution. In
the first months of the year a large private entreprise,Goodman
Industries,a meat processing concern,won a takeover battle with
Killeshandra Cooperative for the control of the ailing Baileborough
Cooperative. The decision of the Baileborough farmer-shareholders to opt
for private entreprise sent shock waves through the whole dairy sector in
general,and through the cooperative movement in particular. The monopoly
of the movement over the dairy processing sector was significantly
breached for the first time since 1927,and a new benchmark for
comparative performance had entered the industry. How far private
entreprise will penetrate the industry from the Baileborough bridgehead
is as yet unknown,and a new imponderable,in the future structural
evolution of the industry.
The entry of private entreprise into the industry in 1988 was also
accompanied by the entry of a number of the major cooperatives into the
capital markets. Kerry Cooperative was the leader in this historic
development,a development that,as time passes,is likely to change in a
fundamental way the very nature of the large cooperatives themselves.
Kerry,as we saw earlier,first sought a stock market quotation in 1986.
Kerry's strategic approach to the restrictions on the future growth of
the national milk supply was to reduce its overall dependence on the
Irish dairy sector through a programme of active and agressive
diversification. Kerry redefined its mission and set about becoming an
international food business. In 1987 it broke new ground by investing in
a casein plant in Wisconsin. In September 1988 it followed this up with
with the purchase of Beatreme Food Ingredients,a former subsidiary of
Beatrice Foods,for $130M(f90M). Kerry's lead into the capital markets,and
into new business areas,is being actively followed by both the Avonmore
and Waterford Co-operatives. The initial reaction of the capital markets
to the arrival of Kerry and Avonmore,and to the prospect of more to
follow has been very favourable. In fact,according to the business
correspondent of the Sunday Independent on 24/Jul/88 the "food industry
has become one of the sexiest market sectors" in the Irish economy where
many of the potential market newcomers were likely to come from over the
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near future. The same writer went on to speculate that even "the
once-stricken Golden Vale (which) has been spectacularly revived by Jim
O'Mahony" might be expected to "come to the market when it gets a
reasonable track record reestablished".
The Irish dairy industry,in the late 1980's,seems once again to be in
the process of transition to a major new phase in its historical
evolution,as private interests enter the sector,and as more and more of
the major cooperatives look to the capital markets for new equity,and
increasingly look outside the sector for growth oportunities. Moreover,
the programme for the completion of the EEC internal market in 1992
brings the realistic prospect of new cross-national alignments and
consolidations in the wider Community dairy sector. It is far from clear
at this time how the structure Irish dairy industry will evolve during
the transition,or how long this latest transitionary phase will last,but
there is a growing sense throughout the sector that changes of a very
fundamental,and far reaching,nature are already in process.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT
Part three of the dissertation covers the next two chapters. In this
part the empirical data are analysed and the major analytical categories
for subsequent synthesis and theory building are developed from the
data. Here,in chapter nine,the main contextual factors that were
found to shape strategy in the four organisations under study are
isolated and empirically examined. This is followed in chapter ten
by an examination of the effect of autonomous organisational action on
strategy formation in the four organisations. The approach taken in this
part of the dissertation is to avoid the determinist-voluntarist debate
for the time being and to seek initial insight through analysing the
same empirical data sequentially and independently through first a
deterministic(this chapter),and then through a voluntaristic(next
cha.pter),perspective. This approach,as mentioned in chapter one,owes its
inspiration to Allison(1971). The empirical findings that emerge from
this analysis will then be used in the search for conceptual synthesis,
and for the purpose of theory generation,in the final part of the
study,covering chapters eleven to thirteen inclusive.
The situational context of any organisation is a complex web of
political,economic,technological,social and cultural features as
reflected in the chapter on the national context and in the case
naratives. The researcher,through a process of reflexive interaction
with this data, has identified FIVE,analytically separable though
empirically linked,FACTORS that appear to have had the most salient
influence on strategy formation in the organisations under study. These
are TECHNOLOGY,including production economics and asset specialisation;
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE,nationally and internationally; the INTERNATIONAL
TRADING ENVIRONMENT; NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND LEADERSHIP; and
national SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION. These five factors and
their effects on the strategic development of the four organisations
under study are now analytically examined.
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Factor 1: TECHNOLOGY
Technology is seen from the data to affect strategy formation in a
number of ways. Technological breakthrough can enable the development
and organisation of whole industries to move onto a new plane. In the
case of the dairy industry it was the development of the mechanical
cream separator in the 1870's that made the centralised production of
butter possible. It was the availability of this technology that
enabled and stimulated the structural reorganisatiori of the dairy
industry from a cottage industry to a 'factory' system. In the case of
sugar,without the initial development of beet processing technology the
Irish sugar industry would have been a refining industry only,with a low
level of vertical integration. It would probably have been in the hands
of private entreprise and would have had no developmental role in Irish
agriculture.
Even when technological breakthroughs become available,however,
individual companies can chose to adopt them or not,with strategic
consequences either way. This is most clearly seen in the Irish
Distillers case where historically the Irish distilling industry
rejected the technological breakthrough that allowed for the production
of cheaper grain whisky using the continuous column still. The adoption
of the new technology by the Scottish industry enabled it to broaden the
the international market for the spirit and to secure for itself an
unassailable dominance in the largest 'commodity' segment. The
major differences in the generic strategies of the two industries
can be traced,in no small measure,to the historic differences in the
choice that they wade in relation to grain distilling in the nineteenth
century. Scotch became the high profile popular genre with mass market
acceptance. Irish,by making a virtue out of its distinctive
'pot-stilled' character and by believing that the 'inferior' product
would not receive wide consumer acceptance,had unwittingly chosen a
differentatied high premium niche strategy which constrained its growth.
The data show how expansion at one stage in an industry chain can be
dependent on technological breakthroughs at a previously stage.
In the case of the dairy industry the widespread adoption of the milking
machine at farm level was a major factor in the expansion of the milk
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processing industry. In the first place,the adoption of milking machine
technology was the major factor in the restructuring of milk production
at farm level. Its arrival,alongside the development of an indigeneous
source of fertiliser,made specialised dairy farming an economically
attractive,and physically manageable,proposition for many farmers. This,
in turn,enabled the growth of the dairy processing industry to
accelerate in the post-1950 period. Furthermore the traditional seasonal
production system in Irish dairy farming,a reflection of the economics
of farm level production,has in large part restricted the product-market
scope of the processors to storable milk products,like butter,cheese,
milk powder and the like.In the sugar industry it was the recognition of
this important relationship between its own prospects for growth and the
state of the technology at farm level that prompted the processor to
develop its own engineering activity in order to develop and supply
beet harvesters for Irish conditions and to put its energies into the
difficult task of getting the new technology adopted by the growers.
The development of the distilling industry,in contrast,was largely
unaffected by the national growth rate in barley production,its main
agricultural raw inaterial,because it uses a relatively small percentage
of the total national output.
The trend over time in the development of milk processing,sugar
processing and distilling has been towards increasing concentration in
physical capacity. Ongoing technological development has yielded
economies of scale in the processing systems in all three cases,in terms
of both capacity per £ invested and operating cost per unit
produced. This tendency towards the adoption of more centralised,high
voluine,automated processing capacity has also been influenced by
important marketing considerations. The maintenance of consumer and
trade loyalty,which is difficuitto win and easy to lose in all three
industries,depend on consistent quality and continuity of supply.
Production scheduling and production quality are normally more easily
controlled where capacity is concentrated and processes are automated.
In the case of the dairy industry this trend towards the concentration
of processing capacity was also dependent on the changing economics of
raw material assembly. It was developments in motorised transport and
refrigeration technology that made technically and economically feasible
the evolution of the Irish dairy industry from its early fragmented
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parish structure to its present structure which is now dominated by
large processing centres. Raw material assembly economics were a also an
important consideration in the location of the original four sugar beet
factories,though less important than in the case of milk,which is more
perishable and more prone to contamination. Over time in both cases the
scale economies in centralised processing came to outweigh the raw
material assembly economies in decentralised processing.In the case of
the distilling industry the economics of barley assembly had relatively
little impact on the issue of centralised versus decentralised
processing because the cost of procurement has always been small
relative to the cost of processing.
A further consideration encouraging the trend towards concentration of
processing capacity was the desireability of having multipurpose
processing facilities located in one complex. This is particularly
evident in the case of the dairy industry. The industry largely produces
storable commodities and the market for any given commodity can swing
considerably from year to year. The ability to adjust production levels
across commodities in order to take maximum advantage of the short term
variations in the marketplace can have a sizable impact on the profits
of the industry as a whole and of the individual participants. These
adjustments are more easily made within a single complex managed by a
single management hierarchy than across complexes and across
organisations. In the distilling industry the move to concentrate
distilling capacity was also influenced by considerations of processing
flexibility,but to a much lesser extent. This is because the flavouring
spirits that give the different brands of whiskey their characteristic
flavour must be laid down in cask early in the maturation cycle,which
for the pot-still distillates is 8 to 10 years. The flexibility gained
was more in terms of being able to make adjustments to certain product
attributes,i.e.sniall variations in colour and taste,to suit the
preferences of different national markets. Production level adjustments
across the different whiskey distillates is more responsive to long
term markets trends than to short term market variations.In any
case,short term market fluctuations tend to be much less severe in the
case of branded products than in the case of commodities and strong
consumer loyalty to particular brands is a noted feature of the
distilling industry.
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The availability and adoption of new technology can be an important
element in diversification. In the case of the sugar company the
adoption of accelerated freeze drying technolgy(AFD),a revolutionary
dehydration process,became a cornerstone in the company's
diversification into food processing. The company opened the world's
first commercial AFD processing plant at Mallow in 1961 and developed a
new range of branded and commodity food products based on this process.
Ironically while this technological development provided basis for a
unique success factor in the company's food business strategy,another
technological development,refrigeration,and its application to the food
industry in the form of frozen foods,went some considerable way to
undermine it. In the case of Golden Vale the adoption of processed
cheese technology in 1947 was the foundation on which it was built and
the adoption of spray-dry technology in the 60's was the basis for its
major diversification into what was later to become its main product
line, fat-filled milk powder.
The concentration of capacity in specific technologies oftens involves a
major commitment of resources to specialised activity. These commitments
can then become major contingencies for future strategy formation.They
are the resource base or capability on which future strategy will be
built.More often than not this commitment to certain technologies is
manifest in the large investment in specialised physical assets. The
investment of Irish Distillers in the Midleton distillery complex,of
CSET in its specialised sugar factories,and of Golden Vale in its
Charleville dairy processing complex are the most obvious examples in
the data. For organisations like these,the production technology is
extensive and mainly embodied in specialised physical assets.
For some organisations the production technology is intensive.It resides
primarily in the specialised knowledge and skills of professionals.The
fourth organisation included in this study,AFT,falls into this category.
The commitment to specialised assets,in this case mainly human assets,is
a major contingency for future strategy here also,particularly where the
organisation offers longterm security of employment.This was a major
factor in AFT's ongoing difficulties in attempting to change the
emphasis in its research programme.
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Factor 2: INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Industry structure is usually taken to include basic conditions of
supply and demand;and market structure,including the relative
concentration of suppliers,competitors and buyers and their competitive
strategies(Scherer,l970; Porter,l980). The data reveal an interactive
relationship between industry structure and strategy formation and
illuminate some of its characteristics.
Galbraith(1963;45-46) noted a typical pattern in many US industries in
which "a point of stability is reached with a handful of massive
survivors and,usually,a fringe of smaller hangers-on". He pointed out
that this tendency towards concentration is "deeply organic" and not
simply "the result of some individual's imperial design". He identified
a number of structural biases that develop within many industries which
favour the existing participants and deter new entrants. These include
economies of scale,capital and brand loyalty barriers to entry,
preferential access to capital for those with a proven track record,
economies of experience,and the like. This same tendency is noticeable
in the development of Irish industries but often to a point of
stability where there is just one large survivor. The underlying
economics of industry structure have been an important consideration
in the evolution,over time,of industry organisation.
Irish organisations have a small domestic market. Even in those
cases where an industry is dominated by one company this large survivor
tends to outgrow the domestic market at a low level of turnover in
international terms. Irish Distillers is an example. In 1983 the
company's brands accounted for 80% of the domestic market for whiskey.
Yet the Irish market for whiskey was only around 1% of the US market by
volume,and a fraction of 1% of the world market,in the same year. In the
decade between 1975-85 international sales rose from 30% of the total
industry sales by volume to 58%,a trend that is continuing. Growth-
oriented Irish companies,then,must seek their growth mainly through
expansion in the international business arena. The rate at which
capital has tended to concentrate in many Irish industries,and the level
to which this concentration has progressed,have reflected the developing
concentration in the industry internationally and the scale of the
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industry's international competitors. Few Irish industries can now
support more than a handful of indigeneous companies that are
significant competitors in international terms and many industries,
like distilling,can support only one. Irish Distillers is the Irish
distilling industry at the time of writing,and has been the Irish
distilling industry for nearly two decades.
Irish Distillers became the Irish distilling industry through the merger
of the three main Irish distilling companies in 1966 and through the
subsequent acquisition of Bushmills in the 70's. This concentration
strengthened the international competitiveness of the Irish distilling
industry in a number of important respects. It significantly
improved and secured the profitability of the industry's domestic
activities through rationalisation and scale economies,first in sales
and marketing and later in production and distribution. Prior to
consolidation the industry was dissipating resources in inter-company
and inter-brand competition.It was failing to make any appreciable
impact on its major generic competitor on international markets,scotch
whisky,because of there was insufficient funding for product and market
development.Capital formation was inadequate and fragmented in an
industry in which the productive capacity was in need of modernisation.
The industry had a high cost structure as a result of insufficient
capital intensity in international terms and there was scope for
economies of scale,but not at the scale of the individual competitors.
The domestic consumer's interests were protected in the consolidation
through the operation of government price controls and the availability
of imported substitutes. The concentration of capital in the industry
brought about by the merger allowed the industry to use its improved and
more secure domestic profitability to underwrite a consolidated effort
aimed at developing overseas markets,particularly in the US. As a result
of the merger the industry was able to concentrate,in its export
strategy,on promoting Irish whiskey as a generic product while
de-emphasising inter-brand competition by selectively promoting the
individual brands wherever they were most likely to do well.
The international competitiveness of the Irish distilling industry was,
it appears,structurally strengthened by consolidation. However,the data
indicate that there were also defensive considerations involved in the
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merger. Prior to the merger the industry was dominated by three
distilling companies. One of these had become financially weak and was
vulnerable to take-over. There were concerns among the others that the
the troubled firm might be taken over by a large British brewing
company with uncertain,and less controllable, consequences for the
future structure of the industry.
The same broad strategic considerations were involved in the progressive
concentration that has taken place in the dairy industry over the years.
For the Irish dairy industry to develop to its full potential it was
necessary to turn for its major growth oportunity to export markets.
In 1983 the Irish market absorbed only 20% of the industry's total
output with international markets accounting for 80%. Though the
international market is vital to the industry,Irish dairying accounts
for less than 3% of world output and faces strong international
competition. The first major concentration in the industry took place in
the export marketing area when An Bord Bainne,the Irish Dairy Board,was
set up in the industry in 1962 to be the central agency for the
marketing of Irish dairy products abroad. This enabled the industry to
promote much of its produce abroad under a generic brand,Kerrygold,
which raised the quality image of Irish dairy produce and improved
the industry's export earning potential.
The concern to strengthen the industry domestically so that it
might be more competitive internationally was also central in the major
rationalisations that took place in 1927 and in the 1968-74 period. It
remains central to the recent momentum which has built up within the
industry for further consolidation. The 1927 rationalisation stabilised
and concentrated the profitability of the industry when it was in
imminent danger of collapse from a combination of excess capacity and
sharply declining demand. The rationalisation of the 1968-74 period
brought about a major concentration of capital in a number of large
processing units.The large scale capital programmes of these units were
a vital element in the expansion and diversification of the industry
that characterised this period and would not have been possible
had the industry remained fragmented. The greater concentration of
capital and organisation allowed for major capacity expansion with
economies of scale,in large multipurpose process complexes which
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facilitated product level adjustments to take advantage of short term
market fluctuations. The cost structure and revenue earning capability
of the whole industry were enhanced as a result. The potential for
further economies of scale is limited by the high transportation costs
and highly seasonal pattern of production that still characterise this
industry(Porter,1980;197). However the economic rationale for further
consolidation in the late 80's is that it would allow for even more
process flexibility and enable more concentrated application of capital
for further technological improvements but most importantly for product
and market development.The profitability of the industry would be
enhanced through the reduction of domestic intra-industry competition
and through the potential for rationalisation in milk assembly and
domestic distribution.
CSET is the Irish sugar industry and has been since it was founded in
1934. Concentration in the sugar industry did not progressively evolve,
unlike the situation in distilling and dairying. CSET was set up from
its foundation as a state monopoly. This action was taken when the
second attempt by private capital to develop an indigeneous sugar
industry failed. Private entreprise had established the technical
feasibility of an indigeneous sugar industry based on the extraction of
sugar from beet,but not its economic feasibility. Concentration of
capital and domestic market power,from the outset,were seen at the time
of CSET's foundation to be the structural economic prerequisites for the
successful development of this industry. The data show that CSET was set
up as a state monopoly for pragmatic developmental economic reasons and
not because of any underlying political philosophy of social ownership.
In the case of dairying Ireland has traditionally had a low cost
comparative advantage in the production of milk because of a longer
grass growing season relative to its major international competitors.
The Irish sugar industry has no such low cost advantage and in fact is a
high cost producer in beet production relative to the main European
beet growing areas,such as the Paris basin. Irish sugar,though
comparable in quality with any produced elsewhere,does not have a
premium image internationally,unlike Irish whiskey. Consequently,unlike
the cases of distilling and dairying,the output of the Irish sugar
industry goes mainly to the domestic market with over 80% of the output
disposed of on the island of Ireland.
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While CSET,at preserit,exports less than 20% of its produce,its growth
and development have been significantly influenced by the structure of
the international sugar industry. The world market for sugar is
currently of the order of lOOm tons per annum. The total tonnage for
disposal on the world spot market,however,is only 15m tons. The
remaining 85m is disposed of under price support mechanisms at high
domestic prices in the large markets of the TJS,Australia and the EEC.
There has never been a free market for sugar since CSET was founded.
Agricultural commodities like sugar and dairy produce present particular
problems when supply and demand are left to the operation of the market
mechanism alone. Much of agricultural production is characterised by
relatively inelastic demand and by the inability of the market mechanism
to control supply(Heilbroner&Thurow,1975;l33). Agricultural producers
must typically make their production decisions simultaneously and
short-term adjustments to the production of basic commodities in
response to current market prices is always difficult,and usually
impossible to any great degree. Producers plan future production
levels on the basis of current prices and,under free market conditions,
the overall effect would tend to be a 'cobweb' type supply-demand
relationship. This,in turn,would lead to sharp fluctuations in prices
and to frequent,and drastic,cycles of surplus and shortage. Such an
instability would ramify and amplify throughout the economy,through
the downstream agricultural-based industries. Consequently the
international market for commodities like sugar and dairy products has
come to be governed by price support mechanisms,that favour domestic
producers and try to stabilise producer income,and by production
quotas that attempt to stabilise supply. When CSET sought to grow beyond
its domestic market in the early 60's it turned its attention to
diversification. This was to a large degree a recognition that the
protected structure of the industry internationally,and its own lack of
significant comparative advantages,severely restricted its potential for
growth through the export of its primary product,sugar.
An Foras Taluntais is different from the other three organisations in
this study in that it is not a manufacturing organisation and it does
not dispose of the bulk of its 'product' through a market mechanism.
Nevertheless Its strategic development has been tied inextricably to
the structure of the industry which it serves. Agricultural production
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is by nature difficult to concentrate to any large degree and farming as
an industry tends,in Western economies,to be highly fragmented. The
industry,taken as a whole,has little consolidated market power and
generates little concentrated surplus that can be reinvested in the
areas of research and technical development. Furthermore,the individual
farmer has little incentive to fund research on an individual basis
because he has neither the resources to afford the critical mass of
research normally needed to produce a development nor would he be able
to prevent most of his innovations from being appropriated by the rest
of his industry without it having contributed to the cost of
development. It is for reasons such as these that many Western
governments have set up state-funded research organisations to support
the technical development of agriculture(Calbraith,l963;104).
AFT was described in the case narrative as an state-funded
infrastructural R&D organisation for Irish agriculture.It got
its raison d'etre from the underlying economic structure of agricultural
production and processing. As this underlying structure has changed over
the years AFT has persistently found itself having to try to redefine
its role in line with the change. The major strategic shifts in AFT's
research programme from production research to processing research,
from government-funded to user-funded research, and from basic
infrastructural research to specific contract research are all
manifestations of how the oorganisation's strategic emphasis has
changed,over its lifetime,with changes in the underlying economic
structure of Irish agriculture.
The data show that all four organisations have at various stages in
their development been heavily influenced by organisational and
technological developments in their respective industries worldwide.
The major capital investments by IDG in Midleton, Golden Vale in the
Charleville complex,and CSET in the refurbishments to the sugar plants,
were all done with reference to the latest available process technology
anywhere in the industry. Furthermore,from the pioneering efforts of
Horace Plunkett right down to the major reorganisation efforts of the
last two decades the drive to consolidate and strengthen the structure
of the Irish dairy industry have been taken with reference to what has
been happening elsewhere in the industry internationally,as,for example,
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the excerpts from the report of the Dairy Survey Teaxn(1963) included in
the case narrative most clearly indicate.Similarly the initial concept
and structure for AFT owe much to the Dutch model than was then in
existence and the major reorganisation that took place in that
organisation in 1971 was carried out essentially to a blueprint drawn
from the Canadian experience. CSET continues to monitor its comparative
performance through the European Sugar Manufacturers Association which
publishes annual 'campaign' statistics on the beet harvest and on
production yields and costs.IDC picks up what it can on international
competitors and on what is happening in the industry generally "from
bits and pieces that are published,bits and pieces that you get from
personal contact and bits and pieces that you get from visits to
other companies",as one senior executive put it. These bits and pieces
enable IDG to monitor such comparative measures on their international
competition as case sales per employee,return on shareholders funds,
debt-equity ratios etc. for the major Scotch and American whisky
distillers. AFT and Golden Vale carry out similar monitoring of their
comparative positions within their respective industries.
The vertical relationships in the industry structure have also been a
significant factor in the formation of strategy in all of the cases.
For the sugar and dairy industries the relationship with the sources of
supply has been of major importance. The major thrust of the General's
first phase as leader of CSET was to secure the source of supply. As the
Irish sugar industry sought to grow to its full potential domestically
the General invested considerable CSET resources into the expansion of
the acreage under beet,and towards the improvement of crop husbandry
and crop quality. Under constant threat of competition from alternative
uses for the land under beet the company has had to try to ensure,
through its own productivity and through its help to the beet growers,
that the production of sugar from beet remained a profitable proposition
for the supplier as well as for the company. The growth of the dairy
processing industry was also totally interdependent with the expansion
in milk supply. The amalgamation blueprint of the 1968-74 period was an
attempt to chart the orderly expansion of the whole industry through an
agreed allocation of the milk supply. So ciitica1 has this relationship
been in the industry that the processors had developed an industry norm
around not competing directly for milk supply. On the few occasions when
27S
this norm was breached the ensuing milk wars created major uncertainty
and instability in the industry. In the case of Golden Vale,the milk war
with Kerry in the early 80's undermined its profitability and was the
major factor In its fall from number 2 in the processing industry to
number 6. Like the sugar industrythe dairy industry has also had to
contend with competition from alternative uses for land and sources of
farm income. The major drop in national milk production in the 1980-81
period represented a sharp drop in the confidence of producers in their
industry and gave rise to an over-capacity situation in the processing
part of the industry chain,which was a direct cause of the milk war
that ensued between Kerry and Golden Vale.
A central dynamic in the relationship between producer and processor in
these two industries is that it involves both cooperation and
competition for profitability at one and the same time. The processors
need to generate internal funds for capital maintenance and for further
development,yet they must ensure,through the milk price and the beet
price,that the producer's income is at least adequate to secure his
continued participation in the industry. In spite of their long history
of association and interdependence in the development of their
respective industries the issue of milk price and beet price,and through
them the division of the profits of the industry,remain perennially the
most sensitive issue between producer and processor.
For Irish Distillers and An Foras Taluntais it is the vertical
relationship at the forward end of the industry chain the distribution
end,that has been most significant strategically.Before the 1966 merger
that consolidated the production of Irish Whiskey,the product was
brought to the ultimate consumer through an independent wholesale
network. Moreover the wholesalers typically bought the whiskey in cask
from the distillers and did their own blending. To gain more control of
their product quality,and of its access to the consumnerone of the first
major strategic moves of the newly merger entity was to bypass the
wholesale network and distribute a bottled product directly from the
distillery to the retail outlets. This involved a massive investment in
pipeline inventories, that were previously carried y the wholesale
trade. It also involved a major political confrontation with the
wholesalers whose power and stake in the industry were being taken
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away. These risks were assumed by the newly consolidated distilling
company as an essential element in a strategy that involved development
and domination of the home market as the basis for a future export-led
growth drive. Then over the following decade a major structural change
developed in the retailing end of the industry. The growth of the
off-licence trade,both stand alone and within the large multiple
supermarket chains,both shifted and consolidated buying power within the
industry so that by the 1980's this off-licence business represented
about 40% of IDG's domestic business concentrated in the hands of just
10% of its customer base. It was to increase its own influence over
this retailing structure that IDG integrated forward in 1984 and took
over the BWG Group. The acquisition,through this takeover,of a large
cash and carry business ,AWL,gave IDG a more direct influence on the
independent off-licence trade.
For An Foras Taluntais the relationship with the advisory service has
always had strategic significance. The advisory service was developed
to be the primary channel through which the research output of AFT would
be distributed to the farming community. Even though these agencies were
supported mainly through the political system rather than through the
market system,nevertheless,they were still links in an industry value
chain(Porter,1985).These agencies,like independent producers and
distributors in the market system,have found themselves competing for a
share of the 'income' that is generated through the service that they
combine to give to the farming community. The 'income' in this parallel
between market systems and public arenas is the annual appropriation,
which as Wildavsky(1965;34) pointed out in his development of the
parallel is the "most essential manifestation of political support",and
one could add also of public prestige,for a public agency. Two major
efforts have been made to bring about an integration of the two
services. The first effort in the mid-seventies was driven by the
Minister for Agriculture and by the Director of AFT. The Minister's goal
was to achieve the same level of political 'revenue' from a smaller
amount of public expenditure through the rationalisation of the two
services. The Director's goal was to consolidate and to extend the power
and prestige of his organisation within Irish agriculture. This first
effort was resisted by a coalition of the professional staff within AFT
with the main opposition party in Dail Eireann. A decade later,under
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severe public service budgetary constraints,the government of the day
have succeeded in forcing through a merger of the two organisations
which is bringing about a major rationalisation and retrenchment of the
two services.
Finally,strategy formation in all of the organisations in the study
has at various stages,been significantly influenced by basic structural
changes to the supply-demand relationship within the industry and by the
development of substitute products. The distilling,dairying and sugar
industries have all in recent times experienced significant shifts in
consumer demand away from their main product lines because the growing
concern among consumers generally about health and diet. The Irish Dairy
industry has seen the domestic sales of its main product,butter,fall by
almost 40% between 1983 and 1986 as consumer demand shifted to lower
fat,lower colesterol substitutes. Dairy processors have reacted through
intensive new product efforts industrywide to develop low-fat,low
colesterol spreads.The industry as a whole has also begun to recognise
the need to diversify its product range considerably and to become more
consumer oriented. Excess capacity in the industry internationally and
the sharp decline in demand for the industry's traditional product lines
are together having a major influence in the strategies that are
currently being formed throughout the industry. Furthermore the
availability of cheaper forms of animal feed,in particular of corn
gluten from the IJS,has changed the cost structure of the industry.It
has made the large scale concentrate-feeding of cows an attractive
proposition and has thereby eroded much of the low cost comparative
advantage of the Irish industry.It has also encouraged over-production
under the price support mechanism in the EEC dairy industry at a time
when the overall demand worldwide for dairy commodities is declining.
In distilling the major strategy that IDG developed in the post merger
period and persisted with throughout the 70's was to build up a strong
profit base in Ireland through dominance of the domestic market,and to
use this base to fund its development of the US market. The US market
was seen to offer it enormous scope for growth beyond that afforded by
the domestic market alone.IDG invested heavily in this strategy, but it
became seriously undermined in the late 70's,and early 80's,when the
underlying trend in US demand began to move away from the company's
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main product base. American consumer taste began to shift away from
hard liquor to wines and beers,again reflecting a growing concern with
health and diet. Furthermore,within the hard liquor category itself
there has also been a shift away from brown spirits towards white
spirits which has exacerbated,for IDG,the effects of the decline in the
spirits market. Starting from such a low base the company managed to
develop the US market to the degree that Irish whiskey became the
fastest growing category of spirit in the overall declining market.
However,the countervailing market trends have limited the potential
of the strategy and increased its cost. This development has recently
led to a major revision and modification of the company's strategy for
export-led growth. Reflecting the overall trend in the liquor market
generally the company has also in recent years successfully launched its
first non-spirit new product,a new strategic departure, with a fair
degree of success. Finally,in the distilling industry internationally,
the decline in demand has led to an increase in concentration as the
the major players have moved to maintain their earnings growth through
acquisition and take-over. As a result of these developments IDG,with
its monpoly control over a distinct genre of liquour,Irish whiskey,
became an increasingly attractive target for takeover. For six months
during 1988 two international players were locked in a battle for the
future ownership of the company. The eventual success of Pernod Ricard
in this takeover battle will undoubtedly have historic implications
for the future of IDG and the Irish distilling industry.
For the sugar industry worldwide the major development affecting the
overall level of demand has been the trend away from sugar towards
low calorific sweetners and towards more direct substitutes. The natural
growth that the sugar industry experienced through the sustained
growth in one of its major customers,the soft drink industry,was
severely attenuated by the development of isoglucose,as a direct sugar
substitute;and aspartame as a low calorific sweetner,more popularly
known as nutrasweet. The trend towards the low calorific sweetners is
yet another reflection of the underlying consumer concern with health
and diet.The trend towards the direct substitutes reflects the
desire of the soft-drink industry to reduce its dependence on the sugar
industry and to secure a source of supply that is less prone to the
periodic shortages that can befall a natural product as a result of a
particularly bad harvest * For CST th effect of these trend.s has bean
to reaffirm its st teic conf rement in sugar largely to the domestic
market and to put it under increasing coupetitive pressure in this
market.
Supply-demand considerations and the availability of substitutes have
operated more indirectly in the case of Afl.. This organisation has
always had a problem in measuring the demand level for its services,,in
determining the level of consumer satisfaction and in sensIng basic
shifts in its consumer's needs. In fact it was precisely because of
these difficulties that it evolved fairly elaborate review processes
to ensure that its research programme remained current with the changing
problems of its clients and to demonstrate to the resource providers the
level of its client support. The early 1970's marked a major change in
the financing of the organisation. The government of the day decided
that the further development of the organisation would be tied more
directly to client support in the form of levies and contract research.
The tangible support coming from some sectors most notably the dairy
sector,was higher than that from others and the relatively poor response
from the main sector of Irish agriculture,the beef sector 3was
particularly disappointing to the organisation. Direct government
funding of AFI began to decline steadily in real terms from the mId-70s
onwards. This forced the organisation to find progressively more
revenue directly from the client base and has been a major factor in
changing the emphasis in the research programme away from basic research
to development research. More recently the demand for production
research,for long the bedrock of the AFI programmehas declined
dramatically in the light of the developing surpluses in agricultural
commodities. The demand for research on processing has increased.
However,with the increasing concentration of capital in the processing
industry,many of the large processors have begun to develop their own
in-house R&D. In-house R&D is a major substitute for the services of
an organisation like AFT.This trend towards in-house R&D,therefore,has
major implications for AFT's future role in Irish agriculture.
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Factor 3: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT
Strategy formation in the organisations under study was also affected by
elements in their situational context analytically separate from their
technologies and industry structures. If the world was truly a single
market economy then technology and industry structure would be the
salient contextual elements in the formation of strategy. The fact that
world trade patterns are affected by political as well as economic
considerations made it meaningful to distinguish,within the situational
variable of industry structure,between the industry structure nationally
and internationally. It also suggests that the changing structure and
'rules of the game' of the international trading environment,and the
domestic public policies of major trading partners,can have a marked
effect on the development of trading organisations,particularly on those
of a small open economy like Ireland.The data show that at various times
and in various ways developments in the structure and 'rules' of the
international trading environment,and in the level of international
trade,did affect the development of the focal organisations.
International Conflicts
The two major international conflicts of the twentieth century disrupted
the prevailing pattern and level of international trade. After each of
the World Wars,the pent-up demand released at the end of the conflict
gave rise to post-war booms. For agricultural products with their
relatively inelastic demand the immediate boom in both cases was short
lived and followed by a dramatic fall in prices. For the developing
Irish dairy industry the effects of the first world war and its
immediate aftermath were particularly significant. The industry was
still in its formative period when hostilities broke out in 1914.
Since 1890 the industry had been rapidly transforming from a farm-based
to a creamery-based structure,largely due to the initiative of the
cooperative movement under the leadership of Sir Horace Plunkett.
During the War the industry continued to expand. The pattern of its
production changed dramatically,however,in response to the changes that
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war time conditions brought about in Britain,its primary export market.
During 1915-19 butter exports to Britain fell from 40k tons to 17k
tons under war-time price controls.This,however, was more than
compensated for by the dramatic expansion in cheese exports which rose
over the same period from .25k tons to 15k tons as the price of cheese,a
wartime scarcity, soared.
Inflated post-war prices for agricultural products generally,
including cheese and butter,fell rapidly after l920,and continued to be
depressed for most of the decade. As commodity prices fell,so too did
milk prices,and the milk supply to the creameries contracted. The Irish
dairy industry,which had expanded rapidly and fragmentally in the
1913-20 period in response to market oportunity,found itself in the post
1922 period with severe excess capacity. The scramble for survival which
ensued was so potentially destructive to the whole industry that the
Government was persuaded to intervene to rationalise it. The
rationalisation of 1927 was significant in history of the industry for
two reasons. It consolidated the industry and strengthened its base for
further development. It also secured the industry for the cooperative
movement at a time when cooperative and private interests were both
jockeying for primacy in the organisation of the industry.
For the dairy industry the disruption caused by the Second World War
affected the growth rate of the industry more than its structure and
organisation. Scarcity of supplies,transport and fuel shortages all made
life difficult for the industry. Butter was rationed,prices were
controlled and the industry's latest effort to develop the British
market,through the recently established Butter Marketing Comniittee,was
disrupted.There was competition for land use from tillage,which was
intensified by the Government's emergency compulsory tillage programme.
The result of all of these effects was that national milk production
remained at a level of l3Om gallons throughout most of the 1940's,a
level only 30% higher than the level operating in 1922. The take-off of
the industry was delayed for almost a decade by the international
conflict.
For the sugar industry the advent of the 1939-45 war both accelerated
the development of the industry and strained it to near breaking point.
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CSET had been set up in 1934. For its early development it relied
heavily on the import of European technologists. When the war broke out
these strategic resources returned to their homelands and the company
was forced by the exigencies of the situation to become self-sufficient
with national expertise alone,much sooner than had been forseen at its
foundation. The organisation responded to the challenge,and the industry
proved its strategic value to the country in being able to supply the
home market to its pre-war levels throughout the period of the conflict.
However,the hostilities did lead to severe difficulties in the
acquisition of vital spares for the beet processing equipment,which were
unobtainable from the original suppliers. There were vital shortages
also in grease,oil,formalin and beet knives. Beet seed,no longer
available from abroad,had to be grown at home,and fertilisers were in
short supply. By 1945 the industry "had a group of experienced people
but they had expended their efforts on stop gap measures" to keep the
industry going during the war. The industry had proved itself but was
not in a very coherent state at the end of the conflict.
The Structure of International Trade
The structure of the international trading arena,like that of many
industries,is not homogeneous. The structure of international trade
is dominated by a small number of major economic powers or trading
blocks. The pattern of trade is largely dictated by these major
powers,and the majority of international traders have to survive
under their 'umbrella' with comparatively little influence on the
evolution of the structure,or on the prevailing pattern,of world trade.
The structure and pattern of world trade,and the 'theories in use' of
the major economies that largely determine this structure and pattern,
have gone through a number of major changes since the end of the 1914-18
war. The changes which the data show had most impact on the development
of Irish organisations were;the protectionism and isolationism of the
interwar years,the formation and development of the European Economic
Community and the general trade liberalisation and boom of the
1950-74 period; the emergence of OPEC as an economic power block and the
redistribution of world income; and the 'new game' of the 1980's.
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Protectionism and Isolationism
The protectionism and isolationism that characterised the international
trading arena in the interwar period had its roots in the decline of
Free Trade as the governing economic principle,in the unwillingness of
the United States to assume a leadership role in the ordering of
international economic affairs,and in the Great Depression. The
evolution of this protectionism and isolationism is now briefly
reviewed,as a prelude to examining its effect on the development of
the organisations in the study.
Great Britain was the major economic power of the nineteenth century and
a strong and persistent supporter of free trade. Having achieved a
significant lead,historically,in the process of industrialisation,
Britain had a comparative advantage over less industrialised nations in
the international mass marketing of its manufactured goods. Under free
trade conditions British manufactures were highly competitive with
domestic products in most foreign markets. By the early years of the
twentieth century the industrial power bases of the United States and
Germany had grown to match that of Britain in the international arena.
Both nations had used selective protection to allow their industrial
bases to grow to full competitiveness in international terms. The case
for free trade as a universal doctrine for international trade was
empirically undermined by the evidence of US and German experience.
The United States emerged from the 1914-18 war as the world's leading
economic power. However,it was reluctant to accept the political risks
that it felt to be associated with any active leadership role in the
restructuring and reordering of- international economic affairs in the
post-war period. "It was willing to participate in internationally-
flavoured pacts and agreements but unwilling to bind itself by either
machinery or promises to actual involvement in European or Asian
affairs",and American statesmen faced at home "a strong determinism to
avoid foreign entanglements,keep up trade barriers and emphasize
domestic progress"(Nye&Morpugo,1965;651). In the period 1920-32 American
public opinion was fairly evenly split between isolationism and
internationalism and US foreign policy steered a middle path.
Under this 'middle-path' policy,the US economy expanded rapidly
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throughout most of the 1920's. Except for agriculture,mining and
textiles,the business profits of America reached new historic heights.
US economic development had become the envy of European countries, still
struggling with post-war reconstruction. Then the American 1920's boom
spiralled out of control.
The seemingly boundless optimism in the future profit growth of US
business led,in the late 20's,to a massive rediversion of American
capital from investment in European economies under reconstruction,to
domestic speculative investment in US stocks. US stock prices rose to
grossly inflated levels. When the crash came in October 1929,it was
sudden and dramatic. Between 1929 and 1932 economic activity in the
world's leading economy had declined sharply and drastically. Stock
prices fell by 83%,productive output was down 40%,dividends were
down 57%,wages were down 60%,money had depreciated by 50% and,worst of
all,unemploynient reached l7million(Nye&Morpugo, 1965; 660). The sudden
drop in the level of US imports compounded the pre-crash impact of the
sudden withdrawl of US foreign investment and the depression quickly
spread internationally. Productive output in Britain,France and Germany
fell by 16%,28% and 47% respectively between 1929 and 1932 and
unemployment rose to unprecedented levels in these major industrial
nations.
The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed created,not
just economic,but also ideological,shock waves that affected Western
political and economic order. Free trade and laissez-faire were
abandoned as guiding principles in many industrial nations. For
Britain,in particular,it meant the abandonment of long cherished free
trade ideals,at least for the foreseeable future.The influential
economist J.M.Keynes,at a public lecture in Dublin in l933,indicated the
change in contemporary intellectual opinion that these events had
brought about,particularly in relation to the doctrine of free trade:
"I was brought up,like most Englishmen,to respect Free Trade not only
as an economic doctrine. .but almost as part of the moral law. .Yet the
orientation of my mind is changed;and I share this change of mind with
many others. .It is my central contention that there is no prospect for
the next generation of a uniformity of economic system throughout the
world,such as existed,broadly speaking during the nineteenth century;
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that we need to be as free as possible of interference from economic
changes elsewhere,in order to make our own favourite experiments
towards the ideal social Republic of the future;and that a greater
movement towards national self-sufficiency and economic isolation will
make our task easier,in so far as it can be accomplished without
excessive cost"(The Finlay Lecture,University College Dublin,19/4/33).
The unprecedented high levels of unemployment in the Great Depression
brought to an end the laissez-faire relationship between governments and
their industrial complexes. In 1932 the US electorate endorsed F.D.R.'s
'new deal for the American people' ;a deal he had pledged to deliver
through 'bold,persistent experimentation' (Nye&Morpugo,l965 ; 662-4).
Likewise in Britain,the MacDonald government,in l931,"were given a
'doctor's mandate' to try any remedy"(Pollard.,1983 ; 123-4). By popular
mandate these administrations were given a more active role in the
management of their economies and empirical pragmatism replaced
economic doctrine as the guiding philosophy for their actions. Later,in
1936, Keynes published his 'General Theory of Employment,Interest and
Money' and provided a new and powerful theoretical legitimacy for this
new active role.
International trade in the 1929-39 decade,then,was characterised by
protectionism and isolationism.The protectionist policies of this
era were different in character and motive than those which had allowed
the industrial bases of America and Germany the time to take root. In
the period of the Great Depression the world's leading traders turned to
general protectionism and isolationism in an attempt to 'export' their
unemployment and to decouple their economies from the effects of
depression elsewhere.International trade became more restricted and its
volume fell considerably. International trade became more politicised
and tariff barriers came to be used as instruments of political,as well
as economic ,policy.
For the Irish whiskey industry the interwar years offered little scope
for development.The economic boom that the US enjoyed for most of
the 20's before the crash might have provided the Irish whiskey
industry with an oportunity for major development through export-led
growth were it not for the prohibition wave that swept across the United
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States during this period. Prohibition was repealed in 1933 but after
the Crash of '29,the fall in US domestic demand and the rising tariffs
on imports effectively closed off any hope of regaining a substantial
presence in this major market for whiskey until after the War.
In the early 1920's Irish pot-stilled whiskey had begun to lose
significant ground to blended whiskey on its major export market,the UK
market. Then the combination of Great Depression,destructive 'Economic
War' and wartime disruption almost totally eroded its position on this
market. All in all the total exports of Irish whiskey fell drastically
over the 1925-45 period from l.012m to O.108m proof gallons. The
industry came to concentrate almost entirely on the domestic market
during the 30's and 40's and remained fragmented,inward-looking and
relatively inefficient behind the Irish tariff walls.
The interwar years were difficult years for the development of dairy
production and for the expansion of Irish dairy exports. Britain
remained the major export market for Irish dairy products until the
l960's.The British economy did not enjoy the same level of buoyancy that
characterised the US economy throughout the 20's. This was largely due
to her return to the gold standard and to her maintenance of a grossly
overvalued currency throughout this period,at the expence of a low level
of economic activity and a high level of unemployment,even before the
slump. We saw earlier that the go-stop condition of the British market
for dairy products in the early 20's led to a shake-out in the Irish
dairy industry and to its first major rationalisation in 1927. Prices
recovered somewhat towards the end of the decade and then declined
steeply after 1929 as the depression took hold. At that time
export prices regulated the price of butter on the home market and this
in turn determined the milk price to farmers. By 1931 milk prices had
fallen below the 1914-18 levels. It was in these circumstances that a
price support system was introduced into the Irish dairy industry for
the first time in order to stabilise it and protect it from the harmful
effects of external influences.
The British market continued to be of strategic importance to the Irish
dairy industry even when the market went into a depressed state after
1929. Britain adopted a policy of protectionism in 1931,reflecting the
change in the international arena generally with the onset of the Great
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Depression. However the British response to international protectionism
was to create a large trading block around itself through a system of
imperial preference and protected by a tariff wall from outsiders.
The Irish dairy industry might have benefited by continued favoured
access to the British market through this imperial preference system
because of Ireland's dominion-type status at that time. However the
'Economic War' that broke out between Ireland and Britain during the
1932-38 period was a clear manifestation of the political use of the
tariff barrier by both countries. All Irish exports to Britain,including
dairy exports,faced a punitive ad valorem duty of first 20%,rising later
to 40%. The Government did take action to mitigate the effects of these
tariffs by the introduction of export subsidies but between the post-war
go-stop conditions in the British market in the 20's,the protectionism
and economic war of the 30's and the international conflict of the 40's,
the Irish dairy industry found little scope for development in the basic
area of milk production and processing.
The industry structure did however change significantly during this
period and turnover grew.There was a marked consolidation of societies
as stronger units took over weaker units and the industry's current
structure began to take shape in this period with the emergence of
Ballyclough,Mitchelstown and Dungarvan(now Waterford) as three industry
leaders. The price support systems did allow for a more ordered
development and in the face of static milk supply levels the industry
turned,in this period,to the expansion of its trading activities to
increase overall turnover. Agri-goods,which in 1920 accounted for
only 13% of the turnover of the cooperative creameries,rose to 32%
by 1940.
In contrast to the distilling and dairying industries,whose prospects
for development were limited by the prevailing protectionism and
isolationism that characterised the international trading arena at this
time,the budding Irish sugar industry was saved from extinction and
nurtured through its infancy in these same prevailing conditions.
The first commercial attempt to develop an indigeneous sugar industry
was failing when the State intervened. The State's intervention in 1934
to reorganise the industry as a state-owned monopoly was a reflection of
the empirical pragmatism that characterised the prevailing wisdom about
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state intervention in economic activity.The government of the day
recognised that the manufacture of sugar from sugar-beet was not,jn
itself,a commercial proposition but justified it on the basis of its
advantages to the economy as a whole,in terms of agricultural and
industrial employment and of social development. The isolationalism and
protectionism that had become the 'theories in use' in the international
trading arena provided an external supporting rationale for such a view,
and for establishing the industry under tariff protection.
International Trade Liberalisation and Expansion and the EEC
The volume of international trade over the 1913-74 period shows two
distinct phases:
1913	 1928	 1937	 1950	 1960	 1970	 1974
Index of volume
of world exports	 100	 113	 114	 131	 244	 525	 732
(Sodersten,l980;lOO).
Table 9.1 - Index of volume of world exports 1913-74.
The period up to 1950 was characterised by two world wars and an
interwar period that combined a deep depression with an era of
isolationism and protectionism. These factors,taken together,severely
restricted the growth in international trade.The period 1950-74 presents
a marked contrast. During these two decades world production and world
trade expanded considerably with trade expanding faster than production,
indicating the growing level of interdependency in the international
trading arena.
After the Second World War the United States,as the international
trading world's leading economy,played a more active role in the
reconstruction of European economic activity and in the revitalisation
of international trade than it did after the first world conflict
earlier in the century. In the late 40's the economies of war-torn
Europe struggled painfully to reconstruct their industrial bases and
financial systems.Their international trading activities remained
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constricted because of the severe international liquidity difficulties
arising out of lack of confidence in each other's currencies. The
Americans "saved the day by their generous and spectacularly successful
Marshall Aid Plan,which pumped desparately needed resources into the
European economy" (Livingstone,1966;105).
Within Europe itself a new,and historic,economic order evolved from this
American aid for European recovery. The first tentative and awkward
steps were taken by the establishment of the Organisation for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC),which,while it made some progress on
economic cooperation,remained essentially an inter-governmental
conference in permanent session(Hallstein,l962;7).The first decisive
step beyond economic cooperation and towards economic integration came
with the famous 'Schuman declaration' made by Robert Schuman,France's
Foreign Minister,on May 9,1950. Schuman proposed the pooling of French
and German coal and steel resources under common supranational
institutions that would be open to any other European countries able and
willing to join. "Europe," declared Schuman,"will not be made all at
once,or as a single whole:it will be built by concrete achievements
which first create de facto solidarity". Building quickly on the process
begun by the Schuman initiative,six European countries,led by those old
traditional enemies,France and Cermany,signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957
and brought into being the supranational European Economic
Community(EEC).
The original six members of the EEC were France,Germany,Belgium,the
Netherlands,Luxemburg and Italy. Great Britain had the oportunity,
at least in the early stages,of being one of the leading architects in
the evolution of the EEC. However she let this oportunity slip and in
the process jeopardised her chances of gaining early membership of the
Community after the EEC was formed. For this,there were a number of
reasons. The maintenance of the imperial preference system,in its then
form,would have been incompatible with European economic integration.
Furthermore,Britain was reluctant to give up her desire to remain an
independent world power. Finally,she was also sceptical that economic
integration involving France and Germany could work,however worthy the
ideals behind it,and she was reluctant to commit herself in advance of
the evidence.During this formative period the British had begun "to
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accumulate the reputation of being bad Europeans"(Livingstone,1966;11l),
and Britain's first application for membership of the Community in
August 1961 was unsuccessful. Ireland's application for membership was
taken in tandem with those of Britain and Denmark and was likewise
unsuccessful. The applications were not actually withdrawn and were
re-activated later in the decade. In 1972 Britain,Ireland and Denmark
were eventually admitted into the EEC. As an interim measure,and as a
stepping stone along the way to Community membership,the Irish
Covernment,in l965,negotiated the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement with
her largest trading partner.
The Treaty of Rome provided for the progressive dismantling of tariffs
between the member states and establishment of a common set tariffs on
imports to the Community,in effect a customs union.It also went beyond
this.The Community was to be a free trade area in which there would also
be freedom of mobility for the factors of production,i.e of capital and
labour.For all practical purposes national frontiers within the EEC
were to have little economic significance. Special consideration was
given to agriculture because of the complexities involved in freeing up
trade in this area.
The formation of the EEC represented a new level of concentration in the
structure of international trade and became,in itself,an important
catalyst in the general liberalisation of trade.It created a new
formidable economic block of 180 million people,a block comparable in
size with the United States and likely to exceed it as time went
by and membership enlarged. Furthermore,the members of the community
began to enjoy economic growth rates that exceeded those of Britain and
the US in the early 60's and many trading non-members wanted to
participate in this growth.European countries that remained outside the
community sought more liberisation of trade among each other and trade
association with the Community.Even many of those Commonwealth countries
that had been mQst critical of Britain's intentions to join the EEC in
1962 were,a short time later,making their own approaches to the
Community for favourable trading terms. In Britain,Ireland and Denmark
the 1962 failureto gain entry was seen as a postporiement,rather than an
outright rejection. Furthermore,the remarkable growth and bargaining
strength of the Community also produced new pressures in the
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United States which enabled the Kennedy administration to enact the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This gave the President the power,among
other things,to reduce all tariffs by as much as 50% and to cut tariffs
down to zero on those commodities traded predominantly between the US
and the Community(Sorensen,l965;454).The President stressed the
political as well as the economic significance of the EEC and pressed on
Congress for closer trade links between the two through a general
reduction of trade barriers.He told Congress that "the two great
Atlantic markets (would) either grow together or grow apart" (quoted in
Schlesinger, 1965 ; 721)
The European recovery plan,the general liberalisation and rising volume
of international trade and the development and evolution of the European
Economic Community had major implications for all of the organisations
in the study.
An Foras Taluntais was a child of the Marshall Aid programme for
European recovery. The data show that the primary stimulus for the
establishment of an agricultural research institute was the Marshall Aid
programme. The US delegate for the programme in Ireland marked the area
of agricultural research out as one of strategic importance to Ireland's
economic recovery in the immediate post-war period. By international
standards the productivity of Irish agriculture,generally,was low; a
point brought home to Irish interests by a visiting New Zealand
grassland expert in the late 40's. AFT was set up in 1958 with Marshall
Aid in the form of a capital fund of £0.84M and an endowment fund of
£l.OM. It was always understood that the interest from the endowment
fund would not,in itself,be enough to cover the operating expenses of
the new institute and that an annual grant-in-aid from the State would
be needed to supplement it. However the American funding gave the
management of the new institute a high degree of autonomy during its
early expansion and basic character forming stage of development, an
autonomy which came under increasing pressure as the Marshall Aid funds
ran out.
Ireland's entry into t1-e EEC was an important development for all of the
organisations in the study as it changed their trading and institutional
environments irrevocably.It was particularly significant for the sugar
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and dairy industries as it brought their future development directly
under the umbrella of the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) regime.
The basic aims of the Community's policy on agriculture were set out in
article 39 of the Treaty of Rome and they included;
(i) increased productivity through technical progress and the best use
of all the factors of production,in particular manpower;
(ii) a fair income for the farming population;
(iii) the stabilisation of markets;
(iv) security of supply;
Cv)	 reasonable prices to consumers;
and,in practice,the fourth of these principles would appear to have been
given the highest priority up to now(Kerr,1980;62).
The production of sugar from beet remains relatively uneconomical in
world commodity terms but the sugar beet industry is still of
considerable strategic importance to Europe. Entry into the EEC
transformed the Irish sugar industry from a nationally protected
industry to a Community protected industry. CSET for the first time in
its existence faced the 'cold winds of competition' within the larger
Community market framework. The future of the industry was challenged on
all sides by EEC membership. Production at EEC support prices was
limited by quota,protection on the home market was removed and this
market became open to all EEC producers. There was also an increased
threat of competition on the supply side from attractive alternative
uses for land. Prices to the beet grower had to be maintained at levels
attractive enough to keep them in the industry. At the same time the
price of sugar had to remain competitive in European terms. These were
new pressures on margins. The basic business had been relatively
neglected in the 60's as profits from sugar were re-invested in the
developing food area. With EEC entry the modernisation of the sugar
factories became a matter of urgency. Over the 70's and the 80's a major
capital programme,totalling £90M was undertaken in order to put the
business on a sound commercial footing in European terms.
As in the case of sugar,entry into the EEC brought new competitive
pressures to the dairy industry. The major restructuring of the
organisation that took place over the 1968-74 period was carried out in
order to bring the capital concentration levels and organisation of the
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industry into line with those prevailing in the industry in Europe.
Unlike the case of sugar,the Irish dairy industry was given further
scope for growth under the Common Agricultural Policy after EEC entry.
Milk production grew unrelentingly from l3OM gallons in 1945 to 864N in
1979.This growth came in three waves. The first was associated with the
improvement in farm productivity and modernisation that followed on from
a return to peace time conditions and the second was associated with the
Lemass programme for economic expansion. This programme anticipated
Ireland's entry to the EEC and, in the meantime,fostered freer trade with
Britain. The third wave came with EEC entry. The enormous expansion in
the milk supply from the late 60's onwards was a direct response to the
higher prices,and in consequence higher farm incomes,available under the
CAP regime,and to the guaranteed market at these high prices for all
production in excess of the 200M gallon level,which was the requirement
of the home market. The 1972-78 period was a period of rising farm
incomes to equal,and for a time to surpass,the average industrial
wage.It was also a time of major capital investment in the dairy
industry 'within the farm gate'.
In the 1970s',in line with this expansion in milk production,the
processing industry,including Golden Vale,went through the most major
expansion and capital development phase in the industry's history.Crowth
within the CAP regime allowed the industry to expand and to diversify
its export markets.Irish dairy exports grew by 250% in the decade after
EEC entry. Milk production for the home market remained static at 200M
gallons. In 1972 the UK market accounted for 85% of Irish dairy exports.
Since EEC entry the absolute size of this market has declined somewhat
and in 1983 it accounted for just about 30% of the industry's exports.
The major growth since joining the EEC has been in exports and the major
growth in exports has been beyond the UK market(30%) to other EEC (20%)
markets and to world (50%) markets. The Community system of
institutional supports,particularly the EEC export restitutions for
third country eports,have had a major influence on the development of
this trading pattern(Keane, 1984; 15).
While EEC ntry accelerated the growth of the industry and raised it to
new heights,development under CAP has left it with some major strategic
issues in the late l980's.The industry has grown to be over-dependent on
297
intervention type commodity products,which in the first decade under the
CAP regime had provided the best returns. The world market for these
products tends to be volatile and highly susceptible to political
interference. It is now recognised,as a matter of growing strategic
urgency,that the industry needs to change its product profile
dramatically towards branded consumer products for the EEC market in
order to secure its future profitability.Growth under CAP is over for
the forseeable future and the regime itself is under pressure for
reform.The Community is in serious surplus in most dairy commodities.The
oportunity for growth,in hindsight,was in the first decade after EEC
entry.During this period the Irish dairy industry grew at a spectacular
rate relative to its previous history. Yet it did not grow fast enough
relative to the general expansion in Community production with the
result that when the Community came into serious surplus and had,in the
end,to resort to production quotas,the Irish dairy industry was
restricted to a level still well below its full potential.
EEC entry was a major milestone for the development of Irish agriculture
generally and,as such,had major implications for the organisation that
was set up as an infrastructural research and development resource to
support the sector,An Foras Taluntais. AFT,in the early 70's,had reached
a plateau. It had played a major role in raising the productivity of
Irish Agriculture from its very low base in the immediate post-war
period. By 1972 the spectacular gains from the initial investment in
agricultural research had been made and it had become more difficult for
the organisation to demonstrate the impact and value to the economy that
further investment in the research programme would yield.EEC entry
provided a new challenge.It allowed AFT to carve out for itself an
expanding role in helping Irish Agriculture to maximise its earnings
from the development oportunies that Community membership presented.It
also offered AFT a role as a Community,and not just simply as a
national,resource in the development of Community approaches to EEC
agricultural d?velopment. After 1972,AFT was to seek and be sought for
an increasing involvement in EEC research projects,at a time when State
funding had begun to contract,and a new supranational dimension entered
into the Institue's research programme.
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The effects of EEC entry on the Irish distilling industry were,in some
ways,more indirect than in the case of sugar or dairying. Entry into the
EEC meant the end of protection for the home market. The merger in 1966
was motivated as much by the desire to defend the home market as to
consolidate resources for a major export drive in the more liberal
international trading environment of the post 1950's. The main export
markets for Irish whiskey in 1964 were the UK(45%) and American
niarkets(3l%),each with their own indigeneous industry.The post-merger
strategy of IDG involved securing the dominance of the domestic market
in the absence of protective tariffs and using the profits flow from
this market to fund a strategy of export-led growth. Irish distillers
continued to target the American market as the one offering the best
potential for company growth,even after Ireland had gained entry into
the EEC.The EEC market for whiskey was very much under-developed and,
even in the absence of tariff restrictions,further development would
have required substantial expenditure on product promotion and
distribution. America offered the advantage being a well developed
market for whiskey as a product form. As a large English-speaking market
with existing extensive and concentrated distribution networks it aLso
offered greater possibilities for economies of scale in promotion and
distribution. Each one percentage gain in market share in this market
would involve an almost 100% increase in Irish whiskey output. However,a
characteristic of the liquor drinker is his conservatism and
traditionalism. Traditional brand loyalty is a major barrier to market
entry and penetration and it requires substantial non-recoverable
investment to overcome.
One of the major indirect effects of EEC membership was the growth in
the domestic market over the 1972-79 period. This resulted to a large
extent from the rise in disposable incomes in the country generally,
and in the farming community in particular,that characterised this
period. This growth in the domestic market was a major factor in
the expansion of industry sales after 1972. Irish distillers focused on
the American market but they did not ignore the oportunities offered
by freer access to new markets in Europe.The most notable feature of
the company's deve1opment since the merger was that it has developed its
exports to a level which exceeded 50% of its case sales by the 1980's.
This resulted from the more outward-looking strategy of the company in
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the more liberal trade environment of the post-merger period. Exports
accounted for only 12% of case sales in 1971/72. By 1985/86 they had
risen to 58%. Taking 1971/72 as a base year(lOO) the growth in case
sales on all of the major markets to 1981/82 were domestic(145),
UK(275),America(419) and Europe (389). More recently,as the company's
sales to the US became static,and experienced a temporary decline,IDG
continued to increase its penetration within the EEC. The company's
performance in its major EEC markets,i.e.the UK,Germany,Holland and
France showed significant growth rates of between 39% and 69% in the
period since 1983. By 1987 the combined case sales to these four EEC
countries had reached over 60% of the level of US sales,up from 37% in
1984. Though the US market remained the company's main target for
export-led growth since the merger,the EEC market,during the 1980's
became progressively more significant. By 1987 it was already beginning
to match the US market in strategic importance.
The International Oil Cartel - OPEC
The structure of the international trading environment changed
significantly with the emergence of the OPEC cartel which controls an
estimated 60% of the world's proven oil reserves. The economic
development of the world's more advanced industrialised nations had
grown to depend heavily on oil as a form of energy,and on oil-based
derivatives as key production materials. Up to and including the 1950's
the world's supply of oil,and the world price,was controlled by the
'seven sisters' based in Western economies. When Iran nationalised the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company without compensation in 1951,the large oil
companies were able to bring about a large increase in production
elsewhere to satisfy world demand. As a result,Iranian oil revenues
fell to a fraction of what its royalties had been under foreign
ownership. The balance of power over oil at that time still remained
within the Western industrialised world.
Over the 50's and 60's,however,world consumption of oil rose
exponentially. By the late 60's the world's dependence on Middle East
oil was such that there was not enough oil elsewhere to compensate for
any drastic cut-back in Middle East production. By l970,the Organisation
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of Petroleum-Exporting Countries(OPEC),which had been formed in 1960
with little attention from the world inedia,was clearly in the driving
seat as far as world supply and world prices were concerned. The modern
political leaders of the area like the Shah of Iran and Sheik Yamani of
Saudi Arabia were sufficiently well versed in the economics of energy to
understand both the extent and the limits of their new power over world
energy. These leaders determined to use their full economic power over a
strategic and non-replaceable resource to accelerate the economic
development of their countries. A major change in price level for crude
oil was inevitable,given this shift in the balance of power. The price
rise,when it came,was sudden and steep and it sent shock waves
throughout the developed world. It was preceded by an embargo on supply
to those countries that were perceived as pro-Israeli in the
Arab-Israeli hostilities that broke out in 1973. This embargo was
followed by a price rise that saw the price go from $2.59 per barrel in
early 1973 to $11.65 per barrel in early 1974,a massive rise of
450%(Banks,1979;27).
The immediate structural effects of this sharp increase in oil prices
were the transfer over $100 billion per annum from the industrial
countries to OPEC and the introduction of severe cost-push inflationary
pressures into the industrial economies. These economies began to
experience double-digit inflation. Classical deflationary policies were
introduced across the board leading to a general world recession in
1974/75. The deflationary measures increased idle capacity and
unemployment without having a major impact on the rate of inf1ation
and were eased off,or abandoned,soon afterwards. Inflation remained
high throughout the remainder of the decade. A second oil crisis in 1979
presaged a new era of low growth in international trade and production
as the advanced industrial countries faced up to the longer term effects
of OPEC's new economic power and to the effects of some basic structural
changes that had taken place in the international trading environment
since the the boom years of the 1960's.
The 1973 Oil Crisis in the international trading arena had a number
of immediate effects on the organisations in the study. These effects
were generally related to the higher cost of energy and of material
inputs and to the high levels of price-wage inflation.
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For the dairy industry the main short-term impact of the Oil Crisis
was that the sudden rise in production costs,particularly of imported
fertilisers,led to a fall in the overall national milk pool of almost
30M gallons. This sudden and steep increase in costs put pressure on
farm incomes. Over the two years since entry into the EEC, farm incomes
had risen on average by 80%. This had given rise to a new confidence
among farmers in the future of their industry,together with a greater
willingness to invest in its expansion.In 1974,farm incomes fell by 12%
and a new caution prevailed.It had been expected on EEC entry that
national milk production would have expanded to 1000M gallons by 1978.
The inflation and uncertainty generated as a result of the sudden
increase in the price of oil,and of its ramifications throughout the
economy,set back and retarded this expansion. The milk pool,after the
small decline in l974,did continue to expand until 1979. By that time,
however,it had reached a level of only 864M gallons.
Golden Vale had 94M gallons of capacity on stream in 1974. In that year,
because of the fall in national production,and because of the failure of
the amalgamation to reach the scale intended,the organisation processed
only 6lM gallons,or just over 2/3 of its full capacity. In addition,
Golden Vale's capital structure was badly out of gear with £15.4M in
borrowings, £lO.5M of which was in the form of bank overdraft. This
weakness in the company's financial structure was stressed to crisis
point by the fall in volume and the by the inflationary pressures on
energy, wages and especially on debt service charges that flowed from
the Oil Crisis of 1973. This company financial crisis,in turn,led to an
acceleration of the rationalisation programme to more fully realise the
operating economies made possible by the amalgamation.
In the immediate aftermath of the Oil Crisis,An Foras Taluntais also
experienced financial difficulties. The rapid inflationary spiral set
off by the oil price rise in early 1974 threw the public finances into
disarray. Annual estimates of expenditure for the coming year,drawn up
in late 1973 and incorporated into the January '74 Budget of the
Government,proved totally inadequate to cover the 1974 out-turn.
By 31/3/74 AFT had run up an operating deficit of £O.5M and the
annual report of that year referred to the Institute's "difficult
liquidity position. . the culmination of under financing over a number of
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years,heavily accentuated by rapid inflation". It was in the immediate
aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis,and of the financial pressures which
ensued,that AFT accelerated its efforts to acquire direct funding for
its research programme. The meetings held between AFT,the Farm
Organisations and the Industry,on the reconmiendation of the Government,
resulted in general agreement on the principle of direct funding of
research by the agricultural sector. The research profile began to
change from this period towards contract and user-directed research
priorities. In 1974, there was also a basic shift in the research
programme onto the problems posed to the farming community by the Oil
Crisis and the consequent inflation. In particular,research attention
intensified on the use of energy and of imported fertilisers and
feedstuffs across a wide range of agricultural production systems.
For Irish Distillers and CSET the Oil Crisis and its immediate aftermath
had similar effects. IDG began its major capital project,the Midleton
project,before the crisis began. The bulk of the work,however,took place
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and this added greatly to the
capital cost of the project. The project,originally estimated at a cost
of £2M,eventually outturned at £9M. Furthermore,the new distilling
complex had been designed to replace labour-intensive technology with
energy-intensive technology. Moreover,to finance the project the
company had to increase its borrowings at a time when interest rates
were escalating with the inflationary trend.The project was already
underway when the Oil Crisis broke out and the crisis itself caused a
certain amount of anxiety within IDG about the wisdom of the investment.
The company later invested in a change-over to Irish natural gas in
order to decouple it from the direct effects of any further oil shocks.
CSET also initiated a major capItal programme in this time of escalating
inflation,high interest rates and harsh trading conditions. After a
decade when re-investment in the basic sugar business was comparatively
neglected,the company,facing the cold winds of competition that
memebership of the EEC implied,was forced to modernise its facilities
on a large scale in the mid-70's when the investment climate had
deteriorated. Golden Vale,in contrast,was fortunate in retrospect to
have largely completed its major capital programme before the crisis.
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It did have the burden of excess capacity to carry until 1978
but,viewed in 1978 replacement cost terms,its capital programme
represented an 'outstanding bargain' ,to quote from its merchant
bankers.
Cost inflation,in the wake of the Oil Crisis,hastened the
rationalisation process in IDG and CSET. Rapidly rising costs in raw
materials,energy and particularly in wage-inflation put the trading
profit margins of the companies under increasing pressure. Prices did
also rise but the price rises were not always in line with costs and
were often implemented after some time-lag. According to the CSET annual
report,1974-75 was "probably the most difficult trading year in the
history of the company".Production of sugar was down 24% on the previous
year because of a substantial drop in the number acres under beet,
reflecting the depression in farm production margins from higher input
costs. Trading margins on sugar and engineering activities fell from 8%
in 1973 to 3.7% in 1975 and hopes of getting the food project into a
trading profit receeded with the adverse effects of cost inflation. IDG
also experienced trading difficulties with a 'dramatic increase in
operating costs' .IDG's problems at that time were exascerbated by a
steep rise in excise duty in January l975,as the Government sought to
come to terms with its own cost pressures; and by a damaging 14-week
strike over relativities,the longest in the company's history. IDG's
profit before tax declined from 8.3% of turnover in 1973 to 3% in 1975.
The 'New Game' of the 1980's
In the late 1980's the structure of the international trading
enviroriment,as it has evolved since the 1960's,can be described as
consisting of an Advanced Capitalist Block(lead by the United States,the
EEC,and Japan),an Eastern Trading Block(lead by the USSR and China),an
Oil Producers Block(OPEC),a set of Newly Industrialising Countries
(including Taiwan,Korea,Hong-kong,Mexico,Brazil) and a set of Less
Developed Countries(including most of the so-called Third World and
concentrated in the Southern Hemisphere). Traditionally the Eastern
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Block has had very little involvement in international trading and this
situation has changed only very slowly up to now. International Trade
in the late 1980's is still largely dominated by the Advanced Capitalist
Countries(ACCs) but the relative influences of OPEC and the Newly
Industrialising Countries(NICs) have increased significantly over the
last two decades.
The international trading order in the immediate post-war period was,as
we saw earlier,largely controlled by the United States. At that time it
accounted for over half the world's GNP,and was the only major economy
that had not been destroyed by the war. America's dominance of the ACC
block,and hence of the international trading environnient,has been on the
decline since the late 1950's. Between 1963 and 1980 America's share of
world manufacturing output fell from 40.3% to 29.4%.Over the same period
the corresponding share for Germany rose from 9.7% to 12.4% and,more
spectacularly,that for Japan rose from 5.5% to 15.7%. Over the period
from 1963-80 the combined output of Germany and Japan rose from just
over one third of US output to almost parity(Dicken,1986;28). America's
low rate of capital accumulation relative to Japan and Germany was the
main reason for the decline in relative economic strength of the US
over the 1950-73 pre Oil Crisis period(Armstrong et al,l984;219).
With the enlargement and further development of the EEC,and with the
emergence of OPEC and the NICs,the structure of the international
trading environment,in the 1980's,has evolved into one with substantial
economic power concentrated in a number of different clusters.
Though America still remains the leading economy in terms of world
manufacturing output,dominance of the international trading arena
is no longer possible for any single trading block and coordination of
policy in the effort to develop world trade has become increasingly
difficult in more recent times(Thurow,1987;259).
Coordination of world trade has also become more complex in recent times
because of the increasing internationalisation of production that has
taken place over the last few decades. By the mid 80's over 20% of total
world production outside of the Eastern Block was produced by
Transnational Corporations(TNCs),and the trend has increased with time.
An integral part of this trend is that a growing portion of world trade
is crossing national boundaries intrafirm. The Transnational Corporation
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is in effect integrating parts of the economies of individual nations
within economic empires that transcend national boundaries,making the
control of international trade through national and international public
policy more difficult and more complex. In particular,the internal
decisions of TNC's have a significant effect on the distribution of
capital formation and employment in the world economy. Large TNCs
potentially threaten the economic sovereignity of governments and
and constrain the ability of governments to manage their economies.
The pattern of direct foreign investment has not only increased,it has
also become more diverse geographically and sectorally. The main
sources of foreign direct investment over the 1967-78 period remained
the United States and Britain,but during this period their relative
shares declined. The US share fell from 50.4% to 45.2% and that of
Britain from 15.6% to 11.0%. In the same period Germany's share rose
from 2.6% to 8.5%,while that of Japan rose from 1.3% to 7.2%. In the
late 70's most of the destinations for ACC transnational investment
were still other ACCs,which increased their interconnectedness and
interdependence. However,transnational investment has also played a
major and increasing role in the acceleration of economic growth in the
NICs. Direct foreign investment in developing economies rose from $32.8B
in 1967 to $88.3B in 1978. More recently some of NICs have,themselves,
become significant sources of transnational direct investment.
To date the major TNCs have been quite selective in the sectors that
they have chosen for transnational investment. Some industries like
computers ,pharmaceuticals ,motor vehicles,consumer durables ,and soft
drinks have undergone comparatively extensive transnationalisation,
and the list is growing. In addition,the transnationalisation of
manufacturing is being closely followed by the transnationalisation of
related business services.In short,transnationalisation of manufacturing
has been,and continues to be,a major force in the globalisation of the
world economy.
The 1950-73 period was the boom period in the international trading
environment. Output in the ACCs grew by an average annual rate of 4.9%
over that period.The crash of l974-5,in the wake of the 1973 oil Crisis,
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was a major turning point. Output growth rate declined,in the decade
after 1973,to less than half of what it was in the 60's. The immediate
impact of the 1973 Oil Crisis was the general recession in world output
and trade in 1974-5. This was followed by a fragile recovery as many
countries reflated in 1976 and expansion resumed until the second oil
crisis in 1979:
Index of volume
of world output:
Index of volume
of world trade:
1963 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
100 197 203 200 216 227 238 249 251 254
100 280 304 290 328 344 364 382 398 416
(Dicken, 1986; 18)
Table 9.2 - Indices of volumes of world output and world trade 1963-81.
After 1979 the international trading environment entered a period of
prolonged low growth which continued throughout the 1980's.
The general productivity slowdown experienced by the ACCs since
1973 was the heart of the low-growth problem. The decade after 1973 saw
a significant decline in the growth rate of the business capital stock
of the ACCs from 5.3% p.a. over 1965-73 to 4.1% p.a. over l974-82,and by
1982 it had fallen to a rate of 3.5% p.a. Profits are the prime motive
for business capital stock accumulation. They are also,as retained
earnings,a major source of funds for further investment in capital
formation. The profit rate in the ACCs fell from a peak of 17.2% in
1968 to 10.2% in 1981. Falling profit and accumulation rates,in
turn,led to a decline in productivity growth rates,which for the ACCs
fell from an average rate of 5.1% p.a. over the 1960-73 period to 3.3%
over l973-81(Armstrong et al,1984;34l-347).
All of the Advanced Capitalist Countries suffered a slowdown in
productivity growth rate since 1973. However the rate of decline has
varied significantly across the major economies within this group.
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Within the ACCs the two decades between 1960 and 1980 were marked by the
relative decline of the US and British economies and the relative rise
of Germany and Japan. Over the 1960-78 period the average annual
growth rates in labour productivity for these four economic powers
were; United States 1.7%, Britain 2.2%, Germany 4.2% and Japan
7.5%(Hayes&Abernathy,1980;5).As the 1970's progressed,and the growth in
living standards across the ACCs generally declined,these disparities
were thrown into greater relief. Concern mounted within the United
States and Britain about the relative decline of these traditional
economic powers,their falling productivity and their declining
international competitiveness.
This concern was further intensified by the Japanese trading response
to the Oil Crisis. It was also intensified by the growing
competitiveness of the NICs and by the unfavourable imbalance that
evolved in the trade pattern between the ACCs and the NICs. Japan,almost
totally dependent on imported oil in l973,embarked on an aggressive
exporting strategy in order to create a substantial dollar trade surplus
as a hedge against possible further oil price shocks. The increasing
penetration of Japanese exports into Britain and the US heightened the
awareness within these economies about their declining international
competitiveness. Moreover,the newly industrialising countries of South
Korea,Hong Kong and Taiwan continued to expand rapidily even in the wake
of the Oil Crisis. By the end of the 70's they were running substantial
trade surpluses with the ACCs through their highly competitive exports
of leather and footwear,clothing and some engineering goods. These
NICs were not,however,running a trade surplus with the ACCs as a whole.
They were running a trade surplus with the EEC and the US through their
exports of consumer goods while at the same time buying their capital
goods from,and running a trade deficit with,Japan. "The NICs were the
terrain on which the competition between the advanced countries was
fought out"(Armstrong et al,1984;358). This rising loss of domestic
markets for consumer goods and export markets for capital goods
gave rise to a sense of increasing urgency and resolve within the major
Western economic powers to tackle their problem of relative decline.
The period 1975-79 was characterised by the presence of mass
unemployment and high levels of inflation throughout the ACCs.
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This was a new and unexpected phenomenon. In the then prevalent
'Keynesian' approach to public policy and economic management,rising
unemployment was expected to lead to a fall in prices and to deflation,
as happened during the Great Depression. The persistence of high
inflation in the presence of mass unemployment created new difficulties
for public policy-makers. Short-term attempts to reduce the one only
exascerbated the other.
In the latter half of the 70's political and economic opinion within the
ACCs shifted away from full employment as the number one objective of
public policy. The need to reduce and control the inflation level became
the major priority. High and variable inflation was seen generally to
have a number of undesireable attributes. The main concern in the West
was that high and uncontrolled levels of inflation were contributing
directly to the two major and related constraints to further economic
growth,falling productivity and declining international competitiveness.
Uncontrolled inflation discouraged further productive investment because
it made future profit flows more uncertain and difficult to predict.The
the high and variable interest rates that accompanied uncontrolled
inflation acted as a further discentive to Invest in productive capital,
especially in projects with a medium to long-term payback. In addition,
countries with persistently high inflation relative to that of its
major trading partners and competitors saw their international
competitiveness progressively undermined.
Towards the end of the 1970's the broad consensus about economic policy
that had operated across the major political parties in many Western
economies since the Second World War had broken down(Donaldson,1984;63).
Keynesian doctrine and the notiàn of the 'mixed economy' ,which had
reigned supreme and was seen to have worked well up to the early
70's,came under strong attack. The first major economy to formally
abandon Keynesianism was Britain,with the coming to power of the
Thatcher Administration in 1979. In 1980 the America followed with
Ronald Reagan's decisive victory in the US presidential race on a
platform very close in economic ideology to that of Mrs Thatcher.
The economic thought of Hayek and Friedman replaced that of Keynes in
British and American public policy. The "basic proposition" of
neo-classical monetarism was that "inflation is primarily a monetary
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problem,produced by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than
in output" and that "excessive monetary growth. . is produced by
governments"(Friednian&Friedman,1980;309). In the case of the US the
particular brand of the neo-classical economics that came to be known
popularly as "Reaganomics" was a combination of monetarism and
supply-side economics. Monetarists advocated the control of the money
supply to reduce and control inflation and supply-siders advocated cuts
in personal taxation as the means to increase savings and work effort
and to facilitate a shift in national income towards productive
investment.
The economic policy priorities broadly shared by both the Thatcher and
Reagan administrations,and drawing their legitimising rationale from
neo-classical economic doctrines,were aimed at controlling inflation,
through control of the money supply; substantially reducing the role of
the government in the economy through a reduction in public services and
through privatisation; reducing protection and subsidies for the
uncompetitive and inefficient sectors of the economy; and increasing the
flexibility and mobility of labour through the abandonment of full
employment as a central objective of public policy. A central unifying
theme was the withdrawl of state involvement and the restoration of the
market mechanism to progressively wider areas of economic activity. High
levels of taxations were stiffling initiative and discouraging savings
and investment and high levels of government borrowing were 'crowding
out' private investment. Full employment policies and high levels of
state expenditure on welfare were encouraging dependence and
inflexibility in the labour force and undermining the virtues of hard
work and individual entreprise.
While this underlying neo-classical cocktail was being endorsed by the
American and British electorates continuously,in one form or another,
from 1979 right up to the present,there were many influential thinkers
and writers who remained unconvinced about the analysis. Most agreed
that productivity and international competitiveness were the main route
to future economic growth. However they pointed to the examples of the
economies of the trading world's leading competitors,Germany and Japan.
The German and Japanese economies have narrower distributions of income
than the US,have a higher savings rate,lower unemployment levels,higher
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levels of gross and R&D investment,and more government intervention in
their economies(Thurow,1987: Hayes&Wheelwright,1984).For them the source
of America's declining international competitiveness was rather to be
found in the adverserial relations between labour and management; the
short time perspective of investors,management and labour; the tendency
to manage businesses as portfolio's of investment at the expense of due
emphasis on customers,markets,products and technologies; and such like.
As Thurow's summarised the position:
"If the foundations of the American economy are to be rebuilt,the
rebuilding must begin with a reconception of the theory of the
American firm. Conceived as a partnership,structured to promote common
long-term goals,and operated to push decision making to the lowest
echelons - the American firm can succeed. Operated as it is now
operated, it can but fail. .What America needs is. .better social
organisation"(Thurow,1987 ;228-9).
Monetarist theorists did warn that the long-term benefits of
neo-classical economics would involve a short-term price in the form of
low growth and high unemployment as the economies of the US and Britain
went through structural transformation(Friednian&Friedman, 1980; 317).
In 1981,soon after Reaganomics went into the effect,the US economy went
into a recession that was deeper and longer than expected. Given the
US's continuing importance to world finance and international trade the
recession quickly spread throughout the international trading arena.
In particular,many of the newly industrialising countries which had
levered their developments on foreign borrowings found themselves facing
severe liquidity crises as their export earnings collapsed. It was the
impending financial collapse of Mexico in August 1982 that led the
Reagan Administration to abandon monetarism. In order to save the US
banking system from a major crisis the Reagan Administration advanced a
major loan to the Mexican Government to prevent a Mexican default,and in
the process greatly expanded the money supply in the US economy.This
expansion in the money supply gave rise to what was in effect,though
never publicly acknowledged as such,a 'Keynesian' cyclical recovery.
This recovery lasted through 1983-84. Growth in the US economy then
returned to a low level after 1984. The underlying problem of the
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decline in international competitiveness was not turned around as was
evidenced by the US's large trading deficit. Furthermore,the US's large
budget deficit,run up mainly to fund the defense programme,niade
a return to economic growth increasingly difficult for most of the
decade.
Monetarism had been abandoned in the US in 1982. Control of the money
supply has proved to be very difficult in practice,even in the UK where
no Mexican type crisis accelerated its abandonment. However the broad
right-wing philosophy of 'less government and more market' has remained
central to the economic and political philosophies of the Thatcher and
Reagan Administrations. Whether neo-classicalism is going to continue to
dominate the public policies of the United States and Britain or whether
the restoration of productivity growth and international competitiveness
is going to be pursued along the alternative lines suggested by Thurow
and others,expectations for a return to economic growth in the global
economy remain modest as the 1980's draw to a close. Right wing and left
wing economic analysts have been alike in recognising that major
structural transformation was necessary to provide the basis for a
return to growth,and that this had to involve a lengthy transitionary
period of low growth,while resources were husbanded and reallocated from
low to high productivity uses.
In sum,the international trading environment of the 1980's has been
characterised by the increasing globalising of international trade.
It has become at one and the same time more complex and more
interconnected as more and more national economies have come to depend
on exports for their economic development,and as the trend towards the
increasing transnationalisationof production continues apace. This
growth in complexity and interdependency has increased considerably the
exposure of the international arena to economic shocks,such as strategic
commodity and international liquidity crises,which reverberate and
ramify with increasing speed throughout the whole system. The current
prolonged period of low growth has given rise to an intensification of
international competition and a new isolationism in economic affairs.
Trading tensions have increased among the ACCs and between the ACCs and
the NICs. There is a growing need for orderly development in the
international trading arena and at the same time there seems to be a
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growing inability to secure it. There is no longer any broad consensus
about economic management principles as neo-classicists contend with
post-Keynesians and national efforts to stage economic recovery are
twarted by a lack of complementarity and coordination internationally.
There is no longer any dominant economic power that can impose order,
although the international trading world still looks to the largest
economy to provide the lead towards recovery and stability. However,a
substantial US-led economic recovery seems unlikely for the forseeable
future and there seems to be little willingness or capability on the
part of the other leading economies,most notably those of Germany and
Japan,to take an active lead in world recovery. There is,in the late
80's after almost a decade of Thatcherism and Reaganomics,some
encouraging harbingers of recovery,particularly in the recent upsurge in
the productivity of the British economy. However,after a decade of
difficult transitions with many 'false dawns',the immediate outlook,
in late 1988,still remains uncertain.
These changes in the international trading arena had major implications
for the development of all four organisations in the study.
The period 1979/80 was a watershed for the Irish economy generally.
Since 1972 Ireland's economic development has been closely tied into the
development of the European Economic Community. With low economic
growth,high unemployment and foreign competition threatening the
domestic economies of all of the EEC partners,to a greater or lesser
extent,a new wave of economic nationalism developed within the Community
in the 1980's. During the early to mid 1980's there was a notable
hardening of attitudes within the Community with regard to programmes
that involve intra-Community transfers across national boundaries. The
funding of the Common Agricultural Policy and of the Regional and Social
funds became more contentious and the Community's Budget was the central
pre-occupation of the EEC summit meetings for much of the decade. This,
as we will see a little later on,has had a major effect on the dairy and
sugar industries and also,though somewhat more indirectly,on AFT.
Within the country itself the 1980's heralded particular difficulties.
Ireland had attempted to mitigate the recessionary effects of the first
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oil crisis with an increase in public borrowing for current account.
This was a classic Keynesian response to the 1974/75 recession and its
had the desired short-term effect. Consistent with Keynesian economic
management principles the government of the day had intended to
progressively decrease the size of this public debt as the recovery got
under way. This process had already begun by 1976/77. Then a new
government came to office with a bold,an in hindsight now somewhat
reckless economy strategy. They injected a major demand stimulus into
the economy to try to once more accelerate the pace of economic growth,
which had continued with one small interruption since 1958. As
Neary(1984;69),quoted in a previous chapter,had pointed out:
"It was a brave strategy and a risky one. It gambled on continued
growth in the rest of the world; and it gambled on Irish workers being
willing to accept lower wage increases than our competitor countries,
so that we could increase our share of growing world trade.
Regrettably,both bets lost. In particular,the second oil crisis of
1979 plunged the Western World into the worst recession since before
the Second World War. Our exports faltered but imports,fuelled by
foreign borrowings continued to grow".
Ireland,had attempted to lever its continued economic growth on foreign
borrowing. When world trade went into recession in l980,and Irish
exports declined,the country had high debt service charges to meet with
no export-led growth to self-finance them. When the recession came the
country,because of its large public debt,had little room to manoeuver.
In common with most Western economies Ireland experienced a major
expansion in public service employment during the boom years from
1958-73. This trend continued under the 1977 expansionary policy. When
the recession came the private sector was the first to be impacted.
Mounting trading difficulties led to closures and rationalisations with
rising unemployment. The public finance burden on the economy was
severely worsened by the contracting private sector and the mounting
social welfare expenditure as the dole queues lengthened. Mirroring the
developments elsewhere,public opinion shifted to the right. High
government borrowing was seen to be 'crowding out' private investment.
Rising levels of personal taxation were seen to be killing off
initiative and effort. Full employment policies were sidelined. Jobs
remained the major priority in political rhetoric but 'meaningful,
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economically self-sustaining,jobs' were the goal and they could not be
provided until economic growth was restored. Control of inflation and
containment of rising public debt became the twin aims of government
fiscal policy. Public service rationalisations and cuts were the almost
inevitable consequences of this development as all manner of public
agencies and entreprises were subjected to new levels of financial
stringency and public scrutiny.
For Irish Distillers 1979 was a turning point. Home market sales reached
their peak in that year. IDG's post-merger strategy for growth was based
on the continuation of a strong home market,where the company has a
traditional dominance. Though the domestic market offered the company
limited potential for growth it provided the funds flow to fuel the
company's strategy for the development of the key North American market.
The 1980's hurt the company's home market in three ways. The recession
brought to an end the 'natural' growth in the market associated with
economic expansion and rising disposable incomes. Consumer expenditure
fell by an annual average rate of over 1% between 1980-85. The State's
financial difficulties led to sharp increases in taxation on the 'the
old reliables' in successive budgets further depressing the domestic
market. Finally,the depressed condition of world trade has led large
international distillers to seek increased sales on a marginal
contribution basis to maintain their volumes. IDG's dominance of the
domestic market was,as we have seen,a key element in its overall
strategy. Yet throughout the 1980's it had to fight harder than ever to
protect its dominant market position against intensifying international
competition.
Furthermore,the low growth 1980's made it more difficult for the
company to make its US strategy succeed. Spirit sales in this strategic
market declined in line with economic depression. After several years of
of making small gains against the tide case sales in the US market have
recently fallen to below their 1981/2 level. In 1986 the combined case
sales to the Britain and Europe exceeded those to the US. The failure
to achieve any significant growth in this market since the early 80's
led to a major reassessment of US market strategy and a major change
315
in approach. IDG more recently modified their hopes for this market and
turned from a 'shotgun' approach,promoting a full range of whiskies
across the entire US, to a 'rifle' approach,promoting a narrow line
intensively in the five most promising states.
For the Irish dairy industry the low growth 80's brought to an end the
great expansion that had taken place in the industry over the previous
two decades. The fall in national milk production that took place during
the 1980/81 recession left the processing industry in Ireland with
aggregate excess capacity. Milk production fell because of a loss of
of farmer confidence.The farmer's margin came under severe pressure from
the sharp rise in input prices. The price supports for milk products
under the CAP regime did not keep pace with the inflation in input
prices and farm incomes declined. Processed output at the peak 1978
level and higher could still be disposed of at this time under the
CAP regime,albeit at lower marginal profits. Consequently processors
moved to protect and secure their milk pools. Golden Vale provided for a
milk development fund,effectively a use of retained earnings from the
peak period,to provide local support for the milk price during the
recession. They did this in order to encourage their suppliers to
maintain or even to increase their milk production levels. Golden
Vale's efforts in this regard were undermined by the milk war that broke
out with Kerry. Kerry's response to the fall in national milk supply was
to break the industry norm and to compete for additional milk with other
processors,principally with Golden Vale. In this way Kerry sought to
recession-proof their ambitious drive for growth. The milk wars,in
turn,almost brought about the demise of Golden Vale. These wars were a
major factor in its decline from number two to number six in the
industry over the 1978-86 period. They led directly to a change of chief
executive at Golden Vale and to the more recent attempt to develop a new
strategy for the Company.
The international situation in the industry over this period was broadly
one of increasing supply and declining demand. By the late 70's the EEC
had become self-sufficient in dairy products and was still expanding its
production. By the early 80's it had changed from being a net importer
of dairy commodities to being a net exporter. This led the Community
into increased trading tensions with the other major producing blocks,
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primarily the US,Australia and New Zealand. There was,inevitably,a
scramble for market share in the residual world markets and the EEC's
share of the world market was slowly declining for some years up to
1985. Meanwhile,within the Community the most efficient dairy farmers
continued to respond to the price supports and aggregate production
continued to rise. With the advent of cheaper forms of animal feed,most
natably of corn gluten from the US,large scale concentrate feeding of
cows became an attractive proposition.This 'factory style' production
greatly accelerated output at a time when the EEC was losing world
market share. As a result large structural surpluses developed within
the Community and it became increasingly clear,by the mid 80's,that
the Common Agricultural Policy was not coping with the situation. The
Community's response was to first establish quotas with severe financial
penalties for over production,the so-called superlevies. Even this
measure was inadequate and in late 1986 the Community resorted to a
cutback of 9.5% in EEC milk production over a 3 year timefranie.
Low growth and intensifying competition in the global economy,and the
Community's response in the form of production cutbacks and controls,
have had the effect of capping the development of the Irish dairy
industry,at least for the forseeable future,at a level well below its
full potential. The industry as a whole is currently trying to come
to terms with the restraints on production and its over dependence on
intervention style commodity products which are most susceptible to
political interference. In the late 1980's the industry as a whole
appears to be on the threshold of yet another era of major structural
change,rationalisation and consolidation as the full implications
of the structural changes which have taken place in the international
arena become more widely appreciated. Industrywide interests like the
Industrial Development Authority and the industry's own central
marketing body,An Bord Bainne, have been calling for a major strategic
re-orientation in product profile towards greater emphasis on branded
consumer goods and away from commodities. In July 1987 the Irish
Cooperative Organisation Society proposed a major rationalisation
of the industry towards even greater levels of concentration that
current exist. The main rationale was to create entities that could
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generate the funds flow required to mount the marketing and product
development efforts needed to bring about the reorientation in product
profile that is now generally perceived to be the key to securing the
industry's future in an increasingly more uncertain and competitive
international trading environment.
At the level of the firm all of the major processors have been trying to
come to terms with these changes in the international trading
environment. Kerry Cooperative,the largest organisation currently in the
industry in terms of turnover,has determined to insulate its ambitious
growth plans from structural restriction. Much of its post-1980 growth
has come from diversification. In 1986 it made history in the industry
by becoming the first of the major cooperatives to raise equity outside
of the movement. Kerry is now a plc. In 1987 it broke further new ground
for the Irish dairy industry by making a strategic investment in a
casein processing facility in the United States. In 1988,it diversified
even further away from its traditional dependence on the Irish dairy
industry by acquiring Beatreme Food Ingredients,the former food
ingredients subsidiary of Beatrice Foods,the large US-based food
processor. Several of the other major dairy processors have already
taken steps to follow Kerry's lead,both into the equity market,and into
new related non-dairying activities. These departures are changing
the nature of the major dairy processors in a most fundamental way as
they go about redefining their businesses. The major processors have be
moved to broaden their scope in this way in order to reduce their
dependence on the Irish dairy industry,whose future growth has been
restricted by global trading conditions and Community supply policies
in the 1980's. In Golden Vale,our focal organisation in the dairy
industry,the company has been recently undergoing a major internal
reorientation away from being production and finance dominated towards
more emphasis and 'fire power' in the marketing and product development
areas. This is consistent with the what is generally perceived to
reflect the cuirent strategic priority in the industry. Strategic funds
flow in the 70's went largely into capital development throughout the
industry. In the 80's the priority,as we have seen,has changed towards
market and product development and towards diversification. It was,
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moreover,this shift in emphasis away from capital development,
exacerbated by the tight margins that prevailed in the industry
throughout the early 80's,that led to the demise of Golden Vale's
engineering business,as its main domestic market collapsed.
The Irish sugar industry ran into trouble early in the difficult 1980's.
In 1980 it recorded a trading loss; the first trading loss on the sugar
business since the foundation of the company almost 50 years earlier.
The company was back in trading profit the following year but for the
next three years,1982-84 inclusive,the company's trading profit was
insufficient to cover its substantial interest charges. These
difficulties refocused the attention of the Government and the Civil
Service on CSET after a decade of arm's length management. The Joint
Committee of the Oireachtais,set up to examine the state of the company,
helped to raise the awareness within the political system of the
reality of the commercial pressures facing the company in the 1980's.
These commercial and structural pressures were highlighted by the
Chairman in the 1986 Annual Report. According to the report the EEC had
become 150% self-sufficient in sugar and increased levies or reduced
quotas were expected. There was a growing attitude towards the
curtailing of surplus production and evidence to suggest that this
action would be supported "by sugar companies whose balance sheets are
strong and who are prepared to withstand a period of difficulty to
quench out the smaller,more marginal,less efficient producer". This
report went on to point out that though the Irish sugar industry
accounted for less than 2% of EEC production yet there were "determined
efforts to make inroads on (the domestic market)" by "major producers on
the Continent who are prepared to sell here at marginal prices".The
Chairman finally warned "that in an EEC which is beset by financial
problems (the Irish sugar industry) will find little sympathy in looking
for special concessions".
The report of the Joint Committee of the Oireachtais on CSET's
activities provided important support in the political arena for the
company's own wish to be free to rup its affairs on a commercial basis.
It supported the company's repeated calls for more equity participation
by the 'shareholder' so that the capital structure of the industry might
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reflect the kind of debt/equity relationship more common in commercial
firms. It went further than the company in that it suggested a degree of
privatisation for CSET. The Committee also recommended that the company
should in future "concentrate its sugar operations on its most viable
plants". Through these and related recommendations the Committee clearly
reflected the view that the prime objective for the company must be
commercial viability. Its traditional roles as developer of Irish
agriculture and provider of industrial employment in regional centres
were,in the changed conditions of the 1980's,dependent on its commercial
viability.
In the 1980's the company was,finally,able to bring about the closure
of the Tuam sugar factory which was known publicly to have been
uneconomic,and a substantial drain on CSET resources,for more than a
decade. The competitive pressures had become so great and the political
resistance to job losses so muted by the prevailing change in economic
thinking and conditions that the unthinkable in the mid-70's was
achievable in the 1980's. The company were also able to carry out major
rationalisatiori in their food business. Finally,the Covernment,in spite
of the massive problem with the public finances,came to recognise the
necessity to inject more equity into the company after decades of
comparative neglect.In the changed international trading environment of
the 1980's the company could no longer meet the competitive and
structural pressures with an uncommercial capital structure.
Like the other organisations in this study,AFT also faced some major new
difficulties and challenges in the 1980's. The worsening state of the
public finances left it with progressively tighter budgets. It came
under increasing pressure to justify and re-justify its expenditure.
It was effectively unable to hire any new researchers and was expected
to de-scale through natural attrition. Meanwhile the changes happening
in the agricultural sector generally presented AFT with tough new
challenges for its research programme. In the new international trading
environment of the 1980's Irish agricultural faced a world of declining
demand,commodity surpluses and falling farm incomes. With the
Community's restrictions on the production of many farm commodities the
priorities in AFT's research programme had to change in the most
fundamental way since the 60's. The main thrust of AFT's programme up to
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the early 80's was to tackle the poor productivity problem in Irish
agriculture. The emphasis across the board was on production; on
increasing the volume of output by increasing productivity and
efficiency. By 1984 there was "an absolutely new ball game.. .a whole
revolution taking place" as Community measures to restrict output in
many farm commodities were introduced and later escalated. The changes
that took place "in any one year since 1983" were "as important as any
that took place in decades before that" with "enormous implications for
research".
The challenge for AFT was to try to bring about a major transformation
of its research programme. To meet the new priorities in Irish
agriculture it became clearer to more and more people,within the
organisation and without,as the 1980's progressed that AFT would have
to reorientate its overall programme in some very fundamental ways. It
would have to shift the programme away from its traditional emphasis on
production research. It would also have to concentrate on production
systems that maximised farm incomes at variable levels of output.
Moreover,in the new world of production surpluses it would have to
increase its emphasis on alternative uses for land and on the
socio-economic problems of marginal farming. It would have to re-examine
its role in the major areas of beef and dairying. As we have seen the
challenge for the Irish dairy industry in the mid to late 80's has been
to shift its product profile away from commodities to less volatile and
higher margin branded consumer products. A similar challenge has faced
the less developed meat processing industry. If AFT was to remain of
significant value to these industries it was going to have to be able to
reorientate its research emphasis to confront this challenge.
Transforming the research programme at AFT proved to be enormously
difficult. AFT had an aging cohort of core researchers,many of them
highly specialised and experienced in those areas of research that posed
the challenges to the development of Irish agriculture in the pre-1980
era. The organisation had difficulty in maintaining an ideal blend in
its research group of youth and experience,of 'new' sciences and
'mature' sciences,because of long time restrictions on hiring at one end
and lack of oportunities and motivation for career mobility beyond the
organisation at the other. Yet,within these considerable restrictions
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and with considerable skill and persistence,the executive did make some
significant progress in transforming their organisation. One of the
most notable developments in this regard was the setting up of a
dedicated Food Science Research Centre in 1987,in spite of the internal
and external political difficulties that were involved. Events since the
General Election of 1987 have overtaken the organisation's own efforts
to transform itself. The Government have intervened to accelerate the
pace and the extent of the change. They did this through amalgamating
AFT with ACOT,the advisory service, and through rationalising the merged
entity using an new public service voluntary redundancy scheme. These
measures have helped to create the conditions for much more radical
change than was possible through internal efforts at transformation
alone.
In spite of this most recent radical transformation the newly merged
entity,now known as Teagasc,continues to face major questions about its
future role in the new conditions of the 1980's and beyond. With high
levels of urban unemployment and continuing pressure on public funds the
political support for high levels of state involvement in agricultural
research has diminished over the years. The meat and dairy processors
are now among the largest of Irish businesses. These industries have
developed substantially since the late 50's when AFT was founded. Their
claim on public resources is no longer as strong as it once was and the
role that state-funded agricultural research can or should play in their
ongoing development remains problematic.
1992 - The EEC programme for completion of the internal market
One of the major developments already in train in the international
trading environment that is likely to have major implications for the
organisations,and the industries,in this study in the next decade is
the EEC prograrme for the completion of the internal market by 1992.
It is as yet impossible to predict exactly what changes the post-1992
trading environment will bring about and how extensive they will be.
This will depend very much on the level of political commitment among
the Community partners to fully realise a true internal market,with few
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internal cross-national barriers to trade. If the EEC moves decisively
towards increasing levels of economic integration then the evolution of
national organisations,the structural evolution of national economies
and of the Community and Global economy,are all likely to be affected in
very fundamental ways. For Ireland,in particular,the very meaning of
'Irish' industries and of 'Irish' industrial policy are likely to be
altered in a profound way. New industry structural configurations are
probable as the 'domestic' market of the sugar,dairying and distilling
industries,for consuniers,capital,labour and material acquisition,
becomes the Community market rather than the Irish market. New levels of
industry concentration can be expected as national industries merge into
Community industries and new intra-Commuinty transnational alliances and
consolidations in the dairy, sugar and distilling industries are
probable. Furthermore,new patterns of direct foreign investment in the
Community can also be expected as large transnational corporations in
the global economy seek to participate in the "large injection of
inflation free growth" in the Community economy that is expected to
result from the completion of the internal market(Cecchini,1988;xix).
Moreover,the Community's move towards fuller economic integration can
be expected to be mirrored in other parts of the world as similiar
trading blocks across the globe widen their membership and increase
their own internal economic integration. This,in turn,can be expected to
alter trading patterns and affect the future evolution of global
industry structures.
Some indications of what is to come are already in evidence as the pace
of transnational mergers and alliances quickens in the run up to 1992.
In Ireland the takeover battle for IDG,that took place during the latter
half of 1988, was seen as the first tangible indication of the kind of
structural change that is likely to be in store for many Irish
organisations,whether as preditors or prey,wooers or wooed, as the
programme for full European economic integration proceeds. For the
Irish economy as a whole,and for Irish organisations in particular,
the post 1992 era seems likely to be very different from anything that
has gone before since the foundation of the State.
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Factor 4: NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND LEADERSHIP
Strategy formation in the focal organisations was also affected by
national public policy and leadership. In the last section we saw how
the structural evolution of the international trading arena had affected
the development of the organisations in this study. Ireland,as a
small open economy,has had very little influence on this structural
evolution and must largely deal with its effects as a 'given' . These
effects,as we have seen in the last section,were both direct and
indirect. Some of the international developments ramified directly into
the development of the focal organisations. They did this through their
direct effects on the industry structure and competitive conditions
prevailing internationally,such as changes to international
supply/demand patterns and product/factor price levels. In other cases,
developments in the international trading arena have been mediated for
the focal organisations through national public policy and leadership.
The data show,however,that national public policy and leadership is also
an independent variable in its own right. National public policy and
leadership has at times been,itself,directly reactive to international
developments as we have seen,again and again,in the previous section. It
has also,however,sought at various times to actively harness the
'natural' forces in the international trading context to pursue a
positive policy of national economic development. In this regard it
has,in turn,both directly and indirectly affected strategy formation
in the organisations under study. This more active role of national
public policy and leadership will be the main focus of this section.
Ireland 1921 - from a provincial to a national economy
The political developments that led to Ireland's independence as a
nation have alxeady been briefly reviewed in chapter 4. The
whole country did not opt for independence and the island of
Ireland remains divided by a political and economic land frontier.
The economic frontier has become less important since the 1960's as a
result,firstly,of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1965; and
later,of the simultaneous entry of Ireland and Britain into the EEC in
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1972.
The decision to go it alone politically and economically as a nation in
its own right in 1921,as a free state within the British Empire with
dominion status, was the major watershed in the history of modern
Ireland.The declaration of a full republic in 1949 was simply an
extension of this development and a formal recognition of what,by
then,had long since become the defacto position. The alternative in 1921
was to remain,in some form or other,a major regional province of the
United Kingdom. An important ideological justification for Irish
separatism had been that the welfare of the Irish people politically,
socially and economically,would be better served through
self-determination. An assessment of how far and to what extent this
assumption has been justified by subsequent history is outside the scope
of the present work and any such assessment would indeed be a difficult
and complex task. What can be safely asserted,within the confines of
this study,is that the change in status from province to nation was of
fundamental contextual significance for the development of Irish complex
organisations generally,for good or ill,from that time forward.
To begin with,the national economic structure within which Irish
organisations were to develop and operate in the future was to be
smaller and more immediate after 1921 than before. Medium-sized
organisations in international trading terms which would still have been
classed as medium-sized organisations in the context of a large
traditional economic power like Britain,had Ireland remained a province;
became or were to become large organisations in the new context of a
small Irish national economy. This,however,also meant that the scope for
Irish organisations to grow within their domestic economic context
was now to be much more limited than before.
Secondly,the 'Irishness' of Irish organisations took on a new level of
distinctiveness and strength of association in the context of an
independent national economic structure. It is unlikely,for example,
that the developmental roles of the Irish sugar industry and An Foras
Taluntais would have been so focused and so energised by economic
nationalism had they been regional extensions of a larger British
sugar-beet industry and agricultural infrastructure respectively.It
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seems certain that the structural evolution of the Irish distilling
industry would have been very different had it remained a regional
element of the British distilling industry. Exactly how is a matter for
speculation. However,it seems likely that,in an overall British
distilling context,the development of individual brand strength would
have become more important than generic distinctions and that the
pattern of diversification and concentration of capital within the
industry would long since have crossed the historic Scotch-Irish divide
and blurred the distinction between the two industries. It seems certain
also that the structural evolution of the Irish dairy industry would
have been very different in the context of a larger British dairy
industry. For one thing,it is unlikely to have remained so firmly in the
hands of the cooperative movement for so long. Furthermore,dairying has
been a vital economic activity to the Irish economy.It is comparatively
less important in the overall economic structure of Britain. This is
most clearly evident in the diametrically opposite stances taken by the
two countries in relation to the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy.
The third major change was that the locus of public policy and
leadership had transferred from London to Dublin. In the context of a
much smaller national economic structure the effects of this public
policy and leadership on Irish complex organisations were destined to
become more immediate and interdependent than would have been the case
had Ireland opted to remain a part of the United Kingdom. While we can
only speculate on how the structural evolution of the industries
represented in this study might have differed historically had Ireland
chosen to remain British; we can,from the evidence in the data,be more
positive about the effects of public policy and leadership on the
development of the organisations in the study.
Early Self-Government - Classical Economic Policy
The public policy of the first Free State administration was broadly
classical.This administration concentrated on the orderly assumption and
development of the institutions of government and on the establishment
of public order. The major problems for the new state were political and
the domestic political situation remained volatile in the wake of the
326
1922 civil strife over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The first
administration was slow to intervene in the direct working of the
economy. Its approach to intervention,through tariff protection and
through state funding for economic and industrial development,was
piecemeal and cautious. It saw agriculture as the primary wealth
creating activity in the Irish economy. The need for continued ease
of access to the British market was seen to be of primary importance and
was a disincentive to any interference in the freedom of trade with the
major trading partner. This administration's overall approach to the
economic management of the country was essentially one of free-trade,
laissez-faire classicism.
Under this laissez-faire policy of the 1920's the Irish dairy industry
confronted the first major crisis since its structural transformation to
the creamery system. For most of the 20's private and cooperative
interests jockeyed for position in the industry. This competitive
activity became intensified,and potentially destructive of the industry
as a whole,when agricultural prices fell sharply after 1920 and
remained in a depressed state for the remainder of the decade. The
industry was suffering from low profitability and excess aggregate
capacity. The industry was saved from almost total collapse when the
Government was reluctantly persuaded to intervene directly through the
forceful advocacy of Henry Kennedy of the lAOS. The Government's
intervention in 1927 was decisive. The State set up the Dairy Disposal
Company as a mechanism for bringing about a major rationalisation of
the industry through the selective use of state funds. Private interests
were bought out and marginal operations were amalgamated or closed. The
immediate effects of the State's intervention were to secure the future
profitability of the industry and to secure the central position of the
cooperative movement,and the cooperative form of organisation,in the
industry for a long time into the future. An important unintended
consequence arose from the cooperative movement's own failure to buy out
and recooperativise the Dairy Disposal Company Interests in the near
term. The State retained a direct foothold in the industry right through
to the l960's,through the active involvement of the DCC. This foothold
was to become a major bargaining counter in the State's attempt to bring
about a major rationalisation of the industry in the mid 60s.
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This episode in the history of the Irish dairy industry was a case of
a laissez-faire public policy almost allowing a vital industry to
self-destruct and then,at crisis point,being harnessed and mobilised by
one of the key participants,the cooperative movement,to save the
industry and to secure the movement's central position within it.
By the 1920's the pattern for the future evolution of the distilling
industry in the British Isles had already taken root. The war between
the pot-stilled product and the blended product had been fought over the
previous two decades. The pot-stillers had won a battle when they
influenced the British Government to enact a measure requiring a minimum
3 year maturing period for all classes of whiskey. They lost the
war,however,when they failed to have the blended spirit declassified as
whiskey and when they subsequently failed to recognise its enormous
export potential.The introduction of the three-year compulsory bonding
period forced a lot of the marginal producers of blended spirit out of
business or into mergers with larger,more resourceful,firms. By the
l920s the blended Scotch whisky industry had achieved a high degree of
concentration and had established a number of highly reputable brands.
The largest concentration was in the Distillers Company,which had been
formed through the amalgamation of the six oldest Scottish grain whisky
producers in 1877. By the 1920s most of the major brands were under DCL
control including the Dewars,the Haigs,the Walkers and the Buchanans.
Meanwhile the whiskey industry in Ireland had achieved a fair degree of
concentration itself and by the 1920's was dominated by the Dublin-based
pot-stillers. These Dublin companies continued to maintain their
conservative stance with respect to grain whisky,and in 1926 they
secured from the new Irish Free State Government an extension of the
compulsory bonding period to five years for all whiskey to be sold on
the Irish market. This measure did penalise imports of blended whisky
from Scotland and Northern Ireland and it strengthened the Irish
pot-stillers' dominance of the domestic market. However it proved to be
short-sighted. It made future penetration of the American market more
difficult for Irish pot-stilled whiskey. In the US the spirit laws
prescribed that no spirit could be marketed there which could not be
sold in the country of origin. This meant that Irish whiskey,even if
blended,had to be at least five years old. In contrast three-year old
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whiskey from the United Kingdom could be marketed in the US which gave
it a decided competitive advantage. Throughout the 20s and 30s blended
Scotch was able to establish a significant bridgehead in the American
market,which remained restricted until the 14 year prohibition was
lifted in 1933. This bridgehead was to be an important springboard for
the take-off of Scotch whisky in the US market which accelerated after
the Second World War.
As in the case of the dairy industry,government intervention in the
distilling industry was in reaction to the pressures coming from the
industry itself. In the case of sugar the early development of this
industry remained in the hands of private interests from its
establishment in 1926 until this first administration finally went out
of office in 1932. During this period there was no significant
intervention in the industry,or on its behalf,by the state.
Economic Self-Sufficiency and State Entreprise
The first change in government in the Irish Free State was accompanied
by a major change in public policy away from classical free-trade and
laissez-faire principles to a policy of economic self-sufficiency.
The Fianna Fail administration that came to office in 1932 was already
committed in advance to this economic self-sufficiency policy. An
integral part of that policy was the clear intention to accelerate the
development of native industry behind protective tariff walls. Sean
Lemass,whose name was later to become synonymous with Irish industrial
and economic development,had clearly signalled this philosophy in the
Dail as early as 1928 when, in aspeech advocating protectionism,he said:
"We believe that Ireland can be made a self-contained unit,providing
all the necessities of living in adequate quantities for the people
residing in the island at the moment and probably for a much larger
number"(cited in Meenan,l967;74).
As we saw earlier,the international trading arena turned to isolationism
and protectionism in the wake of the Crash of 1929,and the subsequent
Great Depression in world economic activity. This fragmentation
remained the prevailing condition until after the Second World War.
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In this context it is important to stress that protectionism as an
economic philosphy was positively embraced in Ireland by the government
of the day as a strategy for industrial development and not simply as a
reaction to contemporary developments in world trade. However,the
self-sufficiency policy of the Fianna Fail administration of 1932-48,and
its policy of extending state involvement in economic activity and
in the management of the economy,were reflected in,and reinforced by,the
prevailing practice of the time in the international environment. As a
result,these new policy departures were made easier to defend and
sustain politically. They were also supported ideologically through the
growing influence in this period of the newly emerging Keynesian
economic doctrine.
It was in the 1932-48 era,under the self-sufficiency policy,that the
semi-state organisation really emerged as a major instrument in Irish
economic development. Sean Lemass,the Minister responsible for most of
these initiatives later pointed out that this growth in the State's
involvement in economic activity was motivated by economic pragmatism
and not for any ideological reasons or as part of any philosophy of
State socialism(see Chubb&Lynch l969;177-194). State resources and
organisation were mobilised in economic activities deemed important
to overall economic development where private capital had proved shy,as
in the development of the peat industry; or where private entreprise had
tried and failed,as in the case of the sugar industry. In all 18 new
semi-state organisations were formed for various purposes during the
1932-45 period.
The beet sugar industry in Ireland was introduced by commercial
interests in 1926. A production facility was erected at Carlow and by
1932 the new company was producing 13400 tons of sugar,around 7% of the
domestic market requirement. It was only when this entreprise got into
financial difficulties in 1933 that the new government intervened.
The Government might have taken minimal measures at this time to shore
up the failing concern. }lowever,it saw a developmental value in the
industry and recognised that private entreprise would not be willing or
able to develop it fast enough,or fully enough,in the overall national
interest. Lemass,in moving the proposed legislation in the Bail to
establish a new semi-state organisation to develop the sugar-beet
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industry,recognised that the industry was not an economic proposition
"from a purely accountancy point of view. .(but). .by giving a measure of
protection necessary to put the beet crop into existence,we are going to
provide employment-it will be a cash crop for farmers and indirectly
create new business for quite a number of industries,and we are going to
do that at a cost to the community of an extra halfpenny a pound of
sugar".
Once the State got involved the aim was clearly to make the country
self-sufficient in sugar as quickly as possible.This involved the
development of acreage under beet and sugar manufacturing capacity
at a level way beyond that reached by the private entrepreneurs when
their project ran into difficulties. In addition to taking over the
Carlow facility from the private interests the new semi-state
organisation,CSET,established three additional factories. At the
sod-cutting ceremony for one of the new factories the Taoiseach,
Eamonn De Valera declared that "in establishing factories such as these
we are making the way for a self-sufficient and self-supporting State".
The strategic benefits of being self-sufficient in a basic commodity
like sugar were realised much sooner that anyone had expected.
During the 1939-45 hostilities the new industry was able to supply the
country's basic needs despite severe operational difficulties brought
about by the war-time scarcity of industrial materials.
The successful establishment of an indigeneous sugar industry was one of
the major successes of the economic self-sufficiency policy. The dairy
and whiskey distillates industries had more mixed fortunes throughout
the period in which the self-sufficiency policy was in operation.
At the time Britain was still the country's dominant trading partner and
an important export market for the Irish dairying and distilling
industries. The use of protection to develop native industry through
import substitution was always likely to be met with some economic
retaliatory measures by the major trading partner. However,it had been
hoped to minimise these effects on Irish exporting industries through
the careful selection of the new industries that would be marked out
for development under protection. This hope was shattered by the
political developments that led to the Economic War with Britain.
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The Fianna Fail administration of 1932-48 was dominated by two men,the
political idealist De Valera and the economic pragmatist Sean Lemass.
There was no question however but that the economic pragmatism of Lemass
was subsumed under the political leadership of De Valera and not in
conflict with it. The economic philosophy of self-sufficiency had a
clear political ideological basis in self-determination. De Valera was
determined to achieve a defacto republic in the 26 counties as quickly
as possible and during his first term of office he proceeded,with
considerable political skill,to dismantle the 1921 Treaty with this
intent. His administration's pursuit of this political objective led to
the 'Economic War' with Britain; the immediate causus belli was his
with-holding of the land annuity payments to Britain that had been part
of the terms of the Treaty. In this era of economic depression and
isolationism,Britain,no longer restrained by any ideological commitment
to free trade,retaliated with the political use of the tariff in its
attempt to bring Ireland into line. Ad valorem duties of first 20%
later rising to 40% were imposed on Irish imports.
The British market for dairy products and for spirits was already
considerably weakened as the Great Depression took hold and deepened.
The imposition of penal duties in extremely depressed market conditions
was a critical development for both industries. The Government moved
quickly to protect the dairy industry,which was always seen to be of
vital national interest,through domestic price supports and export
subsidies. It also became directly involved in an attempt to improve the
export marketing of Irish dairy products through the establishment of
the Butter Marketing Committee in 1936. In contrast,little support was
forthcoming for the distilling industry,already suffering severe
pressure on the British market from the general economic depression and
due to the intensifying competitive pressures from Scotch and from beer.
The 'Economic War' was a major element,along with the others just
mentioned,in bringing about the almost total collapse of Irish whiskey
exports in this period.
During the 1939-45 wartime emergency period the Irish Government
imposed restrictions on the expot of whiskey in order to conserve home
supplies and to maintain excise revenue. This strategy led to the
further withdrawl of Irish whiskey from export markets. In contrast,the
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British Government during the same period restricted whisky sales on the
domestic market in order to protect and develop the export of
Scotch,especially throughout the European theatre wherever American
soldiers were stationed. When the war was over and the American
soldiers returned home they had already,in large nuinbers,developed a
preference for Scotch whisky. This formed a significant nucleus around
which the Scotch Whisky industry launched its significant export
drive on the US market in the immediate post-war period. By 1952 exports
of Scotch,mostly blended whisky,had reached a massive £32m. Exports of
Irish whiskey,in contrast,were languishing at a paltry £O.5m. The
contrast was so stark by the early fifties that it was raised in Dail
Eireann on a number of occasions throughout the decade. One independent
deputy went so far as to try to secure a measure to promote the export
of Irish whiskey if necessary through the setting up of a semi-state
body to produce a suitably blended Irish product. The industry itself,
however,remained reluctant to commit extra capacity to the production
of a new blended whiskey for export in the absence of a guaranteed
market. While the Government continued to pressure the industry on the
issue of exports it did not directly intervene.
Sean Lemass.Economic Ex pansion and Entry to EEC
Sean Lemass,the economic pragmatist in the first Fianna Fail
administration,is the legendary public figure most associated with
Ireland's industrialisation and transition to from a traditional to a
modern society. As Minister for Industry and Commerce in the 1932-48
Fianna Fail administration he lead the economic drive for
self-sufficiency. In this period the basic character and structure of
the modern Irish economy was formed. He is linked historically with
both the rate of Irish economic development and with the structural
evolution of the economy,in particular its particular mix and balance
between private and state entreprise.
The policy of economic self-sufficiency did have its successes,and any
evaluation of its overall effectiveness must take full account of the
conditions prevailing internationally during the 30' and 40's when it
was in full operation. In the post-war era,serious doubts began to
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grow about its continuing appropriateness. Many of the new Irish
industries,that developed under protectionism,had remained small and
inefficient. The flight from the land,typical of modernising economies,
became a flight from the couritry,mainly to the industrial centres of
the United Kingdom. Living standards north of the Border were higher
than those in the South. The country as a whole began to experience a
crisis of national self-doubt. It had won its political independence but
was the national economy a viable one,capable of providing enough work
and acceptable living standards for its people? In 1958 the policy of
self-sufficiency was formally and dramatically abandoned,though the
country had been edging away from it since the late 40's. The analysis
and blueprint for a change in policy were provided by Ken Whitaker in
his now historic document 'Economic Development'. Whitaker's analysis
was inspired by the rate of recovery in Europe and influenced by the
success of the French economic policy of indicative planning. Under
Lemass's leadership the Whitaker blueprint was developed into the First
Programme for Economic Expansion, which covered the period 1958-63.
The period 1958-63 is now regarded by most modern historians as a
watershed in the development of modern Ireland. The full historical
significance of this period has been examined in some detail in
chapter 4 and as we move farther beyond it,and gain more perspective on
it,its significance seems to grow rather than diminish. Ireland's
economy is now generally described as small,mixed and open. Smallness
was determined when the Irish people determined to go it alone. Mixed
and open are the result of subsequent broad policy choices. As we have
seen above the mixed character of the modern Irish economy largely
evolved during the 30's and 40's. The self-sufficiency policy was an
attempt to close the economy asmuch as practicable by diverting
resources from exporting activities to import substitution. This policy
was reversed in the First Programme. The Irish economy was to be
opened and a sustained effort made to develop the economy through
export-led growth,funded to some extent by direct foreign investment in
the country and by the use of public investment for productive purposes.
An integral part of this policy was to seek entry into the EEC at the
earliest possible oportunity. Among other thi,ngs,membership of the EEC
would help Ireland to diversify its international trade away from over-
dependence on a single trading partner,the United Kingdom. The expansion
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targets for the First Programme were exceeded,national self-confidence
was restored,and a sustained policy of economic expansion was embarked
on which was to continue to expand the economy right up to the end of
the 70's. The first application for EEC membership was turned down in
1962 but eventual membership a decade later was a logical extension of
the major policy change which had occurred in the late 50's.
All sectors of the Irish economy were mobilised in support of the
programme for economic expansion. This was the era of Ireland Inc. under
Lemass's 'corporate style' of management. Many state organisations were
directly mobilised,and many non-state entreprises nudged,cajoled,
induced and otherwise pressured,into support for the programme for
economic expansion and for the drive on exports.
The establishment of a state-sponsored research organisation to support
Irish agriculture had its genesis in the Marshall Aid Programme for
European recovery,and the proposal was first made by that Programme's
representative in Ireland as early as 1948. After many years of wranging
by the various interests over different proposals the institute was
finally established in 1958,the year that 'Economic Development' was
published and the First Programme got under way. The new institute was
immediately drawn into the national effort. The close linkage between
the institute's early development and the First Programme were clearly
revealed in AFT's annual report of 1963-64:
"At the request of the Minister for Agriculture a report on
developments in (AFT) in relation to the first Economic Expansion
Programme was prepared and submitted. . . In line with the objectives of
the Programme a comprehensive organisation with competent staff was
built up to carry out research in the fields of plant sciences and
crop husbandry,animal production,horticulture and finally rural
economy. ."
The Institute's, early formation and development took place in the
context of the First Programme and by the end of the period covered by
the first programme it had already begun to have a notable impact on
the development of Irish agriculture. The Institutegrew rapidily in
this context,being marked out as an important target for public
productive investment under the guiding philosophy in 'Economic
335
Development'. When the Second Programme for Economic Expansion came to
be formulated,the Institute was required to advise on the research
needs of agriculture up to 1970. AFT's proposed programme on approval
by the Government was directly incorporated as an integral element in
the Second Programme's plans and objectives for the agricultural sector.
Agriculture was targeted in the Second Programme as an important
source of foreign exchange with which to finance the expansion of the
industrial sector. It was seen to be an important primer of overall
economic development and agricultural research was recognised in the
Programme as a vital 'third factor' along with labour and capital in the
pursuit of economic growth. "As such".as the Institute's fttst fltrettc
said in his address to the Nominating Organisations to the Council of
AFT in 1965, "it (research) is now regarded by planners and economists
as basic to economic development and indeed as determining the extent
to which investment in capital,equipment and facilities can result in
increased productivity. . investment in research is investment in
growth"(Walsh,1965;2).During the period covered by the Second Programme
the Institute got the only multiyear budget in its history,a 3 year
financial commitment from government covering its development over the
1963-66 period. The 1958-67 period marked the major formation and growth
phase of AFT.
By the end of the fifties Ireland was already self-sufficient in sugar.
Due to the structure of the world market for sugar,where most of the
world's production is disposed of under price support within large
trading blocks,the industry offered little realistic prospect for
export-led growth in the basic commodity. The world spot market for
sugar is a residual market and under free trade conditions beet-sugar
is uncompetitive. Yet,by the time that the First Programme for Economic
Expansion was introduced CSET had accumulated considerable experience in
the processing of a basic agricultural foodstuff. CSET was,by then,
a valuable resource which could be mobilised in support of the First
Programme in which significant net exporting from the agricultural
sector was to be a major cornerstone. Lemass,in his drive for economic
expansion,threw down the gauntlet to organisations like AFT and CSET and
they were expected to come up significant tangible contrirbutions to the
national effort. CSET had,since the early fifties,been exploring the
possibility of a diversification into food. When the economic
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expansion gauntlet was thrown down the food project was CSET's almost
immediate response:
"With our experience and knowledge of handling farmers' produce over
the years and our intimate knowledge and understanding of the farming
problems of our 30,000 beet growers,we tackle these problems with
considerable advantages. We consider it our duty in the national
interest to utilise our special knowledge and our very considerable
technological resources to exploit the vast oportunities of economic
expansion offered by the convenience food business" (Annual Report
l964;8).
The food project was the most significant diversification in CSET's
history. CSET entered into the task with much energy and imagination.
New food processing factories were built alongside the sugar processing
factories in the company's four regional operating centres. New
processing technologies were introduced and the world's first commercial
AFD(Accelerated Freeze-Drying) plant was opened in Mallow. A new R&D
centre was established in Carlow. The Government supported the project
by increasing its equity in CSET to provide funds for the erection of
the new facilities but the developmental costs in R&D,Marketing etc were
all funded through retained earnings,i.e. through net funds flow from
the sugar business to the food project. The government of the day were
clearly fully behind the project. Sean Lemass came personally to perform
the opening ceremony at the new Mallow plant. In 1963 Lemass,then
Taoiseach,paid tribute to the 'very positive response' of CSET 'in
widening the scope of (its) activities in areas unrelated to (its)
present operations' in support of the drive for economic expansion.
The food project was the major drama in CSET's history. The early aims
for the food project were ambitious and they envisioned the building up
of a national food business that would "be larger than any industrial
activity now carried on in Ireland"(Annual Report,1962;14). However,the
task proved more difficult than had been expected and the project never
made the impact that had been hoped for it. The main difficulty was the
market. The company proved capable of managing the latest in processing
technology and of carrying out effective product development 10 produce
a range of new and exciting convenience products. Even with these
advantages the market development costs necessary to secure a critical
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and self-sustaining breakthrough on the vast,but highly competitive,UK
market were far greater than anyone had anticipated. The market
structure was already dominated by several giant competitors. In
addition,the company embarked on the diversification with a major
handicap.In order not to discommode private entreprise at home the
Government had placed a requirement on CSET that only 10% of the food
project's turnover could be offered for sale in the domestic market.If
the export market development costs could have been met by funds flowing
from a strong and profitable domestic market position,so that the food
project as a whole could break even and show an early profit, then
perhaps the company would have been allowed to persist longer with the
expensive effort to build up its own sales and distribution network in
the 1.3K and eventually reach the critical self-sustaining breakthrough
that General Costello believed was possible.
Without the substantial home market the project as a whole continued to
have difficulty reaching a break-even level. Lemass retired as Taoiseach
in 1966. The torch of national leadership passed to a new
post-revolutionary generation of Irishmen. This new leadership lost
faith in the General's strategy and contrived his departure from CSET
with his own unwitting assistance in late 1966. Tony O'Reilly was
induced by the Government to take over as leader of CSET with the
express purpose of bringing the food diversification to early profit.
O'Reilly was chosen for his commercial skills and for his track record
in An Bord Bainne,the Irish Dairy Board,where he had played a major role
in the successful launch of a generic brand for Irish dairy produce in
the UK market,the Kerrygold brand. A new marketing strategy was devised
for the food project. The direct sales and distribution network was
disbanded and a joint-venture was formed with the Heinz corporation to
use the existing Heinz sales and distribution system to bring Erin foods
to the UK consumer. Heinz were impressed with O'Reilly and persuaded him
to join their UK organisation after less than 3 years as Managing
Director of CSET. The project was still not in profit when O'Reilly
departed. The Government,disillusioned with O'Reilly's early
resignation and with the continuing difficulties associated with making
the project successful,effectively withdrew to arm's length and leftthe
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company to its own devices. By 1972,the great experiment was essentially
over and by this time the high hopes,harboured in the early days of the
drive for economic expansion,that the project would spawn a national
food industry and become in time CSET's major activity were abandoned.
The Lemass-led drive for economic expansion played a direct role in
bringing about the major rationalisatlon in the dairy industry in the
late 60's. The Government was concerned about the competitiveness of the
economy,particularly of vital export sectors like the dairy industry,in
the context of its decision to seek full membership of the EEC. In this
regard it commissioned two important studies. The first was the survey
of the dairy products industry carried out by the Survey Team in 1962.
The Survey Team's study was extensive. Many issues requiring urgent
attention in order to strengthen the industry were raised and specific
recommendations made. The main issue was the Team's call for a major
restructuring of the industry. According to the Team's analysis the
industry was too fragmented. They saw an urgent need to achieve a
greater concentration in capital and expertise in order to bring the
industry into line with developments among Europe's other major dairy
producing countries. As they put it in their report(Survey Team,1963):
"What is principally being aimed at is a flexible and cohesive dairying
industry,based on a relatively small number of large units,and strong
financially,organisationally and administratively. .The zeal with which
(such structural changes) are being tackled in Holland and Denmark,for
exaniple,is in our opinion very significant. The dairy industry in each
of these countries is more closely integrated than the Irish one.. It
be near folly for (the Irish dairy industry) to persist with a
structure that is rapidly becoming out of date in competitor
countries. ."(pars 135,64).
In addition to its call for the urgent restructuring of the industry the
Survey Team raised doubts about the capability of the industry to
restructure itself. It suggested the setting up of a permanent
superstructure for the industry with "adequate independence,virility and
power" to lead and guide the industry through its own reorganisation,by
mandatory powers if necessary. The dairy industry,arising from its
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historical evolution,was primarily controlled by the cooperative
movement at the time. Yet,the Survey Team was doubtful whether the
IAOS,the corporate body of the movement in Ireland,was capable of
providing the appropriate superstructure needed.
The Government then promptly set about commissioning a second
report,this time on the state and health of the cooperative movement in
the country. Dr.Knapp,in this report,devoted a major section to the
dairy industry and to the Survey Team analysis. He agreed with the Team
that the reorganisation of the industry was indeed necessary and that
the need was urgent,in the light of the major national drive for
economic expansion. However,he felt strongly that the restructuring
should evolve organically with the industry and he did not share the
Survey Team's belief that the lAOS were not up to the task of leading
the process. On the contrary he recommended that the lAOS should be
given "full responsibility for working out general reorganisation plans
for the industry" in the belief that under Its leadership the dairy
cooperatives "have the ability to achieve the consolidations and mergers
which are required to improve the structure of the dairy
industry" (Knapp,1964; 108).
After the publication of these two reports the lAOS came under
increasing pressure to develop a set of proposals for the restructuring
of the industry. while the Knapp report had been reassuring the Survey
Team analysis had clearly shown that there was no room for complacency
regarding its central role within the industry. The Lemass Government
was anxious that the restructuring of the industry proceed without undue
delay. In the Second Programme for Economic Expansion the lAOS was
explicitly charged with the reáponsibility of "encouraging the
co-operative creamery societies to achieve such voluntary consolidations
and mergers as are designed to bring to the industry the operating and
marketing advantages to be gained from economies of scale and
diversification of production"(Chp9,VII). However,it was clear to the
lAOS that if they did not move on it quickly the Government would seek
to achieve its objectives for the industry through some other mechanism.
The most likely means was through extension of the State's direct
involvement in the industry. The lAOS was left in little doubt that the
future character of the dairy industry was on the line. It was made
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known that the Government had its own rationalisation plan-in-waiting.
A major initiative taken by the State during this period was the
formation of An Bord Bainne,the Irish Dairy Board,as a state agency
in 1961. The Board was set up to be the central marketing agency for
Irish dairy exports. It had been long since recognised that the full
potential of Irish dairy exports was not being realised for lack of
concentrated marketing effort by the industry. After the first major
rationalisation of the industry in 1927 a serious effort had been made
to set up such an organisation from within the cooperative movement. The
organisation in question,the Irish Associated Creameries Ltd. ,was set up
within the movement as a federation. In spite of having being strongly
supported by the government of the day and the IAOS,the effort failed
for lack of commitment from the cooperatives themselves. After this
failure the State intervened in 1936 when it set up the Butter Marketing
Committee to coordinate and organise the export marketing of creamery
butter during the difficult period of the 'Economic War'. The urgency
grew for the more effective marketing of dairy exports under the climate
generated by the economic expansion drive. Once again the State took the
major initiative. The new agency scored an notable achievement early on
when it developed and successfully launched a generic brand for Irish
dairy exports,the Kerrygold brand, something which the supporters for
centralised marketing had been advocating as far back as the 20's.
By the mid 60's the State was directly involved in the processing and
marketing of dairy products. Clearly it was not slow to extend its own
involvement if it was unsatisfied with the pace of development in the
industry. There was every reason to believe,therefore,that the State
would spearhead the restructuring of the industry through its own
agencies if the cooperative movement was slow to set about the task
itself. Faced with this possibility,the lAOS came out with
its own proposals for the reorganisation of the industry in 1966.
These proposals ran into considerable opposition from within the
movement itself because of the political implications that widescale
mergers within the industry were going to inevitably involve.
The postponement of Ireland's entry into the EEC and the retirement of
Leinass in 1966 removed some of the urgency for the restructuring of the
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industry. Ireland's application for EEC membership was reactivated in
1967 and membership was then expected towards the end of the decade.
Once more the Goverrunent intervened and commissioned a third report,this
time specifically focused on an examination of the organisation of the
industry and charged with making specific recommendations on the
restructuring of the industry. In the face of such persistence industry
leaders,like Dave O'Loughlin of Golden Vale,came to accept amalgamation
as inevitable and began,in earnest,the slow and painful task of
bringing it about. Significantly,one of the carrots held out to the
cooperative niovement,to further move it along the road to amalgamation,
was the promise by the then Minister for Agriculture,iri the late 60's,to
finally hand the Dairy Disposal Company over to the cooperative movement
and to thereby withdraw from direct involvement in dairy processing.
The Lemass drive for economic expansion played a significant,if less
direct,role in the major rationalisation that took place in the
distilling industry in the mid 60's. The distilling industry had been
experiencing increasing criticism from without,and growing frustration
from within,concerning its poor export performance. As we saw earlier,
this was thrown into dramatic relief by the enormous growth in the
exports of the blended Scotch industry in the late 40's and early 50's.
During the 50's the industry's underdeveloped export potential was
the subject of a number of discussions in the Dail chamber. One
independent deputy was sufficiently moved by the issue to call for
the restructuring of the industry,with state involvement if necessary,
to improve its export earning potential and consequently its overall
contribution to the development of the economy. The state export
development agency,An Coras Tractala,became involved around this time
in an exercise to help the industry to assess its presence,prospects and
potential in the US market. So for more than a decade there had been a
growing awareness among various interests that the industry was far from
realising its full potential. There was much speculation on what might
have been achievable through greater consolidation of resources within
the industry and greater concentration of effort on exports. The
industry,however,had been slow to move on the issues under the national
policy of self-sufficiency and in the difficult international trading
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conditions that had pertained up to the end of the war. Under these
conditions the home market the industry could remain inefficient,
fragmented,inward-looking and conservative; and survive. The dramatic
turn that national economic policy took in 1958 was soon to lead to a
change in this situation.
Unlike the cases of dairying and sugar,there was no direct state
involvement in the reorganisation of the distilling industry. Lemass
remained convinced that the distillers themselves,with their
conservative attitude to the product,remained the main obstacle to
industry rationalisation and to any new drive on exports. His new
economic policies,however,did have a significant effect on the
industry's evolution. In his drive for economic expansion he officially
abandoned protectionism and signalled the opening of the home market,
giving freer access to foreign goods and capital. The First Programme
for Economic Expansion incorporated the assumption of early entry into
the EEC. When the first application was turned down,Lemass set about
maintaining the momentum for change in the economy towards freer trade
and export-led growth by negotiating the Anglo-Irish Free Trade
Agreement of 1965. It became clear to the Irish distilling industry that
it was going to face intensifying competition in the home market from
imports of Scotch whisky under the terms of the agreement. It also
became clear that in more open trading conditions the industry's future
growth and development would come to depend more and more on exports.
Strongly influenced by these considerations the three companies that
comprised the distilling industry in the Republic of Ireland merged in
1966 to strengthen the competitiveness of Irish distilling and to
concentrate its resource power for more effective export market
development.
In spite of the strong economic rationale favouring consolidation,there
were major political obstacles to be overcome in bringing the previously
independent leading firms in the industry around to amalgamation.
In this respect,the situation paralleled that of the dairy industry.
However,whereas in the dairy industry the Government used direct
pressure to bring about the desired concentration and reorganisation of
the industry,the merger moves in the distilling industry came mainly
from within the industry itself; with some mediating help from the
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industry's bankers. Informal discussions had been going on over a
number of years concerning how the independent producers in the industry
might combine,rather than conipete,in the area. of export development.
Then,with the opening up of the Irish economy to direct foreign capital
investment after 1958 several large UK brewing companies began to take a
direct interest in the oportunities for growth presented by the Irish
brewing and distilling trades. When one of these,Allied Brewers,began to
expand its interests in the wholesale and distribution of wines and
spirits in Ireland there were very real fears within the distilling
industry that one of the three major distillers,Jameson Ltd. ,was
vulnerable to takeover by the UK-based brewer in the face of this
concentration in buying power. This very real threat to the Irish
distilling companies' control over the future evolution of their
industry provided the impetus necessary to overcome any political
resistance to amalgamation. A merger of the three companies which had
long since dominated the Irish distilling industry,Power,Jameson and
Cork Distillers,took place in 1966.
The first annual report of the new entity,United Distillers of Ireland
Ltd,was careful to tie the merger to the country's drive for economic
development:
"These three long-established and famous companies have united in a
spirit of partnership to enable our industry to make its maximum
contribution to economic development in Ireland by utilising all our
resources to the fullest extent"(Annual Report,l966;14)
The chairman of the new company went on to outline the strategy:
"We look to export markets for long-term expansion of our activities.
Our ability to sustain long-term effort depends in a large part on
the stability of the home market. It is now widely recognised
throughout the world that export success is generally founded on a
firm base at home"(p15).
Demand and profit in the home market had always been heavily influenced
by government policy because of the traditional importance of the duties
and taxes on spirits to the public finances. The Government were being
appealed to directly to play their part in facilitating this strategy
for the industry by ensuring that "Excise duties and taxation will be
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restrained"(p15). In a real sense the gauntlet was been reflected back
to the Government. IDG was using the Government's own public commitment
to a national strategy for export-led economic growth to try to coopt it
into maintaining favourable fiscal conditions for the company on the
home front.
Ireland's application to join the EEC was reactivated in the late 60's
and the country finally entered the Community along with Britain and
Denmark in 1972. Entry to the EEC was a logical extension of the major
change in direction that public policy had taken since 1958. In that
respect,niuch of change that had taken place in Irish organisational life
over the 1958-72 period had happened in anticipation of this
development. Entry into the Community was a malor Landar t tb.
country's history and the effects of EEC entry on the development
of industries and organisations represented in this study have already
been fully examined earlier in this chapter.
Public Debt and Fiscal Rectitude
Entry into the EEC allowed Ireland's economic expansion to continue
through to the end of the 70's in spite of the economic difficulties
arising from the 1973 Oil Crisis and from high and uncontrolled
inflation. The second oil crisis in 1979 brought in its wake a new age
of low growth in world economic activity. Ireland entered this period of
general and prolonged economic slowdown with particular structural
difficulties,concerning especially the state of the public finances.
In 1972 the Fianna Fail Government of Jack Lynch abandoned the
convention that had governed public financial management up to then,
the convention of not running a deficit in the current budget. Though
the initial current deficits were small relative to GNP,once the
convention had been breached further deficits became a matter of degree
not of principle. The first impetus to the growth in the current deficit
came during the 1973 oil Crisis. The quadrupling of the price of oil was
bound to have a major depressing effect on an economy such as Ireland's
with its high level of dependence on imports of oil and of oil-based raw
materials. In order to gradualise and smooth out the necessary
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deflationary adjustment the newly-elected Cosgrave administration moved
to protect living standards,employment and social services by an
increase in public borrowing for current expenditure. As the economy
began to recover in the mid-70's the Cosgrave administration returned to
more conventional budgetary strategies and set about to progressively
decrease the size of the budget deficit,consistent with Keynesian-based
economic management principles. However,in the General Election of 1977
a new Fianna Fail administration swept into office committed to a
political nianifesto,and to economic programnies,that were designed to
inject a major demand stimulus into the economy,to be funded by much
higher current deficits than ever before. It was a big gamble and it
failed. It gambled on continued economic growth in the international
environment and it gambled on the willingness of Irish workers to accept
wage increases that were lower than those in competitor countries. Both
bets lost and Ireland entered the difficult 1980's with a high level of
public debt and with little room to manoeuver in fiscal policy.
The debt to GNP ratio had grown from 29% in 1976 to a massive 70% in
1985. The state of the public finances remained a central election issue
throughout the 80's. Yet several successive administrations had enormous
difficulty in tacking this problem. One of the legacies of the economic
expansion drive was a vastly increased public sector. Many of the public
sector jobs created during the two decades of economic expansion were
directly related to the expansion effort. They were created in the
various state agencies that were set up or revitalised and expanded at
this time to stimulate and support development. With the early success
of its expansion efforts,public policy moved to use some of the new
prosperity to develop a more equitable and caring society. In particular
the fields of public education,health and social welfare were greatly
improved and expanded. In addition to all of this,the area of security
rose sharply and steeply in the period after 1968 to become a major item
of public expenditure,as the troubles in Northern Ireland developed and
deepened.It has remained a major element of public expenditure ever
since. All in all,public sector current spending rose from 24% to 42% of
GNP over the 1958-78 period.
As the recession of the 1980's deepened,the burden of this expanded
public sector fell on a progressively contracting private sector.
346
Pressure mounted from the private sector for cuts in public expenditure.
These were stoutly resisted by the powerful public sector unions and by
the recipients of public services. Difficult political decisions were
called for but the political system failed,for most of the decade,to
return a goverrunent with sufficient political power and will to risk the
electoral fallout. In four general elections over the 1981-87 period
power alternated between a single party Fianna Fail administration,
politically weakened by internal conflict over the leadership, and a
coalition of Fine Gale and Labour,ideologically split over where the
burden of the country's economic difficulties should fall within the
community. A FitzGerald-led coalition held office from 1982-86. This
administration managed to achieve some significant success in reducing
and controlling inflation. However,while the major partner to the
coalition,Fine Gale,had strong leanings towards right wing policies of
fiscal rectitude,it was forced to modify its position in order keep the
Labour party in the coalition. This coalition of the right and left
failed to make any major progress on the containment of the rising
public sector debt.
Throughout the 80's successive administrations continued to run a
current deficit until eventually the stage was reached when the country
had become over geared and additional debt raising capacity was largely
taken up with servicing the existing debt. They also raised the levels
of direct and indirect taxation until the point was reached where
further tax increases were generating diminishing returns
In addition there were continuing efforts to curtail public expenditure
and most public sector agencies found their budgets coming under
increasing stringency.Many of these agencies saw their non-pay
expense and capital budgets progressively tightened as budgetary cuts
were implemented across the board. Reductions in personnel were limited
to the replacement of 'natural' attrition on a one new hire for every
three terminations basis. These attempts at fiscal rectitude,however,
were grossly inadequate to eliminate the current deficit or even to
reduce it sufficiently so that the public sector debt could be
stabilised. What was needed,and what successive administrations had
balked at up to l987,were the rationalisation of public services,the
closure of uneconomic facilities and major cuts in public sector
employment.
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By 1987 the country had run out of options. Public opinion has shifted
strongly to the right. The high level of government borrowing was seen
to be 'crowding out' private investment. High levels of personal
taxation were seen to be killing off initiative and effort. National
despondency with the political system was high.The February 1987 General
Election was indecisive and returned a minority government to Dail
Eireann. However,the incoming Haughey-led Fianna Fail administration
became a belated convert to fiscal rectitude. In the light of this
development a remarkable and unprecedented consensus emerged within Dail
Eireann around the need to restore order to the public finances as the
number one prerequisite for the restoration of economic growth in the
country. In spite of its lack of an overall Dail majority,the current
Haughey-led Fianna Fail administration,with its own internal divisions
over the leadership now largely exorcised, has found itself in the
strongest political position of any administration,since the current
depression began,to implement the tough economic policy of fiscal
rectitude. In the period since the February 1987 election the Haughey
administration has demonstrated that it is prepared to implement such
tough measures. The pace of public service rationalisation was
stepped up to previously unrecognisable proportions. Radical cutbacks,
closures and amalgamations,and proposals for more of the same,have
become the order of the day as this latest administration,with the
conditional public support of the main right wing opposition parties,has
set about implementing its tough three year programme for national
recovery.
As noted earlier,the post-1979 period has been a period of major change
in the histories of all of the organisations in this study. A
major factor in all cases was the change in world economic and
trading activity reviewed earlier. However,the State's financial
difficulties were also an important element in the changes that took
place particularly,though by no means exclusively,in the cases of AFT
and CSET,the two public sector organisations.
The 1980's have been particularly difficult for all manner of public
agencies because of the State's persistent fiscal problems. Many
public agencies had been formed or had experienced their major growth
phases during the major economic expansion drive. Indeed many of them
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contributed vital infrastructural support to that drive. In the late
50's many sectors of the economy were very underdeveloped and the scope
for development was great. The initial returns from public investment
in many these agencies was quite dramatic. For most of the period during
which the economy was expanding there was little attempt by governments
to critically assess on any cost-benefit basis the continuing value of
these agencies to the economy. In the 1980's this changed dramatically.
Budgets became progressively tighter,programmes and services came under
close critical scrutiny and agencies felt the 'Sword of Damocles'
continually hanging over them as pressure within the community mounted
for a descaling of the public service.
AFT is just such an agency. Throughout the 1980's the Institute's annual
grant-in-aid from the State became progressively tighter as the
problem with the public finances deepened. The gap between the
Institute's estimates to government of its expenditure needs and the
amount of grant-in-aid that was actually forthcoming widened. Yet AFT
was left to its own devices to determine how to operate within the
constraints of a budget that was contracting in real terms. The effect
of this situation was that that the State,through its inadequate
funding,indirectly forced AFT towards the increasing commercialisation
of its services. This in turn led to a change in the basic nature and
operant mission of the organisation though its statutory mission had
never been altered. Within AFT the strong sense of its value and
importance in the national economic structure was being eroded. As one
senior financial officer in AFT put it:
"What is happening as the budgets are being reduced is that
people (are asking) the question why? Why are they reducing ours.
Either there are no votes in it or they do not see us as
contributing. ."
AFT was progressively troubled during the 80's by a crisis of
identity and by concern for the long-term role and future of the
Institute in its service to Irish agriculture. Long-term,basic,
infrastructural research was being pushed out of the research progranune
by the increase in user-funded,user-defined, short-term applied or
problem solving projects. This shift occurred to a large degree because
of public finance exigencies. A senior researcher characterised this
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change in the organisation's research emphasis and what for him and his
peers were its most worrysome implications:
.the organisation has changed from one which strongly promoted
research activities to one which now demands developmental and applied
research. This is a deterimental change ... to short-term,
problem-solving,fire-fighting activities. .In the long run the fear is
that AFT would lose its scientific base..
It would be wrong to say that this change has been approved and
consciously generated by top management. . . .The budgetary problems are
dictating (it)"
As we have seen already earlier in this chapter,the major changes in the
international environment that have taken place since 1979 had major
implications for Irish agriculture. The challenges posed by the
post-1980 environment for agriculture in general implied a rate and
degree of change for the sector that were unparalleled since the
foundation of the State. For AFT it meant "an absolutely new ball game
a whole revolution taking place" in Irish agriculture with "enormous
implications for research" involving new priorities and demanding new
sciences and skills. AFT has been trying,since 1980,to bring about an
internal transformation in its research programme and resource profile
in order to try to meet these new challenges. At a time in its history
when the need for transformation and change has never been greater,the
Institute has found it particularly difficult to bring it about. One
major reason for this was the tightening of the budgetary situation
leaving little or no room for manoeuver. The Institute,moreover,was
trying to transform itself in an fiscal environment that had become
increasingly more critical of its current real value to the economy,
regardless of its past contribution. A typical example of this more
critical environment was the inclusion of AFT in a list of State-
-sponsored bodies which "test the taxpayers' tolerencett in an article in
the Irish Independent of 27/4/83.A more stinging blow to AFT's morale
was the more recent criticism of Denis Brosnan. In a forum convened by
the FitzGerald Government in 1986,which was widely representative of
Irish agricultural interests,the influential chief executive of Kerry
Cooperative dismissed the Institute's effort on food research as largely
ineffective. Whatever the objective merits of the criticism,it sent
shock waves through the organisation and undermined it in the eyes of
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the agricultural community.
The pace of events quickened for AFT as the Government's fiscal problems
became more acute. In April 1985 the FitzGerald Government set up a
commission,under the chairmanship of farm leader Donal Cashman,to
examine the operation of the Institute and of the related advisory
body,ACOT, and to recommend how the existing resources of the two bodies
might be better deployed and coordinated. This was the first major
review of the Institute's activities to be commissioned by government
in the lifetime of the organisation. The Government had kept the
operation of AFT at arm's length for most of the Institute's history.
However,as public funds became more scarce,governinent evaluation and
control of expenditure in the state sector became more stringent and
commissioned reviews of the affairs of state agencies became more
prevalent. In the case of AFT the Cashman Report highlighted a number of
structural difficulties which beset the organisation and impaired its
performance. It addressed itself primarily to the issue of how the
research activities of the Institute might be expanded and extended into
new areas without any increase in overall resource input. According to
Cashman AFT's age profile was too high and the ratio of research staff
to other staff was too low. Cashman lay the responsibility for the
reform of these structural problems primarily with AFT itself. AFT,which
had already begun the painful process of internal transformation in the
wake of its own major internal review,now came under substantial public
pressure to speed up the process,whatever the internal difficulties.
Since the General Election of February 1987 there have been even more
dramatic developments. This general election did not produce a decisive
result. It returned a Haughey-led minority Fianna Fail Government.
However,Fianna Fail's conversion to fiscal rectitude has effected a
broad consensus of the right in the Dail, and earned it a two budget
'honeymoon' from the main opposition party on condition that its
budgetary strategy addressed the fiscal problems of the country,with
persistence and determination,as the top priority. The Haughey
Administration has purused fiscal rectitude with all the zeal of the
convert. The implications for AFT of this most recent development
are enormous. In late 1987 the Minister for Agriculture announced his
intention to merge AFT and ACOT and he provided for a dramatic cutback
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in the combined budgets of the two organisations from £35m to £20m for
1988. The savings were to be achieved though staff reductions,estimated
to be of the order of 500 personnel over the two organisations. AFT and
ACOT were merged in 1988 into a new body called Teagasc. Significant
staff reductions across the combined organisation have already been
brought about at the time of writing,in September 1988. These reductions
were largely achieved through a voluntary redundancy scheme that the
Government introduced,as part of its strategy for national recovery,in
order to radically descale the whole public sector. By its intervention
in pushing through the merger,and by supporting it with the voluntary
redundancy scheme,the Government has greatly accelerated the process of
transformation that was already underway within AFT,as it strove to
realign its research programme to the new priorities of the 1980's and
beyond.
This development was a major milestone for AFT. Its timing was of
particular significance in the light of AFT's previous history. In the
mid 70's there was a previous attempt by the government of the day to
merge the Advisory Services with AFT into a single body to be known as
the National Agricultural Authority. Legislation was prepared with that
intent. The proposed merger was stoutly resisted by the AFT researcher
staff. As a group they defied the wishes of their own Director and they
fought the issue in the political arena and through the national
media. The merger failed to materialise on that occasion because of the
fortuitous intervention of the 1977 General Election. The new Minister
for Agriculture in the incoming Fianna Fail administration had been
publicly committed to the anti-merger position,having been lobbied by
AFT professionals. On coming to office he modified the pending
legislation in order to maintain two separate services. Just over a
decade later,in very different economic and political circumstances,his
successor,from the same political party,was able to drive through
essentially the same merger with little resistance or opposition. AFT
research staff still retained their fundamental concerns about the
merging of the two entities. However,in the new context of fiscal
rectitude,it was clear that any attempt to overtly resist the
Government's merger plans woqld be futile and damaging to AFT'S future
political support.
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The problems with the public purse,in economic conditions of zero-growth
and increased international competitiveness,brought the performance of
the commercial semi-State organisations back into the centre of the
political arena. For the first time since the economic expansion drive
was launched in 1958 the role of these commercial semi-State bodies
became a central issue for public discussion and political debate,as the
problems of the post-1979 period brought the central dilemma of these
organisations into full,and painful,relief.
The Irish sugar industry,as noted earlier,ran into financial
problems in the difficult trading conditions of the early 1980's.
CSET's first recorded loss in its long history quickly brought it back
to the centre of government attention after nearly a decade at arm's
length. The fiscal problems of the Government led it to examine closely
the affairs of the company. The public purse was in no condition to
carry faltering semi-State organisations through the recessionary 80's.
The company,along with other state-owned entreprises,became the
focus of a special study by a joint committee of the Oireachtais. The
commercial viability of the company was being undermined by two major
problems. The company was heavily over-geared and in the difficult
trading conditions of the 80's interest payments were exceeding trading
profit. Moreover,the company was experiencing annual running losses of
the order of £2m per annum on its Tuam operation.
The Report of the Joint Committee focused on three key areas for
decision; the measures necessary to ensure the viability of the sugar
operation, the role of diversification in the company's future plans and
the weight to be given to social and regional development
responsibilities in the company's overall goals. The Committee's report
was significant for CSET. It was the first official recognition that the
role of the company in Irish economic and social life had changed. It
placed commercial viability of the sugar business as a top priority. It
recommended that the company be allowed to concentrate its operations on
its most viable plants. It also recommended that the equity base of the
company be significantly strengthened in order to reduce the interest
burden and to bring its capital str.zcture more into line with commercial
norms. Finally,it called on the Government to clarify the criteria under
which CSET was expected to operate,both commercial and non-commercial.
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The Sunday Independent leader writer(20-Sep-81) succintly summarised the
company's dilemma in the difficult trading conditions of the 80's:
"The Dilemma is this. Are semi-State companies to be run commercially
or as development agencies?Incredibly,as in the Sugar Company,nobody
has formally told them what role they are to play. If they behave
commercially and sack workers,all hell breaks loose. If they pursue
social objectives and lose money they get hammered. That's a catch
22 with vengence. Somebody had better clear up this contradiction.."
The government of the day accepted the Committee's findings
with regard to CSET's equity base and enacted legislation in 1982 to
increase the authorised share capital of the company to £75m. Prior to
this the State's total equity in the company was £5.5m. The provision of
the additional equity was,however,another story. The company needed a
major injection of capital to fund a capital investment programme aimed
at maintaining the company's competitiveness in international terms. The
rationalisation and modernisation taking place in the industry throughut
Europe was largely dictating the urgency of this capital need. The
flow of the additional equity was hindered by the Government's financial
difficulties and it came in stages. In 1983,the Government requested
that a Review and Rationalisation Plan be drawn up by CSET and stressed
that the future operation of the Group be undertaken on the basis of
normal commercial criteria. The company's plan was based on a
rationalisation and modernisation that would necessitate a total
injection of fresh by the 'Shareholder' (the State) of £68m by 1984.
The company received £30m in 1983, followed by a further £20m a year
later. It was still £l8m short of its expectation in 1986. The company
was forced to proceed with the capital programme less rapidly than it
felt was necessary and it was forced to rely more heavily on further
borrowings than it had planned for. In the Annual Report of 1986 the
chairman of CSET was still expressing concern about the weakness of the
equity base and about the high burden of interest payments.
In the difficult economic and fiscal conditions of the 1980's CSET has
undergone significant rationalisation of its operations in order to
secure the competitiveness of its core activity and to secure the
company's future commercial viability. Over the 1979-87 period the
average number of persons employed by the Group declined from over
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3600 to around 1800. The widely dispersed network of food facilities
that had been built up during the 60's and the 70's was slimmed down to
a three plant configuration in line with the decline and contraction in
the food activity. Rationalisations on this scale by a state-owned
entreprise would have encountered enormous opposition in the pre-1979
era. The whole thrust of the economic expansion policy had been to stem
the tide of emigration by providing more jobs at home. However,as the
problems with the public finances deepened in the harsh economic
conditions of the 80's it became politically less acceptable and
financially more impossible for the State to shore up jobs in
the semi-State commercial sector that were not economically
self-sustaining.
The company's attempts to rationalise the core sugar processing
operation did run into major difficulties. The political system was more
prepared to accept the rationalisation of the food business in
accordance with commercial criteria than that of sugar. This reflects
the differences in the historical origins of the two activities within
the company. The sugar project was essentially a developmental one; the
food project,in contrast,was always viewed and structured along more
commercial lines. The difficulties that the company had in closing the
uneconomic sugar processing operation in Tuam were a reflection of the
difficulties that the political system had in adjusting to the realities
of the fiscal problem. The company,on the strength of the Committee
report,moved quickly to close the Tuam facility in 1981. The company had
already begun to make off-the-record moves to close the Tuam plant in
the late 70's. By the early 80's it had begun to highlight the cost
penalty of Tuam,and its desire to close it,in its public statements.
The Report of the Joint Committee provided it with influential public
support in its efforts to close uneconomic operations and to restructure
itself for commercial viability. Armed with the backing of the report
from the Joint Committee the CSET Board took the decision on 21-Sep-81
to close the Tuam plant. The announcement of the Board's decision was
followed by "thirteen days of controversy"(Foy,l981;161) in which,in the
words of the Sunday Independent editorial of 20-Sep-81 quoted above,all
hell had broken loose.
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In the face of strong national and regional representations from
politicians,churchmen and local community leaders the government of the
day decided to avoid immediate closure,and it allowed the factory to
stay open for another season pending a review of the situation. There
were three general elections between June 1981 and November 1982. The
Dail positions of the administrations that governed over this period
were insecure and the threat of an early General Election was constant.
In these political circumstances the Tuam issue became a potential
political bananna skin of much greater than normal significance. In
such political circumstances,given the degree of controversy over the
closure, it is not surprising that the FitzGerald Government opted
to buy time on the issue. A Haughey-led Fianna Fail administration
returned to power in February 1982,pledged to keep the Tuam plant open.
A FitzGerald-led Coalition,with a more secure Dail majority returned
to office in November 1982 and stayed in office until January 1987.
The early policy of this administration was that they recognised that
Tuam was not commercial but that it would remain open for social
reasons. As the fiscal difficulties became more acute,however,this
approach changed. This same Government's plan for the economic recovery
over the 1985-87 period, called 'Building on Reality',indicated a
significant change in public policy with regard to state entreprise:
"The Government believe that if public entreprise is to make a major
and effective contribution to industrial and economic development in
this country,there will have to be an entirely new approach to the
role and function of public entreprise. Primary emphasis will have to
be placed on developing modern industry with emphasis on commercial
viability and profits"(par 3.61).
With a government now more clearly and publicly committed to a
philosophy of commercial viability for public entreprise,and with public
opinion generally less tolerant of the State subsidising uneconomically
viable commercial employment,the company was able to close the Tuam
facility with relatively little public outcry in 1986. Events have moved
fast since then. The company has signalled its desire to operate the
sugar business on a two plant configuration. This implies the closure of
a second of the four historical sugar processing centres,the Thurles
facility. Once again the need to remain cost competitive in European
terms is the pressing concern behind the move. Once again,however,there
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are political difficulties. Thurles is in the constituency of the
present Minister for Agriculture,the Minister politically responsible
for CSET.The company's 'Two Factory Plan' became an issue in the 1987
General Election. During the campaign the outgoing Minister and the new
incoming Minister both publicly committed themselves to the future of
the Thurles factory. In the light of the Haughey Government's sudden
conversion to fiscal rectitude,in the wake of the 1987 General Election;
the future of the Thurles sugar factory is by no means secure. In spite
of the Minister for Agriculture's campaign assurances the Government is
currently showing every sign of accepting the company's 'Two Factory
Plan' as it continues to proceed with determination in reducing the
size of the public sector and the burden of public sector debt.
Furthermore,since 1987 the issue of the possible privatisation of
semi-State entreprises has come to the fore in serious public debate.
CSET is a possible candidate for privatisation and the Managing Director
has expressed himself openly as being in favour of it for his company
(Sunday Independent,22-Nov-87). Given the economic policies that have
been pursued by the Haughey Administration since early 1987 the
possibile privatisation of public entreprises like CSET has become a
serious option and one that is now more likely than ever to be pursued.
The fiscal difficulties of the State and the policies pursued to deal
with them had a major effect on the two public sector organisations in
the study. However,the Government's handling of the economic
difficulties brought about by the major recession and uncertainty in
world economic activity also had significant implications for
organisations in the private sector. The protectionism of the 30's was
no longer an option in the 80's. Ireland membership of the EEC limited
the extent to which the Government could taken an independent line in
industrial policy. In particular,the Government could not take any
measures to support domestic industries which would give them an unfair
competitive advantage relative to other EEC producers. The Government's
fiscal difficulties narrowed its options even further in this regard.
More important still,the Government's fiscal difficulties hd a direct
impact on the level of demand in the home market and on the rate of
economic recovery domestically.
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Irish Distillers saw their home market decline over the post-1979
period. The company had looked mainly to exports markets for
its major growth prospects after the 1966 merger. However,the home
market also provided considerable sales growth up to 1979 with an
expansion in sales volume of more than 30% over the decade. One major
factor in that expansion was the rise in agricultural incomes to equal,
and for a short time to exceed,the average industrial wage in the years
immediately following Ireland's entry into the EEC. The level of real
incomes in general,and farm incomes in particular,declined during the
80's and over the 1980-85 period the level of consumer expenditure in
the country fell by an average on 1% per annum. Stagnation in economic
activity and the growth in public debt service burden removed this
spending power from the economy. The domestic market for whiskeya
luxury product,is particularly sensitive to the level of disposable
income in the economy and was inevitably affected. As the Chairman of
IDG pointed out in the 1986 Annual Report:
"There is a strong link between national economic performance and sales
of our products".
In addition to this link with national economic performance the domestic
performance of Irish Distillers was also very closely linked to
Government budgetary strategy. As the fiscal difficulties of the State
deepened successive governments turned to increased taxation as one of
the options to contain the current deficit. Over the 1979-83 period the
excise duty per bottle increased by over 200%. Over the 1981-83 period
the sales of IDG branded products in the domestic market fell from l.4m
to l.02m case equivalents,a fall of 27%. Much of the growth that was
achieved in the domestic market over the previous decade had been
eroded. IDG's major strategic thrust since the merger in 1966 had been
to develop export-led growth on the solid foundation of a strong and
profitable domestic base. This foundation was undermined in the 1980's
as the domestic market declined. The company had little doubt as to what
was the major actor in bringing about this decline:
" The size of the fall in volume is a very considerable blow to (IDG).
Whilst the general economic conditions undoubtedly depressed demand
for spirits,the excessively high rate of duty now applying in the
Republic of Ireland is,in our view,the main cause of the sharp
decline" (Annual Report,1982;6).
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The government's 'take' in excise duty from domestic spirit sales had
risen from £39.9m in 1979 to £66.8m in 1981. By 1983,however,the onward
rise in excise duties had depressed the market to such an extent that
the overall return to the exchequer had actually declined to £55m on the
contracting volume of sales. The company was successful in pressing home
to government that they were both now hurting from declining sales. The
Government reacted by actually cutting the excise duty in October 1984
by 20% and the market responded promptly with a 15% recovery in sales
volume over the ensuing twelve months. However,the Government increased
the excise duty once more in the 1986 budget causing renewed downward
pressure on domestic sales.
In 1979 the sales of IDG products peaked on the domestic market after a
prolonged period of growth. In the late 70's the company planned for the
continuation of this growth and had built up a domestic transportation
system to cater for 1979 peak and higher levels of domestic activity. In
1981 all IDG plants were on short-time working as a result of the rapid
downturn in domestic sales. In l985,the company carried out a major
rationalisation of its domestic transportation at a cost of almost £l.5m
in redundancy and other related costs,as the domestic market remained
stagnant and hopes for any foreseeable recovery to 1979 volumes and
beyond were abandoned.
The decline in the home market,largely brought about through Government
fiscal policy,was the major consideration in the strategic takeover of
BWG in 1984 for £l6m. The major target in this acquisition was BWG's
cash and carry business. By the early 80's cash and carry had become a
major element in the distribution of IDG products and represented a
major concentration of buying power in the domestic market. IDG's
purchase of BWG in 1984 was to a large extent oportunistic. The
acquisition of this cash and carry business was not part of any
long-term preconceived strategy,though the company was always on the
alert for suitable acquisition oportunities.According to a feature
article in the Sunday Tribune(8-Apr-84) the takeover had been met by "a
torrent of criticism from the press" and was followed by a "hefty fall
in the IDG share price". The market viewed the move as defensive and
regressive and felt that any strategic investments by IDG at that time
should have been oriented towards the export market where the major
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growth potential was always said to be. However to IDG the move was a
reflection of how important the home market was to their overall
strategy. The Managing Director of IDG ,who was quoted in the same
article,clearly connected the move with the decline in the home market
when he explained that "the fall in the home market has eroded our home
base so we need to consolidate the home base".
In the case of the dairy industry the developments in international
trading conditions,and in EEC agricultural production under the Common
Agricultural Policy regime,tended to dominate over dett. 	 kt'.
policy in the industry's development. As one senior industry observer
put it:
"The CAP and its fiscal difficulties had more effect on the industry
than the Government and its fiscal difficulties".
For the dairy industry the ECC's budgetary difficulties were part
of,and reflected,the budgetary difficulties of the member states,
including Ireland,in the depressed trading conditions of the 1980's.
Since EEC entry in 1972,Brussels had become the locus of public policy
making with the main effect on the industry and its constituent
organisations. The growth of EEC intervention surpluses,and the moves
by the Community to reduce them,first through production quotas with
superlevy penalties and later through cutbacks,were the major issues for
the industry in the 1980's.
There were,however,some noteworthy effects on the industry due to
Government policies and fiscal difficulties since 1979. Government
action and inaction were involved in the circumstances that brought
about a decline in the nationalmilk supply in the 1980-81 period.
Government was later involved in preventing this setback from leading
to a too low ceiling for national milk production under the quotas and
cutbacks introduced by the Community to curb the build up of commodity
surpluses.
In 1979 the Government took the decision to join the European
Monetary System. This had the effect of breaking the traditional link
with sterling,for the first time since the foundation of the State,as
Britain continued to remain outside the system. To some extent the move
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was made for political reasons; to demonstrate the strength of Ireland's
commitment to the Community ideal of to greater European integration.
The Government also joined the EMS at this time to try to reduce the
level of imported inflation by tying the Irish currency more closely to
those of relatively low inflation economies. Unfortunately for Ireland,
and for Irish dairy farmers,the British currency began to soar shortly
after the link with sterling was broken. In the light of Britain's newly
acquired status as an oil producing nation her currency had become a
petro-currency. In the wake of the 1979 Oil Crisis the petro-currencies,
dollar and pound sterling,rose sharpy in foreign exchanges. The rise in
sterling was given further impetus by the advent of a new Tory
administration conimitted,under Mrs Thatcher's leadership,to strong
currency policies.
Farm input prices,particularly those of fertiliser imports from Britain,
rose sharply with the rise in sterling relative to the Irish pound.
However,the price increases for dairy commodities,set under the CAP
system and pegged to average European inflation,were very low by
comparison and Irish dairy farmers suffered a sharp and severe decline
in margins. This dramatic fall in farm incomes led in turn to a decline
in national milk production over the 1980-81 period. The Government had
little latitude for intervention to protect the development of the
industry at farm level. As a member of the EEC it could no longer act
unilaterally on the issue of price supports and as a member of the EMS
it had little room for manoeuver with regard to adjusting the value of
the currency. Had this setback in national milk production not occurred
then the industry would probably have been producing at a much higher
aggregate volume when the Community was forced to curb production
surpluses with quotas and cutbacks. These were to be pegged to the then
existing levels of national milk production in the member states.
However,the Irish Government managed to offset the effects of the
1980-81 setback somewhat by persuading its EEC partners,only with some
considerable difficulty,to set a quota for Ireland that would still
allow for some further small expansion in national milk supply.
Finally,government fiscal difficulties were an important factor in the
decline of butter on the home market since 1979. Butter had always been
a politically sensitive commodity and Governments over the years have
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interfered with domestic butter prices only with extreme caution. In
1981,the price of butter was subsidised on the home market at a level of
38p per lb. Over the 1981-87 period,as the Government's fiscals
difficulties mounted,this subsidy was reduced in successive budgets
until it was removed altogether in 1987. Over the same period the
domestic market for butter declined from 40,000 tons to around 20,000.
Industry observers attribute about half of this decline to the reduction
and removal of the subsidies. The other half was due to the development,
and introduction onto the market,of new low-fat dairy spreads.
Factor 5: SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION
So far four factors have been identified in the situational context that
have been major determinants in the formation of strategy for the
organisations in the study. These factors were TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE, the INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT and NATIONAL PUBLIC
POLICY AND LEADERSHIP. The data also reveal the importance of a fifth
factor,SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION. The effects of this factor
have not always been as marked on specific developmental episodes of the
organisations in the study as has largely been the case in the first
four. Nevertheless,the data reveal this fifth factor to have been an
important contextual influence,in its own right,in the overall strategic
development of these organisations.
At certain times the effects of this factor on the formation of strategy
have been direct. At other times its effects have mediated,or been
mediated by, some of the other four factors. Social and cultural
transformation is ongoing. Usually it is a gradual process. Then again,
due to an historic confluence of a number of transforming agents,the
process can at times be dramatic. An example of this was the case of
Ireland's in ti-i? 1960's when,in the words of one historian, the country
appeared to have experienced "one of those pivotal periods when a
society swings on its axis to face a new direction"(Lee,1979;166).
Furthermore,social and cultural transformation also permeates the
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organisational context as the internal demography of the organisation
comes to reflect the demographic transformation taking place in the
wider situational context. Evidence from the cases of the effects of
this variable on the development of the focal organisations will be
now be reviewed.
Traditionalism to Empiricism
One of the major transformations that took place in Irish society during
the decade of the 60's was the decline of faith and reliance on
traditional authorities,both civil and religious. In their place came
the growth in reliance on the empirically verifiable fact in decision
processes and debates throughout the political,economic,social and
religious life of the country.
The decade of the 60's heralded "a new emphasis on information" (Lee,
1979b;171) that permeated all aspects of Irish life. The drive for
economic expansion laid new emphasis on the need for empirical economic
research and analysis as the basis for public decision making in the
development of the economy. De Valera could lead a less educated Irish
people through the power of his personality and could determine public
policy by 'looking into his own heart'. Lemass did not have,or want,this
luxury. The analysis on which the First Programme for Economic Expansion
was based was outward looking. It recognised the role that research and
education had played in the development of more advanced economies.
Investment in education and research was seen as productive and as
providing essential preconditions for economic take-off. There was a
shift in emphasis within education towards science and technology.
Moreover,the advent of television around this time helped to open up
the whole culture to new facts and new influences. A further thrust to
the new empirical wave in Irish society was provided by the Pope John
XXIII. The Secopd Vatican Council deliberately lowered the authoritarian
image of the Church, opened it up more to the laity and encouraged more
dialogue and debate.
This transformation in Irish society is reflected in the development of
the organisations in the study,in a variety of ways and at different
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times.
In the case of CSET it seems certain that the decision on the
location of the four sugar factories in 1934,a decision that came to
cast a long shadow,would not have resulted in the same configuration had
it been taken in a more empirical context like that of the 60's. The
data indicate that the locations were primarily chosen on the basis of
political clout. There was competition and lobbying by parochial
committees from localities all over the twenty six counties where the
beet crop had the slightest chance of success. The decision,according to
the CSET historian,went "to the committees with the biggest political
clout,where the hardest Fianna Fail TD's came from or where the most
active Bishops came from". In a more empirical and less traditional
context,it seems certain that the economic analysis would have been more
sophisticated and more influential on the decision outcome.It seems
unlikely,for example,that Tuam would have been selected in such a
context.
The formation of AFT in 1958 was very much affected by the prevailing
philosophy in the Ireland of the time about social organisation and its
relationship to the State. A major influence in this regard was the
Catholic Social Movement. In 1931 Pope Pius XI produced an encyclical
on Catholic social thought,'Quadragesimo Anno',to update and elaborate
on the work of Pope Leo XIII in 'Rertun Novaruin' forty years earlier.
Pope Pius produced his document at a time when socialism was on the rise
throughout Europe and many countries were turning to systems of
government that involved a more dominant role for the state in social
organisation. The two main elements in this elaboration of Catholic
social thought were a philosophical concern with the extension of state
involvement in social organisation and the idea that Vocationalism
represented the best principle along which to develop the organs of
society. Whyte(1980;67) has outlined the main ideas in this influential
encyclical:
"The solution it proposed was that the members of each industry or
profession be organised in 'vocational groups' or 'corporations', in
which employers and workers would collaborate to further their common
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interests. .It would restore the State. .to its rightful place. .to
direct,watch,urge and restrain subsidiary organisations. For,the Pope
argued,there is a basic principle in social philosophy,the principle
of subsidiary function:'It is an injustice and at the same time a
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and
higher association what lesser and subordinate organisations can do".
Throughout the forties and fifties any extension of the State's direct
involvement in social and economic activities was viewed with extreme
caution. In 1948,the idea for an agricultural institution was first put
forward by the US representative of the Marshall Aid programme in
Ireland,who promised initial financial support under the aegis of the
programme. There followed ten years of delays and conflict over what
form the new organisation should take. In 1955 the Minister for
Agriculture announced his plan for the reorganisation of higher
agricultural education in Ireland. Essentially what he wanted to do was
to centralise all third level teaching and research in Agriculture into
a single institution modelled on the Dutch agricultural university at
Wageningen,which it was believed had much to do with making Dutch
agriculture among the most efficient in the world. At the time,three of
the Irish universities already had faculties of agriculture and a
fourth was agitating for one. The Minister argued in an interview given
to the Irish Independent on 20-7-55 that:
"It was manifest that we had not available the trained personnel to man
four faculties of agriculture adequately,and that the only
consequence of attempting to do this would be to leave us with four
inadequate faculties of agricultural science instead of one good
centre for agricultural education and research"
In the event the Universities,and some farming interests,opposed the
Minister's plan for a variety of reasons. ln doing so,however,they
appealed to Catholic social teaching and centred the debate around
concepts like subsidiary function. This allowed them to mobilise a
number of influential Irish bishops in their opposition to the
Minister's plan. The Archbishop of Tuam,the Bishop of Galway and the
Bishop of Cork entered the debate on the side of the opposition to the
proposal. The Bishop of Cork's intervention illustrates clearly how
effectively Catholic social thought was mobilised by the opponents to
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the plan:
"The accepted principle is that in agriculture as in industry,coinmerce
and professions,etc.,the proper function of the State is to help the
private citizen and his organisations rather than edge them out with
its own agencies...
The people of this country would vote down a government that openly
committed itself to a policy of Socialisation. But Socialisation can
be a gradual,hidden and undeclared process. One department after
another can nibble more and more from the field of private entreprise
until finally little worthwhile remains outside civil service control.
That is why it is so necessary to examine the proposed Institute and
see if it be part of the larger trend or movement towards out-and-out
Statism. ." (cited in Whyte,l980;310).
In the face of opposition on such a scale,the Minister had to revise his
proposal for the new institute. The teaching function was dropped and
left with the universities. Furthermore,supporters of the new institute
had to fight to retain its active research role in the legislation so
that it wasn't reduced solely to a coordinating function.
The social and cultural context within which AFT had such a prolonged
and troubled gestation contrasts with that within which the Institute
developed and grew. The influence of Quadregesimo Anno,though still
strong in the mid 50's,was already on the wane. It had reached its nadir
in the Church-State clash over the proposed 'Mother and Child' social
legislation in 1951. The success of the First Programme for Economic
Expansion,in lifting national despondency and self-doubt by mobilising
state resources to accelerate economic development,had contributed to a
more positive attitude towards direct state involvement in economic and
social affairs. Catholic social thinking,itself,had undergone
significant modification. In 196l,Pope John XXIII published his
encyclical 'Mater et Magistra' in which the principle of subsidiarity
was reaffirmed but with a more positive orientation towards state
organisation and its potential for good in society,if wisely deployed:
"Recent advances in scientific knowledge and productive techniques give
to the public authority much more power than it formerly had to remedy
lack of balance,whether between different sectors in the economy,or
between different parts of the same country,or even between different
peoples of the world"(cited in Whyte,l98O;356).
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The Catholic social movement in Ireland reflected this change and the
new respect for science and empiricism. According to Whyte(1980;332):
u• .instead of promoting a ready corpus of doctrine,the (movement)
appeared increasingly concerned with empirical investigation of the
actual needs of the Irish people".
AFT expanded quickly over its first decade of existence to a position of
preeminence in Irish agricultural research,surpassing in influence those
of the universities. By 1966,AFT had grown to a complement of over 500
technical staff,more than 200 of them professional researchers. There
was little evidence over this period of opposition to the growth of the
Institute based on a fear of the extension of Statism in Irish
organisational life. Had AFT been conceived in such a context,it seems
reasonable to suggest that the Dutch model would have been more closely
followed and the Institute would not have had such a long gestation.
Catholic social thought,based on Vocationalism and the principle of
subsidiarity,was,as we have just seen,at the height of its influence in
the 30's and 40's. One form of social organisation that was particularly
favoured by this philosophy was the cooperative form. According to
Whyte(1980;63):"The rural co-operative movement was a particular
favourite" and Bolger pointed out(l977;124) that many "saw the Irish
co-operative movement as a happy example of how the. .concepts
(vocationalism and cooperation) were successfully blended".
In the late 50's and early 60's the Government commissioned a number of
studies of the Irish dairy industry with a view to preparing it for
entry into the EEC. The studies recommended the rationalisation and
reorganisation of the industry into larger,more resourceful and more
flexible processing units. The dairy industry was a major export
industry and an important element in the plans for economic expansion.
The Lemass Government was clearly anxious that the recommended
rationalisation proceed as quickly as possible.
Government pressure was brought to bear directly on the cooperative
movement to get the rationalisation under way. It became clear to the
Irish Cooperative Organisation Society(ICOS)that if the movement
did not bring about the desired reorganisation of the industry then the
Goverriment,itself,would do it. To ICOS the most probable form that
state-induced rationalisation would have taken was through the extension
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of state-sponsored entreprise within the industry. ICOS leadership were
under little doubt that the Cooperative Movement's traditional
dominance of the industry was on the line. It is hard to imagine that
such a threat could have been credible if the social and cultural
context had been that of a decade or two earlier,when the anti-Statist
Catholic social movement was at its zenith. In such a context,as we have
seen, any suggestion of an extension of State control into an area long
considered the preserve of the cooperative movement would hardly have
been conceivable and would undoubtedly have been stoutly resisted.
The change from traditionalism to empiricism that characterised the
Ireland of the 60's was a kind of fermentation process that once set
in motion began a self-sustaining and self-amplifying chain reaction.
The First Programme for Economic Expansion provided much of the initial
impetus by setting up or revitalising an applied research infrastructure
with a clear and prestigious role in the country's economic and social
development. State-sponsored research,training and development bodies in
economic and social research,industrial research,industrial and
management training,and in agricultural research,to name but some,were
all in the vanguard of the economic development effort. Investment in
education in the 60's emphasised the sciences and technology. Young
Irish graduates were encouraged to study for post-graduate degrees
abroad,especially in the US,to bring back the best in technical
knowledge and research skills. Direct foreign investment in Ireland,
encouraged under the expansion drive,brought new technical processes
and skills into the industrial life of the country. The advent of
television and the modernisation of the telecommunications,power and
road networks all presented new technological challenges and induced
new knowledge and skills in their solution. By the mid to late 60's many
young Irish people were working in careers that were largely
non-existent in their parents time as the application of research-based
knowledge became more prevalent right throughout Irish society. These
young people carried the value systems of their new professions into
society at large and reinforced the cultural changes that were then
taking place.
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This new empiricism and faith in science and technology that
characterised the Ireland of the 60's was reflected in the developments
that were taking place within the organisations in the study. The
youthful AFT was a product of the times. It was people largely by a
young cohort of agricultural science graduates fired up with a strong
mission to bring science to the land. Individually and collectively
these young scientists had identified for themselves a central role in
the revival of Irish agriculture,which was recognised as a key element
in the drive for economic expansion. The early application of science to
the problems of the land had immediate impact. It quickly earned for
AFT,and for agricultural research,a prestigious and valued place in the
infrastructure of Irish agriculture,and facilitated its early and rapid
expansion. AFT's early efforts were both supported by,and contributed
to,the growth of empiricism in Irish life. In a society that was
undergoing a transition from tradition to modernity,Irish agriculture
was undergoing its own transition from a tradition-based to a
knowledge-based industry and AFT was a major element in this transition.
The new empiricism that characterised the Ireland of the 60's was most
manifest in organisations like AFT which were specifically set up to be
the agencies through which the new emphasis on research and technology
would be applied to the development Irish economic and social life.
However,the impact of this cultural shift in Irish society can be
detected in the other organisations in the study. In particular,it was a
time when many Irish organisations considered new ideas and new
departures from their traditional modes and fields of operation. These
new departures were clearly influenced by diverse case-specific factors,
i.e. leadership,industry evolution,public policy etc. However,the
openness to new ideas and to the acquisition and application of new
knowledge and skills was clearly a reflection of,and encouraged by,the
cultural change from traditionalism to empiricism taking place,and
gathering pace,in the wider Irish social context of the time.
CSET had been contemplating a diversification into food since the early
fiftiesThe plan received a major impetus from the economic expansion
drive.In the ferment of the times the company put its faith in new
technology and new R&D skills. It confidently committed itself to the
first commercial application of a new convenience food technology,
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Accelerated Freeze Drying(AFD),when it opened the world's first
AFD-based food processing plant at Mallow in 1961. It invested heavily
in a new R&D facility to support the food project and this brought a new
set of skills,and a new sub-culture,into CSET. In the early days of the
project Erin Foods captured the imagination of many,at home and abroad.
The company,and its young Irish scientists,were enjoying the challenge
and the prestige that came from the national and international
recognition that they were pioneering in the field of convenience foods.
In the targeted UK market the 'Times' ,'Guardian' and 'Financial Times'
were all positively taken by the boldness and imagination of the
project. If the strategy was inherently flawed, and even with the
benefit of hindsight opinions still differ to this day in this
regard,then few at the time were aware of it. The CSET dream in the
early 60's was nothing less than the creation of a national food
processing industry on a scale "larger than any industrial activity now
carried on in Ireland"(Annual Report,l962). In the empiricism of the
time,when the economic expansion drive itself was empiricism on a
national scale,the trajectory of the CSET food project can only be fully
understood when viewed against the cultural change that was taking
place in the Ireland of the period.
The period 1958-74 saw fundamental changes in the area of Irish
distilling that can also be fully understood only when set within the
context of the time. In this period the forces of empiricism within the
industry overcame the traditional conservatism which was formerly its
most distinctive characteristic. For long Irish distillers had ignored
the realities of the marketplace outside of the country. They held to
their belief that blended whisky was not true whiskey and had long
waited for the world's markets to endorse that belief. The only market
that did was the small home market. As late as the 1950's the industry
was still holding out; torn,in the words of their clever slogan of the
time 'between pride and profit'. Meanwhile,the Scotch industry had
been given an almost clear field to develop a mass market for blended
whisky and a long head start to consolidate their dominance of it. The
1966-74 period saw a significant break with the past. There was a new
willingness to experiment with the centuries old process in order to
produce a line of whiskies, still distinctively Irish,yet tailored
to the taste and colour requirements of the US and UK markets. This was
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done through the development and production of new blends. A century of
traditional resistance to blended whiskey was finally overcome. The
decision to build a new single distillery complex in Midleton,again
reflected the triumph of empiricism over tradition. There were fears
within the company that the essential character of the product might be
somehow compromised by transition to modern technology.
The series of studies of the dairy industry,carried out in connection
with the economic expansion drive,very much reflected the new empiricism
of the period. In particular,the Survey Team study was the first
comprehensive empirical examination of the industry. The Team collected
information;
". .on all important aspects of the industry, e.g. buildings,equipment,
capacity,voluine and value of output,production costs,einployment and
marketing" (Survey Team Report,l963;lO).
using a detailed questionnaire that was sent out to 210 concerns,widely
representative of all aspects of the industry's operation. In addition,
the Team;
". .niade a detailed study of the existing documentation on the dairying
industries of the six EEC countries and of Denmark,Norway and the
United Kingdom,and subsequently supplemented their information by
on-the-spot investigation in France,Western Germany,Holland and
Denmark" (Survey Team Report,1963; 11)
The Survey Team study marked a new departure. The debate on the future
development of the industry after this study became more focused on
the empirically determined state of the industry and its international
competitiveness than on the industry's owr history and traditions. The
Survey Team study was a very significant factor in creating and
sustaining the momentum for change that ultimately led to the major
rationalisation that took place in the industry in the late 60's.
Within the industry itself,there was increasing evidence of a new
openness to fresh ideas at this time. In Golden Vale,for example,a
number of major innovations took place during the 1956-68 period. This
was the pioneering period for Golden Vale Engineering. The
diversification into engineering represented a major departure for any
dairy processor at the time. Golden Vale built up its engineering
capability and expertise in the late 50's and early 60's to the point
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where it had become,to all intents and purposes,the indigeneous
engineers for the entire dairy processing sector. The 60's was also
the era in which Golden Vale undertook the first major diversification
of its dairy product range.The big innovation in this regard was the
entry into fat-filled milk powder. Golden Vale did not invent the
fat-filled milk powder but,beIng on the alert for new ideas,it was quick
to recognise its commercial potential. Fat-filled milk powder soon
became the main product line of the organisation. It quickly built up a
distinctive technical competence in this product type and a strong
market position of brand leadership,which it has been able to maintain
and build on over the years.
The Rise in Careerism
The period 1958-63 had been represented as a period of axial shift in
Irish society. Most modern historians and commentators agree that the
period was a pivotal one,which marked the beginning of major transition
in modern Ireland. Among the most significant of the transitions at the
time was the transition in the leadership of Irish society in all
spheres; political,economic,social and religious. The period was one in
which there was a notable change towards careerism,managerialism and
professionalism in all walks of Irish life. This change reflected into
the organisational life of the country,and indeed the growth of
organisation throughout the fabric of society was both a product of,and
a further stimulus to,this change.
In the political sphere,the revolutionary generation was on the decline.
The average age in the first Free State cabinet had been 33; in De
Valera's first Fianna Fail cabinet,in l932,it was 41; by 195l,in another
Fianna Fail cabinet,it had reached 57. The young revolutionary
generation had grown old in power without any significant renewal until
the late fifties. When Lemass became Taoiseach in 1959 he accelerated
the renewal process. He put a new premium on demonstrated executive
talent and he used the junior ministries to grow and prune that talent.
He was in many ways the ideal leader to manage the renewal process. He
had been a revolutionary,but with strong personal leanings towards
inanagerialism. The revolutionary generation had been obsessed with
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national issues and constitutional problems which had tended to divert
their attention away from pressing social and economic issues.Lemass,
however,as Minister for Industry and Commerce,had been closely
associated economic development since Fianna Fail first took office in
1932. When economic development became the pressing issue at the end of
the fifties Lemass provided the vision that linked the new with the
old;anchoring pressure for change to a secure mooring of continuity.
"The historic task of this generation", he told the Dail on 3-6-59,"is
to secure the economic foundation of independence" and he managed to
successfully wed the commitment to economic development in the Republic
to the nationalist aspiration for a united Ireland.
By the time Lemass retired in 1966 the transition to careerism and
managerialism in public life was well under way. The post-revolutionary
politicians were more empirical and material,reflecting the developments
in Irish society at large. With the passing of the revolutionary
generation loyalty to old comrades-in-arms was no longer a relevant
criterion for selection to executive posts in government. The demands of
the job and the skills of the imcumbent became the major considerations.
The men who governed the country in the post-Lemass era had come to
power,not because they were men of destiny,but because they chose
politics as their preferred career,and they were men of ambition.
Elsewhere in the Irish society of the time the values of careerism and
managerialism were in the ascendency. The economic expansion drive had
created the need for an expanding cadre of managers right throughout the
public and private sectors. Many of the foreign-owned operations that
had been attracted into Ireland by the incentives offered in the various
programmes for expansion were iti the vanguard in generating the demand
for training in modern management knowledge,skills and techniques. The
provision of this training grew rapidly through the expansion of the
Irish Management Institute,the growth in business schools and MBA
programmes in the universities and the growth in in-company training and
development activities. Through these developments,reinforcing them and
being in turn reinforced by them,the values of managerialism and
careerism came to pervade more and more of Irish cultural life.
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This change towards careerism and managerialism in Irish society was
reflected into,and affected,Irish organisational life. The most obvious
example in this research is provided by the succession drama in the CSET
case when General Costello was succeeded by Tony O'Reilly in 1966.
CSET was led by General Michael Joseph Costello from 1945 to 1966. CSET
had survived its embrionic period and proved its worth to the country
during the 1939-45 emergency. By the end of the War,however,the industry
was exhausted by its efforts to keep the country supplied during the
difficulties and shortages that characterised the 1939-45 period. The
fields had been over-tilled and the factories were in need of
modernisation. The saving of the crop was still a very laborious task
and the crop itself was exposed to all kinds of pests and crop diseases.
The industry needed revitalising and Lemass turned to General Costello
to provide the leadership required.
Lemass was careful in his choice of such men and had a clear idea of
the qualities that they should possess. He was in the process
of building the economic foundation of the new nation and he was looking
for like-minded nation-builders to lead the state entreprises which were
major agencies in this national endeavour. According to Lee(1979;24),
Lemass believed that in "a small society with no inherent momentum of
its own and with a heritage of stagnation,it was men that mattered. .The
initiative,or lack of it,of a handful of individuals could make or mar
important institutions for a generation". What Lemass and his Ministers
were looking for to lead CSET in the post-War period was tta man who had
proved himself not alone as possessing the ability and strength of
character to shoulder a major industrial appointment,but who had proved
his patriotism to the hilt". Such a man was General Costello. The
General had a meteoric career in the Irish army since its establishment
in 1922.He had proven leadership skills in the military context and as
an army man he was,as CSET's own historian pointed out in interview,
"committed to the State in a very basic way".
General Costello concentrated on revitalising the sugar industry over
the 1945-60 period and organised the logistics of production and
processing with military-style efficiency. Farm labour became scarce
as the massive flight from the land continued throughout the fifties.
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The General met the difficulty by diversifying into engineering and
concentrating the engineering resource on the niechanisation of the
harvesting operation. New harvesters were developed to suit Irish soil
conditions. He initiated R&D activities in the areas of seed improvement
and pest control. He diversified into quarrying in order to provide lime
to the beet growers and he developed a transport system that was
specially adapted to spread the lime as well as transport it. By 1960,
the General had rescued the industry from its post-War exhaustion and
had systematically developed it into a secure industry capable of
serving the national demand for sugar for some considerable time to
come.
To the Ceneral,the task he had been engaged in was not simply a
commercial one. He clearly viewed his role and that of his company as
developmental in the most basic sense. He was passionately committed to
the development of Irish agriculture to its fullest potential for the
social and economic benefit of the rural community itself,and for the
nation at large. He took a special interest in the problems of the small
producer and continually exhorted them to consider new options and to
organise to protect the economic viability of their way of life. His
guiding philsophy with respect to producers was his stated belief that
"the cooperative theories of Horace Plunkett (were) superior to
communism and capitalism and the only workable alternative to those".
When CSET,under the General's leadership,diversified into convenience
foods,he had nothing less in mind than the creation of a national food
industry as his response to the challenge set down in the First
Programme for Economic Expansion. He chastised the sceptics roundly:
"We have to cope with the timid spirits who baulk at every obstacle
and cannot bring themselves to believe in the ability of Irishmen to
compete with men of other nations. They think our aim is impossibly
great. Their imaginations boggle"(quoted in Lynch,1986;l7).
In 1966 Sean Lemass retired as Taoiseach and the torch finally passed to
a new generation of Irish politicians,the post-revolutionary career
politicians. In the same year the leadership of CSET passed from General
Costello to A.J.(Tony) O'Reilly. This transition from nation builder to
career professional within CSET was a microcosm of the transition taking
place in that period at national level. The General resigned essentially
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because the Government no longer supported his strategy for the Erin
Foods project or his dream for a national food industry. The position in
relation to the food processing activities was that the sales were
growing rapidly but the overall losses were accumulating rapidly also.
Achieving the critical breakthrough in the target UK market had proved
more difficult and more expensive in market development costs than had
been originally anticipated. The General and his Board considered the
losses as development costs and still believed that with persistence and
more investment the project would eventually prove its worth,not just in
commercial terms but in overall developmental terms. The Government were
no longer convinced.
As recounted in the case narrative,the General's resignation was
somewhat manoeuvered with his own unwitting help. To some of the 'men
in the mohair suits' that represented the new generation of political
leadership the General,like the rest of the revolutionary generation,
were 'yesterday's men'. The young ambitious career politicians that now
held the reins of power turned to a young ambitious career manager
to take over the leadership of CSET. Tony O'Reilly came to CSET
with an impressive success in the marketing field behind him. He was a
contemporary of the men that dominated the Lynch administration and
and reflected their professional and careerist values. He was a
new breed of Irish industrial leader whose primary commitment was to the
advancement of his own career,a professional manager not a
nation-builder. To the new Government the food project was in trouble
for commercial reasons,however laudable the General's grand vision had
been. The modern marketing of convenience foods was a complex commercial
challenge needing modern management skills. In the food project CSET
were meeting international competition,backed by modern management
methods and mass marketing professionalism,on a scale that it never had
to confront before. The new administration put their faith in a young
professional with proven marketing skill. The era of traditional
leadership in Irish organisations was passing; the era of professional
managerialism had arrived.
The advent of Tony O'Reilly to CSET marked a major hange in strategy
for the food project. A more limited and less costly strategy was
adopted. The costly UK marketing operation was scaled down and a joint
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venture was set up with the Heinz Corporation. The new joint company,
Heinz-Erin,was to concentrate on marketing with CSET handling production
and processing and the Heinz organisation handling UK sales through
their widely established sales and distribution network in Britain.
Unlike practical patriotism,however,professional commercial skill is
itself a readily marketable commodity. As with any professional in any
field,O'Reilly had taken on the job primarily for the personal challenge
that it offered and the contribution that it could make to his
professional growth and his marketability as an executive.Professional
pride rather than practical patriotism was to be the prime motivator.
He would judge himself and be judged on his ability to achieve results
as defined between himself and those to whom he was contractually bound.
He was playing the professional game,not the patriot game,and like all
professionals he would always be open to better offers. The Heinz
Corporation became quickly impressed with his undoubted talent and
in less than three years he was attracted away from CSET to take up a
senior position in the Heinz UK operation.
The Lynch Administration were stunned by his departure after such a
short time at the helm of CSET. In the wake of O'Reilly's departure the
State once more removed itself to arm's length involvement with the
company. However,the replacement of the General with O'Reilly had
signalled a new set of expectations from the 'shareholder' to the
company. The dominant ideology within the company was no longer so
clearly developmental as it had been in the General's time. O'Reilly's
appointment and the O'Reilly style of leadership had brought with them a
more limited ideology of commercial viability. After O'Reilly's
departure CSET was left essentially on its own to work through this
dilemma-was the company's primary role a developmental one or a
commercial one. This ambiguity has persisted right up to the present.
Currently the commercial ideology is the more dominant one within the
company,though some ambiguity remains. The decline of the developmental
ideology and the rise of the commercial ideology within CSET can be
dated back to the leadership changes and dramas of the 1966-70 period.
General Costello was part of a generation of leadership i Irish
life that was driven by values forged during the revolutionary times.
These were the military patriots,or those sons of military men
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reared during the ferment of the struggle for independence,who turned
their deep nationalism and their leadership talents to the practical
patriotism of building up the economic infrastructure of the new State.
Many,like General Costello and C.S.(Todd) Andrews,the man Lemass
commissioned with the task of developing an indigeneous turf industry,
committed themselves to careers in the semi-state sector. They saw their
role in this sector as one of national importance and as a natural
extension in civilian life of their former military endeavour. Such men
were also among the early builders of the dairy industry,men like Eamonn
Roche in Mitchelstowri and Capt.David Barry,the ex-soldier on whose
initiative Golden Vale caine into being. These men were unified in
their determination,each in his own sphere,to develop the resources
of Ireland for the people of Ireland. The first director of AFT,Tom
Walsh,was too young at the time of the War of Independence to play any
active role in the armed struggle. However,he grew up in the ferment of
this period in a family that held strong republican convictions. Walsh's
nationalism was the primary motor that drove him as he proceeded with
a rare vigour and determination,overcoming all obstacles,to establish
and build up AFT. As one long serving AFT executive recalled "the
development of the land of Ireland for the people of Ireland was the
mission" and he fired up his young scientists to fulfill this endeavour
of national importance through "bringing science to the people".
The transition from traditional leadership to modern management
accelerated from the early 60's onwards throughout Irish cultural and
commercial life. In the semi-state sector,and to a lesser extent in the
cooperative sector,it often took the form of a leadership transition
from practical patriotism to career professionalism. In industries like
distilling careerism was also on the rise. In this case the traditional
leadership was characterised by family ownership and industry
tradition. The Irish distilling industry was for long dominated by
family capitalists. By 1966,some of the more far-sighted of these
recognised that tradition alone was no longer enough to successfully
manage a modern distilling industry. Tradition,in fact,had played a
major role in the industry's poor export performance relative to the
Scotch whisky industry. In the post merger period the industry egan,in
earnest,the transition from family capitalism to managerial capitalism.
One of the architects of the historic 1966 merger was Frank O'Reilly,a
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decendent of the Power family. O'Reilly saw the need to import new
professional skills,and a new level of objective commercial detachment
to strategic decision-making,within the newly merged entity if the full
economic potential of the merger was to be realised. The appointment of
the non-family career professional,Kevin Mc Court,as managing director
of Irish Distillers in 1968 was a major factor,if not the major
factor,in getting the merger to work. His managerial skills and
professional detachment were the major catalyst in the transformation of
new entity from an uneasy federation of three distinct inward-looking
traditional family cultures to a more unitary outward-looking
professional management culture. The progressive outlook of businessmen
like Frank O'Reilly and the availability of professional executives
like Kevin Mc Court were,to a significant extent,reflections of the
wider changes taking place in the Ireland of the 1960's.
Transformation in Social Structure
The 60's and 70's were decades of major transition in Irish social and
economic structure.
During this period the country became increasingly urbanised. In 1926
less than 33% of the population lived in towns of more than 1500
people; by 1971,the figure had risen to 52% and was still increasing.
In 1926 employment in agriculture accounted for 53% of all those
employed; by 1971 this had fallen to 25% and by 1981 had reached 17%.
The country also became increasingly industrialised. Over the 1960-79
period the profile of the national output changed substantially as
agriculture declined in relative importance. Agriculture's share
of CDP fell from 22% to 15% over the period while industry's share rose
from 28% to 38% and that of services remained about the same at 48%.
Employment in agriculture fell from 397500 to 229000 between 1961-78
while employment in industry and services grew from 257000 to 319000,
and from 416000 to 500000,respectively.
Over the two decades the occupational profile of those at work changed
considerably. The proportion of those at work classified as employees
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rose from 56% in 1961 to 69% in 1979. The class profile of those in the
employee category changed over the same period from 36% to 50% middle
class; 20% to 29% skilled manual; and 44% to 21% unskilled manual.
Furthermore,the general educational level in Irish society rose right
across the occupational spectrum. Between 1965 and 1979 the number of 15
year olds still at school increased from less than 50% to over 85%. The
number of males going on to sit for the State second-level Leaving
Certificate rose from 20% to almost 50% over the same period.
Participation in third-level education grew by two thirds over the same
period, with 20% of each cohort of the young progressing to third-level
institutions by the end of the 70's.
Finally,all of these structural changes were accompanied by the growth
of direct state involvement in the social and economic sphere. Between
1960 and 1980 the overall numbers employed in the public service
increased from 182000 to 295000. Public authority current spending had
risen from 24% of GNP in 1958 to 42% in 1978. In addition,over 40 new
state-sponsored bodies were formed over the two decades since the 1960
with responsibilities ranging from the export marketing of dairy produce
to the improvement in the public's health.
All in all the social and economic structure of the country had become
more diversified and more differentiated both horizontally and
vertically; the culture had become less rural,less homogenised and more
cosmopolitan in outlook and values. The transition was not painless.
New tensions arose as these changes progressively diffused throughout
the social structure. There were town and country tensions,farmer
and industrial worker tensions, private and public sector tensions,
tensions between occupational c-lasses and even within occupational
classes across different generations and betweem different occupational
groupings.
This transformation in the national social and economic structure
affected Irish complex organisations. In some cases the organisations,
themselves, were the agents of structural change in the wider social
context and a clear example of this is provided in the Golden Vale case.
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The major rationalisation that was carried out in the dairy industry
over the 1968-74 period was brought about in order to insure the
international competitiveness of the industry in an EEC context. The
initial impetus for the rationalisation came from government pressure
and the restructuring of the industry was carried out by the industry
itself,with help and guidance from the Irish Cooperative Organisation
Society(ICOS). The intent of the rationalisation was to create a greater
concentration of physical and financial resources in the industry.
The process by which this concentration was brought about was by the
voluntary amalgamation of large groupings of smaller units. One major
effect of this amalgamation,and the main reason why it was so difficult
to accomplish,was that it entailed a fundamental transformation of the
industry from a parish structure to a processing centre structure.
Ever since the industry had transformed from a farm-based industry to a
creamery-based industry the parish creamery was the basic organisational
unit. The parish structure became the organisational unit for the
industry at this time because the logistics of transporting a highly
perishable commodity by horse-drawn cart determined that it be so.
Over time,however,this basic organisational unit became an integral
part of the fabric of Irish rural life. For the dairy farmer and his
family the main institutions in their way of life were their
church,their parish creamery and their primary school. The key figures
in the parish structure were the parish priest,the creamery manager,
the teacher,and the largest farmer.The creamery manager was an important
figure in this structure for many reasons. He was the economic leader of
the parish; the rate of economic development in the parish often
depended to a large extent on his drive and initiative.In a traditional
culture he was an authority figure,second only to the parish priest. His
leadership and advice were sought on issues extending way beyond his
professional responsibilities. He and his family had social status and
prestige within their community. In addition,he was the main regulator
of cash flow to the dairy farmers and he served them unofficially as a
banker. His knowledge of the cyclical pattern of their cash flow allowed
him to be a comfortable extender of credit on no security other than
the good name of the farmer. The farmer,for his part,felt that his local
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creamery was a place where he was known personally and had some
influence. Furthermore,the delivery of milk to the creamery was partly a
social occasion where neighbouring farmers maintained contact and caught
up on local news.
The rationalisation of the dairy industry over 1968-74 helped to
accelerate the decline of a way of life and the break up of a social
structure that had remained largely unchanged for over 70 years. This
was little short of social revolution and it is hardly surprising that
the process turned out to be politically difficult to carry through. The
farmers were split on the benefits of amalgamation. The younger,more
highly educated and more specialised farmers were attracted to the
economic advantages of amalgamation and were pragmatic and empirical in
their approach to it. The older farmers were slow to abandon what had
been for them a way of life and they took a conservative,traditional
approach. These young-old,empirical-traditional tensions were
concentrated and magnified by the approaches taken by the farmer
organisations.The National Farmers Association(NFA) reflected the views
of its predominantly younger generation of dairy farmers and supported
the rationalisation moves. The Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association
(ICMSA) reflected the views of its predominantly older generation of
dairy farmers and opposed the moves, favouring instead the federation
alternative. Among the creamery managers themselves the same broad
young-old split was in evidence. Many of the younger cohort perceived
more interesting and more enhanced career prospects for themselves in
the larger units. Most of the older cohort did not welcome the changes
implied in amalgamation for their social position and influence in the
communities into which they had settled as part of the older social
structure.
CSET and AFT were set up to be developmental agencies and both had
direct impact on,as well as being affected by,the transition in Irish
social and economic structure. AFT's mission to bring science to
the people was directly related,in conjunction with the rising level of
education within the community at large, to the evolution of a new
generation of farmers, more professional and less traditional than
their fathers. The application of research-based knowledge at farm level
encouraged a higher level of knowledge of basic husbandry in the farmer.
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AFT was directly concerned with catalysing the transition of agriculture
from a tradition-based to a knowledge-based industry. As the early
adopters of AFT output began to show greater productivity than their
neighbours the rate of diffusion of that output accelerated.
Research-based knowledge became more and more topical in papers,
magazines and telecommunication directed specifically at the farming
community. More and more young farmers sought,and were exhorted to seek,
specialised training in agricultural science.
From the start AFT was always very conscious that it was not just
involved in research but had a wider role to piay in economic
development and social transformation. The inclusion of the Rural
Economy Division as one of the initia' five main àivisions is tangible
evidence that from its inception AFT foresaw the need to balance the
introduction of science and technology into farming with a full and
careful consideration of the major structural transformation that such
changes would inevitably entail. AFT saw itself as an integral part of
what,according to its first Director(Walsh,1980;8), was a "mini
revolution . . . in our farm economy" that was set in motion by the
economic expansion drive of the early 60's. This 'mini revolution' was
transforming agriculture.It was "no longer a subsistence type entreprise
and rural people no longer work in isolation but as an integral part
of the whole national endeavour. . penetrat(ing) deeply into the
activities,welfare and livlihood of people in our cities and
towns"(Walsh,l984;l3). The 'farmer of yesterday' was an isolated
economic unit producing primarily for his own needs and disposing of
any surplus into cheap food markets. AFT were involved,from the outset,
in transforming the basic business of farming from this state of
isolation and subsistence into a more sophisticated activity,comparable
in importance and in skill to any modern industry,in which:
". .the farmer of tomorrow. .(would)be able to bring together numerous
inputs - animals ,seeds ,chemicals, land, capital,machinery and
labour,and integrate these into viable systems for the production of
commodities which will be marketed or further processed along the line
to consumption. This is a complex undertaking,requiring not only
scientific training but a deep knowledge of farm business analysis and
management,marketing and organisation. .A modern,competitive and
business-like agriculture is and will continue to be as technically
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demanding as any other productive activity"(Walsh,1984;21).
CSET was set up in 1934 as a semi-state entreprise to rescue a
fledgling and failing sugar beet industry. At the time Ireland was still
predominantly an agricultural country. CSET was one of the first public
sector initiatives aimed at developing and expanding an indigeneous
industrial base in the Irish Free State. As such the organisation was
one of the pioneering agencies in the process of industrialisation in
Irish society. It was also an agent in the process of urbanisation.
At first,most of the skills and the technology had to be imported from
the European sugar beet industry. In the early years of operation
most of the Irish labour input was unskilled. By the end of the first
decade this had changed considerably. A cadre of young Irish chemistry
graduates had been recruited in 1934 and sent off to the Royal Technical
College,Glasgow to follow a course of special studies on sugar
technology and the sugar beet industry. These young men and others
subsequently travelled far and wide to study all aspects of sugar
technology at first hand. They brought back their newly acquired
expertise to provide a solid indigeneous base of technological skill on
which to secure the industry's future. They were the technological
pioneers,not just of the Irish sugar industry,but in a wider sense of
Irish industrialisation. Within a few years,through inhouse training
on-the-job development and apprenticeship schemes,the Irish workforce
of CSET acquired the technical and managerial skills needed to run the
industry themselves. This initial technological competence was built on
to develop research and engineering activities which in turn attracted
new skills to the industry. CSET and the other semi-state entreprises
set up in the 1932-48 period were the important front-end of the Irish
industrialisation process,a process which got underway in the
30's and gathered pace in the economic expansion era of the early 60's.
The CSET processing operations were,by their nature,located in rural
heartlands.These area had little or no industrial tradition. CSET
brought new wage labour and occupational elements into the economic and
social structure of these communities. It also contributed to the
economic development and urbanisation of the areas. While the population
of the country was in decline over most of the period between 1921 and
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l961,the populations of all of the main centres of CSET operations,
Carlow,Thurles,Mallow and Tuam, all rose significantly with rises of the
order of 30% or more over the same period. The company was also
instrumental in transforming the basic structure of the farm unit. It
has played,and continues to play,a direct role in bringing about the
transition to the Walsh vision of the 'farmer of tomorrow' ,as outlined
earlier. In the period 1945-60,under General Costello's leadership,CSET
moved the basic job of beet production far along the way towards this
vision.Through its own research and engineering efforts it propelled the
basic business of beet farming into the technological era. Between 1950
and 1970 the percentage of beet that was precision sown rose from 0 to
89%,that which was herbicide sprayed from 0 to 88% and that which was
mechanically harvested from 0 to 80%(Foy,1976;74). Moreover,in keeping
with Costello's fundamental commitment to the cooperative ideal CSET
helped their beet growers to form themselves into syndicates of 5 to 7
farmers representing 70 acres or more. As a syndicate they could buy
the seeders,sprayers,hoes,harvesters and cleaner loaders to mechanize
and technologically advance the production process in a way which would
not have been feasible for each acting alone. Each member of the
syndicate was encouraged to specialise in particular operations; an
industrial engineering approach to work organisation being applied to
farming.
From the late 60's onwards the relative influence of semi-state
entreprises on the social and economic transformation of Irish society
began to decline.By that time the industrial base of the country was
rapidly expanding and entreprises like CSET were becoming a
progressively smaller part of that base. Ireland's industrial policy
took a marked shift in the late 60's. It was recognised that the sunrise
industries of the 70's and beyond were in the higher technology,higher
value-added areas,like electronics and pharmaceuticals. Ireland went
about attracting into the national economy substantial direct foreign
investment in these areas. The strategic local inputs for these highly
mobile industries were ready supplies of educated labour and of water,
and Ireland had an abundant supply of both. Many of these new projects
did not need to be located within the large metropolitan areas and could
be attracted to diverse regions of the country through specially
packaged incentives. The state was able to harness these projects to
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their wider social goals of regional development. 1-Iowever,semi-states
like CSET were in the van of industrialisation in the Irish economy,
particularly of regional industrialisation, and up to the early 1960's,
at least,they were the most important agency in that process. C.S.(Todd)
Andrews, a contemporary of General Costello and a revolutionary who had
spent his entire civilian career as a chief executive in the semi-state
sector, in 1959 conuiiented on their socio-economic importance as follows:
". .the companies have given to the administrators and technologists in
Ireland oportunities for advancement which would never have been
available to them in an economy where the family-owned firm was
dominant and the crown prince blocked promotion to the top posts.
the companies have introduced into Ireland modernity in
mechanisation and in management methods,in industrial environment and
in training of staff. .1 believe that without these companies the
country would be little better than a cattle ranch,nianaged by what
someone once described as the finest herdsmen in the world"
(Andrew's comments are reproduced in Chubb&Lynch 1969;l94-8).
Distilling,along with brewing and biscuit making,is one of the oldest
traditional industries in Ireland. Distilling had made the transition
from a cottage industry to a substantial factory system almost a century
earlier than the dairy industry. Distilling had tended to concentrate in
the major cities. There were many reasons for this including the desire
to be close to major domestic markets; the desire to be close to a major
port to facilitate exporting and to facilitate the importation of coal,
as energy was a major input; and because the major cities,situated on
the banks of large rivers,had a plentiful supply of water. By the time
the Irish Free State was founded in l92l,the distilling industry had
already achieved a fair degree of concentration in capital,and the
distilling companies already had a fair degree of social differentiation
in internal organisation. The areas in which they were located were the
most industrially advanced in the country. The work organisation of the
typical distillery was comprised of family capitalists,clerical office
workers,skilled distillers,skilled craftsmen and general workers.
Class,religious and regional differences,reflecting the wider social
context, sedimented into the disparate cultures of the different
organisations in the industry. For example,Power was predominantly
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catholic and Jameson was protestant. Power had a policy of hiring their
general workers from the regions and bringing them to Dublin to work.
Jameson drew their general workers from the urban working class. Cork
Distillers had a strong local loyalty and an mate suspicion of,and
resistance to,Dublin domination. The family executives in Jameson had a
tradition of serving in the British Army prior to returning to take up
positions in the firm. Jaineson also had a tradition of bringing their
first line supervision in from the Army. Power tended to promote theirs
from the shop floor. Cork,reflecting strong regional class attitudes,
long considered first line supervision as strictly a white collar job
and moved personnel into that role from clerical positions.
The history of IDG since the merger has been one of internal social
transformation as the company made the transition from a federation of
three disparate family capitalist traditions to a single managerial
capitalist culture. The strategic development of the merged entity was
paced by the rate at which this transformation could take place. It was
only as the internal demography of the organisation changed that the
forces of modernity were able to overcome the forces of tradition and
this was a gradual and incremetal process. The first major step was
taken when the board of the newly-merged entity decided to hire in a
career professional,Kevin Mc Court,as managing director. Mc Court took
the next step by hiring in career professionals to the key senior posts
of financial controller and marketing manager.By 1970 production was the
only major function that was led by a family executive. After the new
Micileton distillery was coumiissioned in 1976 this last major function
came under the control of a career professional. The transition was not
easy. For a long time after the merger was concluded tensions remained
between the career professionals and the traditional family capitalists
as the former tried to implement the new corporate structures,policies
and procedures needed to fulfill the full economic potential
of the merger at operational level. As managerialism took hold at the
top of the orgnisation the strategic decisions taken to transform the
merged entity into a single rationalised modern distilling operation
involved major social transformation throughout the organisation.
Over the 1969-86 period,through various closure and rationalisation
moves,the total numbers employed in Irish Distillers Ltd. fell by 25%.
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An integral part of the descaling process was the strategic buy-out of
traditional skills which became redundant under the new centralised and
modernised distilling operation. Under this process centuries old
trades,like that of coopering in Dublin,passed into history. New
skills,more appropriate to the modern plant,were imported into the
organisation. These successive rationalisations led,not only to a
scaling down in the overall level of personnel in the organisation,but
also to a major change in its internal demography. For example,between
1969 and 1986 the ratio of blue-collar to white-collar personnel changed
from 69%:31% to 5l%:49%. During this period the number of blue-collar
employees fell by 44% while that of white-collar employees rose by 14%.
In addition,by 1986 the ratio of pre-nierger to post-merger hires within
the organisation had fallen to 21%:79%. As old skills were bought out or
retired out of the organisation,the old pre-merger loyalties and
traditions became more and more diluted. The post-merger hires were
characterised broadly by having higher formal education levels and/or
wider industrial experience.They possessed no traditional loyalties to
any of the pre-merger companies with their disparate customs and
practices. Finally,they were in general a younger generation that
reflected the changing values in Irish society from the 1960's onwards;
the empiricism and careerism that came to characterise much of Irish
social and economic life. This major demographic transformation
that took place in Irish Distillers over the 1969-86 period was,itself,
an important element in transforming the company from three disparate
traditional cultures into a unitary modern managerial culture. It was
an integral part,at the level of the firm,of the larger social and
cultural transformation that was taking place in the wider national
context over the same period. It was both influenced by,and contributed
to,this larger process.
Powerful Interest Groups and Weak Bonding Agents
The effect of the State's fiscal difficulties on the development of the
focal organisations was reviewed in detail in an earlier section. Two
factors,when taken in tandem,had a major impact on the perpetuation of
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these fiscal difficulties,and through them on the organisations in this
study. These factors are products of the social transformation that took
place in Ireland since the early 60's. They are the growth and
proliferation of vested interests in the Irish economic structure, and
the concurrent weakening of the traditional bonding agents in Irish
society.
As mentioned earlier,in the two decades of economic development since
the First Programme for Economic Expansion was launched in l958,the
social and economic structure of the country had become more diversified
and more differentiated. This process gave rise to new tensions in Irish
social and economic life. There were new tensions between town and
country,between farmer and industrial worker,between public and private
sectors,between occupational classes and within occupational classes
across different generations and between different occupational
groupings.
This process of diversification and differentiation in the wider social
structure came about,to a significant degree,through similar processes
of elaboration that took place within individual industries and
organisations. For example,as AFT grew from its small beginnings in
1958 it developed its own internal occupational groupings; professional
researchers,technicians,general farm workers and administrative staff.
These sub-groups developed a common group consciousness with similiar
occupational groupings throughout the economic and social structure.
AFT also came to develop over time the tensions between professionals
and administrators that are common to most professional bureaucracies.
CSET elaborated into scientific and technical staff,general workers,
skilled workers,farmer-suppliers and general management. Within the
professional grouping in CSET there were occupational tensions between
the engineers,agricultural scientists and chemists as they competed for
influence and control. The consolidation in the dairy industry brought
the farmer income versus industrial wage tension within the industry
and into the organisations of the large processors
As the economy expanded and elaborated over a period of two decades the
problems of distribution of the newly created wealth within the economy
became more complex. As time passed the claims of the different
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occupational groupings came to be more focused on indexation to the
cost of living and on the preservation of relativities than on the
overall level of performance in the economy. In addition,the development
of the economy was accompanied by an expansion of the public sector and
an enlargement of the State's position as an employer in the economy.
This made it increasingly difficult for the State to mediate between the
unions and the employers in its efforts to achieve and maintain wage
moderation in order to protect the country's international
competitiveness. Moreover,econoniic expansion had created the means
for an expansion in state spending on social welfare,health and
education. However,as time passed the extant levels of education,social
services and health services caine to be perceived as a right and not as
contingent on the overall performance of the economy.
In sum,the growth,elaboratiori and differentiation of the economic and
social structure over two decades of economic expansion had led to the
growth and proliferation of powerful interest groups in the Irish
economy. In addition to the growth in occupational interests,the growth
in government,that characterised the economic developemnt era,had
resulted in an expanded and diverse range of state agencies which came
to develop and consolidate for themselves,over time, positions of
considerable autonomy and power in both public policy formulation and in
the acquisition and allocation of public resources. As pointed out by
Farrell(1986 ; 148-9):
"The growth of government has been accompanied by what can be described
as a new corporatism,the development of institutions and practices
through which ministers,civil servants and representatives of the
great vocational and sectional interests decide policy and conduct
administration.. .(but). .Legitimising their role has encouraged a
feudal tendency for powerful interest groups to challenge and reject
openly the legal decisions of government and parliament. Far from
inducing some sense of common purpose,the new corporatisni has
encouraged th pursuit of narrow self-interest; agencies created to
stimulate the economy or tackle particular social issues have become
vested interests pursuing their own organisational goals".
When the economy entered a prolonged period of low growth in the early
1980's the great vocational and sectional interest groups fought to
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maintain their economic positions. The electorate,more generally,also
resisted any attempts to cut back on the levels of provision in the
areas of education,health and social welfare that they had come to
perceive as rights. Successive governments over the 1980-87 period
did not feel politically secure enough to confront these interests and
to resist their demands. Earlier,we traced the origins of the fiscal
difficulties that faced the State as Ireland entered the low growth
1980's. However,under these sectional pressures the State's fiscal
problems deepened. Government attempts to progressively reduce the size
of the current deficit were strongly resisted and the absolute level of
government borrowing for current expenditure continued to rise over most
of the 80's.
Concurrent with the development of strong and diverse sectional
interests,the period since the economic expansion drive began in 1958
has been characterised by the progressive weakening of the traditional
bonding agents in Irish society,the aspiration to national unity and the
catholic ethos. The aspiration to national unity has weakened since the
late 50's for a number of reasons. The passing of time itself,and with
it the receding of the revolutionary generation further into the
historical past,has led to a progressive weakening of nationalism as a
potent cultural force in Irish life (Note: For the vast majority of
Irish people the legitimate armed struggle for Irish freedom had ended
by the mid 20's. Those who have continued to pursue the national
aspiration by force of arms after this period were marginalised in Irish
society and were no longer considered in official ideology as
legitimate revolutionaries or freedom fighters ,but rather as subversive
paramilitaries). The potency of nationalism as a bonding agent has been
further weakened as result of the troubles in Northern Ireland since
1968. IRA violence carried out in the name of the traditional national
aspiration has tainted nationalism as a cultural force for many Irish
people.
While the aspiration for national unity remains popular in Southern
Ireland, the commitment to it is no longer unconditional(O'Malley,
1983;97). The Nortlern troubles have raised the level of reality
in Southern Ireland about the full cost that immediate unity would
entail both to the economy and to the political stability of the
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country. Southerners are no longer prepared to accept these costs
unconditionally. As a result of this weakening of nationalism as a
bonding force in Irish society it is no longer as easy in the 1980's
to link national aspiration to economic sacrifice as De Valera was able
to do in the 30's and 40's,nor is it easy to use it as a motive force
for national entreprise as Lemass was able to do in the 1958-66 period.
The aspiration to national unity has become conditional,yet the 26
county Republic is still widely regarded among Irish people as being
incomplete,as a transient state only,and not in any fundamental sense a
'nation' in itself capable of evoking deep feelings of identification
and overriding loyalty. As Fennell(l984;30-l) put it:
"Our first self-definition as a nation began to crumble in the 1950's,
was assaulted throughout the 60's,and faded away in the 70's. All that
is left in its place,as a public image of Irish identity,is the
factual Twenty Six County state,without any cultural or ideological
overtones other than 'democratic'"
The cultural bonding power of the Republic's traditional Catholic ethos
(in the sense of a shared system of christian values,rather than in any
narrow sectarian dogmatic sense) has also been considerably weakened
over the post-1958 period. In the post Vatican II period the Church
became less authoritarian and more empirical. In addition,economic
development and the advances in telecommunications brought in their wake
a spreading materialism,secularism and pluralism to Irish society.
As Carvin(l982;3l-2) observed:
"The process of secularisation,familiar elsewhere in the west,occurred
belatedly but rapidly in Ireland,and the Church lost,almost without
realising it,the role of intellectual and cultural arbiter that it
once had. .The demise of the Church's secular leadership has left
political society in the Republic in a curiously leaderless condition
there is no large group of people in the society who have the trust
of the population,and can get its cooperation for medium- or long-term
goals.."
As a result of the weakening of the traditional cultural bonds of
nationalism and catholicism,modern Ireland has evolved with what
Lee(l982;l3) has described as a "peculiarly weak sense of identity by
European criteria".
392
As mentioned earlier,successive Irish governments throughout the
1980-87 period found it particularly difficult to resist the demands
of the strong vested interests that had evolved in the Irish economy and
social structure since 1958. As a result these administrations were
unable to quickly phase out the current deficit and public sector
borrowings continued to accumulate to critical levels. The problem was
first diagnosed in 1980 when it became clear that the international
economic environment was entering a serious recession. The weakening
sense of national identity and of cultural bonding had left it
difficult for governments to mobilise the great sectional interests to
accept economic retrenchment in the 'national interest' ,so that order
might be restored to the public finances and the conditions for future
economic growth might be created. The weakening of the cultural bonds
and the development of strong structurally-embedded sectional interests
were together major factors in prolonging the public fiscal difficulties
and delaying the return to national economic growth. In turn,the
prolongation of the State's fiscal difficulties and the delay in
national economic recovery had major implications for the organisations
in the study. These implications were fully developed already in an
earlier section.
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CHAPTER TEN
ORGANISATIONAL ACTION
In the last chapter the effect of the situational context on the
strategic development of the organisations in the study was examined
and analysed. In particular the chapter analytically isolated and
empirically explored the five main contextual factors that were found
to be the most salient contextual shapers of strategy in the cases under
study. In this chapter we re-examine the data base in order to focus on
the role that autonomous organisational action played on the strategic
development of the four organisations included in this research.
In terms of the conceptual framework developed for this study in chapter
two,autonomous organisational action was seen to involve the interaction
of key organisational actors and their organisational contexts. For the
four organisations in this study the data revealed that the key
organisational actors were the chief executives and the chairmen of the
boards. The chief executives were generally the most salient influence.
However,in certain circumstances the coalition of the chief executive
and the chairman was the dominant influence on autonomous orgariisational
action,while in yet other circumstances the contribution of the chairman
was the crucial element. The contributions of these key organisational
actors were clearly related to the strategic challenges which faced
their organisations while they were at the helm. In this respect,it is
enlightening to use these different strategic challenge types as an
organising principle for the analysis of autonomous organisational
action and its effect on the strategic development of the organisations
under study.
BUILDERS - Walsh and O'Loughlin
Dr. Tom Walsh of AFT and Dave O'Loughlin of Golden Vale were the
builders of their respective organisations at the formative stages in
their development.
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Dr Tom Walsh - AFT
The personal drive of AFT's first Director,Dr. Tom Walsh,was a major
factor,if not the major factor,in the organisation's early growth and
development. As one senior long-serving executive of the organisation
put it, " . . the Doc was the driving force. . . it would never have been as
big as it is. .never have been what it is today.. if it had not been for
the Doc". The interviews carried out with many AFT and ex-AFT personnel
consistently supported this view. The Doe was expansionist in outlook
and temperament. In fact,as one interviewee pointed out,the Doc "had no
concept of,and did not want discussed,when the end of the expansion of
AFT was to be".
Tom Walsh established AFT and expanded it quickly so that at the end of
only three years,in 1961,the Institute had already reached a complement
of 705 personnel; by 1967 this number had risen to 1076. AFT was
established just at the time when the First Programme for Economic
Expansion was getting underway and this undoubtedly created a context
for its rapid growth. However,the organisation had been born in
controversy and powerful institutional interests,already active in the
field of agricultural education and research, were jealously guarding
their own domains. In the Doe's own words AFT "commenced quickly and
this fact raised the ire of some people in the Department and in the
Universities".
Right from the start Tom Walsh had to fight for his operational scope
and freedom. He was clear on what he wanted as he recalled in interview:
"The Institute was set up to develop the agriculture of the country.
Agriculture included Food,this is very important,it did not just mean
farming. It brought in the socio-economic structure and behavioural
sciences as well. The model was the State College of Agriculture(in
the USA)"
Many of the other interests did not agree. There were objections to him
setting up the rural economy division "because it was said that the
Institute's focus was production-I never saw it that way". He won this
battle but lost others. For example,he ran into stout resistance from
the Department of Agriculture when they refused to transfer their cerial
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breeding and barley breeding research programmes over to the new
institute. The Department continued to maintain a research division in
spite of the strong representations made to government by Walsh and his
council to have all of the Department's former research activities
transferred to AFT. The question of AFT's autonomy as an independent
research institute had been controversial from the organisation's
very inception as many different institutional interests sought some
degree of control. The Institute was finally set up as an independent
institute on the recommendation of a minority report and the director
was given a unique position as a statutory entity in his own right
between staff and council. The intergovernmental agreement through which
the new institute came to be funded initially,as part of the Marshall
Aid programme,was also a very important factor in providing AFT with a
fair degree of independence from the state bureaucracy. However,as the
Doc pointed out in interview,operational autonomy was something that had
to be fought for with eternal vigilence:
"The Department wanted a lot of control. I was operating the autonomy
of the Institute. It was a continual struggle day in,day out."
In the face of such difficulties the Doc managed to quickly define the
major fields for research in the new institute. He structured the
initial research programmes under the broad headings of Soils,Animal
Production,Plant Sciences and Crop 1-lusbandry,Horticulture and Forestry,
and Rural Economy. He was also conscious of the importance of having
ready access to research output from like institutions internationally,
and of having an effective dissemination system so that research results
could be quickly implemented, and he set up the scientific liaison and
agricultural liaison departments to carry on these tasks. With this
initial structure,drawn from his wide knowledge of what was happening
in other countries and his own convictions of what needed to be done,he
set the broad outlines of the strategy that was to serve AFT right up to
the present. AFT's claims to legitimate involvement,then or at some
future time,in the areas of food research,processing and marketing as
well as production research,and in rural development were all advanced
in this formative period and institutionalised in AFT's initial
structure and programme. When asked in interview what were the biggest
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decisions taken under his stewardship he included the following:
"The biggest decision of all was to develop the Institute as an
institute and not just as a coordinating body. .The decision to
deal,not just with farming but with the whole spectrum from soil to
table. The decision to have a rural economy division. .
He assembled the physical and human resources to fulfil his vision for
AFT quickly and with the minimum of bureaucratic procedure. He
negotiated personally for the transfer of existing facilities and staff
from the Department and from the Universities,with decisions often being
made at a single informal meeting between himself and the other
principals involved. With the Marshall Aid money,he and his senior staff
went out and bought buildings and land in the same informal way,haggling
personally over terms and conditions as if they were dealing for
themselves. In at least one case he even signed a personal cheque so as
not to risk losing an opportunity through the possibility of
bureaucratic delay. In this way the initial resources for AFT were very
quickly acquired and assembled. In his own words "the main thing was to
get the work done". He hired experienced scientists,some of them
non-nationals,and young Irish graduates and he fired them up with
enthusiasm for the work that AFT had to do. Driven by his own deep
nationalist convictions he summarised in interview the major part of his
management philosophy:
"My main job was building morale. .to get to know each person and their
capacity. . The big thing was the motivation of the staff and how they
could be motivated. They had a national job to do. They might have
thought that they were small cogs but the work they were doing was
important. ."
The Doc's management style in the formative years of AFT was to "get the
best people,motivate them and turn them loose and they will define the
programme". He saw the department as the key operating unit and the
ability of the heads of department as key to the success of the
Institute's programme:
"Possibly the most important unit in the whole thing was the
department. That was where the work was. That was where the staff
training and development was. The development of the department
depended very much on the energy and vigour of the department head"
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The Doc moved quickly to build up the skill base of the new institute to
international standard. In the first few years of the Institute's life
he sent off young Irish graduates in droves on Kellogg Foundation
scholarships to take higher degrees in reputable US universities. At one
point he had almost 100 such graduates on this programme concurrently.
He was a cavalier and a builder who attracted like people into AFT
and encouraged them to be innovative and to build up their departments
and their programmes. With the ferment that he encouraged,it was almost
inevitable that difficulties would arise; some people in key positions
were moved,others resigned. Some were not cavalier enough,others were
too much so. Many of the young pioneering scientists that Walsh had
attracted to AFT in the early days left to take up key positions in the
meat and dairy industries which,as Institute scientists,they had helped
to modernise. Walsh took a pride in this process which he viewed as a
natural extension and by-product of AFT's role as a developmental
agency:
"There is the whole thing about the intellectual investment. . the
resource pool.. the training of staff provided a pool of scientifically
trained manpower to this country in a real sense. . to the meat
processing sector,to the univerities etc. ."
At the end of the first decade the Doc undertook a major review of the
Institute's research programme and shortly afterwards reorganised. The
review was carried out at this stage,partly because the Doc feared that
AFT was becoming too institutionalised:
"That 10 year (review) was a crucial one and it was looking forward.
AFT was never allowed to settle down into a mundane thing. In any
research organisation there has to be agitation or nothing will be
done. This is a philosophy o management"
The other reason for the major 10 year review was that AFT's autonomy
was at risk. The Marshall Fund money had dwindled down to a small
fraction of AFT annual funding and AFT had become progressively more
dependent on the public purse,and in consequence on the Department of
Agriculture. The 10 year review was partly an exercise in
self-justification and external legitimation as a bulwark against the
increasing encroachment of the Department. The output of the review was
published as the Institute's Plan for Agriculture 1970-75. A major
reason for the production and publication of this plan was to assert a
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prior claim on future public resources in order to sustain a momentum
for growth in AFT,and to bolster up this claim by attempting to build up
strong external support for the plan throughout the agricultural
sector. The context had changed and so the tactics were changed; but the
Doc's overall policy thrust was still focused on promoting the
growth,and maintaining the autonomy of,the Institute.
In 1973 a new Minister for Agriculture,in a major new shift in public
policy,let it be known that further AFT expansion would have to depend
substantially on non-exchequer funding from whatever sources. With
public funding contracting in real ters ac es.'it of t
	 atotar'j
spiral set in motion by the 1973 Oil Crisis,the Doc set out with
characteristic energy to develop external sources of research funding in
order to maintain the momentum and growth of AFT. The EEC and the
domestic agricultural sector became the main targets for the sourcing of
external funding. This mainly took the form of commodity levies in the
case of the industry and of direct contract projects in the case of the
EEC.
In the wake of the major review that took place at the end of the first
decade the Doc and his Council decided to carry out a fundamental
internal reorganisation. The main thrust of this restructuring was to
create an organisation around commodities rather than around scientific
disciplines. One of the major new departures in this reorganisation was
the setting up of a Western Research Centre for the development of the
West. This move did not receive the wholehearted support of either
AFT staff or Council,many of whom felt that the small farms in the West
were inherently uneconomic and that a research centre dedicated to this
area might be a poor application of scarce research resource. The Doc
took a different view,consistent with his deep conviction that AFT had a
role to play in the social and economic development of all parts of
rural Ireland:
"It was something that was very important. There are two Irelands
whatever way you look at it,the (poorer)West and the (richer) East..
We were raising the development of land in the West to a national
priority level (in the reorganisation)"
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The Doc lent his personal credibility and support to the move by the
Cosgrave Government in 1977 to amalgamate AFT and the Advisory Service
of the Department of Agriculture into a new body called the National
Agricultural Authority. In this he was opposed by his own professional
research staff. This confrontation between the Director and his staff
extended into the public arena, involving the political parties and
the farming organisations, and was fought out in the national media and
over the national airwaves. The outcome of this development,described in
more detail in the case narrative,was that the proposed amalgamation did
not take place. In the wake of this confrontation a credibility gap
remained between Director and staff. The Doe eventually left AFT in 1979
to take up the post of first Director of the new independent advisory
service body,ACOT.
Dave O'Loughlin - Golden Vale
Unlike the Doc,Dave O'Loughlin was not with his organisation ab-initio.
Nevertheless,he is generally recognised as having been the great builder
in the early history of Golden Vale Cooperative Society. O'Loughlin is
credited with the main strategic developments that set the organisation
on the road from being a small operation with a turnover of less than
£lm in the mid 50's to a turnover of over £70m by the mid 70's.
Golden Vale had been founded in 1947 largely on the initiative of Capt.
David Barry,an ex-soldier of the War of Independence and of the Civil
War. At that time in the dairy industry a number of large processing
centres had already evolved. A number of natural cheese manufacturers
around the North Cork area of Charleville were concerned about the
potential loss of milk supplies to some of these larger processors,like
Ballyclough and Mitchelstown. David Barry brought them together and
suggested that they form a federation for the manufacture of processed
cheese. Barry helped them to procure a licence and Golden Vale Food
Products Ltd came into being with a subscribed capital of £30000 and a
federal ownership structure involving 12 dairy cooperative societies.
The first two general managers that were brought in to develop the new
entity had limited success. They were primarily production managers.
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By the mid-fifties it was felt that the business was not developing to
its potential and the second general manager was replaced by Dave
O'Loughlin in 1956. O'Loughlin's father was the manager of one of the
federated creameries so that Dave had a strong background in the
industry. Dave O'Loughlin was one of the first of a new cadre to enter
the dairy industry at this time. Most creamery managers of the time were
qualified to diploma level but Dave had an MSc in Dairy Science. Before
joining the federation he had been a chief representative of a dairy
engineering firm which supplied plant to creameries.He had a combination
of background,qualifications and personality traits that was rare at the
time in the dairy industry. He was one of the first of a new breed of
leader in the industry,a professional manager whose education and
training had been directed specifically to gear him for such a role.
O'Loughlin,like Tom Walsh of AFT,was expansionary and oportunistic.
He led the small federation into its first major diversification,
engineering. There had been a small engineering activity at Golden Vale
before O'Loughlin caine in as managing director but "O'Loughlin developed
this at. .a rate of knots". He did this by being able to exploit
oportunities that were opening up as a result of the changes that were
taking place in the industry in the late 50's. By that time the dairy
industry had already entered the first of the three major expansion
waves that characterised its development over the 1950-80 period.
The expansion itself generated a demand for plant and equipment in the
dairy engineering area. At this time also the pasteurised milk business
began to expand rapidly. The regulations surrounding the pasteurisation
process required that stainless steel had to be used for pumps,tanks,
piping etc right throughout the whole industry. In addition,there was a
lot of engineering activity involved in the re-equiping of cheese-making
plants taking place around this time as well, again because of the
advent of new regulations.
Golden Vale Engineering did not get involved in the manufacture of any
highly specialised processing equipment. However,it acquired a number of
agencies for valves and pumps and carried on an extensive fabrication
operation. Under O'Loughlin's leadership,the engineering activity
expanded "like topsy" and became the major indigeneous engineering
activity in the Irish dairy industry. In 1956,when O'Loughlin first took
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over as general manager the engineering activity had a turnover of
£37000. By 1958,he had expanded this to £166000. By 1974 Golden Vale
Engineering had become a £3m per year business. It played a significant
role in the major physical development that took place in the industry
in the 60's and in the 70's. In addition,it also diversified into
serving the developing UK dairy industry and it secured major contracts
in other processing industries,most notably the brewing,soft drinks and
chemical industries.
Golden Vale expanded under O'Loughlin throughout the 1960's. A new
grading system had been introduced by the Department of Agriculture to
improve the quality image of Irish natural cheese, it became more
difficult for the small cheese manufacturers in the federation to keep
up with the technology needed to produce cheese of the highest grade so
O'Loughlin developed a central facility for the manufacture of natural
cheese. In 1962 he began to diversify Golden Vale into the milk powder
business when he invested in a skim-milk powder processing facility at
the Charleville site. At this time dairy production at farm level was
becoming increasingly more specialised and mechanised. This advancing
mechanisation and specialisation contributed to a significant expansion
in the national milk pool,while at the same time reducing dramatically
the use for skim-milk on the dairy farm. The expansion in whole milk
supply and the decline in skim-milk requirement at producer level
created an increasing need for the expansion of national processing
capacity. O'Loughlin could see the direction that the industry was
already taking in the mid-60's. Potentially large processing units were
growing around the Mitcheistown, Ballyclough and Dungarvan cooperatives.
The Survey Team and the Knapp reports,with their strong recommendations
for further concentration of capital in the industry,were being widely
discussed. Having developed and diversified Golden Vale's dairy
processing activities O'Loughlin set about building the Charleville
complex up to be one of the industry's large emergent processing
centres. To do this he embarked on a capital expansion programme. At the
same time he set about enlarging the federation in order to gain
favoured access to a larger milk pool. Over the 1964-66 period he
managed to persuade an additional 9 cooperative creameries to join the
federation,which enlarged it to 21 members.
402
With the expanded milk supply that O'Loughlin had gained access
to,through extending the federation, Golden Vale "began to be noticed"
by the other major processing centres. By the inid-60's Dave O'Loughlin
had become firmly established as a major figure in the industry. As a
senior executive of the Irish Cooperative Organisation Society recalled:
"In the late 50' and early 60's what was emerging very rapidly was
Golden Vale. You had Pat Power in Ballyclough, Jim Lynch in
Mitcheistown and Ned Maher in Dungarvan. Very little happened in the
50's in this industry without these people being consulted. More and
more I perceived the growing influence of Dave O'Loughlin. ."
In 1967, O'Loughlin launched his organisation into a new diversification
of immense strategic importance,the specialised field of edible
fat-filled milk products.In the production of fat-filled milk a
cheaper,edible fat such as sunflower oil is used to replace the whole
milk fat that is removed in the production of butter. This cheaper fat
is added to the skim-milk output of the butter process and the new
substance is dehydrated into a milk-replacer powder. The milk-replacer
has a whole range of applications in the food processing industry and as
a milk substitute in countries with dry climates. The most important
application is as a milk-replacer in calve rearing. Used in this way the
whole-milk normally consumed by new-born calves,a substantial gallonage
when aggregated over the national dairy herd,becomes available to the
dairy products industry for further processing. The pioneer of this
process was a private entrepreneur in County Cavan. O'Loughlin was the
first of the major processors to recognise its potential and to set
about the large-scale production and marketing of the product.
Fat-filled milk products became the major specialised product line for
Golden Vale,and the main strategic platform for the organisation's major
capital expansion phase in 1968-75 period. Golden Vale lost little time
in bringing fat-filled products to market and had an immediate success
with a milk-replacer for calves called 'Golden Maverick' . This product
line has remained the flag-ship of the company,and the market leader
in calf milk-replacers,right up to the present.
Throughout çhe 60's there was mounting pressure on the dairy industry to
rationalise. The Survey Team Report had even suggested that the
government should be given mandatory powers,if need be,to bring about a
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much greater level of concentration in the industry. The Knapp Report
recommended that the industry be encouraged to consolidate itself under
the guidance of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society,the
cooperative corporate body as it was then known. The lAOS published
its own plan for consolidation and it recommended large-scale
amalgamation as the preferred mechanism for bringing it about. This was
a very significant episode in the structural evolution of the Irish
dairy industry. The amalgamation proposals were controversial. What was
at risk was the future of the parish structure; and whatever the
strength of the economic rationale,there was much resistance to the
break up of this structure. According to a senior executive of the then
lAOS O'Loughliri "on the surface vehemently opposed (amalgamation)",at
first, "because his own owners(the federation members) vehemently
opposed it"; but then "he very quickly saw the advantages in
amalgamation because he saw it as strengthening Golden Vale Food
Products by (means of) a reverse take-over of his owners".
Once he had become convinced about the oportunity that amalgamation
offered for the further development and growth of Golden Vale he threw
himself into the task of bringing it about with characteristic
single-mindedness and persistence. In 1968 O'Loughlin began to
identify the development oportunities that a greatly expanded milk
supply,made available through auialgamation,would provide.He carried out
a number of exercises to see what facilities would be needed to process
the additional milk and what were the costs and business oportunities
involved. He then "took the bull by the horns" and committed his
organisation to a major development programme,based on the assumption
that Golden Vale would expand greatly through the process of
amalgamation. At the same time -he set about making the process of
amalgamation happen. This was a long and arduous process. Over the
1968-71 period O'Loughlin and two senior colleagues attended many
meetings with creamery managers and their committees to persuade them on
the benefits of amalgamation. Many of these people were reluctant to see
the break-up of the traditional parish structure come about and the task
of persuasion was slow and incremental. As one of those involved in the
process remembered it:
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"All the time we were trying to get the thought leaders committed all
along the line,a sort of preaching the gospel effort. That went on for
three years before we got any breaks. .It was attrition the whole
time. .You just kept at it and at it. .going to the ACM's of the member
societies to get the 'principle' accepted,never forcing a vote if we
thought it would go against us....".
In May 1971 O'Loughlin and his senior colleagues decided that the
groundwork for amalgamation was done sufficiently to start the formal
process by August of that year. In July,O'Loughlin died suddenly while
on vacation. The enormous work pressure of the period, generated by
the combined demands of the development prograisme,the introduction of
the new fat-filled milk product line,the continued expansion of
engineering and the arduous efforts on the amalgamation process,
undoubtedly contributed to his premature death. It was left to his
successor to complete the process of amalgamation and the major capital
development programme. However,the overall strategy was firmly in place
before O'Loughlin passed away. By 1971 it was clear to the IAOS,who
were then in the process of developing a revised plan for the
rationalisation of the dairy industry,that Golden Vale would be one of
the major growth centres around which the industry should be
consolidated.
Over his tenure as managing director,from 1956-71,Dave O'Loughlin had
led Golden Vale in its growth from a small federation of cheese
manufactures to a position where it was one of the largest processing
centres in the industry with a widely-recognised status as one of the
industry's leaders. To be have become accepted on equal terms with the
Ballycloughs and the Mitchelstowns,the industry's traditional
leaders,was a major achievement for an organisation that began its
existence as a federation of minor players in the industry in 1947.
The leadership of Dave O'Loughlin was a major factor in the building
up of Golden V41e to such a position of preeminence in the industry.
O'Loughlin was an entrepreneurial leader who dominated his Board and his
senior management team. "The general perception was that Dave 0' was
standing way above the whole lot" was how one executive put it while
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another described O'Loughliri as "very much the boss. .forceful,driven,a
risk-taker (whose) basic strategic decisions were very right".
O'Loughlin was variously described as "dynamic" with an "extraordinary
capacity to take risks,pushing it to the very limit".
This capacity for risk taking did,however,leave O'Loughlin's successor
with potential problems which were later to develop into crisis.
O'Loughlin,in his drive for continued expansion in the late 60's,
committed Golden Vale to capital development in advance of,and in
anticipation of,securing the milk supply to make the development
profitable. In doing this O'Loughlin was,in effect,claiming product
territory within the industry and strengthening Golden Vale's prior
claim to an enlarged milk pool as the industry rationalisation
proposals continued to evolve; in effect using capacity expansion
as a pre-emption strategy(Porter,l980;327). In this he took two major
risks which had consequences for Golden Vale after his death. One was
the risk that the amalgamation process might not be a total success and
that the enlarged milk pool might fall significantly short of
expectations. The other was in his cavalier approach to the financing of
the development programme,where he was "pushing the debt/equity at an
enormous rate.. pushing forward with (the development) sailing very
close to the financial wind". In spite of these risks,and the ensuing
crisis,time came to justify the overall wisdom of his pre-emptive
development strategy which secured Golden Vale's preminence in the
industry right through to the 1980's.
REVITALISERS - Costello and McCourt
General Costello of CSET and Kevin Mc Court of IDG came to head up their
respective organisations when the basic characters of these entities
were already established. The strategic task that both these men faced
was the challenge of raising their organisations to a new plane of
development.
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General Michael J. Costello - CSET
General M.J.Costello was the general manager of CSET from 1945 to 1966.
By the end of the Second World War the company was already over a decade
in existence. The first two chief executives were "administrators and
custodians" and had guided the organisation through its formative
period. With the aid of foreign expertise these men had built the
industry up to a level where it was able to supply the country's basic
need for sugar during the 1939-45 period. However,by the end of the war
the industry was in poor shape and badly in need of revitalisation. Most
of the European experts,on whom the industry had relied heavily during
its formative years,had returned home when war broke out. Native
expertise had managed to keep the industry functioning during the
difficult war-time conditions,in spite of severe shortages in equipment,
oil,beet knives,beet seed,fertilisers and other essential materials. By
the end of the war the industry was exhausted from the stop gap measures
that had to be resorted to during the conditions of wartime scarcity,
and numerous difficulties threatened to undermine its further
development.The fields had been over tilled. The sugar factories were in
need of modernisation. The saving of the crop was still a very laborious
task and farm labour was becoming increasingly scarce. The crop,itself,
was exposed to all kinds of pests and crop diseases.
Lemass and his ministerial colleagues looked around for "a man who had
proved himself not alone as possessing the ability and strength of
character to shoulder a major industrial appointment,but who had proven
his patriotism to the hilt"(Lynch,l986;12). They also wanted someone to
"loosen the grip of the civil service" on the company because these
public officials "were not business orientated". General Costello,as an
ex-arniy man,had been committed to the State in a very basic way
throughout his career, and he carried this commitment into his civilian
life. His personal credentials were impressive. An a time in his
country's history when young men of exceptional ability were being
called upon to play major roles in the newly emergent nation state,
Costello was promoted to Colonel Commandant in the new Free State army,
when not yet 20 years of age. He rse to the rank of General Officer
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Commanding of the 1st Division South before his retiremnt from the army
at the age of 41. He had been one of a select cadre of five officers
who were chosen for a special two year training programme at Forth
Leavenworth,the US military academy for senior officers. On his return
he had been given the task of founding the Irish Military College and
became, himself,an educator of officers.
General Costello clearly saw his task as developmental. He came to CSET
not simply to head up a sugar processing company but to secure and
revitalise a sugar industry, capable of providing both industrial and
agricultural employment in rural areas. He was passionately committed to
the development of Irish agriculture to its fullest potential for the
social and economic benefit of the rural community itself and for the
benefit of the nation at large. He took a special interest in the
problems of the small producer and continually exhorted them to consider
new options and to organise to preserve the economic viability of their
way of life. His guiding philosophy with respect to producers was his
stated belief that "the cooperative theories of Horace Plunkett (were)
superior to communism and capitalism and the only workable alternative
to those"
His managment style was that of the benevolent autocrat. His task was
the revitalisation of an industry of national importance and his
'civilian army' consisted of the CSET employees and the sugar beet
producers. Consistent with his army background he set about mobilising
his 'civilian army' into an efficient machine. He recruited into CSET a
number of army officers that had served under him to help him in the
management of this endeavour. He believed in consultation,in informing
and in being kept informed,andwould take on board good suggestions and
good ideas. He believed in using peoples talents to the full but he took
full responsibility for,and full charge of,CSET while at the helm. He
knew his employees and his suppliers and kept close links with them.
He was a strict disciplinarian who was intolerant of sloppy or
faint-hearted effort,yet he took a deep and abiding interest in the
welfare of his employees and suppliers. He was a commanding figure in
the sugar beet industry. He saw his task,as one of winning over the
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hearts and minds of all connected with the industry,and of raising their
sights and ambitions from "the restricted economy and narrowed horizons
to which (many of them) had clung,in a changing world,almost since the
time of their grandfathers"(Lynch,1986;13-4).
The General,as he came to be liberally known and referred to throughout
CSET and the industry at large,took "a general's view" of the problems
that confronted the industry when he took over as general manager of the
company. A 'campaign' was needed to secure the beet crop itself. The
General extended CSET activities beyond sugar processing to develop
a soil-testing service,a limestone quarrying activity and an
agricultural engineering activity.
The General recognised that the problems of poor land fertility and
disease control would have to be quickly tackled. The prograimne that he
set had research as the key. He initiated R&D activities into crop
disease and pest control and into beet seed quality. He set up field
stations at each factory to engage in systematic soil-testing. The
tests showed that much of the potential beet growing acreage was lacking
in essential lime. There were private quarries in existence but the
General saw that their aggregate capacity was far below what was needed.
He diversified CSET into quarrying and opened up quarries on a large
scale to provide the lime. He purchased 300 British Army trucks,which
had seen service in the North African campaign against Rommel but which
had become post-war surplus. The farmers had no way of spreading the
lime after delivery so the General had his trucks fitted with specially
engineered spreading equipment so that they not only took the lime to
the farm but spread it as well.
In post-war Ireland the flight from the land gathered momentum and
emigration from rural Ireland to the large urban centres of Britain was
on the increase. Over the 1951-61 period the rate of emigration was
running at over 40,000 per annum. One of the major consequences was that
agricultural labour in Ireland became a scarce commodity. This rising
scarcity of farm labour threatened the future levels of beet supply. The
production of an acre of sugar beet involved 6O hours of labour in
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1945. This had been an impediment to further expansion of the acreage.
As labour became increasingly scarce and expensive there was a distinct
danger that the total acreage would progressively contract and that many
farmers would move into less labour intensive areas of farming.
The General met this challenge by developing a major engineering
activity at CSET. The General's first approach was to examine the beet
harvesting machinery available in Britain and elsewhere. Trials found
this equipment to be unsuitable for Irish winter soil conditions. He
then decided to develop his own beet harvester and enlisted the
engineering expertise of Austin Armer,an internationally renowned US
engineer who was highly experienced in the design of agricnitnial
machinery. Under Armer's expert guidance an Armer Mkl harvester was
developed for Irish conditions at the CSET Carlow complex. According to
the General himself "it wasn't the invention of the harvester which
caused us the most trouble,but rather it was the task of convincing a
farmer to let us in to test it on his crop". Winning farmer confidence
to adopt new techniques and to apply the results of scientific research
to the production of beet took up a lot of the General's time and
energy. There were further developments of the basic Armer harvester,and
MkII and MkIII versions quickly followed. Progress in the mechanisation
of beet harvesting has,over time,made an enormous difference to the
labour intensity of the activity. Over the years CSET,under a strategy
initiated by the General and continued by his successors,extended its
engineering product line in order to further the mechanisation of the
beet production and harvesting activity. In keeping with the General's
commitment to the cooperative ideal CSET helped to organise their beet
growers into syndicates of 5 to 7 farmers representing a combined
acreage of 70 or more. As a syndicate they could buy the seeders,
sprayers,hoes,harvesters and cleaner loaders to in order to further
mechanise and technologically advance the production process in a way
that would not have been possible with each acting alone.
The General brought the mechanical and the chemical 'revolutions' in
modern agriculture to the beet growing industry in Ireland. By 1968,just
two years after his retirement,the engineering,quarrying,fertilisers and
related activities initiated by the General in the 50's had grown to a
turnover of £4.2m,nearly 25% of total company revenues. The engineering
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activity,which had been developed primarily to protect and increase
the supply of beet by improving efficiency at farm level,was generating
valuable export sales and realising revenues of £0.5M,with 100
employees. CSET's Armer range of agricultural machinery continued to
extend and develop and enjoyed increasing market penetration in the
British sugar beet industry and in other export markets. Beet sugar
production had risen from pre-war averages of 70k tons to a 1962-64
average of 125k tons,and was still rising. Factory daily capacity was
increasing at a similiar rate largely through progressive improvements
in productivity. Labour hours per acre were already on a steep decline
from the 660 man-hours in 19L5 to just 21 man-'nouis n' 	 'y ne
early 60's the General had revitalised and modernised the Irish sugar
beet industry,and he had regenerated widespread confidence in ts future
throughout the land.
By 1960 the industry was ready for further development. However,because
of the nature of the international sugar market there was little scope
for developing the sugar activity much beyond the demand in the home
market. In the late 50's Lemass came out with the First Programme for
Economic Expansion based on the analysis in the Whitaker document,
'Economic Development'. State entreprises like CSET were expected to
respond to the challenge laid down in the economic expansion drive.
The response of the General and his organisation was to diversify into
food processing. Having secured the sugar industry and having overcome a
variety of technical challenges to do so,the company,under the Generals
leadership,looked with confidence towards this new strategic departure:
"With our experience and knowledge of handling farmers' produce over
the years and our intimate knowledge and understanding of the farming
problems of our 30,000 beet growers,...we consider it our duty in the
national interest to utilise our special knowledge and our very
considerable technological resources to exploit the vast oportunities
of economic expansion offered by the convenience food business" (Annual
Report, 1964; 8)
The market identified as offering a major oportunity for CSET's new
convenience food business was the fiB per annum UK market. For the
company to gain even just 1% of this enormous market would have doubled
its turnover at the time. The company was confident of even bigger
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gains. The 1962 Annual Report outlined the aspiration for the project
which CSET hoped "to build. . to a scale which will be larger than any
industrial activity now carried on in Ireland". This vision was big and
bold and the General,himself,recognised the difficulty involved in
securing the necessary commitment and conviction from all the interests
involved to make it work, when he said in 1960:
"We have to cope with the timid spirits who baulk at every obstacle and
cannot bring themselves to believe in the ability of Irishmen to
compete with men of other nations. They think our aim is impossibly
great. Their imaginations boggle"
The General embarked on the food project with characteristic energy and
vision. Food processing plants were established in the company's four
factory towns. A new R&D facility was established in Carlow in 1961 and
expanded in 1964. New processing technologies were introduced. The first
commercial AFD(Accelerated Freeze-Drying,a then revolutionary
dehydration process) plant in the world was opened in Mallow,with
Taoiseach Lemass significantly performing the opening ceremony. The
first commercial product,instant potatoes flakes,appeared in 1962. The
company was quickly filling out the product line with each passing year.
The company had met the R&D and production challenges posed by the new
project with confidence and imagination and by 1964 their efforts were
enjoying unprecedented national and international recognition. Lemass
paid tribute in the Dail to the "very positive response" that CSET had
made to the economic expansion drive "in widening the scope of their
activities in areas unrelated to their present operations". Tributes
appeared in the 'Times','Financial Times' and 'Guardian' about the
quality of the products and the importance of the work. The State
increased its equity in CSET to provide funds for the erection of the
new facilities but the development costs in R&D,marketing etc. ,were all
funded by the retained profits of CSET,which were being generated by the
traditional sugar and related businesses.
The General had chosen to build up a direct sales and marketing
organisation for the assault on the UK market. Though the market was
imniense,several giant food companies were already well establisbd
there. CSET encountered competition on a scale,and of an intensity,that
it had never experienced before. By 1965,after three years years in the
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market-place,the food project was still not profitable. There was
growing consumer acceptance for the product line as evidenced by the
rapidly increasing turnover,but the marketing costs were much greater
than had been anticipated and production costs were still running higher
than the market would bear. Conflict arose between the General and the
Department of Finance over the status of the project. What the
department were calling 'losses' the General still considered to be
'development costs'. The Government was concerned at the mounting cash
drain of the project,which by 1965 had accumulated to over £5m.
Accordingly they instructed the CSET board to carry out a reappraisal of
the project and the board enlIsted the. e.e.rtise. of	 Litt'e.
Company to carry out this study. A.D.Little reported in early 1966.
Their main finding was that the project strategy as it then stood would
require a programme of broadening the product range and expanding the
scale of the operation through a further investment of £15m and
incurring an additional operating cash drain of £5m over a further six
year period before an operating profit could be expected. The
alternatives were to reduce the scale of the project and to narrow the
focus of the strategy to selected segments of the UK market, or to
consider a joint-venture so that the same scale of sales and
distribution might achieved more economically and with less risk.
In November l966,the General resigned from CSET,in controversial
circumstances,after 21 years as the head of the company. The main
conflict was over future policy in relation to the food project.
With the General's departure came a new leader for CSET. A new
generation of politician,the professional politician,put its faith
in a new generation of Irish management,the professional manager,
and the food project was reoriented towards a more commercial and less
developmental strategy.
There is little doubt that the General and all concerned had grossly
underestimated, the difficulties involved in penetrating the UK market
on a scale that would have secured its competitive position and its
longer run profitability. Could such a scale have been reached or was
the strategy inherently flawed? This is difficult to answer. The A.D.
Little analysis seems to have suggested that it was possible but that it
would have expensive and risky. Would it have been worth it? Reasonable
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people at the time considered it debatable and would still consider it
so today. Ireland's industrial policy took a distinct shift in the late
60's towards the inducement of foreign direct investment into the
country in targeted higher technology areas like electronics and
pharmaceuticals. According to Kennedy(l986;48-9) this shift in
industrial policy "staked our money on the hare of foreign entreprise
rather than on the tortise of native industry. .yet the race is not
always to the swiftest. . the approach produced quick but not lasting
results". In the late l980's,the development of the Irish food
industry was raised to a national priority and a new government ministry
for food was established. In the light of this attempt to shift the
balance of industrial policy more towards the development of indigeneous
industry,the failure of the CSET food project of the 1960's may yet come
to be seen as a missed,and as a nationally mis-managed, oportunity.
Kevin Mc Court - IDG
The year 1966 was a historic one for the Irish distilling industry. This
was the year that Irish distilling in the Republic of Ireland
consolidated into one large entity through the merger of Power,Jameson
and Cork Distillers. One of the prime movers behind this historic
merger was Frank O'Reilly,the then chairman of John Power and Son.
O'Reilly was an uncontentious choice for chairman of the new entity.
There were both positive and defensive reasons for the merger. One of
the reasons for consolidation at this time was to ward off the possible
entry into the industry of the large British beer company,Allied
Brewers. On the more positive side it was hoped that the merger would
provide a strong platform from which to mount a serious revival of the
industry's exports,which had declined drastically since the late 20's.
The spectacular post-war export success of the Scotch Whisky industry
provided an important spur in this regard.
One of the early moves made by Frank O'Reilly,as chairman of the new
entity,was to hire in a professional manager,Kevin Mc Court,as managing
director. This move was crucial to the merger's ultimate effectiveness.
The full exploitation of the merger's potential involved nothing less
than the transformation of three traditional family firms into a unitary
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public company. It involved a transition from family capitalism to
managerial capitalism. At the time of the merger the need to appoint
an external managing director had not been anticipated by the parties
involved. However,it became clear to O'Reilly,soon afterwards,
that full implementation of the merger would be exceedingly difficult,
if not impossible,without being headed up by a strong professional
manager with no traditional affiliations to any of the particular
parties to the merger.
Frank O'Reilly and Kevin Mc Court,working in tandem,were the key
personalities in the evolution of the modern Irish Distillers Group
plc.,and in the modern revival of Irish distilling as an important
export industry. Their respective contributions cannot be easily
separated. O'Reilly was a progressive industry leader whose personal
efforts were crucial in bringing about the merger. Both men shared a
post-merger vision for the industry. The vision was one of export-led
growth, facilitated by the promotion of Irish whiskey as a generic
product. The platform for this renewed drive for export sales was to be
a profitable domestic base. Domestic profitability was to be secured
through strong market leadership. Underpinning this two-front marketing
strategy was a product strategy that positioned Irish whiskey as a
premium product relative to the Scotch or American blended whiskies,and
an operations strategy that was aimed at equipping the company with the
capability to become and remain cost competitive,nationally and inter-
nationally. Mc Court's main role was to flesh out this strategic
vision,give it substance and implement it; and that is what he did.
Kevin Mc Court came to IDC in 1968. He had a marketing background and
was an experienced chief executive. In the early part of his career
he had worked for P.J. Corroll Ltd.,the large Irish tobacco
manufacturer,in the sales and marketing end of that business. He later
worked as Managing Director in the UK firm of Hunter Douglas. On his
return to Ireland he had taken up a five year contract as Director
General of the Irish television service. On the expiry of this contract,
in 1968,he was hired in as Managing Director of the newly merger United
Distillers of Ireland Ltd.,as IDG was then known. According to one
senior executive in IDG,Mc Court was a strong forceful leader, a
hard-working and dedicated managing director who "brought through very
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difficult decisions".
Implementing the merger posed some formidable problems. At the time of
the merger there were serious differences among the major parties
concerning what it would entail and about how far it would extend
operationally. Of the three parties to the merger "there was more
commitment to the concept from Power,the middle amount of commitment
from Jameson and the least from Cork". Norbert Murphy,was the chairman
and managing director of Cork Distillers Company Ltd. (CDC)at the time
and CDC was still a private family firm. He was "farseeing, innovative
but difficult to deal with", a strong,independent-minded,leader who
in fact to a large extent "was Cork Distillers really". He had had the
business acumen to diversify his product range into white spirits. At
the time of the merger he had already developed his Cork Gin brand into
strong leadership position on the Irish market and he had developed a
a successful line of vodkas. Murphy accepted the need for the three
traditional producers of Irish whiskey in the Republic to form a close
association in order to develop the export potential of the industry.
However, at the time of the merger he was a long way off accepting any
significant degree of operational integration.
Murphy,as noted,was very independent-minded and the full integration of
his company with the other two partners was a long and slow process. At
the time of the merger "there was the least commitment to do anything
about rationalisation from Cork". Murphy tried to maintain much of his
pre-merger operational independence. Cork Distillers looked on the
newly-merged entity as "a trade protection association" and "a joint
venture on exports". In the post-merger period there were many
difficulties in forging a single organic entity from the disparate
organisations that were parties to the merger and McCourt worked hard to
overcome them. The main centrifugal forces,however,were experienced at
board level. As one senior executive recalled:
"There was a feeling that the objectives were acknowledged,the
development of exports and the defense of the home position. It was
often said in 1968 to 1975 that the staffs and managements of the
companies went with the merger but the lack of acceptance was at board
level.
Frank O'Reilly's ability to "smooth oil on troubled waters" as chairman
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of the board was perceived to been a key element in getting the merger
to work in spite of severe boardroom difficulties. Murphy experienced
new pressures and new demands that undermined his previous autonomy.As a
senior executive pointed out "after you got together,no matter how much
you may have felt you misunderstood each other,you now had a
responsibility to the shareholders". In particular,Murphy had "not
bargained for Kevin Mc Court t' and "did not (for)see a unitary hierarchy
developing as quickly as it did".
Kevin Mc Court brought in two outside professionals,Archie Cook and Gene
Savage,to head up the marketing and finance functions respectively. The
only board member with line management responsibility was Clem Ryan, and
he headed up the production function where the traditional commercial
strengths of the distilling families lay.The organisational difficulties
that confronted Mc Court and his team were multifarious as they
attempted to mold the loose federation into a strong unitary
organisation. There were three companies with three different
philosophies,three different staffs and three different systems to be
integrated. "You just wouldn't believe that three systems could be so
different" was how one senior executive put it. There were major
differences in financial systems and databases,compensation and benefit
schemes,union representation and work arrangexnents,staff promotion
policies and in many other areas of operation and organisation.
Marketing and finance were the first of the major functions to be
operationally merged and the appointments of Cook and Savage were
important in bringing these developments about. Merging the salesforces
was difficult enough because the salesmen of the three traditional
partners to the merger had been "indoctrinated in the belief that their
company's brands were superior,and that the brands of the other parties
to the merger,that they now had to promote as well,were inferior".
Around the time that the sales forces were merged Kevin Mc Court made a
move of strategic significance. He decided to bypass the wholesalers and
sell directly to the retail trade,which at that time were mainly the
public houses. This move was strategically important for two reasons.
Firstly it gave the company direct control over product image and
product quality. Prior to this the product was largely shipped in bulk
to the wholesale trade where it was blended and bottled in bond by the
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wholesaler before reaching the consumer. Secondly,some large British
brewing companies had been extending their direct participation in the
wholesale and distribution of wines and spirits in Ireland for some time
past. Kevin Mc Court was concerned with the growing concentration of
commercial power in the wholesale trade and he wanted to reduce
substantially his company's dependence on it. He also wanted to
secure direct access to the retailer and consumer in order to more
strongly influence the pattern of consumption and to more strongly
promote the company's brands at the point of sale.
McCourt's strategy of bypassing the wholesalers involved a major
increase in working capital for the company. The company was taking on
the funding of credit to the retail trade that had been formerly borne
by the wholesalers. It was taking on the associated bad debt risks. This
strategy destroyed the wholesale trade and changed the structure of the
industry. So significant was the strategy for the industry at the time
that the company took the prudent precaution of advising the Minister
for Industry and Commerce of its intentions in advance and of seeking
his approval. It was a wise precaution because not surprisingly the
wholesale trade was "vitriolic" in its opposition.
A major feature of the 1966-72 post-merger period was the progressive
transformation of the industry from its traditional production/product
orientation to a stronger marketing orientation, consistent with the main
requirements of the post-merger strategy. The arrival of McCourt and
Cook,both with professional marketing backgrounds,was an important
factor in this transformation. Following quickly on McCourt's
merging of the three salesforces,and his policy of selling direct to the
retailer,the company changed its name from United Distillers of Ireland
Ltd. to Irish Distillers Ltd. The main reason for the change to the new
name was that it was more readily identifiable in both home and
export markets. Meanwhile the company,under the leadership of O'Reilly
and Mc Court,tben set about developing and extending the product range.
In 1971 the company introduced four new products,a whiskey,a white rum,
a vodka and a dry gin. These were the first major corporate brands not
traditionally associated with the former parties to the merger. As such
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their arrival helped in strengthening a more unitary corporate identity
within the company and within the marketplace. Frank O'Reilly gave a
formal public emphasis to the company's growing marketing orientation in
his 1971 address to the shareholders when he declared that those who
had an interest in the company,employees and shareholders alike "must
all be salesmen".
The company,in 1972,heralded the success of its Jameson 'North American
Blend' which was specially developed to meet the tastes of North
American consumers. This was quickly supported by a special blend of
another of the company's flagship brands,Tullamore Dew. These blended
products represented in the most tangible way how far the industry had
moved away from its strong product/production orientated traditions. For
centuries the Irish distilling fraternity had been taking it upon
themselves to determine what was,and what was not,good whiskey
irrespective of the changing and variable tastes of consumers. Now,in
the early 70's,the industry had begun to experiment with the blending
of whiskies in order to develop new and lighter blends of Irish whiskey
that were more closely tailored to the taste of the foreign consumer,as
determined by empirical market research. Had such an approach been taken
one or two decades earlier,the Irish distilling industry would not have
given its great rival,the Scotch industry,such a head start in its major
export markets.
The decision to consolidate distilling in one location was "absolutely
far reaching" in its implications for the future of Irish Distillers
Ltd. It meant the end of the distilling tradition in Dublin which was a
milestone in the country's commercial history. The decision process was
complex and long drawn out. Some of the parties to the merger forsaw
this consolidation of distilling as a possible downstream development,
but not all. Cork Distillers and Norbert Murphy,in particular,had not
anticipated any major consolidation of operations, and Murphy was slow
to accept it. In 1969 O'Reilly and Mc Court brought in A.D.Little
Consultants to study the corporate distilling operations with a view to
making recommendations concerning their modernisation and international
cost competitiveness. The consultants somewhat ritualistically examined
the option of modernising the existing distilleries as well as the
option of consolidation,though it seems it was already clear to O'Reilly
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and Mc Court what their recommendation had to be. The decision to close
the existing distilleries was almost inevitably going to be politically
difficult and bringing in the consultants was a way of neutralising
these political pressures. As one senior executive recalled:
"The main reason for bringing them in was to take the personal politics
out of the situation. . If you bring someone as expensive as A.D. Little
in and pay them large fees, you cannot walk away from the decision
after that"
The political difficulties associated with the Midleton decision were
mainly confined to board level. The first difficulty was the decision to
do it. There were even greater difficulties around the when,where and
how of the proposed consolidation. There were later downstream
difficulties in bringing about the plant closures and rationalisations
associated with the implementation of the decision. Within management,
however,there was broad cross functional support for the idea of a
centralised modern distillation and maturation complex. The economic
arguments for modernisation were for greater product flexibility
and for the productivity improvement that would stem from a more
efficient and more capital intensive process. Both arguments were
strongly linked to the company's clearly articulated corporate strategy.
The export-marketing argument for greater flexibility in the production
of blended whiskey was particularly influential. Yet,there were also
major concerns about the magnitude of the decision and about the
possible consequences for the product's image in the marketplace.
The decision involved the writing off of the traditional distilleries
with little expected salvage value relative to the cost of the new
facility. There was also a concern that the product would be affected
physically and/or in the consumer's perception through the transfer from
the old slow traditional processing methods to new shiny facilities
that might make it seem more like a chemical process. In addition to all
of this the Midleton decision was a major capital undertaking on a scale
which was unprecedented for the industry with its conservative
traditions and the consequences of any fundamental flaw in the wisdom of
the project might have been disastrous. Confidence in Mc Court,and in
the senior production executives,Clem Ryan and Denis Cotter,who were
the main champions of the project,"was a major element in the whole
thing" according to one senior executive who was closely involved with
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the whole decision process at the time.
In 1972 Irish Distillers acquired a 25% minority holding in the Old
Bushmills Distillery Company as part of an association with Seagrams,
who were then the corporate owners of Bushmills. Seagrams for its part
acquired a 15% stake in Irish Distillers. In 1974 Irish Distillers
raised their equity in Bushinills to 80%. The acquisition of a
controlling interest in Bushmills marked a major milestone in the
history of Irish distilling. With this acquisition Irish Distillers
achieved full consolidation of the Irish whiskey industry. This
eliminated the final element of inter-company competition in Irish
whiskey and further strengthened Irish Distillers' strategy of promoting
Irish whiskey as a generic product on the export markets of the world.
Frank O'Reilly rightly declared that the acquisition of a substantial
controlling interest in Bushmills was the fourth major milestone in the
history of Irish distilling after the foundation of the large family
distilleries in the late 1700's,the formation of Cork Distilleries
Company in 1868,and the formation of United Distillers of Ireland in the
1966 merger.
In the strategic vision of O'Reilly and Mc Court the US market had been
targeted as the market that would provide the major growth oportunity
for the Irish whiskey trade. The total sales volume of Irish whiskey
was equivalent to less that 1% of the total volume of that enormous
whiskey market,so the potential for growth in every small percentage
increase in market share was huge. Through the association with Seagrams
and the acquisition of a contriling interest in Bushmills, Irish
Distillers came to consolidate the key export end of its corporate
strategy around three major USimporters and three major flagship
brands. The Calvert Division of Seagrams was given responsibility for
the distribution and marketing of Jaineson, Brown Forman Inc. were
given a renewed franchise for the Bushmills line and Heublein Inc. for
Tullamore Dew.
Kevin Mc Court retired from Irish Distillers on the expiry of his ten
year contract with the company in 1978. In the decade under the
leadership of Mc Court and his chairman Frank O'Reilly the Irish whiskey
industry had undergone major transformation and renewal. Because the
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broad strategic intent of the two men was clear from the very beginning
of Kevin Mc Court's tenure the rate of progress on some key aspects of
that strategy must have seemed slow and frustrating at times. Yet viewed
in the perspective of history,the changes brought about over that ten
year period were quite dramatic. Three disparate family capitalist
firms, each with its own centuries old traditions,were well down the
road in the process of being molded into a modern unitary managerial
capitalist organisation. The traditional marketing structure of the
domestic market had been dramatically and irrevocably changed. The
centuries old traditional distilling complexes had been closed down and
many of the old skills long associated with those traditions had been
consigned to history. The world's most modern distilling complex had
been built and commissioned in Midleton and new skills were developed
and hired in to manage it. The production and marketing of Irish whiskey
as a generic product had been totally consolidated within Irish
Distillers,and in the process the company and the Irish whiskey industry
had become synonymous. The industry's traditional product/production
orientation had been steadily transformed towards a more market-led
orientation.
Over the ten years,while this transformation was taking place,
considerable progress had been made in growing the business generally
and in expanding the industry's exports in particular. Group turnover
had increased over the decade by 108% in real terms and group profits by
260%. Total case sales of Irish whiskey had expanded by 290%, home sales
by 195% and export sales by 552%. Exports of Irish whiskey had risen
from about 27% of total volume to 47%. Overall the industry had been
placed on a more secure footing than was the case prior to the merger.
The main elements of the post-merger strategy were in place and working.
The one major objective not yet reached by the time Mc Court retired was
the achievement of a self-sustaining breakthrough in the strategic US
market.In spite of the considerable export growth over his ten years
at the helm the increase in penetration of the strategic US market had
not yet reached take-off. The achievement of take-off had turned out to
be much more difficult than the industry's leaders had been expected.
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TURNAROUNDERS - O'Reilly and O'Mahony
Tony O'Reilly of CSET and Jim O'Mahony of Golden Vale were each hired
in to head up their respective organisations to achieve a turnaround.
O'Reilly's challenge at CSET was to turn around the performance of a
major diversification project while,at Golden Vale, O'Mahony was called
upon to turn around the fortunes of the organisation itself. A change of
strategy was felt to be needed in each of these cases and the principals
of both organisations considered that this could only come about at the
time through a dramatic change in leadership.
A.J.(Tony) O'Reilly - CSET
Tony O'Reilly was hired in to CSET in late 1966 to turn around the
company's major diversification into food. Tony O'Reilly was with CSET
as managing director for less than three years. It was a dramatic time
for the company in every way; the manner of his arrival was dramatic,his
short term of office was drainatic,and the manner of his departure was
dramatic.
When General Costello resigned in 1966 over differences in policy with
the Government and civil service in relation to the food project, the
board of CSET duly appointed a long serving company executive,B.T.(Bart)
Daly,as his successor. Bart Daly had been one of the six young Irish
graduates that were selected by the fledgling CSET in 1934 to study
sugar technology at Glasgow's Royal Technical College and to become the
first indigeneous sugar experts in the new company. He had spent
his entire career with CSET and was "very much a traditional sugar man
rather than a food man". Within two months of his appointment as General
Manager of the company the four national newspapers broke with the story
that Tony O'Reilly was to become chief of CSET. This caused
"consternation" within the company. Neither the Board nor the General
Manager had been informed of this move prior to the newspaper reports
and were about to publicly refute the stories when they discovered that
the rep?rts were correct. Tony O'Reilly had been offered the position
of Managing Director of CSET. Daly was to retain his title of General
Manager. O'Reilly's appointment included board membership and as such
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was a stronger formal position of leadership than his predecessors had
enjoyed. The workers and management "were so stunned" by the manner in
which the General's departure had been contrived and by the manner of
O'Reilly's appointment that "they never really recovered from" these
events in the autumn of 1966.
Tony O'Reilly was a young professional manager with a high national
profile. He was a well known international rugby player. He had
achieved a reputation as a marketing whiz-kid during his days in An
Bord Bainne,where he was personally credited with the very successful
launch of a generic brand for Irish dairy products on the UK market,the
Kerrygold brand. This was something that many in Irish dairy industry
had been calling for,for decades past. He was still in his early
thirties when he took up his position as managing director of both CSET
and of its subsidiary,Erin Foods. He was on personal terms with many of
the Lynch cabinet, a new breed of industrial leader that appealed to the
new breed of politician. O'Reilly and the General were the two large
large personalities in the history of CSET. A man of undoubted
managerial ability, Tony O'Reilly later in his career to become
Chairman and Chief Executive of the Heinz Corporation,the first person
outside of the Heinz family to be appointed as chairman in that
company's 117 year history.
Tony O'Reilly came into CSET to put his professional marketing expertise
and business leadership talents to work on the food project. The General
had put the main sugar business on a firm foundation but there was
little scope for further expansion in this area. In particular,there was
no scope in sugar to generate significant export earnings. The food
project,on the other hand,did offer the prospect of substantial export
earnings and was considered a project of importance to the national
drive for economic expansion. Under the General the company had shown
itself capable of mastering the process technology of convenience-food
production. 1t had also developed the R&D skills and facilities to carry
out an ongoing programme of product innovation and development. The
major problems in bringing the project to viability were in the
marketing are. The General had resigned because of conflict with the
state bureaucracy over marketing strategy. The Lynch Administration
put their faith in O'Reilly and 'imposed' him on CSET to develop and
424
implement a successful marketing strategy for the food business.
In l965,the year before the General resigned,the Government had
commissioned A.D.Little to review the food project and to recommend a
viable strategy. The consultants estimated that the General's strategy
of seeking a self-sustaining breakthrough in the UK market with a broad
product range,and through the development of CSET direct marketing and
distribution,would involve an additional investment of £15m and the
incurring of a cumulative operating loss of £5m over a five year period
before reaching viability. They suggested as alternatives that the
company could consider settling for a smaller,less ambitious,scale of
food business or that it might try to secure its original growth
objectives "under lower risk terms" through "some form of joint
operation".
The General's grand vision of developing the CSET food diversification
project into a large national food processing industry was abandoned.
'The Lynch Administration and the state bureaucracy decided that the
General's vision was too long-term and too risky,and they moderated
their objectives for the food project. They wanted a strategy that would
eliminate the cash drain and that would bring the project past
break-even to commercial viability as quickly as possible. Tony O'Reilly
was a professional manager,not a nation builder. He did not get involved
in controversy over industrial policy; he simply contracted to do a job
and was determined to use his professional skill to deliver a result
that would meet the objectives of his principals and enhance his own
professional credibility.
O'Reilly eliminated the direct sales and marketing organisation that the
General had built up in the UK. This represented an immediate saving of
£2m. To replace this he negotiated a much publicised joint-venture with
the Heinz Corporation. It was,in its own way,a bold and imaginative
move. The young brash 'David' had persuaded a 'Goliath' to become
directly involved. The association with this large prestigious food
company gave Erin Foods a new commercial status and prestige,whatever
about previous concerns over the project's viability. The arrangement
with Heinz involved the combined operations of three separate companies.
Erins Foods produced the products; the new joint company marketed,
425
advertised and promoted them; and the Heinz Corporation's UK sales
organisation sold them. The joint company was called Heinz-Erin and the
full power of the Heinz brand image was put behind the product line.
The product packaging was branded with the name Heinz-Erin appearing
within the format of the traditional Heinz logo.
Tony O'Reilly was MD of CSET and Erin Foods for less than three years.
During this period he concentrated his efforts on the food project and
largely left the sugar business to coast on its own momentum. Within the
Heinz-Erin marketing framework Ze proceeded to aggressively grow the
food business. Over the three year period he increased the turnover of
the food business from £2.5m to £7m and he expanded production capacity
and acreage in line to support the increase in turnover. The average
level of employment in the food project had risen from 989 in 1966/67 to
1384 in 1968/69. The acreage under food was increased from 4300 to 9200
in the same period. O'Reilly extended the product line through his
acquisition of Mattersons,a meat processing and canning company. This
was all achieved while reducing the 'development costs/losses' on the
project from £l.9m in 1966 to £O.3m in 1969. The Heinz-Erin
joint-venture arrangement seemed to be having the hoped for effects of
expanding sales while at the same time significantly reducing market
development and general marketing overhead costs. By 1968/69 the project
was 'breaking even' on cash flow. The net operating losses had been
reduced to the level of the depreciation charges. The company as a whole
was showing an after-tax profit for the first time in four years. During
the previous four years the food project had absorbed all of the
operating profits from CSET's other activities and had been eating into
the company's reserves.
By 1969 O'Reilly's turnaround strategy for CSET's food business appeared
to be taking effect and expectations were high among all interested
parties that the project would soon reach full commercial viability.
Then,suddenly and dramatically,Tony O'Reilly resigned from the company
to take up a senior position in the Heinz Corporation's UK operation.
The company was stunned. The Lynch Administration were particularly
shocked and disappointed t his departure,having imposed him on the
company in such dramatic fashion less than three years earlier. The
Government withdrew to arm's length and left the company to find its
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own successor. With the General and Tony O'Reilly gone,the great dream
that Erin Foods would blossom into a substantial food industry,equal to
or even greater than the sugar industry in potential and importance,was
over. The separate board for Erin Foods was disbanded in 1972 and all of
Erin's activities were reintegrated with the other main CSET activities
under a single corporate board. The Food business reached its peak of
28% of total CSET revenues in 1969/70 and thereafter declined in
importance. By 1987 the food business accounted for just 11% of CSET
total turnover. It was left to lesser known personalities to manage the
slow painful task of descaling the food business and of extricating the
company from many of the commitments in specialised assets and in
employment that were made during the project's heyday.
Tony O'Reilly strategy for the food project had worked as long as
continued to be managing director of CSET. It ran into difficulties soon
after his departure. This seems to suggest that the personal leadership
O'Reilly was a vital element in the Heinz-Erin joint venture strategy.
Among other things,it seemed to some CSET executives that without an
O'Reilly driving the Heinz-Erin relationship from the Erin side the
Heinz UK organisation tended to put more emphasis on their own corporate
brands to the comparative neglect of the Erin products,as the
competitive pressures in the UK market intensified.
Tony O'Reilly's sudden departure from CSET left the company
demoralised and confused. O'Reilly had brought a new "buzz and
market-oriented approach" to the development of the food business. While
he was the managing director the food business dominated the company's
strategy and the "food people took over the company". The professional
executives hired into the food business were a new breed to CSET.
O'Reilly had imported a foreign,and challenging,culture into the
company but had then left it before this new culture had taken firm
root. When O'Reilly left the company the dominance of food ceased and
after a period of drift and uncertainty the company returned to a
dominant sugar culture. The food business was consigned from then on
to a position of secondary importance.
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Jim O'Mahony - Golden Vale
Over the 1980-86 period Golden Vale lost much of its pre-eminence in the
dairy industry. This period was one of the worst in the long history of
the company and it saw the Golden Vale fall from its long time position
as number two in the industry to become the smallest of the big six in
terms of turnover. The early 1980's had seen a drop in the national milk
pooi after decades of almost uninterrupted expansion. This led to an
outbreak of milk wars between Golden Vale and its neighbouring Kerry and
Kantogher cooperatives,as processors fought for supplies to fully
utilise their capacities. It had long been a norm in the dairy industry
that processors confined their competition to their products and
refrained from actively encouraging suppliers to transfer their
supplies. Kerry had been aggressively pursuing an unrelenting growth
policy under its dynamic chief executive,Denis Brosnan. When the
supply of the industry's strategic raw material declined Kerry broke
with the industry norm and actively sought milk supply from farmers that
had traditional links with rival processors. Kerry succeeded in
attracting a large gallonage away from Golden Vale.
Golden Vale's major difficulty over the 1980-86 period was the loss of
milk supply,mainly to Kerry. The total net loss amounted to around 13m
gallons over the six years. Golden Vale had anticipated the downturn in
national milk supply and had made an expensive provision through a milk
development fund to encourage its own suppliers to maintain their output
levels. This amplified the effect of the heavy losses in aggregate
gallonage that the company suffered over the six year period. When it
was threatened with aggressive competition for its milk pool Golden
Vale's ability to defend its supplies was weakened by other difficulties
which had seriously drained its financial resources. The company's
engineering business,which was once the company's star business ,had
been performing erratically since the mid-seventies. This business
suffered severely from the cut back in capital investment in the dairy
industry in the post 1979 period. After sustaining cumulative trading
losses of £l.55m in its engineering business over the 1981/82
period,the company fina11y took the difficult step of winding up this
activity in 1982,at a net cost of £2.6m. The following year Golden Vale
had yet another difficult and expensive decision to take.In the post-
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1979 period,when the unrelenting growth in milk production that had
characterised the industry since the early 1950's was clearly over,
many of the processors looked to diversification to try to maintain
their own rate of development. Golden Vale made a disastrous
diversification attempt through its purchase of Castlemahon Poultry
Products. In 1983 Golden Vale was forced to write off its investment in
Castlemahon to the tune of nearly £l.3m. With the loss in its milk pool
Golden Vale was forced to carry out a major rationalisation to secure
its operating viability. In 1985,the company's rationalisation effort
cost it nearly £l.35m.
By the mid-1980's Golden Vale was firmly in the grip of a downward
spiral which threatened the future of the company. The loss of milk
supply in the milk wars of the early 80's had generated severe financial
pressure. This pressure became more acute through the costly engineering
and Castlemahon difficulties. The operating losses and drain on reserves
experienced as a result of these problems only served to further erode
supplier confidence and this made it easier for rival processors to
attract even more milk away from the company which added still further
pressure. Though the trading environment of the 1980's had been
difficult for all of the dairy processors,Golden Vale's downward spiral
contrasted sharply with neighbouring Kerry's continued phenomenal
growth which again only served to accelerate the spiralling crisis of
supplier confidence and the mounting erosion of the company's milk pool.
By 1985 the loss of milk supply became "a haemorrhage".In 1985 the
company carried out a major rationalisation and modernisation programme
that strenghtened its operations and improved its cost competitiveness.
The aim of this programme was to provide the margin for a substantial
improvement in milk price in order to protect the milk pool and
galvanise supplier support. However,this development came too late for
the then managing director. In late l985,with Golden Vale facing its
third operating loss in four years and with the rate of milk loss
reaching haemotçrhage proportions,he had run out of time. Finding his
personal position no longer tenable, he resigned.
The board of Golden Vale hired in Jim O'Mahony to turn around the
company's fortunes and position it to meet the new challenges that faced
the industry in the mid-80's.
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O'Mahony was attracted into Golden Vale from his previous position as
chief executive of North Connaught Farmers. NCF was the seventh biggest
dairy cooperative in the country with a turnover of £108m in 1985 and
O'Mahony had successfully managed it since 1972. He was firmly rooted
in the dairy business; his father had been deeply involved in the
dairy cooperatives before him. His academic qualifications included a
primary degree in dairy science and an MBA. He was also a contemporary
of Kerry chief executive,Denis Brosnan,at university.
The tough rationalisation decisions taken by O'Mahony's predecessor had
already created the basis for Golden Vale's return to profitability as a
number of insiders were careful to point out when interviewed for this
study. However there were still two outstanding strategic problems to be
addressed before Golden Vale's future could be put on a more secure
basis. Firstly,supplier confidence had to be restored as a matter of
urgency. Secondly,the milk war situation with Kerry had to be sorted
out and stabilised. O'Mahony's predecessor had not be able to manage
"the politics farming" and lost the confidence of the suppliers
irrevocably. Furthermore his personal handling of relationships with
Kerry during the milk war was perceived to have led to a further
deterioration in the situation and to a deepening personal antagonism
between the two chief executives. These were the major strategic
problems that had finally made his position untenable,and they were the
two major strategic challenges that Jim O'Mahony had to address without
delay if his attempt to turn around the company's fortunes was to have
any chance of success.
O'Mahony moved quickly on both fronts. The arrival of a new personality
with a successful track record in the industry gave the farmer-suppliers
some hope for the future. O'Mahony would have a 'honeymoon period' but
the problems facing Golden Vale were so serious that clearly he had only
a matter of months to make an impact. He lost no time in going out to
meet the suppliers,individually and in groups. His message to them,
simple and direct,was "give me a year to make Golden Vale's milk price
one of the best in the land". As a direct result of these meetings and
of this message,he managed to ave 2.5m of the 3.5m gallons of milk that
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were about to leave the cooperative prior to his arrival. As one
executive recalled his arrival on the scene and its immediate impact:
'The new manager came in and he was prepared to show strength straight
away. He went out and met the farmers and convinced them that he was
going to put things right and he won back the farmers' confidence. He
is politically more astute than (his predecessor)ti.
He also moved quickly to depersonalise the commercial hostilities with
Kerry and put the new Golden Vale attitude on record early on in his
tenure when he declared:
"As far as I am concerned,the objective is to make as much money as
possible for the farmers and Golden Vale cooperative. If that can be
helped by cooperating with anybody,no matter who it is,we'll
cooperate. I have no hang-ups about personalities or opinions. Facts
and figures dominate decisions,but I am not going to let him get any
more milk".
Having signalled his wish to depersonalise the situation between Golden
Vale and Kerry,O'Mahony set about an early show of strength in this
area as well. He brought the milk war to Kerry in December 1986. In this
latest skirmish between the two neighbouring processors Golden Vale
managed to attract 171 suppliers with a total milk pool of 6.2m gallons
from Kerry. Kerry for their part only managed to attract away 45 former
Golden Vale suppliers with a combined milk pool of 0.7m gallons. This
latest skirmish represented a new commercial aggressiveness on the part
of Golden Vale and resulted in a substantial net gain in gallonage.
O'Mahony had served notice to all and sundry that further attacks on his
milk pool would be met with swift and strong retaliation. Since this
latest skirmish relationships with Kerry appear to have changed
considerably for the better. The personal animosity that characterised
the earlier relationship with Kerry has disappeared since O'Mahony took
over. Furthermore,the two companies have developed trading links and
Denis Brosnan of Kerry has declared publicly that he does not intend to
poach any more farmers.
Golden Vale returned a modest profit of close to Lim in 1986 after a
period of sustained losses. Some of the credit for this is attributable
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to the rationalisation measures taken by his predecessor. Jim O'Mahony's
swift action in tackling the two immediate strategic challenges that
faced the company bought him valuable time in his efforts to restore
the profit level to one which is more normal for the industry while
continuing to pay a competitive price for milk.
Having secured Golden Vale's immediate future Jim O'Mahony has already
begun to work on a longer term strategy for his company. The broader
environment facing the dairy processing sector is one where further
expansion in volume of dairy products is limited by EEC milk quotas.
The strategic challenge facing the whole industry is to reduce its
dependence on dairy commodities and reorientate product strategy towards
higher value-added branded items. O'Mahony has been quoted as saying
that "the national reduction in milk supplies will give the coops time
to think about the benefits of rationalisation and improved marketing".
O'Mahony has concentrated his efforts in Golden Vale on two major
complementary strategic thrusts,reflected in this quote,which are
designed to strengthen the company's position in the industry. These are
the further rationalisation of the company's operations to ensure its
future cost competitiveness and a major effort to transform Golden Vale
from its traditional production-led culture to one which is primarily
market - driven.
His predecessor had already implemented a substantial rationalisation of
processing which included automation of the milk powder and the butter
operations and a major modernisation of the intake process. These were
all internal rationalisations involving processing operations and
processing personnel only. The one significant area where progress had
been slow was in the very expensive area of milk assembly.
Rationalisation in this area involved the closure of branch creameries
and major changes in the organisation and methods of milk collection
from the suppliers. O'Mahony's stronger position with the suppliers and
with his board,aided by the sense of crisis that had led to his
appointment in the first place, has allowed him to move much more
quickly in this area than had been possible for his predecessor. The
continued proliferation of branches and trading stores at levels way in
excess of the most economic configuration was an enduring remnant of
the pre-1970 era when the parish structure was the dominant one in the
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industry. It was a remnant that had proved to be difficult to
rationalise. However,Jim O'Mahony quickly set about making progress
in this area. In 1985 Golden Vale still had 63 branch operations spread
throughout its major catchment area; by the end of 1986 this had been
reduced to 28,with promises of even further reductions to come. In the
same period the number of trading stores was reduced from 64 to 30.
O'Mahony moved to improve the quality of Golden Vale's future profit
stream by seeking to reduce the fixed cost burden in areas where the
company enjoyed no particular economic advantage. The major initiative
that he has taken to date in this respect has been the privatisation of
much of the company's former involvement in transportation,both in the
collection of the milk and in the distribution of the dairy products.
He has also privatised some of the company's trading stores by
franchising them out to their former managers.
As well as concentrating on improving and securing the cost
competitiveness of Golden Vale Jim O'Mahony has been working to
transform the company from a strong production orientation to a more
market-led organisation. He retained two of the senior executives that
he inherited in the management team,his company secretary and his
financial controller. He has made his own selections for the key
operating positions of marketing and production and has created a new
position at group executive level with responsibility for the liquid
milk and milk assembly activities. He has moved "more a lot more fire
power" into the marketing area. A major internal renewal and cultural
change is being attempted to restore the confidence of the staff in
their own ability and potential following the morale damaging
loss-making years. It is also being carried out to educate executives
at all levels on the new business realities and in the need for new
departures from customary ways of managing the business. As one long
serving manager described it:
"The whole spectrum is being looked at.New products are being thought
of. (There is) a lot of emphasis on marketing. .very strong
reinforcement of the marketing area. . .production is (now) driven by
marketing. There is movement towards branded products. (We are) in the
middle of a change process".
This same executive expected that the impact of the changes that have
been taking place since Jim O'Mahony caine to Golden Vale should start to
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be clearly felt in the marketplace by early 1989.
Meanwhile,at the end of 1987,Golden Vale returned a trading profit of
close to £3.5m. Given Golden Vale's turnover,this represented a recovery
to a profit level which was about normal for the industry. The early
indications are that O'Mahony's strategy for the company is succeeding.
He has restored Golden Vale to more normal levels of profitability while
continuing to pay a very competitive price for milk. While Golden Vale
has returned to a healthy profit,however,it is unlikely that the company
will ever recover its once pre-eminent position as number two in the
industry,certainly not for a long time to come. That remains the
enduring cost of the various difficulties and missed oportunities that
characterised the company's development over the 1975-85 period.
The dairy industry itself,in 1988,appears to be on the threshold of yet
another major phase in its structural evolution. The Irish Cooperative
Organisation Society has recently published a national strategy for the
industry which recommends a major restructuring of the industry in
order to achieve a higher level of capital concentration. More recently,
the country's major meat processor,Goodman Industries,has entered the
dairy processing business through its acquisition of the ailing
Baileboro Cooperative Society. This entry of a private entrepreneur into
a industry,which has been for long the exclusive preserve of the
cooperative movement,has created a new excitement and uncertainty in the
industry. Furthermore,a number of the major processors have recently
begun significant diversification programmes to reduce their dependence
on the industry,now that the strategic raw material is no longer allowed
to expand. These processors have also sought quotations on the stock
exchange to widen their access to capital for these new developments.
The current state of the industry is characterised by novelty and by
structural flux and transition. Jim O'Mahony's leadership at Golden Vale
has strengthened the company's position in an industry which itself
appears to be n the threshold of a totally new phase in its structural
evolution. His strategic emphasis is aimed at meeting head on the
challenges facing the entire processing industry in the late 80's.
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INHERITORS - Ryan, Burrows, Daly, Sheehy, Cornerford, Lenihan
and Curtin.
The six chief executives that we have looked up to now were all brought
into their respective organisations to take on a specific strategic
challenge. Two were essentially builders of fledgling organisations,two
were revitalisers of existing organisations that were ready to move on
to a new phase in their development,and two were brought in to achieve a
strategic turnaround in organisations that were in difficulties.
The seven remaining chief executives that featured in this study were
essentially insiders whose succession signalled continuity rather than
change. They each inherited an organisation that was already passed its
formative period and they were expected to consolidate and build on the
progress already made rather than to make any dramatic short-term
strategic departures. Some of these men,however,did come to initiate
significant strategic changes as major new issues came to confront them
over their tenure of office. For others,their major contribution was to
see through to full effect the strategies that they had inherited.
One difficulty that all these inheritors suffer,from to a greater or
lessor extent,is that it is more difficult to link their personal
contribution to substantial strategic achievement than is the case for
the builders,revitalisers and turnarounders. Any success that they
achieve is inevitably linked to some degree with their inheritance.
Unfortunately for some of them one area that can be clearly linked to
their leadership is strategic failure,where that has occurred.
Consequently it would seem that the personal contributions of the
inheritors are likely to be under-rated,especially by outside interests.
Dr. Pierce Ryan - AFT
When Tom Walsh carried out his one major reorganisation of AFT in 1971,
he created in the process the new post of Deputy Director. What history
was later to show was that in doing this he had also created,ineffect,a
a position of Director-in-waiting. When the Doe retired in 1979 no one
in AFT was surprised when Dr.Pierce Ryan,his Deputy Director,succeeded
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him.
Pierce Ryan was one of the young scientists that the Dcc had attracted
to AFT in its formative years. His promotion to Deputy Director in 1971
was a two level promotion. Ryan was a well respected scientist,
department head and personality in AFT,and his new appointment as
Deputy Director was generally well received. It proved to be a difficult
position in the AFT of Tom Walsh. The role of Deputy Director under
Walsh's leadership was perceived to have had relatively little impact
because of the Dcc's personality and his natural tendency to keep power
at the centre. Walsh's relationship with his deputy director was
perceived in ternis of "a dominant Director who had a deputy director in
name only. . The Deputy Director had no influence on programme
composition. .this was influenced by external events and the Director".
Walsh only delegated "the things that he did not want to handle
himself. .like personnel(issues)..". Pierce Ryan's personal image
inevitably suffered to some extent from this lack of substance in his
role as second in command to the Doc. When Ryan took over the
leadership of AFT in 1979 one of the early organisational moves that he
made was to make three new appointments to the position of deputy
director. He made sure that each post had content,clout and
responsibility. As a result of this move the top management coalition in
AFT was widened from the one man dominance that characterised the Walsh
era to one of team management by an executive,or office of the Director.
This executive consisted of the new director and his three deputies,with
Ryan still retaining the ultimate accountability.
It was generally expected,and it has been no surprise,that the
leadership style of Pierce Ryan has been very different to that of Tom
Walsh. In contrast to the direct, driving, expansionist and
authoritative style of the Doc, the Ryan style was characterised as
"quieter but equally committed to the advances that science and
technology cart make". Ryan was described as a man who has "a vision., a
more balanced view of where the Institute should be going", a man whose
inclination is towards a "more collegiate approach". Various epithets
and adjectives were offered by a number of the interviewees in this
study in their attempts to convey the contrast in the two leadership
approaches; Walsh as a motivator of men, Ryan as a logician,a systems
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man and diplomat; Walsh as more of a chief,Ryan as more of a chairman.
Pierce Ryan's appointment as Director of AFT to succeed the Doc
broadly signalled continuity to all interested parties. It reaffirmed
at the time that AFT's standing within the State sector,and with the
various agricultural interests,was basically sound and that there was no
felt need for any dramatic changes in the forseeable future. Pierce
Ryan's task would have been basically seen at the time of his succession
as one of taking AFT forward from the base which had already been well
established and to keep its programme and services relevant to the
ongoing needs and changing priorities of Irish agriculture. In 1979
most interests still expected the pace of future change to be gradual.
No one then expected that Pierce Ryan and his organisation would soon
come to face the most revolutionary change in the environment of
agricultural production since EEC entry,which together with the mounting
crisis in the state of the public finances, came to pose
unprecedented challenges to AFT,with dramatic implications for its
future.
The new Director had to face the need to transform the research
programme of the Institute in some very fundamental ways. The
pre-dominant emphasis in the programme right up to the early 1980's was
production research and the need to increase productivity inside the
farm gate by increasing the volume of output across all commodity types.
With the EEC now in serious surplus in many of these commodities,the
national strategy for agriculture has shifted away from a concentration
on commodities towards the development of higher value-added branded
consumer products. Farm incomes that are ultimately based on consumer
loyalty and preference are now felt to be more secure than those based
on commodities.Conimodity based farm incomes have proven to be very
sensitive to political whim and have become more volatile in the
difficult political and economic conditions that prevail in the EEC in
the late 1980's. However,securing consumer loyalty with high value-added
branded goods will involve a whole new marketing emphasis in an industry
which has traditionally been production orientated. In addition the
production cutbacks in the EEC and the progressive lowering of the price
supports under the CAP have brought more and more of the Community's
acreage into the category of marginal land. The social and economic
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problems posed by this development are among the most serious facing the
Community and its individual member states. The enormity of changes
taking place in agriculture in the mid-80's posed a major challenge to a
research institute like AFT. As one executive remarked:
"there is an absolutely new ball game now. . restrictions on production
now. . a whole revolution taking place.The changes that take place in
any one year since 1983 are as important as any that took place in
decades before that. These changes have enormous implications for
research".
Ryan and his executive began the difficult task of trying to transform
the AFT research programme in the eatl'y O' s 'neTL the external pressuies
for change were still relatively benign. The initial impetus for change
came from the executive itself. They carried out a major internal review
exercise that involved the wide participation of the research staff.
From this process a fair degree of consensus emerged about the need for
new priorites and new emphases in the research programme. Securing this
consensus was the first step in the difficult process of trying to
reallocate existing resources to new priorities. Ryan faced inherent
structural rigidities which made the actual reallocation of resources
difficult. The researcher is the primary strategic resource around
which the programme is built and towards which support resources flow.
The complement of AFT researchers had not changed significantly since
the late 60's with the result that the 'typical' AFT professional in the
mid-80's was a 45 year old researcher who had 15 to 20 years of
cumulative specialist experience in a given scientific discipline and
had been an employee of AFT since graduation. Reassigning such people to
the new research areas,like biotechnology,was always going to prove
difficult on any large scale. A further problem faced by AFT management
was that AFT research centres were strategically regionalised to be
located in the heartlands of the major commodities served,i.e. dairy
research in Cork,meat research in Meath and so forth. With many of the
researchers settled in the same community for 15 years or more inter-
centre reallocation of professional resources was also going to be
extremely difficult to achieve on any significant scale.
Prior to the 1980's the process of renewal and adaptation in the
research programme had been less traumatic and more easily accomodated.
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AFT had been to adapt itself to change with minimal internal upheaval,
because the pace of change in the national priorities for agriculture
had been slower. The incremental or marginal funds associated with
with growth,however modest,could be moved directly into the new priority
areas while,at the same time,resources could be moved out of lower
priority areas gradually through the process of natural attrition.
The difficulties in the public finances,which steadily deepened to
crisis proportions over the 1980-87 period,meant that Pierce Ryan and
his executive faced the task of transforming the AFT research programme
in context of an unremitting contraction in annual State funding. This
contraction in State support not only made realignment more difficult
but also led progressively to a developing crisis of identity and a
lowering of morale within AFT,as the staff perceived the political
support for their organisation diminishing. In the face of all of the
difficulties that confronted them in their efforts,Pierce Ryan and
his team had made slow,but steady,progress in their efforts at renewal
and realignment within AFT. In fact,the gathering sense of crisis within
the organisation led to a greater acceptance of the need for realignment
among the professional staff,whatever the difficulties,than would have
been conceivable in the late 1970's.
After 1985 the pace of change at AFT quickened dramatically,mainly
due to external developments. In April 1985 the FitzGerald Government
set up a working group,under the chairmanship of Donal Cashman,to
study the operations and programmes of AFT and of ACOT,the advisory
service, with a view to establishing "the fullest possible degree of
coordination between the services" and to ensure "that the resources
that can be made available are used to best advantage". In its report
the Cashman study group publicly acknowledged that "AFT's internal
review resulted in major positive changes within the organisation as
regards the type of research undertaken and the more effective
deployment of the staff component". The group did signal the need for
further reform. Specifically,it identified the need to lower the age
profile of the research staff; to further increase the range of
research disciplines; to reduce and redeploy the number of
research/staff posts at headquarters; and to achieve further economies
in the management structure. The Cashman study was the first major
external review of AFT commissioned by the State and it added
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considerably to the impetus for change by putting the organisation under
the public spotlight. The study added fresh impetus to the internal
process of change being driven by the executive. In 1986 they were
finally able to set up a research centre for food,in spite of a
further contraction in the State's financial support. This was
something that AFT had been trying off and on to do without success
since the late 60's. The Cashman study helped to lower the external and
internal resistance to this development.
In 1987 a Haughey-led administration came to power. By this time the
problem of the public finances had been recognised by all of the major
political groupings in the Dail as the major obstacle to a return to
economic growth. Consequently the Haughey administration,though not
having an overall Dail majority,found itself in the strongest political
position of any administration in the recessionary 80's to take the
tough decisions needed to achieve a dramatic reduction in public current
expenditure. This administration embarked on an aggressive programme
to achieve a major rationalisation over the whole spectrum of state
agency involvement in the economy. In the agricultural sector they
signalled their intention to amalgamate AFT with ACOT and to achieve a
rationalisation of the resources of the two organisations that would
prune the combined annual expenditure of the two organisations by almost
43% and would involve staff reductions of the order of 500 personnel.
Though a previous Government had failed to bring about the amalgamation
of the two services in 1977,this latest administration has implemented
the merger and rationalisation of AFT and ACOT in 1988,with
comparatively little difficulty.
It has been Pierce Ryan's inheritance as leader of AFT to try to save
his organisation from internal atrophy and preserve its standing in the
community.He has had to do this at a time when the external pressures on
the organisation to demonstrate its continuing value to the economy in a
volatile EEC and world agricultural environment have never been greater.
Most insiders would agree that he has provided a steady hand at the
tiller over this difficult and uncertain period for their organisation.
Many believe that he has led AFT through the problems of contraction
and transformation better than the Doc would have been able to do
because Tom Walsh,as a natural expansionist,would probably have been
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temperamentally unsuited to such a task.
In spite of the substantial efforts made by Ryan and his team,however,
the pace of events overtook them. The amalgamation of AFT with ACOT and
the downstream rationalisation in the newly merged entity will involve
changes in the scope and content of the research activity that will be
more fundamental and far-reaching that any of the changes that had been
already achieved through AFT's efforts at internal transformation.
Pierce Ryan's latest strategic challenge is to lead the new organisation
through its formative phase as a single entity and on into the 1990's.
Richard Burrows - IDG
When Kevin McCourt retired from IDG on the expiry of his ten year
contract in 1978 his successor,Richard Burrows was already waiting in
the wings. He had been marked out to succeed McCourt almost a year
earlier and had spent the intervening period in the specially created
grooming position of general manager of Irish Distillers Ltd.,the main
subsidiary of the group. Directly on Mc Court's retirement Burrows was
appointed to the top position of group managing director with Irish
Distillers Group Ltd. He has continued in that position up to the time
of writing.
Richard Burrows is a chartered accountant by profession and first became
involved with Irish Distillers as member of the firm's auditors. His
uncle was chairman and managing director of Edward Dillon & Co., a wine
and spirits distributor in which IDG had a 65% stake and which was the
sole distributor for Bushmills in the Republic of Ireland. Burrows spent
a short time working in Edward Dillon & Co before being hired by
Seagrams to revitalise and modernise Bushmills,which they had just
acquired. In 1974 Irish Distillers acquired a controlling interest in
Bushmills from Seagrams and consolidated their control over the
production and marketing of all Irish whiskey. As a successor for Mc
Court, Richard Burrows was professionally qualified, he was raised close
to the traditions of the industry,and he had top executive experience
with a successful track record as the managing director of a distilling
company which had recently become part of the Irish Distillers group
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interests. He was an outsider only in the sense that he had not been a
member of the Mc Court management team prior to his appointment but was
an insider in many other respects. There was no real competitor for the
position on the Mc Court staff itself and the Burrows succeeded Mc Court
with the minimum of fuss either from within or from outside the
organisation.
The succession of Mc Court by Burrows was a signal for continuity rather
than change in the overall O'Reilly/McCourt broad strategic thrust for
the group. O'Reilly continued to serve as chairman of the group until
1981 and has remained a board member up to the present. Mc Court
continued to serve on the board until 1982. Richard Burrows inherited a
strategy with three important elements,the rationalisation and
modernisation of the Group's operations to improve its cost
competitiveness nationally and internationally; the domination of the
home market and the development of its full potential in order to
provide a solid profit base from which to sustain an expensive export
development effort; and the export-led growth of the group through
rapid expansion on the US market where every 1% gain in market share
would have an enormous impact on the growth of the company.
The first two of these elements were well advanced when Richard Burrows
took over. Mc Court had succeeded in achieving a substantial merging of
the three disparate parties to the merger into a unitary organisation.
He had established control over product promotion,distribution and
quality by introducing the direct sale of a distillery-bottled product
to the retail trade. The acquisition of Bushmills had consolidated IDG's
corporate control over the production and marketing of all Irish whiskey
as a generic product. The group had the most modern and flexible
distilling operation in the world in the new Midleton complex,with
sufficient capacity to allow for rapid expansion. Cost competitiveness
had improved considerably with modernisation and rationalisation of
operations. The home market position had been strengthened,and profit
potential improved,by the rationalisation and concentration of marketing
operations and expenditures,and by the company's control of the generic
product. The brands were being allowed to find their own levels with
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due market support but with minimum dissipation in group profit through
inter-brand competition. With these achievements alone the places of
O'Reilly and McCourt in the history of the Irish distilling industry
were firmly secured.
The key to the group's future potential was seen to rest in the third
element. The home market provided limited oportunity for growth in the
longer term. The company's future growth rate was seen to depend on its
ability to recover and develop a substantial export position for Irish
whiskey. The American market was targeted as providing the major
oportunity in this regard. The base that McCourt and O'Reilly started
with was a position where Irish whiskey only a fraction of 1% of the
200m case US market. Total exports of the groups products in 1966 stood
at 100,000 cases,which was miniscule in relation to world volumes.
Under McCourt's leadership the two foundation elements of the
post-merger strategy had received the most attention in the early
stages. Fundamental changes had been needed in the industry's
traditional approaches to products,markets and operations to allow all
three elements of the strategy to take root. While prioritising the
foundation elements McCourt,at the same time,built up early momentum on
the export front. The industry reversed its traditional attitude to
blended whiskey and new blends of the flagship brands were developed for
the US and other export markets,after extensive market research.The
product strategy that was developed for the US market concentrated on
market development for the three brands that had the best profile in
that market from pre-merger days; Jameson,Tullamore Dew and Bushmills.
The marketing strategy gave each of these brands to a different
resourceful and well known US importer. This arrangement gave IDC brands
immediate access to extensive sales and distribution networks that would
have been orders of magnitude beyond the resources of the company to set
up for itself. The importers were also committed to matching the
company's funding in the promotion and advertising of the brands which
put twice the resource power into market development than the company
felt able to provide on their own.As a result of these efforts the sales
of Irish whiskey on the US market,under McCourt's leadership,rose from
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50000 cases in 1968 to 250,000 cases in 1978. Total exports had risen to
almost 50% of total volume at 825,000 cases. This was indeed substantial
progress. Yet the belief within the business community at large,which
had been encouraged by the company strategists themselves,was that the
really big breakthrough on the export front still lay ahead.
To make this breakthrough was the major strategic challenge that faced
the 31 year old Richard Burrows as he succeeded Kevin McCourt in 1978.
By 1988 the expected take-off in the export markets has still not
materialised. The penetration of the US and other export rket
has proved to be a long and difficult process for Irish Distillers and
progress has been slow and steady rather than spectacular. While the
company looked poised for exciting export growth in 1978,Richard Burrows
was soon faced with a dramatic shift in the company's environment that
put pressure on all of the major elements of the strategy. In 1987 after
a decade of only moderate success the vital third element of the
inherited strategy was revised in a fundamental way and the company's
aspirations for export growth moderated in the light of experience and
of changes in the marketplace.
The year 1979 had represented a major milestone and turning point in
the company's fortunes. In that year sales on the domestic front had
reached a record level,and exports had passed the level of im cases,a
22% growth over the previous year. The distilleries at Bushmills and
Midleton were on 7-day operation and prospects for continued expansion
looked extremely good. Within a year IDG's environment had begun to
change dramatically,and Richard Burrows found his company facing new
challenges which dampened its prospects and threatened the whole basis
of its strategy.
After the 1979 oil-crisis the international trading environment went
into a period of prolonged recession. Many trading economies found
themselves facing a combination of low growth and high inflationary
pressure. Ireland's economic difficulties were further deepened by the
high level of debt in the public finances. The combination of falling
disposable incomes and a steep increase in government excise sharply
depressed the home market for IDG products. In the period 1980-85 the
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level of consumer spending in Ireland fell on average by 1% per annum
and the demand for IDG products was strongly linked to the level of
disposable income in the economy. In addition,over the 1979-83 period
the excise duty per bottle increased by over 200% as the Government
sought to protect the level of state services in a stagnant economy
by increased taxation. Over the 1981-83 period the sales of IDC branded
products in the domestic market fell from l.4m to l.02m case
equivalents, a drop of 27%. This was an erosion of much of the growth
that had been achieved in the domestic market over the previous decade.
By 1981 all IDC plants were on short time working as a result of falling
volume.
A sound profitable home market was always seen as a necessary foundation
for the company's strategy of export-led growth. These developments on
the home market diverted a lot of the strategic efforts of Richard
Burrows and his organisation from the export drive back onto the
domestic market in an attempt to protect the home base. One of the most
strategic investments made by IDG under the leadership of Burrows was
the group's acquisition of BWG. By the early 1980's cash and carry had
become a major element in the distribution of IDG products and it
represented a new and substantial concentration of buying power in the
domestic market. IDC bought the BWG group for its cash and carry
business at a net cost of £lOm after disposing of other unrelated group
activities. This strategic investment by IDG attracted a "torrent of
criticism from the press" at the time and was followed by a "hefty fall
in the IDG share price t'. The market viewed the move as defensive and
regressive and felt that any strategic investments by IDG at that time
should have been concentrated on the export market development where the
major growth potential was always believed to be. It signalled a turning
point in the attitude of the investment community to IDG. Burrows
publicly defended the acquisition of BWG's cash and carry business at
the time by pointing out that "the fall in the home market has eroded
our home base so we need to consolidate the home base". The company
also made strategic investments over the 1980-87 period in a number
of major rationalisation moves designed to improve the quality of
company earnings,through improving the cost competitiveness and
productivity of its operations and through reducing its fixed overheads.
In 1985,for example,Burrows and his management invested nearly £l.5m in
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a major rationalisation of its domestic transportation operation. In
1987 they invested over LiOm in a cost reduction plan,the central
element of which was a reduction in the staffing of the group's main
trading company of nearly 30%. The effect of this latest move was an
expected improvement in pretax earnings of the order of 25% per annum
and the investment had an estimated payback of 2.5 years.
While IDG encountered new and severe pressures on its home profit base
in the post 1980 period it also experienced major difficulties in
the export marketing element of its strategy,the element that was seen
to hold the key to the company's future growth prospects. These
difficulties were a combination of new and unfavourable developments in
the strategic export markets and some persistent internal problems with
marketing organisation and strategy.
In the strategic US market the company faced three underlying
developments that together had led to a decline and contraction in the
overall market. The sales of spirits have always been linked to the
general level of discretionary income in all markets. Falling incomes in
the US market,following the onset of recession,inevitably led to a
decline in overall demand. A more fundamental unfavourable
development,with longer term implications,was the change in the overall
pattern of alcohol consumption. Starting in the mid to late 70's, and
gathering pace throughout the early 80's, there was a significant trend
away from brown to white distillates and an even more important and
pronounced trend away from spirits to wine and beer. This last trend
reflected the growing concern with fitness and health. The Government
of the US added to the difficulties of the distillers by increasing the
restrictions on advertising andby raising the levels of federal taxes
on spirits as the US's own budgetary difficulties deepened. All of these
developments made it more difficult and more expensive for IDG to
achieve its growth aspirations through take-off in the US,as the total
whiskey market there declined in volume by 15% over the 1979-84 period.
By l987,after case shipments had peaked at nearly 345,000,case sales in
the US were almost back to the the 1978 level of 250,000 cases. In 1987
more than 50% of IDG's total sales of branded goods were still sold on
the island of Ireland,with little growth in the company's total volume
of branded goods to all markets since the early 80's.
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Recessionary conditions at home and abroad,and a general shift away from
spirits to beverages with lower alcohol content,presented IDG with
tougher and more competitive markets on all fronts. However,the company
was also beset with some internal difficulties of marketing
organisation and strategy which did not help it in its endeavours to
maintain its momentum for growth through export development. Richard
Burrows developed his own senior management structure with the help of
Mc Kinsey consultants. The marketing director that Burrows had inherited
in the structure left in place by Kevin McCourt resigned in 1979.
This left the marketing organisation under the direction of two senior
executives,one focused on the home market and one on exports,each of
them reporting separately to the managing director. In 1982 Burrows
decided to go outside the organisation to make a strategic appointment
to the stronger position of marketing director with full responsibility
for the coordination of the group's total marketing effort. An
appointment was made but the new hire did not fit in with the culture of
IDG and he left quietly after less than a year. Meanwhile,the company
was having difficulties with its US marketing organisation. It set up a
direct market development function in the US in 1981 to provide a closer
involvement for IDG in the sales and promotional efforts of their
importers. This operation has had three different coordinators since it
was set up and then was later scaled down and relocated as the company
struggled to find the most effective role for this direct marketing
presence.
This combination of unfavourable market trends and organisational
difficulties presented major problems for Richard Burrows and his team
as they tried to maintain IDC's momentum for growth. The perception
began to grow within the business community at large that IDC
management might not have the resources or the marketing flair to be
able to fully exploit the potential for Irish whiskey on international
markets.
In particular,IDG's export performance tended to look decidedly lack-
lustre in comparison to the phenomenal success of Baileys Irish Cream.
Baileys Irish Cream was by far the biggest whiskey-based new product
success in decades and it happened outside IDG,in its own backyard
as it were. Its introduction in 1974 by Cilbeys,a Dublin wine and spirit
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merchant,gave rise to a whole new genre,the cream liqueur. In fairness
to IDG the Baileys success has been one of international dimensions and
it stole a march on the whole industry. It must be said too that such
fundamentally new generic concepts in the liquor industry are very rare,
as is evidenced by the fact that brands with many decades of tradition
lead the market in most product categories. However,even with these
caveats,the phenomenal success of Baileys,an Irish whiskey based product
concept,has been accepted by many in the business community as a most
tangible indicator of the real export potential for Irish whiskey based
products,given the right combination of creative and entrepreneurial
marketing. By the mid 80's Baileys was outperforming all IDG brands in
export case sales by a wide margin and inevitably IDC's export-marketing
image was being undermined by the comparison.
Richard Burrows and his team did show a willingness to experiment with
new product concepts and new marketing ideas. While much of their new
product activity tended to concentrate on the extension of existing
lines,some interesting new concepts did emerge. In the light of the
underlying trend away from spirits,for example,IDG introduced its first
major non-spirit new product,a low alcohol cocktail of white wine and
fruit juices marketed under the brand name of West Coast Cooler. The
company enjoyed a fair degree of success with this departure and it
subsequently intensified its activity in the new products area.
However,because IDG management considered that new product successes on
the scale of Baileys were a rarity in the industry,they continued
to bank on their traditional brands as their primary route to growth
through export development.
In 1985 Richard Burrows and his board decided that the time had come for
a fundamental review of export marketing strategy.The existing strategy,
notwithstanding the unfavourable market trends,had fallen far short of
the expectations that had been held both within and outside the
organisation. Outside consultancy expertise was drawn upon to help in
this review. One of the valuable lessons that the company learned from
the decline in the overall US whiskey market was that their premium
brands were more soundly established in this market than those brands
that the company had targeted to compete in broader commodity segment.
This review set in train a major reorientation in the company's product
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strategy for export markets. The metaphor used to describe this
reorientation was the change from a 'shotgun' approach to a 'rifle'
approach to product/market targeting. The company initially chose the UK
and European theatres for its new approach. Selected geographical areas
were to be prioritised for special focus on the basis of perceived
growth potential. Growth in these target markets was to be pursued
through concentrating the entire promotional effort behind one,or at
most,two flagship brands. The 'rifle' strategy has so far worked well in
the UK and in the specially targeted German,French and Dutch markets.
In 1986 the total case sales to the UK and Europe exceeded those to the
US. Though part of the reason for this was due to a significant decline
in case sales in the US,it was also due to the steady increase in
combined UK-European case sales in response to the company's more
focused product-market strategy. In fact,over the 1984-87 period,the
focused strategy produced a growth of nearly 50% on the combined
UK,German, Dutch and French markets on a base of over 100k cases. This
was at a time of difficult international trading conditions for the
spirits industry.
In 1987,however,the investment community remained unimpressed. While
the company were taking comfort from the success of their two brand
strategy in the UK and Europe the effects were still not being manifest
on the company's overall performance. The group experienced a small
decline in turnover and a small increase in trading profit over the
1986/87 period. Speculation gathered throughout the year that IDG were
ripe targets for a takeover. The widely-held perception in the market
was that the company was underperforming relative to its potential and
that it would be an attractive target to companies with expertise in the
marketing of fast-moving,internationally branded,consumer products. In
November 1987 FIl-Fyffes announced that it had acquired a 20% stake in
IDG and it seemed that the expected take-over bid was about to follow.
IDG,under Richard Burrows and chairman Joe Mc Cabe,had already taken
some major strategic initiatives in 1987 to strengthen the company's
position and to improve its growth prospects and the quality of its
future profit stream. When it seemed that a 'black knight' had finally
emerged and speculation turned to expectation,Burrows and Mc Cabe
449
galvanised their company's efforts in a show of strength. They brought
their plans directly to the main institutional investors who had
reportedly been "disenchanted for several months with IDG,which they
saw as going nowhere"(Sunday Independent,8-Nov-87) and their presention
went a long way towards restoring investor confidence for the time
being.
The two major elements in the company's plans were the substantial
rationalisation described earlier,designed to improve company cost
competitiveness and the quality of the future profit stream, and a major
reorientation in the company's marketing strategy for the US. Though the
US market had been in decline it still accounted for around half of
the total world market for whiskey in volume terms. As such it continued
to remain,for Burrows and his board,the market which offered the best
long term prospect for export-led growth. The company reaffirmed its
commitment to this market while significantly revising its strategy,the
most important revision in the key US element of its overall strategy
sinve the merger. Burrows and his team decided to transpose the 'rifle'
strategy to the US. In this market they decided to continue to offer
their products nationwide but they prioritised five states for special
focus,California,Colorado,Florida,Illinois and Massachusetts. The
product strategy adopted involved putting the company's full resource
power behind two brands with complementary positioning in the high
quality segments of the market,a premium brand and a deluxe brand. IDG
also revised their relationships with their distributors to give the
company direct control in "preparing and lead(ing)" the marketing of
their products in the specially targeted regional markets. Within IDC
Richard Burrows once more decided to concentrate responsibility for
all marketing in a single senior executive post. This time he did
not go for an outside hire to assume this key position but had for
some years being preparing an insider for such a responsibility.
Richard Burrows inherited a grand strategy that had remained basically
unchanged since the 1966 merger. He also inherited a corporation that
had undergone a major transformation in the previous decade and was
believed to be poised for a major new growth phase,to be fuelled by
export-led growth in the US market. Within two years of his succession
he faced a dramatic change in the environment of the company which
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threatened the whole basis of its post-merger strategy. He has led his
company through a series of major and difficult rationalisations to
strengthen its cost competitiveness in the more difficult international
trading environment of the 80's. He led his company into the acquisition
of a large domestic cash and carry business in order to further
strengthen his company's position in the domestic market. He has
carried through the most fundamental revision of export-marketing
strategy since the merger and he has led the company into non-spirit new
product oportunities that widen the business mission of IDG. He has been
highly regarded as a strong leader within his company and insiders
fully appreciate his achievements in difficult trading circumstances.
Events since May 1988 have overtaken the company's efforts at internal
transformation. The overall decline in the spirits market has led to
increased concentration in the industry globally. This trend has been
particularly pronounced in the whiskey segment. In 1987 the top five
whisky producers accounted for over 60% of the global market. As this
trend continued smaller producers,like IDG,have become more attractive
targets for take-over. FII-Fyffes,the fruit importers,did not make any
take-over moves from November 1987 until May 1988. Their intentions for
their 20% stake in IDG continued to remain a mystery during that period.
Then on May 30th a joint-venture of Gilbeys and Cantrell and Cochrane
announced that it was making a bid for IDG,with the full Fli-Fyffes
stake in the company pledged to the bidders. Gilbeys,the manufacturers
of Baileys Irish Cream,and Cantrell and Cochrane were Irish subsidiaries
backed by large international distilling interests,including Grand
Metropolitan,Allied Lyons and Guinness. The bidders main claim in
support of their takeover move was that IDG did not really have the
resources to fully exploit the export potential of Irish whiskey and
that it had "a very small hand to play". However,the half-yearly results
of IDG,published just 4 days prior to the bid,showed an EPS gain of 37%
on the same period in 1987 with a projected EPS outturn for the year at
19-20p,an all time high. The perception among some influential industry
analysts was that the bid was highly oportunistic and that it came "just
as the fruits of what management is doing are coming through. . (and
when). .the prospects for the company are better than for a decade".
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Richard Burrows and his Board contested the initial bid and fought to
retain the independence of the company. When it eventually became clear
that the only way to stave off the hostile bid was to find a white
knight to enter the takeover contest,they persuaded the French giant
Pernod Ricard to take on this role.Burrows,and his chairman Joe Mc Cabe,
showed considerable ingenuity and deftness in their fight to preserve
the integrity of IDC as a business entity right throughout the takeover
drama. In the process they surprised many of their supporters and
confounded most of their critics as they succeeded against all the odds
in fighting off a powerful and determined predator. All the indications,
in late l988,are that Pernod Ricard will continue to manage IDG largely
as an autonomous subsidiary which will preserve the unity of the company
and the structure of the industry. Had the GC&C bid succeeded then IDG
would have disintegrated. Moreover,the structure of the Irish distilling
industry would have changed in a fundamental way. This is the full
historical significance of the successful strategy devised and
implemented by Burrows and McCabe to defend and preserve their company.
CSET's Daly,Sheehy and Comerford
When General Costello's resignation in 1966 was unexpectedly accepted by
the then government the CSET board appointed long-serving insider
B.T.(Bart) Daly to succeed him as general manager of the company. Daly
was one of the six young Irish chemistry graduates that were hired in
1934 to become the indigeneous pioneering sugar technologists for the
new industry. By l966,Daly had served the company for more than 30 years
and had progressed to the senior management ranks within the
organisation. Within two months of his appointment to the top executive
position within the company DaIy,his chairman,board and staff ,were
shocked to discover through the national dailies that the Government had
invited A.J.F. (Tony) O'Reilly to join CSET as managing director.
O'Reilly,as we saw earlier in this chapter,was brought in as managing
director to turn around the food project. Daly still retained the title
of general manager of CSET but his status as the company's top executive
had been abruptly and insensitively removed from him without any prior
consultation by the Government's dramatic appointment of Tony O'Reilly.
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After Tony O'Reilly's equally dramatic and unexpected resignation from
the company less than three years later the Government in effect
withdrew to arm's length and left the company to its own devices to fill
the void. The company simply and quietly reverted to the 1966 position
prior to O'Reilly's appointment with Daly,as the general manager,
assuming top executive responsibility once more.
Daly was only 5 years from retirement age when he took over as leader
for the second time. His period as leader is remembered as one of
stabilisation and reassessment. He provide solid,but unimaginative,
leadership and gave the company some breathing space within which to
readjust and recover from the dramas of the mid to late sixties. He
"maintained the status quo. .did not initiate any activities., the company
was ticking over and making a profit but there was no reinvestment or
innovation".
During Daly's stewardship the food project reached its zenith of 28% of
total corporate turnover in 1971/72. However,the operating losses on the
project had begun to rise once more and,on the advise of A.D.Little
consultants,the goals for the project were modified and the strategy was
more narrowly focused. In 1972 the food project was reintegrated with
the rest of CSET activities under a single CSET board. The dominance of
food was over,the sugar activity was restored to a position of central
importance in the corporate portfolio, and the sugar men were once
again running the company. By 1987 the food activity had declined to
just 11% of total turnover.
One major milestone that was reached during the Daly tenure was
Ireland's entry into the EEC. This was to have far reaching implications
for the company's core sugar business. Ireland's sugar production was,in
future,to be restricted by a system of quotas and the domestic market
was to be opened to all EEC producers. The company recognised the advent
of "the cold winds of competition" and the "termination of monopoly
protection". However, under Daly's leadership,it took a cautious and
hesitant approach to reinvestment in the core business. Daly retired
from CSET in 1974,after a lifetime of service to the company and to
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the industry. He had made his major contribution to both before he
assumed CSET's top executive position. It was largely left to his
successors to take the major initiatives needed to adapt the company to
the full implications of EEC membership.
Bart Daly was succeeded as chief executive officer of CSET by Maurice
Sheehy in 1974.
Maurice Sheehy had been promoted to the position of assistant general
manager to Daly in 1966 when the General resigned. He was still in this
position when Daly retired in l974.Yet his succession was not automatic.
There was an open competition for the top position and Sheehy had a
credible rival for the post in Chris Comerford,another senior insider.
Unfortunately for both men and for the company the succession decision
process was loosely structured and open to political nianoeuvering. Both
candidates were able and ambitious men. The competition became highly
political and the way in which the decision was taken was controversial.
Sheehy eventually secured the post but the decision process had
polarised the board and management of CSET and seriously damaged the
personal and professional relationships between the two rivals.
As a result of boardroom pressure,Comerford was later appointed as
deputy chief executive with responsibility for the sugar and food
businesses. This attempt to mend the fences only made things worse.It
created a substantial power base for Comerford and a difficult one to
one relationship between two key executives with little personal regard
for each other. The manner of his appointment continued to cast a long
shadow over Sheehy's leadership right up to his retirement in 1985.
When he retired he was succeeded by his old rival,Chris Comerford,who is
still chief executive of CSET at the time of writing.
Three major strategic initiatives dominated the Sheehy and Comerford
periods up to 1988, the major reinvestment programme in sugar,the
substantial improvement in the company's capital structure through
increased state equity,and the closure of the Tuam sugar processing
plant. The period since 1980 has also seen a substantial rationalisation
of the food activity.
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Maurice Sheehy and his chairman Denis Coakley are credited within CSET
with having assessed the full implications of EEC membership for the
company's future and with determining the need to carry out a major
modernisation of the sugar processing capacity. During the 1960's there
had been little reinvestment in the sugar business. In fact the sugar
business had been harvested to provide the internal funds transfer to
fuel the growth of the food business. By 1971 the food business
accounted for 49% of the net assets of the organisation while
contributing only 28% of the total turnover. In 1967 the net assets of
CSET's sugar and related activities were at the level of 32% of
turnover; by 1973 this had contracted to 18%. The asset base of the
sugar business had got old and run down. Yet,in the new EEC environment
of production quotas and community price levels pegged to the general
cost structure of the European sugar industry, the key to future
viability would be the ability of CSET sugar processsing to remain
profitable at EEC prices. At the same time the company had to ensure
that the cash return to suppliers remained sufficiently high to keep
their acreage in the industry. EEC entry provided very attractive
alternative uses for farm land. These conditions could only be met
if CSET sugar processing was to become,and to remain,cost competitive
relative to the European sugar beet industry in general.
In order to bring CSET's cost competitiveness into line with that
prevailing in the European industry Sheehy and Coakley determined that a
major reinvestment programme was needed. They recognised that the scale
of the programnie necessary to become and remain competitive would far
exceed the company's capacity to fund from internal sources alone. The
full modernisation of the 50 year old sugar facilities was estimated at
£90m. The scale of this investment for the company at the time can best
be appreciated when it is considered that the total turnover for CSET in
1976 was £92.9m which yielded £2m in profit before tax on total net
assets of just under £20m. Sheehy and Coakley brought the case for
reinvestment to the Government and sought a substantial injection of
further equity. In 1974 the total equity in CSET was only £6.5m. They
had to be satisfied with 'letters of comfort' from the Government that
would state-guarantee any company borrowings to fund the programme. In
spite of the fact that no further equity was forthcoming the two men
decided not to moderate the reinvestment programme and attempt it
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piecemeal. As they saw it the future of the industry was at stake and
half measures would not suffice. It was a bold move for them and their
company but they committed themselves to the full programme,to be funded
entirely by bank borrowings if necessary,in spite of the inevitable
serious imbalance to CSET's capital structure that such a strategy would
entail. By the time that Denis Coakley resigned from the chairmanship of
CSET in 1979 the company had already spent £40m on niodernisation with
plans in place to invest a further f50m.
The investment programme implemented by Sheehy and Coakley presaged a
future reduction to a three,or even to a two,plant configuration at some
unspecified future time. The modernisation programme raised the
capacities of the Carlow,Mallow and Thurles plants to 6k,5k and 4k tons
per day respectively. The capacity at the Tuain plant was not increased
and the capacity at the Thurles plant was not brought up to the level of
the two largest plants in this modernisation programme. Tuam has sinced
closed and the company currently has plans to close the Thurles plant.
This large reinvestment programme was carried out in difficult economic
circumstances in the mid to late 70's. The company was already
experiencing increasing pressure on profit margins as a result of
inflationary cost increases that were not fully reflected in the
EEC-regulated price adjustments. The only way to secure future
profitability was to improve efficiency and cost competitiveness. Yet
the funding of the necessary reinvestment without a fresh injection of
equity involved an enormous level of borrowings,which at the prevailing
high interest rates created a huge interest drag on operating profits.
It was a difficult strategic dilemma for Sheehy and Coakley. However,
they were prepared to carry an inordinately high interest burden and
risk insolvency,along with the confrontation with government that would
inevitably follow,rather than risk the future competitiveness of the
industry. In 1980 the company entered a period of successive losses for
the first time in its history. Difficult cost and trading conditions
operating in the immediate wake of the 1979 oil crisis and subsequent
recession depressed margins and leading to a sharp drop in operating
turnover in 1980/81. The successive losses were the result of this
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pressure on trading profits coupled with a large rise in the interest
burden generated by the borrowings for the modernisation programme. By
1982 the interest burden had reached £15m against a operating profit
flow of just £3.4m,a clearly unsustainable situation.
In the late 1970's a number of semi-state companies had run into
financial difficulties and the Covernment set up a joint committee of
the Ojreachtais to examine their affairs and their prospects. CSET was
included in this exercise and the Joint Committee reported on the
company in December 1980. Sheehy and his board harnessed the oportunity
presented by this parliamentary review of its affairs to build up
political awareness of the two main issues that were creating severe
pressure on company profits,the inadequate equity and the uneconomic
Tuam plant. The company in its submission to the Joint Committee
dramatised the effects of these two issues on company profitability
by presenting their financial statements in a format which included the
effects of a 'shareholder's deficiency account' and a 'Tuam cost
penalty'. The Tuain cost penalty simply showed the level of CSET
operating losses directly attributable to keeping this plant open. The
shareholder's deficiency account essentially isolated the interest
burden that would be relieved if the company was operating on a
normal commercial 1:1 equity to debt ratio. The Joint Committee broadly
accepted the CSET argument that without the Tuam cost penalty and with a
more balanced capital structure the company was commercially viable.
Their report recommended,among other things,that the company be allowed
to "concentrate its sugar operations on its most viable plants" and that
the company needed "an immediate injection of £25m in additional share
capital" to be followed by "additional capital" to "support the prudent
financing of the additional £40m investment progremnie".
The difficult economic conditions of the late 70's and early 80's
brought the state entreprise sector under intense public scrutiny of a
kind that was unprecedented in the history of the State. A new emphasis
on 'commercial viability' began to emerge and gather momentum within the
state entreprises themselves and within the political system at large.
The report of the Joint Committee reflected this change. This developing
climate of opinion seemed to company strategists to provide a more
favourable context within which to advance the company's claims for
457
more freedom to make commercial decisions and for a more commercially
viable capital structure. In 1980 CSET got a new chairman,James
Fitzpatrick,who was committed to the concept of commercial viability for
CSET. He was prepared to advocate the company's case for commercial
viability in public,through the annual reports and any other media that
offered the oportunity. He brought the messages of 'shareholder
deficiency' and 'Tuam cost penalty' and their quantification out into
full public view at considerable political risk to himself and the
company.
In 1981 Fitzpatrick persuaded his board to confront the Tuam
cost penalty issue and to make the difficult decision to close the
plant,as Sheehy and his management had been advocating for some time
past. In fact the company had also to confront the need to carry out a
substantial rationalisation and restructuring of the company's food
activities which were,themselves,recording mounting and unsustainable
losses in the difficult trading conditions of the early 80's. Yet in the
history of CSET the food activity was more widely perceived and accepted
in commercial terms than the sugar activity.Consequently rationalisation
proposals for the food business were less likely to generate political
fallout than was to be case in the sugar activity. The proposed closure
of Tuam was particularly political because it was located in the West of
Ireland. Westerners had long claimed that their region was economically
under-developed and neglected in comparison to the other regions and the
'neglect of the West' was a longstanding emotive and political issue.
There were also a number of key marginal constituencies in the West
which heightened the political sensitivity of the proposed closure.
Consequently the proposed closure of Tuam presented political
difficulties out of all proportion to the number of job losses involved
in comparison to company rationalisation moves in other areas.
The Fitzpatrick board announced their decision to close Tuam in
September 1981. The announcement was followed by "thirteen days of
controversy" in which church leaders,conimunity leaders,local politicians
and the public became involved. In the face of the controversy the
Government of the day decided to keep Tuam open. The company did not
achieve their objective at this time.However,the effect of their
decision was to begin a conditioning process in the public arena that
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was to lead eventually to a situation where the plant could be closed in
1986 with comparatively little controversy. As the problems with the
public finances deepened the climate of public opinion shifted more and
more towards the view that state entreprise should pay its way and be
allowed to operate in accordance with normal commercial criteria. The
company continued to keep the 'Tuam cost penalty' firmly in the public
mind and waited for a more oportune time to try again.
As the Tuam situation was developing CSET board and management were also
busy pursuing the Government for a substantial injection of new equity.
Though Chris Comerford did not become chief executive of CSET until 1985
he becanie,as leader a the newly formed planning group, a key personality
along with Fitzpatrick and Sheehy in all of the strategic developments
that took place within CSET during the 1980's. In particular,Comerford
and his planners played a key role in the securing of new equity.
In the wake of the report by the joint committee of the Oireachtais the
Government requested the company to submit a 3-year corporate plan for
the industry. This was a further manifestation of the new interest that
the Government and government departments began to take in state
entreprise and it reflected the deepening problems in the public
finances and the difficult trading conditions for the companies. In the
tighter fiscal situation the state apparatus became directly concerned
with ensuring that state entreprise could pay its way. The economic
criterion of commercial viability was becoming the main political as
well as economic consideration in the evaluation of these state
companies. As one senior executive of CSET put it:
"There has been an overall change within the Civil Service to the
operation of the semi-states: Rather than manage them in such a way as
to minimise political hassle they started speaking the (commercial)
truth and supporting change to the Minister. . the government were
amenable to change"
James Fitzpatrick inherited the organisational arrangement that had
Chris Comerford as the deputy chief executive to Maurice Sheehy. This
arrangement was a difficult one because of the divisive nature of the
earlier contest for the leadership of CSET between these two men.
The new corporate planning context that was developing within the state
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bureaucracy provided an oportunity for CSET,if used properly,to pursue
its case for more equity. It also provided an opportunity to secure the
prior support,or at the very least the prior acquiescence,of the state
bureaucracy for the rationalisation programme that the company wished to
pursue to secure and strengthen its commercial viability. Fitzpatrick
and his board had decided to embark on a major corporate reorganisation
at group executive level in view of the serious commercial and financial
pressures that CSET found itself under in the early 80's. As part of
this reorganisation Fitzpatrick persuaded Comerford to head up a new
planning group in order that CSET might exploit these new oportunities
to the full. Conierford's new appointment removed him organisationally
from his former rival's direct line and it freed both men from
what had been a difficult working relationship in the wake of their
earlier rivalry. Under Comerford the planning function became a
powerful function. It became a strong catalyst in the company's internal
cultural transition from a developmental to a commercial ideology,a
transition that had been gathering pace since the late 70's.
Comerford won for himself and his group "the right to bring their plans
directly to the main board and to defend them at that level". It was on
the strength of the planning department's plans that CSET eventually
secured a massive injection of new equity. The group's Corporate Plan
was sent out by the responsible Minister to a firm of consultants for
an independent evaluation of its viability and effectiveness. As a
result,the company's authorised share capital was increased from ClOm to
£75m by legislation enacted in 1982 and a fresh injection of £30m in
equity was made by the State in that same year. The State increased its
equity again by £20m in 1984 and by a further £9m in 1987.
While CSET pursued the strategic issues of the Tuam closure and
the need to acquire fresh equity, the company was also busy in trying to
improve its trading profit performance generally by trying to weed out
uneconomic operations right across the spectrum of its activities.
Comerford's planning group again provided much of the business analysis
and strategic rationale around which the CSET rationalisation programme
was based. Over the 1980-84 period the company achieved substantial
rationalisation,particulary in its food activity which was reduced in
scale and scope and was placed on a more commercially viable basis.
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The company invested in all nearly £20m in rationalisation costs and
reduced the workforce almost 1000 personnel over the 1980-84 period.
Most of this rationalisation was able to take place with comparatively
little political fallout because of the changing attitude within the
state sector to the commercial viability of state entreprises.
The combination of the new equity and the effects of this
rationalisation brought the company back into substantial profit after
four successive years of net losses after interest charges.
Maurice Sheehy retired from his position as chief executive of CSET in
early 1985 and was succeeded as top executive by his old rival Chris
Comerford. Sheehy's contribution as leader cannot be easily separated
from the contributions of Denis Coakley,James Fitzpatrick and Chris
Comerford. Together these major figures in CSET's 1974-84 period led
CSET through an extended phase of modernisation and rationalisation
which was designed to secure the future of the company in the
competitive conditions of EEC membership,and in the harsher economic
conditions of the post-1979 period. Sheehy will be remembered in CSET
history for his contribution to this transformation. He will also be
remembered as a transitional leader whose tenure as leader spanned the
period when CSET underwent an internal cultural change from a dominant
ideology that was developmental to one that is commercial.
Chris Comerford was an active agent in moving CSET to a commercial
ideology long before he assumed the top executive position. His
succession to the leadership in 1985 did not mark any immediate change
in the overall thrust of the company strategy which still emphasised
commercial viability through modernisation and rationalisation. In fact
his main efforts to date have been directed at accelerating the
transition to commercial viability across all of CSET's activities.
Shortly after his own appointment,Comerford got a new chairman and a new
board. Bernard Cahill the new chairman is fully committed to the
commercial ideology for CSET and shares this value with his managing
director.
Under Comerford and Cahill the company determined that the time
was oportune in 1986 to make a decisive move on the Tuam closure.
It had become clear by 1985 that the principle of commercial viability
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for state entreprise had become more solidly grounded in government
thinking. In the Government's national plan "Building on Reality
1985-87" there was an explicit statement which revealed this new
policy approach to public entreprise:
"The Government believe that if public entreprise is to make a major
and effective contribution to industrial and economic development in
this country,there will have to be an entirely new approach to the
role and function of public entreprise. Primary emphasis will have to
be placed on developing modern industry with emphasis on commercial
viability and profits"(par 3.61).
CSET,under Comerford and Cahill,did close Tuam in 1986. Comerford,who
was more committed to the commercial ideology than his predecessor. He
and his chairman were prepared to tackle the Oecision irz a direct
commercial fashion and they worked out a redu'ndarc scheme that was
acceptable to the workers. With those most affected onside,the main
emotive issue was removed,and political opposition to the move was token
in comparison to the furore that erupted in 1981. The Tuam closure was a
highly significant symbol that underlined the company's transformation
from a developmental to a commercial organisation,and the nation's
acceptance of this transformation. It was an event of historical
significance for the industry,and it took CSET more than a decade to
bring it about. After Tuam it would become less difficult for the
company politically to run its affairs on a commercial basis.
Comerford and Cahill have significantly improved the quality of CSET
earnings by implementing further rationalisation measures that,along
with the Tuam closure have reduced the CSET workforce from 2621 in 1984
to 1855 in 1987. They have reduced the food business to a one plant
operation concentrating on branded business only. At the end of 1987
food had retrenched to just over 11% of total turnover. Sugar,which at
one time in the early 70's was only 46% of the total business,accounted
for 75% of CSET turnover in 1987. Maintaining the competitiveness and
profitability of the sugar activity has become more important than ever
in the late 80's. Yet Comerford and his board face increasing
difficulties in this regard. The EEC is 150% self sufficient in sugar,
and the production environment is likely to become more restricted and
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more competitive than ever within the community. Comerford and his
board have already signalled their intention to move as quicky as
possible to a two plant configuration for sugar which the company has
long since considered its economic optimum given the asset base that it
has already established for sugar.
With trading profits improved from 5% of turnover in 1985 to 10% of
turnover in 1987 and with net profits after interest improved from 1% of
turnover to 5%,the company is currently in a strong operating and
financial position,and the short term outlook is secure. The
rationalisation and modernisation strategy has helped to secure the core
business in difficult circumstances. Comerford and his board recognise
that continued reinvestment and further rationalisation will be needed
to maintain the competitiveness of the sugar business but they recognise
that it offers little no medium term scope for growth,and they accept
that it may even experience some decline over time.
When Tony O'Reilly left CSET to join the Heinz organisatiori in 1969,the
dream that the company would develop into a major food industry was
effectively over. What his successors inherited was a sugar business
that had been harvested for nearly a decade in order to fund the food
project. The asset base of the sugar business had been seriously
neglected in the process. In the food area a large investment in
physical assets had been made and CSET staff numbers had been greatly
expanded. By 1971 the food activity accounted for 43% of the company's
net assets,though it accounted for just 28% of total CSET turnover.
Furthermore,the food activity had accounted for most of the staff
increase of over 1800 personnel over the 1960-71 period. From 1972
to 1988 the overall strategic thrust pursued by CSET under the
leadership of three successive chief executives has had two main
elements. The first of these elements was the modernisation and
rationalisation of the sugar business ,which was carried out in order to
secure its international competitiveness in the new environment
following EEC membership. This involved a massive reinvestment
programme in sugar processing facilities and it included a politically
highly sensitive plant closure. This element of the overall strategic
thrust has strengthened the commercial basis of the sugar business and
improved the quality of its earnings. It has restored the primacy of
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this business as the main source of internal funds flow from which to
finance future growth. The second element has been the strategic
retrenchment and refocusing of the company's food business,through the
progressive rationalisation and pruning of uneconomic food processing
activities. This overall strategic thrust was begun rather tentatively
under Daly, boldly accelerated under Sheehy and rounded off with a crisp
directness under Comerford. In the process the dominant ideology of the
company has been transformed from a developmental to more commercial
mind set.
Only now in 1988,after almost two decades since the great food industry
dream began,is CSET once again ready for a major strategic departure.
Comerford and Cahill are now ready to build on the renewed commercial
strength of their company's core business and to lead CSET into a new
phase of development through a major diversification. They are currently
actively looking for the right oportunity. Comerford has also gone on
public record in recent times that he favours eventual privatisation for
his company. He may yet lead CSET into this final formal step in its
transition to a commercially driven entreprise.
Golden Vale's Lenihan and Curtin
Mick Lenihan succeeded Dave O'Loughlin as chief executive of Golden Vale
in 1972.
O'Loughlin's sudden and untimely death in the summer of 1971 came at
time when Golden Vale was in the process of major development. The
amalgamation process that O'Loughliri had begun,and from which Golden
Vale was to emerge as one of the six largest dairy processors in the
country,was reaching a critical and decisive stage. The creamery
societies,ehat had been targeted for amalgamation into an enlarged
Golden Vale,had already been painstakingly canvassed, and O'Loughlin was
almost ready to move on the formal procedures. Moreover,the groundwork
had been laid for a major capital development programme to provide milk
processing capacity in excess of lOOm gallons. Amalgamation was expected
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to provide the company with a milk pool of 74.5m gallons at 1971
production volumes. This was forecast to expand to the lOOm gallon mark
by around 1978 as dairy farmers responded to the economic incentives to
increase their milk production that EEC membership,then imminent,was
expected to provide. Golden Vale was in the early stages of its biggest
expansion phase to date,the blueprint for which was already clearly
mapped out,when Dave O'Loughlin died.
Mick Lenihan was not the obvious successor to O'Loughlin. O'Loughlin's
heir apparent had been Jim Hyland,his financial controller.
Unfortunately }lyland himself had suffered a serious illness a short time
before O'Loughlin's death and did not take up the vacant chief executive
position for health reasons. The company spent some 6 to 8 months
looking for a new chief executive before deciding to offer it to
Lenihan. Mick Lenihan was the manager of the Shandrum Cooperative,one
the largest creamery societies in the Golden Vale federation. He was not
as well qualified as O'Loughlin academically,and was not seen as a
builder or a strategist in the O'Loughlin mold. The choice of Lenihan as
successor to O'Loughlin was perceived as a conservative one; a choice
that signalled continuity rather than change. Lenihan was appointed to
bring to fruition the strategic blueprint of O'Loughlin and according
to one senior executive he "looked at his whole function as carrying out
O'Loughlin' s plan".
Lenihan,however,was an able operator in his own way as was evidenced
by his success as creamery manager of Shandruni. He was well versed,from
this experience,in the politics of the farmer-processor relationship. He
was widely perceived by his own suppliers at Shandrum as a 'sound man'
and this was an important accolade in an industry which,at least as in
terms of the older dairy farmers,was still a 'sound man' business. As
one executive pointed out:
"(Lenihan's) perception of the critical issue was the farming community
and the holding of the milk supply. Custom and practice did not allow
for major transfers at the time but part of the reason that (the milk
pool) was not under threat was because of his ability to hold
'gentlemen's agreements'. This was the sound man concept. Here it is
mainly a sound man business. Agreements are not worth the paper they
are written on.."
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Mick Lenihan was also well respected by his peer creamery managers
within the federation and in the wider catchment area. The creamery
managers,in fact,were more comfortable relating to Lenihan than they
were with O'Loughlin because Lenihan "was one of their own" whereas
O'Loughlin was perceived by them as "dynamic but. .as being a bit
threatening. .not one of the creamery manager types". Lenihan did not
have the same dominance over his board and management that O'Loughlin
enjoyed. He irtherited O'Loughlin's management team but was regarded by
them as somewhat of an outsider. He was,however,a " cute " political
manager who rarely gave his team explicit direction so that he was able
to deflect the political fallout to some extent whenever major problems
arose in any of the key functional areas. One executive remembered him
as "not really as technically strong as O'Loughlin but. .probably more
astute. .a political man".
By the time that Mick Lenihan retired from Golden Vale in 1980 the
strategic blueprint of O'Loughlin had been fully implemented. It had
proved to be right for company in all essential respects and was
seen to have been fully worth the risks and the effort. Between 1971 and
1978 the company had invested over LiOm in the capital programme. In
1978 Golden Vale was operating at near the full capacity made available
through this capital programme when it processed 93.7m gallons of milk.
Turnover had grown over the 1972-78 period from £8m to £89m. At the
end of the 70's Golden Vale was the second biggest dairy processor in
the country,and was number 20 in the list of Ireland's top 300
industrial companies. To cap it all,the early commitment to major
physical expansion had a fortuitous outcome. Much of the progranune had
been complete,or nearing completion,before the rapid escalation in the
cost of plant and equipment that followed in the wake of the 1973 Oil
Crisis had taken effect. When viewed from the perspective of 1978
replacement prices the major capital expansion phase at Golden Vale had
been achieved at 'a bargain'.
However,between 1972 and 1978 Golden Vale encountered difficulties in
implementing the O'Loughlin strategic blueprint that brought the company
to the brink of failure and almost cost Lenihan his job. The financial
crisis that Lenihan and his company experienced in the mid 70's affected
their attitude to strategic investment right up to his retirement in
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1980.
Mick Lenihan inherited the task of bringing the amalgamation process to
a successful conclusion. O'Loughlin had been one of the first chief
executives in the industry to move on the amalgaiiiation process , and he
had involved the active support of lAOS in bringing it about. At the
same time he committed his organisation publicly to a major capital
programme to provide the capacity to process a much larger milk pooi
that the creameries in the federation could supply. Both moves were
pre-emptive and the pre-emption was effective in strengthening Golden
Vale position in the IAOS's(the Cooperative Movement's corporate body)
plans for the rationalisation of the industry. In their revised plan,
published in 1971,the lAOS designated Golden Vale as a growth centre,and
allocated to it a total of 36 creameries with a combined milk pool in
1971 of 74.5m gallons. This was the second largest milk pool in the lAOS
rationalisation plan. There were two risks in O'Loughlin pre-emptive
approach. Firstly there was the risk that the amalgamation would not be
totally successful and might leave the group seriously short of expected
gallonage. The second risk lay in O'Loughlin's cavalier approach to the
financing of the expansion. Before he died he had been "pushing the
debt/equity ratio at an enormous rate. .pushing forward with (the
development) sailing very close to the financial wind". Lenihan
inherited the risks along with the strategy.
The key groups that had to be sold on the amalgamation process were the
farmer-suppliers,the creamery committees and the creamery managers of
the targeted creamery societies. Lenihan had a personal advantage over
0'Loughlin with the creamery managers,and this group were influential
with respect to the others. Lenihan's personal credibility with the
creamery managers was a big factor in bringing the amalgamation process
to a successful conclusion in many instances. As one senior executive
recalled:
"They appointed a guy called Mick Lenihan who was one of the creamery
managers. Politically that was one of the things that moved
amalgamation forward. Lenihan was one of their own. . .Mick Lenihan did
a lot of those deals (with the creamery managers) on his own personal
touch 'over pints'. .He knew what made them tick. He knew how to allay
their fears"
467
In spite of Lenihan's personal efforts not all of the creamery societies
allocated to Golden Vale in the 1971 lAOS amalgamation plan actually
joined the group. Golden Vale had geared its capital programme towards
the provision of capacity for the milk pool of the 36 societies that
were allocated to it in the 1971 lAOS rationalisation proposals. This
milk pool represented 74.5m gallons on 1971 production levels and was
expected to exceed lOOm gallons before the end of the decade. The lAOS
plan had moral authority only.It was up to the designated growth centres
to persuade their targeted creamery societies to amalgamate. The
implementation of the capital programme was staged so that the
commitment to capacity expansion took place in large increments rather
than all at once. The timing of each stage of the programme was
important and difficult because the targeted societies had to be
reassured that capacity to process their milk would be available as a
precondition to their decision to amalgamate. Supply was being secured
in small increments while capacity had to be provided in much larger
increments. By 1973 a total of 25 creamery societies had amalgamated
with Golden Vale and the group had access to the milk of a further 6
societies in that year. The total milk supply processed by the group in
1973 was 66m gallons. This level was stretching the capacity made
available through the expansion programme up to then to the limit.
In 1973 all the experts were still forecasting an unrelenting expansion
in the total national milk pool in response to the higher prices and
expanded market offered by recent EEC membership. Lenihan and his board
decided to go proceed with their long term investment plan and they
commissioned the large NIRO III drying plant which added an extra
3Om gallons of processing capacity to the group at a cost of £1.9m.
Then later in 1973 the group found itself having to accelerate its
investment plan for a new milk intake and centralised butter plant to
align with the skim milk processing facilities.The group had come under
pressure from the Department of Agriculture which was unhappy with the
interim arrangements and had threatened to withdraw its license unless
the group showed substantive movement took place towards the provision
of these new facilities as a matter of priority. These new facilities
became operational in early 1976 at a capital cost of £2.9m. Lenihan and
his management carried on O'Loughlin's cavalier approach to funding and
drove up the debt/equity ratio to alarming proportions,as they proceeded
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to fund these major developments largely from bank overdraft.
In 1974 the national milk pool contracted against all expectations. The
proximate cause was the post-1973 Oil Crisis inflation in input prices.
By 1974 it had also become clear that 12 of the creamery societies that
had been allocated to Golden Vale were not going to join the group,so
that Golden Vale had secured only 61% of the anticipated milk pool.
Furthermore,5 of the 6 independents that had supplied Golden Vale in
1973 decided to amalgamate with other processors and their gallonage
was lost to the group. Moreover the Department of Agriculture decided to
sell off Clare creameries as part of the overall rationalisation taking
place in the industry. Golden Vale faced losing 8m gallons of skim that
dare had been supplying to them. Lenihan and his board decided to
purchase Clare creameries both to protect this supply and to make up for
some of the shortfall that resulted from the amalgamation process. This
acquisition cost the group in the region of Lim and added to the
financial pressures that were building up within Golden Vale at this
time. This acquisition,however,came too late in the year to offset the
fall in Golden Vale total volume processed to 61m gallons. This was an
8% reduction on the 1973 level as against a budgeted increase of 10%.
By early 1975 the company was in financial crisis. The group capital
structure was seriously out of gear. It had £15.4m in borrowings,flO,5m
of which was in the form of bank overdraft, and it had only £6.4m in
shareholder's funds. The combination of large short-term
borrowings,excess capacity and declining volume led to the 1974
outturn where trading profit had fallen to Lim while interest charges
had risen dramatically to £1.06m. There was a great risk,at this time,
that the company was going to lose the confidence of the banks and/or of
the supplier/shareholders,and there is little doubt that a crisis of
confidence from either of these sources would have brought down the
company.
The crisis brought pressure on Lenihan's leadership and a deputation of
supplier/shareholders wanted to force his resignation. With Lenihan's
position under pressure the steady hand at the tiller was provided by
Golden Vale chairman, Martin Flanagan. Flanagan is largely credited with
providing the vital leadership that brought the company through the
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crisis. As one senior executive recalled:
"During the crisis period it was the bank's confidence in Flanagan that
persuaded them to continue their support of Golden Vale. .1 would put
Flanagan's contribution to this place on a par with O'Loughlin's. (He
was) the outstanding chairman".
Flanagan refused to allow Lenihan to pressured into resignation. The
company secretary recalled Flanagan's immediate response to the move to
oust his chief executive which was to the effect that:
". .over my dead body! I don't blame management for the problems that we
have but I believe that they can get them right".
Flanagan galvanised his board and management in the effort to lift the
company out of its immediate difficulties. The recovery plan had two
central thrusts,one was to improve the trading profit stream and the
other was to strengthen the capital structure and reduce the interest
burden. Achieving amalgamation had been at first mainly a political
issue. Once the formal amalgamation had taken place it offered
considerable scope for economic rationalisation in the areas of milk
assembly and processing. However,up to the onset of the financial crisis
little movement had yet taken place on achieving these operational
economies. The expanded board had been the main brake on progress in
this area. However,in the crisis situation Flanagan was able to drive a
major rationalisation plan through his board by reminding them forcibly
that it was their duty "to run this company on a business-like footing"
and that as a board they "must stand over their decisions and these must
be business decisions". Between October 1975 and March 1976 a
rationalisation programme was implemented which involved 400
redundancies and the abandonment of some traditional products lines. In
addition,a. new financing arrangement was worked out to increase the
level of shareholder's funds in the company. The method adopted was a
10% convertible loan stock retention scheme,which was intended to run up
to 1980 and to create an additional £4.9m in shareholders funds.
The company's recovery was quick and spectacular. The trading loss net
of interest in 1975 had been turned around into a profit net of interest
of £l.98m in 1976. The ratio of shareholders interest to borrowings in
the company's capital structure had changed from 1:4.34 on 31/12/75 to a
much sounder 1:1.6 by 31/12/76. In 1974 the group had achieved a
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turnover of £26.2m on a total asset base of £23m. By 1976 group turnover
was running at £54.9ni on a total asset base of £l9m. Golden Vale emerged
quickly from its immediate financial difficulties primarily because of
the timely action on rationalisation and capital restructuring taken by
Flanagan and the management. In a very real sense,however,the company
also simply grew out of trouble. The year 1974 had been a setback for
the whole industry but it was only a temporary setback. In 1975 the
national milk pooi resumed the growth path that had been expected under
EEC conditions. Between 1974 and 1978 the national milk pooi expanded by
nearly 50%,and Golden Vale's milk supply increased by 54% over the same
period. The same strategy which had led the company to a crisis of
survival was finally paying the expected dividends. The same capital
programme which had created capacity too early,and had been a major
factor in the 1974/75 financial crisis, was coming to be seen more and
more as having been a farsighted investment,at a 'bargain' ,as the decade
drew to a close.
Lenihan retired from Golden Vale in 1980. The company had enjoyed five
profitable years after the recovery in 1976. Turnover grew over the
1975-79 period by one third in real terms,as the temporary set-back in
national milk production of 1974 was reversed and the national milk pool
grew by 38% over the same period. In the year of Lenihan's retirement
the company had a trading cash flow (profit + depreciation) of £6.2m and
a sound balance sheet with a trading profit to interest ratio of 7 and
a shareholders funds to borrowings ratio of 1.25. The Lenihan tenure of
office coincided with the major growth phase in the dairy industry that
followed on directly from Ireland's entry into the EEC in the early 70's
and this expansion continued right up to 1979,with just one short hiccup
in 1974. The company grew with 'the industry during this period largely
due to the implementation of the O'Loughlin strategic blueprint. Yet
the financial crisis of 1975 left its mark on the company and on its
chief executive. Lenihan was reluctant to pursue any new strategic
investments in the post-1975 period and was content to let the business
grow through the 'natural' expansion of the time. For example,sonie moves
were made within the Golden Vale management team to promote a strategic
investment in a csein plant in order to increase the company's market
flexibility. In addition,an oportunity arose for the company to purchase
the Limerick Dairies liquid milk business for £0.3m. Neither project was
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pursued. As a senior executive recalled:
"From the mid-70's experiences we were always on the defensive. .A
strategic investment was out of the question because the
(farmer-shareholders) would have gone banannas. . .We were offered
Limerick Dairies (for £O.3m). .After the battering that we took in
1975/76 we were reluctant to buy it. We had the money but we did not
have the bottle to do it.."
Mick Lenihan had, it seenis,succeeded to the position as chief executive
of Golden Vale too late in his career,when his best years in the dairy
industry were already behind him. As one executive put it:
"Lenihan was past his prime when he took over and the (major) thing
that he was able to do was to manage the politics of amalgamation. In
terms of new ideas and innovations he was past it but O'Loughlin's
blueprint was still there - major plans drawn up for the development
of Golden Vale that would take it forward 4 or 5 years".
In 1980 Tony Curtin was appointed as chief executive of Golden Vale on
Lenihan' s retirement.
Curtin was an accountant by profession and had joined Golden Vale as
chief accountant in 1972. He had come to prominence within Golden Vale
during the financial crisis in the mid-70's. He was first to highlight
the critical situation within the company,and he played a major role in
its resolution. The finance function emerged from the crisis with more
power than before within Golden Vale. Curtin was appointed assistant
chief executive in 1978,as Lenihan was winding down towards retirement.
It was Tony Curtin's destiny to inherit the leadership of Golden Vale at
a time when the environment of the industry changed dramatically from
conditions of growth and benignness to those of retrenchment and
intensifying competition. Moreover,in spite of his having been assistant
chief executive there had been internal competition for the top job on
Lenihan's retirement. Cutin did not succeed in fully mending the traces
with his competitors in the aftermath of the succession contest and
during his tenure as leader he did not enjoy the full confidence and
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trust of his own management team at an interpersonal level. This
somewhat weakened his power to lead the organisation through the
harsh environment that confronted it in the early 80's. In the
difficult 1980's the company ran,once more,into financial crisis. By
1985 the Society's shareholder's funds to borrowings ratio had fallen
to 0.67 after two successive years of trading losses and five years of
erratic trading performance. Tony Curtin's leadership did not survive
the crisis and he resigned from Golden Vale in late 1985.
Golden Vale's difficulties in the Curtin era began outside the
organisation. After a prolonged period of expansion,national milk
production declined over the 1979-81 period. Producer confidence in the
industry was undermined by the inflation in input prices and by the
general uncertainty in economic activity that came in the wake of the
1979 oil shock and the onset of general recession in world trade. The
national milk production level fell as a result. Over the 1979-81 period
the national milk volume declined by nearly 5% and all the processors
were threatened with falling supply. The processing industry had excess
capacity and high fixed costs as the industry as a whole had become more
capital intensive since the early 70's. The impact of gallonage on
profitability at the margin of total production was high. The processors
were consequently highly motivated to maintain their supply levels.
In addition,the price support increases within the EEC for dairy
products began to lag far behind the rate of inflation putting processor
margins and farm incomes under increasing pressure. Over the 1978-81
period farm incomes plummeted from 104% of the average industrial wage
in 1978 to just 55% in 1981. The producers became more highly motivated
than ever to abandon their traditional loyalties to individual
processors and to shop around for the best milk price. These
developments led to a breakdown in the normal practice within the
industry,where processors confined their inter-company competition to
the marketing side and did not compete for supply. The early 1980's
saw a fresh wave of milk wars between major processors.
Tony Curtin was just a matter of months in the job as chief executive of
Golden Vale when the first major milk war broke out between his company
and the neighbouring Kerry Cooperative. When Lenihan declined the
oportunity to buy Limerick Dairies in the late 7O's,Kerry had stepped in
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and bought up this liquid milk business and then promptly followed it up
by purchasing Deal Dairies. This brought Kerry processing operations
directly into Golden Vale's traditional catchment area and became "the
launching pad for Kerry to start poaching some of (Golden Vale's) milk
suppliers". Over the 1980-85 period Golden Vale came to lose an
estimated net l3m gallons of milk in total in a series of milk wars with
a number of competitors but mainly with Kerry. The drain on annual
profits from this heavy marginal milk loss was estimated by one senior
executive at around £l.3m per annum or 30% of the 1980 trading profit
level. It was this prolonged loss of milk supply over the 1980-85 period
that finally undermined Tony Curtin's position as chief executive of
Golden Vale and led him to resign in 1985.
Curtin lost an oportunity to end the milk war in early 198l,before it
had really begun in earnest. The boards and senior management of both
Golden Vale and Kerry met in Limerick and thrashed out a deal whereby
Golden Vale would purchase Limerick Dairies from Kerry for just under
£lm. This would have removed the Kerry operation from Golden Vale's
hinterland. Denis Brosnan was reported in the Irish Press of 22-2-81 to
have described the deal as "the final permanent solution" to the milk
war between the two processors. However the deal subsequently fell
through because of mutual distrust and lack of personal rapport between
the two chief executives,the entrepreneurial Brosnan and the cautious,
analytical,Curtin. Relationships between the two chief executives
deteriorated steadily after this time,and the milk hostilities gathered
momentum.
Tony Curtin's capacity to fight a milk war was seriously weakened by
other difficulties that had beset the company in the early 80's and put
an increasing strain on its financial reserves and performance. The
company's engineering business,which was once the company's star
business,had been performing erratically since the mid-70's. This
business suffered severely from the cut back in capital investment in
the dairy industry that marked the post-1979 period. Over the 1981-82
period the company suffered a cumulative trading loss of £1.55m on the
engineering activity,and in 1982 then company finally took the difficult
step of of winding up the activity at a net cost of £2.6m. In fairness
to Tony Curtin,he had irtherited the engineering problem from his
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predecessor. Engineering had reached its zenith in the mid-70's,and it
declined rapidly after 1975. The company,in the Lenihan era,had taken a
very tolerant view of the activity's erractic performance in the late
70's due to its once prestigious position in Golden Vale's history and
because the company overall was doing well. It was Curtin's misfortune
that the company didn't liquidate this activity in the late 70's when
its problems were first recognised and the financial costs could have be
more easily borne. In the year following the engineering wind-up Curtin
and his company had another difficult and expensive decision to make.
When it appeared,in the early 80's,that the major growth phase in
national milk production was over,many processors looked to
diversification to try to maintain their own rate of development.
Golden Vale,for its part,made what turned out to be a disastrous
diversification attempt when it invested Lim in a rescue package for
the troubled Castlemahon Poultry Products Ltd in late 1980. In 1983
Golden Vale had to write off its total financial investment in
Castlemahon,which by that time had amounted to almost £l.3m.
By 1983 Golden Vale was firmly in the grip of a vicious downward spiral
which threatened the future of the company. The loss of milk supply in
the milk wars of the early 80's had generated severe financial pressure.
This pressure became more acute through the costly engineering and
Castlemahon difficulties. The operating losses,and the drain on reserves
experienced as a result of these problems,only served to further erode
supplier confidence. This made it easier for rival processors to
attract even more milk away from the company,which added still further
to the financial pressure,which then led to further erosion of supplier
confidence,and so the spiral continued. Then in l983,with Golden Vale's
position weakening,Kerry's Denis Brosnan made a take-over approach
to the company. Curtin and his chairman reacted angrily to the bid as
they came to see the milk war as having been a softening up process for
the take-over move. Relationships between the two chief executives and
their respective societies plummeted to new depths and the milk war
continued.
The introduction of EEC measures to curb milk production in 1985 led to
a new level of intensification in the milk war. With each producer
limited to a production quota the only way for a processor to increase
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its milk supply under the new EEC super levy scheme was to increase its
number of suppliers. This added further encouragement to aggressive
processors to poach suppliers from competitors. By mid 1985 the milk war
with Kerry had reached new and alarming proportions for Golden Vale.
The rate of milk loss by Golden Vale in 1985 had become a "haemorrhage".
By the end of 1985 the company had lost close to 6m gallons,mostly to
Kerry,and with an estimated impact on trading profits of £O.6m.
Tony Curtin led his company through a tough modernisation and
rationalisation programme designed to strengthen the Golden Valets cost
competitiveness. It was aimed at bolstering the company's ability to
preserve its milk supply from further erosion by ena'bXing it to
improve its operating margins in order to be competitive on milk price.
This modernisation and rationalisation programme included the automation
of the milk powder and the butter operations and a major modernisation
of the milk intake process.It involved 232 redundancies and cost £l.35m
in rationalisation expenditure. However,this effort came too late to
save Curtin's leadership. The effects of the rationalisation were not
going to make any real impact on the bottom line until the following
year,1986. In late 1985 the Society was heading for a trading loss of
£0.5ni. This was the third trading loss over the 1982-85 period and the
second trading loss in successive years. The cumulative drain on
reserves from these trading losses and the extraordinary expenses
associated with rationalisation,the engineering liquidation and the
Castlemahon write-off had driven the shareholders funds to borrowings
ratio down to 0.67. This caused the banks to be once more visibly
concerned about the future viability of the company. Worst of all,the
company was still haemorrhaging in milk supply loss so that the downward
spiral had still not been arrested and reversed. In spite of the tough
measures that he had taken to improve the group's performance Tony
Curtin had run out of time. Finding that he no longer enjoyed the full
confidence of his board and chairman, Curtin resigned in December 1985.
Tony Curtin's experience at Golden Vale illustrates the vicissitudes of
the leadership position. He was the first chief executive of Golden
Vale,and one of the first in the industry,to hav reached the top
position without a background in dairy science. He was an accountant and
was perceived as "analytical" rather than "intuitive". He was publicly
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acknowledged to have played a major role in Golden Vale's rapid recovery
in the mid-70's,when the critical problems were cost and capital
structure,and financial control. He was an energetic and able leader who
was prepared to implement the tough rationalisation decisions necessary
to realise the full economic benefits of the merger,decisions that were
largely avoided during the Lenihan era when the environmental pressures
on the dairy processors were relatively benign. He left the company in a
more healthy operational state than he had inherited,and his successor
became the main beneficiary of his efforts in this respect.
However,the dramatic change in the situation that Golden Vale faced in
the in the 1980-85 period demanded strength in areas where Curtin's own
abilities were more limited. Though his problems were compounded by
difficulties inherited from his predecessor,it was his own inability to
deal with the politics of farming and to maintain supplier confidence,
and his inability to deal with the related politics of competition for
milk supply with the aggressive neighbouring Kerry Cooperative that
ultimately undermined the company's performance and cost him his
position. The was because,more than at any time since the amalgamation
effort,the ability of the leader to establish and maintain a personal
rapport and credibility with the suppliers and their representatives and
to show personal political strength with them and with rival chief
executives and their societies had become strategically critical. This
personal-political style of operating seems to have been totally
foreign to the nature of the rational-analytical Curtin. As one
executive explained:
"Tony Curtin was a very capable man,very hard working,but he did not
understand the politics of farming. He was politically too straight,if
anything. Tony was faced with most of the internal rationalisation
problems. His biggest weakness was that he was not able to convince
farmers that we were paying a good price for milk. . The politics of
farming - you are as good a manager as your last month's price for a
gallon of milk. This is a very basic thing. This puts you under a lot
of pressure. You must appear to be paying a good price..."
The personal strengths that had served him well,and hack led to his rapid
rise in Golden Vale in the seventies,were no longer the key strategic
leadership abilities that were demended in the dramatically new
Kerry
Avorimore
Waterford
I4itchelstown
Ballyclough
Golden Vale
29 1M
25 7M
22 8M
21 3M
16 3M
13 5M
1
2
3
4
5
6
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situation of the 1980-85 period. The manner of his succession,and the
subsequent difficulty in mending the fences with key subordinates in his
small senior management team,deprived him of the oportunity to more
fully,and more effectively,complement his own limitations with the
variety of personal strengths in his management team.
The 1980-85 period was a significant one for the whole industry and its
structural evolution. The new challenges of the 80's had the effect
of 'sorting out' the industry as the different processors sought to cope
with these challenges,each in its own way. All of the big six cut back
on capital expenditure in the early 80's. All of them felt the
intensifying pressure on margins from the combination of static growth
in national milk supply,rainpant cost inflation and lagging price
increases. Under these pressures most of the processors implemented
rationalisation programmes to improve their cash flow and strengthen
their balance sheets. While there were similarities in response,there
were also important differences. This 'prism effect' of the difficult
80's led to significant changes in the relative fortunes and positions
of the big six. Some met the oportunities and challenges better than
others as the table below illustrates:
1987
	
1977	 Capital
Turnover	 Rank
£
(Growth) Turnover
£
(494)	 49M
(278)	 68M
(240)	 67M
(120)	 97M
(140)	 68M
( 88)	 7 2M
Exp endj ture
Rank (1977-84)
£
6	 51M
4	 51M
5	 49M
1	 36M
3	 36M
2	 23M
Table 10.1 - The six biggest dairy processors in 1977 and 1987.
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The missed oportunities of the latter end of the Lenihan era and the
persistent difficulties which dogged the Curtin era seriously undermined
Golden Vale's position in the industry. It seems unlikely now,in the
late 80's,that Golden Vale will ever recover it former pre-eminence in
this industry,and certainly not for the foreseeable future.
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PART FOUR
THE SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
STRATEGY FORMATION PROCESSES IN COMPLEX ORGANISATIONS
In this,the final,part of the dissertation the categories and
relationships that have emerged in the study are synthesised and the
conclusions and implications of this work for further research and
practice are discussed. In this chapter the findings emerging from the
empirical analysis are related to two central themes which formed the
basis for the conceptual framework that was developed in chapter two.
These central themes allow the basic character of the strategy formation
process to be further explored and the study's contribution to the
further understanding of strategy formation to be highlighted and
examined. In chapter twelve the empirical and theoretical inquiry is
extended to the broader question of the whole life histories of
organisations. From this analysis an existential model of organisational
development is then developed which is based on the concept of
ORGANISATIONAL CAREER. The career analogy is advanced here as being both
empirically valid and theoretically consistent with the overall
conceptual framework for strategy formation and organisational
development that was developed in this study. The last chapter,chapter
thirteen,is a final synthesis and summary of the research. In this final
chapter the main concepts and insights that have emerged in parts three
and four are synthesised into a RELATIONAL MODEL OF STRATEGY FORMATION
which incorporates the concept of organisational career. The main
contributions of the research are then briefly summarised and their
utility evaluated. Chapter thirteen then ends with an assessment of the
more important implications arising out of the findings of the study for
future research and practice,which brings the dissertation to a close.
In part three of this study the effects of situational context and
autonomous organisational action were examined separately. This
approach to the search for analytical insight deliberately avoided for
the time being the determinist-voluntarist debate,that as we saw in
chapter two,tended to polarised much of the research in organisational
analysis into two perspectives that are largely considered to be
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mutually exclusive. This research strategy of searching for insight
through the serial application of different perspectives to the same
data base owed its inspiration,as we saw earlier in the study,to
Allison's(1971) classic study of the process of decision during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Having identified and examined the effects of the
major elements in the process of strategy formation individually in the
last two chapters we turn,in this chapter,to the two central themes that
formed the basis of the conceptual framework for this study in order to
further explore the character of the strategy formation process and
to highlight the study's contribution. The first theme is the locus of
influence over strategy formation. This theme brings the determinist-
voluntarist debate,and 'with it the interaction of situational context
and autonomous organisational action,back to centre stage. The second
theme extends the search for insight into this interaction through the
examination of change and continuity in organisational strategy over
time.
THEME 1. The Locus of Influence over Strategy Formation
An examination of the locus of influence over strategy formation
involves an understanding of how organisatfonal strategy is shaped by
situational context and autonomous organisational action,and by the
interaction of these two major elements over time. The data in this
study contribute to a better understanding of this issue by providing
a fuller elaboration of the important factors that comprise the
situational context than heretofore,by allowing the locus of influence
to be tracked longitudinally so that the predominance of any element
or elements might be tracked, and by providing a fuller perspective on
the role of key organisation actors than is generally to be found in the
already extensive literature on leadership.
(i) Situational Context
The conceptual framework for this study,in its most basic form,can be
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stmmarised as shown in figure 11.1. Situational context arid autonomous
organisational action are seen to be the major determinants of strategy
formation in this basic model.
SITuATIONAL CONTEXT
STRATEGY
FORMATION
AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONAL ACTION
Figure 11.1 - The basic relational model.
The first major contribution of the present study is in its
identification and empirical examination of the five factors in the
situational contexts of Irish complex organisations that were found to
to be the most salient for the organisations under study. These
organisations were representative of the four major types in Ireland's
small,open and mixed economy, a state agency,a state-owned entreprise,a
producer cooperative and a public limited company. The five factors
were TECHNOLOGY,INDUSTRY STRUCTURE,the INTERI'TATIONAL TRADING
ENVIRONMENT,NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND LEADERSHIP,and national SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION. These factors provide a first eleboration
on the basic model as represented in figure 11.2. The effects of these
factors on the formation of strategy in the organisations under study
have already been extensively examined in an earlier chapter(chp 9).
SITUATIONAL CONTEXT
Technology.
Industry Structure.
International Trading Env.
National Public Policy and
Leadership.
Social and Cultural Transformation.
STRATEGY
FORMATION
AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONAL ACTION
Figure 11.2 - The situational context element elaborated.
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The first two of these factors,technology and industry structure,are
the major elements of an organisation's task environment. The
organisations in this study were deliberately chosen to provide
variation across task environment. Technology and industry structure are
well recognised in the literature to be important determinants of
organisational action. Technology was one of the first major variables
to interest researchers on organisational action. By the late 60's, when
organisation theory was just beginning to "mature",Thompson(1967;l5),in
his landmark synthesis of the time,was already clear that "technology
(was) an an important variable in understanding the actions of complex
organisations". Thompson's position has long since been widely accepted.
However,much of the early work on the relationship between technology
and organisational action tended to treat technology as a constant
within organisations,and it concentrated on examining how variations in
technology across organisation types were related to variations in their
organisational structure(Woodward,l965,1970: Pugh et al,1969:
Perrow,l970). Longitudinal research that explores how technological
change is linked to strategic change within organisations,and to the
evolution of organisational enviroriments,is still rare(Tushman &
Anderson,l987;90). This present study has presented strong support for
the view that technology is an important contextual factor in the
shaping of strategy within organisations. The role of technological
development as a motor for strategic change will be examined later in
this chapter.
Industry structure,as a key variable in the formation of strategy,has
only come to the fore in the strategy literature since the late 70's.
The contribution of Michael Porter has been largely influential in
securing the now wide recognition of the importance of this variable.
For Porter(l980;3),industry structure is "the key aspect of the
firm's environment" in the shaping of strategy because it "has a strong
influence in determining the competitive rules of the game as well as
the strategies potentially available to the firm". Porter's approach was
primarily voluntarist. He was more interested in the controllable,than
in the non-controllable,contextual forces that shape strategy. He
recognised that there were contextual forces outside of the industry
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that influenced the formation of strategy but he saw them as
"significant primarily In a relative sense; since outside forces usually
affect all firms in the industry",and as such they were not a central
concern in his framework.
This present study did affirm empirically the importance of industry
structure as a major contextual force in the formation of strategy,
though it also assigned importance in its own right to technolgy,a
factor which is subsumed into Porter's concept of industry structure.
Moreover,it found that there were three further important contextual
factors involved in the formation of strategy. These factors were
the structural evolution of the international trading environment,
public policy and leadership, and social and cultural transformation.
As such it provides some extension to Porter's work by suggesting that
there are,in all,at least five major contextual influences that shape
strategy formation in organisations.
It is interesting to speculate on why the results of this research have
revealed the importance,not only of technology and industry structure,
but also of three additional influences on strategy formation that were
given little or no weight,in their own right,in Porter's work.
It may be that such factors are more important influences on strategy
formation in the case of organisations located in a small open economy
like Ireland than might be the case for organisations located in the
large domestic economy of an international trading power like the United
States. In the US context an organisation might typically be a large
player in its global industry while being a comparatively small element
in US industry overall. Furthermore,a large proportion of the aggregate
demand and the aggregate capacity of its global industry may be located
in the domestic economy. In this type of situational context Porter's
assertion of the primacy of industry structure over all other factors
in the formation of strategy may hold up quite well. In contrast,
in a situational context where the domestic organisations are large
elements of the national economy yet small players in their global
industries it seems plausible that the national context would have
a comparatively high degree of immediacy for these organisations and
that the small open nature of the national economy would expose the
whole economy,and all of the organisations within it,comparatively more
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to developments in the international trading environment. Are there
perhaps more than five factors and does the relative influence of the
factors, however many there might be,vary systematically across national
contexts. Further research using a comparative cross national approach
would be needed to provide a fuller examination of these interesting
possibilities,which appear to be strongly indicated in this current
study.
The data on the relationship between situational context and strategy
formation have then,in the first instance,allowed for the
identification of the five contextual factors which have shaped strategy
in Irish organisations and for the empirical examination of the effects
of each of these factors individually in the cases of four organisations
that represent the main organisational types in the Irish national
context. It is possible from the data to go beyond this to develop,at
least,a partial set of directional relationships that relate three of
these influences,the structural evolution of the interanational trading
environment,national public policy and leadership and the structural
evolution of the industry nationally. The directional relationship
between these factors and strategy formation in the firm are illustrated
in Figure 11.3 below.
The main features of the model illustrated in the figure are that
national public policy and leadership in a small open economy like
Ireland's must largely take the international trading environment as a
given; though membership of the EEC has given Irish policy makers
somewhat more influence at this level at the expense of substantially
less influence at national level. The structural evolution of an
industry internationally also influences both national public policy and
the the structural evolution of the industry nationally in a mainly
unidirectional sense. The influence of national public policy on the
evolution of industries nationally is influenced by developments in the
international trading arena and by developments in the industry
internationally. The structural evolution of the industry nationally
both influences and is influenced by national public policy and
leadership.
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STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRAD ING ENVIRONMENT
STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION	 NATIONAL PUBLIC
OF THE INDUSTRY	 POLICY AND
INTERNATIONALLY	 I LEADERSHIP
STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION
OF THE INDUSTRY
NATIONALLY
STRATEGY FORMATION
AT THE LEVEL OF
THE FIRM
Figure 11.3 - Directional relationships in the situational context
(unidirectional arrows are used one direction in the
interrelationship clearly predominates)
The Irish dairy industry in the early 60's will serve to briefly
illustrate the empirical evidence for the directional relationships in
this partial model of the influence of situational context on strategy
formation in the firm.
In the aftermath of the 1939-45 war the international trading
environment became characterised by the abandonment of the isolationism
which had stifled and fragmented world trade in the 1930's. Two
developments in particular had major significance for the Irish context.
The first was the development of the European Economic Community and the
general liberalising effect that Eurpean recovery and cooperation had on
the expansion of international trade. The second was the widespread
acceptance of Keynesianism in the international trading arena and in
particular the French success with indicative planning in public policy.
The general liberalisation and expansion in international trade gave
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impetus to major structural evolution in the dairy industry
internationally as the national industries of the major dairy blocks
looked to export-led growth and to their structural competitiveness in
international terms. Substantial movement towards consolidation and
concentration of capital characterised the development of the dairy
industry internationally at this time.
National public policy in Ireland in the late 50's was clearly
influenced by developments on the broader canvass of the international
trading environment.In 1958 the protectionist public policy of economic
self-sufficiency,which had been in operation since 1932,was officially
abandoned. In its place Lemass and Whitaker turned to a more liberal
and open economic policy focused on export-led economic expansion. This
was to be managed through an approach to public economic planning that
was firmly rooted in Keynesianism and modelled on the French approach to
economic management. Lemass and his Government were clearly heavily
influenced by the pace of European recovery and they committed
themselves to seeking early membership of the European Economic
Connnunity. With this in mind they commissioned a major review of the
Irish dairy industry to examine its state of readiness for EEC
membership. The primary thrust in the analysis of the Survey Team,
appointed by the Government to carry out this review,was the comparison
of the Irish dairy industry with those of its major international
competitors. The Survey Team identified the need for greater
consolidation and concentration of capital in the Irish dairy industry
to bring it into line with developments in the industry internationally
and to secure its international competitiveness. The Lemass
Government,backecl up by the Survey Team's detailed analysis of
developments in the dairy industry internationally,which had confirmed
the Government's own broad perceptions when it commissioned the
report,brought enormous pressure to bear on the Irish dairy industry to
restructure itself from within.
Within the industry itself there were many,particularly in the corporate
body of the cooperative movement,who had arrived at the same position as
the public policy makers from their direct contact with developments in
their industry internationally. The combined influences of the public
policy makers,the leadership of the cooperative movement and other
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opinion leaders within the industry,together with the commissioned
reports of various experts all contributed significantly to the impetus
for structural rationalisation. The rationalisation debate which
gathered force within the industry in the late 60's eventually
influenced certain of the more far-sighted leaders at the level of the
firm to begin the difficult process of operationally bringing about a
new level of concentration and consolidation in the industry through the
process of amalgamation.
The identification of the five contextual factors that were found to
shape strategy formation and the detailed emirtca1, eanth.att c
effects of these factors on organisational action,in the four cases
under study,takes the analysis of the organisation-environment
relationship beyond the largely acontextual approach which has
traditionally dominated much of the literature in the field of
organisational analysis.It also takes it beyond the residual approach
which,prior to Porter(1979,l980),tended to characterise a lot of the
literature on strategy.
The dominant conceptual framework within which most of the empirical
research into organisation-environment interaction has taken place in
organisational analysis is the situational-contingency paradigm. This
paradigm has enjoyed prominence because it is conceptually located
within the functional-positivist tradition which,in turn,has dominated
empirical inquiry in the social sciences since the early 60's(Burell
&Morgan,1979:l64). Empirical studies within this tradition have been
mainly cross-sectional,single point in time,studies. Such research has
typically sought to establish a series of linear relationships between
variables characterising aspects of organisational action,typically
structural aspects,and variables characterising aspects of the
organisation's environment. The independent variable characterising
aspects of the environment typically eschewed specific detail on the
situational context. In such studies "the environmental dimension most
often considered is uncertainty,sometimes measured merely as change,
sometimes including a component of cornplexity"(Pfeffer,1982:155).
Environment is defined,and operationalised,along these dimensions in a
way that is designed to emphasise the ways in which environment varies
across different organisation types,rather than to explore the dynamics
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of environment-organisation interaction within organisations over time.
Only the relatively enduring organisation-specific characteristics of
the environment are of interest,and causality in the relationship
between environment and organisational action is assumed to be
unidirectional. While fully acknowledging the major contribution of
contingency research,Crozier and Friedberg(1980:77) in their recent
review of the field of organisational analysis have underlined the
limitations of this homogeneous and unified conceptualisation of
environment along the acontextual dimensions of uncertainty and
complexity. In particular,it offers little or no insight into which
specific segments of the environment influence organisation action and
how the influence of these segments ebbs and flows over time. Nor does
it reveal much about the actual processes by which such influence
occurs. This present research has attempted to go some way towards
addressing these issues.
If the dominant paradigm in organisational analysis has traditionally
been over reductionist and acontextual in its treatment of the
environment,the opposite is true of much of the strategy literature.
In the classical conceptualisation developed by Andrews(1971),on which
much of the strategy literature is based,the environment is treated as
residual to the organisation. In this paradigm the environment is seen
as a complex web of multitudinous factors that might be relevant to the
formation of strategy in any given situation and at any given time. As
such the environment basically defies attempts at systematisation.
Strategy is the mediating process which involves the idiosyncratic
matching of organisation with environment by organisational
decision-makers and this matching is constantly under review. One of
Porter's major contributions to the strategy field was to move it
away from this residual conceptualisation of environment. For
Porter(1980;3) the "essence" of the strategy formation process is still
to be found in "relating a company to its environment" but he attempted
to define the elements of the environment that had the most immediate
relevance to the formation of strategy. He assigned primacy of influence
to industry structure,a theoretically and practically more useful
concept than the more amorphous and residual conceptualisation of
environment that has traditionally dominated. This research has come to
question,in its findings,the universality of Porter's assignation of
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primacy to industry structure and has identified five contextual factors
that were found to shape strategy in the context of a small open
economy. It has done so,however,in the same spirit,and with the same
goal,that led Porter away from the conceptualisation of environment as
residual. Like Porter,it has sought to assign primacy to specific
factors and to focus on immediacy in its attempt to elaborate on
situational context and its relationship with strategy formation in
organisations.
(ii) Locus of Influence - Organisation or Environment
As noted in chapter two of this dissertation,any study of a process such
as strategy formation comes up against two fundamental and competing
perspectives on organisation-environment interaction. At one extreme
organisational action is seen as rational,purposive and goal-directed.
At the other,organisational action is conceived to be externally
constrained and essentially environmentally determined. This voluntarism
-v- determinism debate still remains a central debate across,and within,
the major fields of study that take the organisation as a whole as the
unit of analysis(Burell&Morgan,1979; Pfeffer,1982; Astley&Van De
Ven,1983). At the heart of this debate,which was fully reviewed in the
earlier chapter,is the the question of where the primary locus of
influence over organisational action is to be found; is it within the
organisation or is it in the environment?
The empirical evidence from this research provides some insight into
this question of where is the primary locus of organisational action.
The data in the four cases strOngly suggest that the locus of influence
over organisational action varies across different organisations at
any point in time and that it also varies within the same organisation
over time.
In order to help support these assertions empirically the case evidence
has been summarised in tableau form in tables 11.1-4 (pp5ll-5l4). The
summaries in these tableaux are presented to the reader for illustration
only. They provide very useful and convenient summaries of the case data
which will facilitate discussion and conceptual argument but are not in
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any way meant to be taken as totally comprehensive and complete
attempts to classify and sunimarise the entire case data. Each tableau
presents a sequence of major episodes in the life of the organisation.
For each episode the major elements in the situational context with most
influence on organisational action are identified. For each episode
also,the key organisational actors are identified together with the
major developments that were then current in their organisational
contexts. In the case of each episode the researcher has identified the
primary locus of influence. In some episodes the locus was primarily
external to the organisation(EXT); in other episodes it was primarily
internal(INT). There are also,however,episodes where it was more
difficult to assign primacy but where the balance of influence can be
seen as either external(EXT/INT) or internal(INT/EXT).
In all four cases the locus of influence varied over the history of the
organisation. Taking the case of CSET as an example,the locus of
influence at formation itself in 1934 was external to the organisation.
Then from 1934 to 1939 the locus of influence was primarily internal as
the company went through its initial development phase.During the period
of the Second World War the primary locus of influence shifted to the
situational context as the organisation struggled to adapt and cope with
wartime conditions. During the 1945-60 period the locus of influence was
clearly in the hands of the General as he set about the task of
revitalising and securing the industry after its post-war state of
exhaustion and disarray. In the 1960-72 period the locus of influence
balanced between the organisation and its situational context with the
balance of influence still internal to the organisation. In this period
CSET had responded to external economic expansion drive by deciding to
diversify into food processing. The food project brought CSET into a new
and more competitive industry environment,and the importance of the food
project to the country's overall export drive brought increasing
pressure onto the company from the external environment. The balance of
influence was still somewhat internal to the organisation but the
situational context was imposing more specific pressures and demands
on organisational action than had been the case over the 1945-60 period.
From 1972 until 1987 tFe balance of influence tilted towards the
external factors. The CSET grand strategy,over this period,of
rationalisation and modernisation was heavily influenced by the new
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competitive pressures that came with EEC entry, by the rampant cost
inflation that was fuelled by the two oil crises, and by the crisis
which developed in the public finances. It was also an outcome of the
organisation's deliberate policy of starving the sugar business of
re-investment during the 60's,when all the sugar-generated profits were
used to fund the food project. Since the end of 1987 the balance of
influence has tilted once more back to the company strategists as the
company is,for the second time in its history,actively searching for a
major oportunity to grow through diversification.
Similar movement of the locus of influence over organisational action
is evident in the other three cases. Moreover,a comparative inspection
of the tableaux clearly supports the assertion that the locus of
influence can also vary across different organisations at any given
point in time.
As pointed out above the empirical data show that the locus of influence
over organisational action varies over time and across organisations
between the situational context and the organisation. The data also show
that this variation in locus of influence is associated with both the
evolution of the situational context and with the biographies of
particular organisational actors.
To begin with it seems clear from the data that some situational
contexts are more bounding and more structuring in relation to
organisational action than others. The most dramatic illustration of
this was the change in context that was associated with the post-1979
period for all of the organisations in this study. The expansionary 60's
and 70's provided a situational context for all the organisations that,
in general,provided a lot of scope for discretionary action on the
part of the organisational strategists. The post-1979 environment,in
contrast,was generally more constraining,providing less scope for
development and more imperatives for survival. This was very evident in
the contrast,highlighted in chapter lO,between the situational contexts
that faced Ryan,Burrows and gurtin,who all succeeded to the leadership
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of their organisations in the late 70's,and those of their predecessors;
Walsh,McCourt and Leriihan. There was a noted tendency in this more
constraining and challenging context for organisational action to be
more reactive and defensive than was the case prior to 1979,as the
environment seemed to 'close in' more on the organisations under study.
However,the case of the dairy industry over the 1978-86 period also
demonstrated that some organisational actors are more able to transcend
the bounding and structuring influences of the situational context than
others. All of the big six milk processors faced the same overall
transition in environmental conditions in the post-1979 period. The
industry had been enjoying a further wave of expansion since EEC entry
in 1972. All six processors had embarked on major capital development
programmes during the 1970's and all grew substantially with the
industry. The challenging early 1980's,which brought a fall in national
milk production,EEC production surpluses and controls,high cost
inflation and a sharp fall in farm incomes and on-the-farm investment
which threatened supplies,presented all the processors with their most
challenging and threatening environment in over 20 years. As a result of
this dramatic change in the environment of the industry all six cut back
on capital expenditure in the early 80's. All of them felt the pressure
on their operating margins from the static growth in milk processing
coupled with rising costs. Most of them responded by implementing major
rationalisation programmes to protect their profit margins and to
strengthen their balance sheets. To this extent the more structuring and
more imperative environment of the early 1980's elicited similar
responses from all six,illustrating the power of a structuring
environment to influence organisational action.
What is equally of interest,however,are the ways in which the processors
also differed in their responses to the challenges of the 1980-86
period. As noted in the case narrative, the challenging 1980's
had the 'prism effect' of sorting out the industry as the different
processors also tried to cope with the environmental pressures in their
different ways,each in accordance with its own leadership and
circumstances. This 'prism effect' is illustrated in figure 11.4.
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494
Benign and
	
Threatening and
favourable	 to	 challenging
situational	 situational
context	 context
Similar strategies
and growth rates
Different strategies and
rates of development -
reflecting differences in
ability to cope with/
adapt to/exploit the
change in context.
Figure 11.4 - The 'prism effect'
The most spectacular performer was the Kerry Cooperative. Under
the entrepreneurial leadership of Denis Brosnan,Kerry increased its
turnover over the 1979-86 period by 54l%,from £49m in 1979 to £265m
in 1986,a performance which took them from number 6 to number 1 in the
industry,in ternis of turnover,over the same period. Kerry approached the
challenges of the 1980's by changing the competitive norms in the
industry in relation to supply and by widening their business definition
beyond the constraints presented by the dairy industry. It maintained an
aggressive growth-oriented strategy in the face of the challenges facing
the industry and even exploited the difficulties that some of its
competitors had in meeting these challenges.
Kerry secured its cash flow in its dairy processing activity by
canvassing milk supply away from other processors in order to maintain a
high level of capacity utilisation. In an industry with a high level of
fixed costs and limited supply Kerry recognised the strategic importance
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of milk supply gains and losses at the margin. In canvassing the supply
of other processors Kerry departed from the long standing norm in the
industry of confining competition to products and of not competing for
supply. In making this break,Kerry recognised that the sharp fall in
farm incomes had weakened the traditional supplier-processor loyalties
and that the suppliers would be more amenable than ever to incentives
to transfer. Kerry also embarked on a major diversification programme
in 1981 which took them mainly into liquid milk and meat processing
activities. Kerry broke further new ground by seeking and securing a
stock exchange quotation and by direct investment in casein processing
in Wisconsin. In 1985 the Kerry board approved a strategic plan for the
1986-90 period which "set new goals and ambitious targets.. (to) turn
Kerry into an international food organisation researching and processing
Ireland's natural resources at home and exporting and marketing them to
the centres of population throughout the world"(Annual Report,1985).
In contrast to Kerry,Golden Vale lost its preeminence in the dairy
industry over this same 1979-86 period,when it fell from number 2 to
number 6 in the industry in terms of turnover. The Kerry strategy only
added to the problems that the new environment of the early 1980's
presented to Golden Vale. The failure of the Golden Vale executive to
maintain the confidence of its suppliers and to hold on to its milk
supply,coupled with a disastrous attempt at diversification,meant that
the company was on the defensive throughout most of the period. The
company entered a vicious downward spiral that reached crisis point in
late 1985,and led to the resignation of its chief executive. The
strategy of Golden Vale throughout the 1979-85 period was largely one of
forced rationalisation and retrenchment. In between the Kerry and Golden
Vale extremes was the case of Mitchelstown. Mitcheistown met the
challenge of the early 80's by pursuing a strategy of rationalisation
and conservation of resources,strengthening its balance sheet in
readiness to expand when the environment became more favourable.It
slipped from number 1 to number 4 in the industry in terms of turnover
but emerged from the 1979-86 period well poised for future development.
Their chief executive had preferred a slower,more careful and
controlled path to future growth and he publiciy acknowledged that his
organisation's ambitions were "modest compared with Kerry" (quoted in
Business and Finance,7-May-87;17).
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The history of the Irish dairy industry over the 1979-86 period,in fact,
provides strong empirical support for the position taken by Crozier and
Friedberg(1980;76),in their conceptual treatise,that the environment is
not homogeneous and unilaterally deterministic in its influence on
organisational action but "that the organisation can 'play' with the
'requirements' and constraints imposed by the environment,and even
manipulate them in its turn". The data show that the degree of
imperative imposed by such requirements and constraints varies over time
and that organisations differ in their abilities to play with these
requirements and constraints and in their abilities to exploit their
situational contexts.
(iii) Organisational Leadership
As well as offering insight into the contextual influences that shape
strategy and into the nature and variability of the locus of influence
over strategy formation,the empirical data in this study also provide
the oportunity to extend our understanding of the phenomenon of
leadership in organisations. In particular,it provides further insight
into leadership as a factor in strategy formation and is specifically
concerned with this phenomenon at the strategic level of the leadership
of the total organisation.
There are few areas in organisational analysis that have received more
research attention than the area of leadership studies. In
preparing for his revision and extension of Stogdill's Handbook of
Leadership,in which the whole field of leadership studies is bravely
surveyed and systematically thematised,Bass(1981;xiv) reviewed over 5000
references on leadership. Much of this material was uncovered from a
comprehensive search for leadership studies in the following journals
over the 1960-79 period; the Journal of Applied Psychology,the
Administrative Science Quarterly, the Academy of Management Journal,
Personal Psychology,and Organisational Behaviour and Human Performance.
Considering the enormous volume of research that has been carried out on
the subject of leadership it is surprising how littl,e empirical and
theoretical attention has been given to the phenomenon of leadership and
its role in strategy formation. In this 551 page comprehensive review of
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the leadership literature,only 15% of book is devoted to the situational
aspects of leadership and less than 3% to the specific relationship
between leadership,organisation and environment. Even within this paltry
3% there has been an almost total predominance of research conducted
within the structural-contingency paradigm. This research has typically
tended to reduce the description of the environments of organisations
to such single,homogeneous,acontextual descriptors as stable or
turbulent,simple or complex and,through cross-sectional studies,has
tried to relate these variables to single,homogeneous and acontextual
descriptors of leadership behaviour. Studies on role of leadership as
a major factor in determining the nature of the relationship between
situational context and organisational action are still extremely rare.
The empirical evidence from this present study helps further our
understanding of leadership in at least two ways. Firstly,it
highlights the importance of studying leadership in its situational
and organisational context if the way in which leadership influences
the formation of strategy is to be fully understood. And secondly,it
strongly suggests that the role of leadership in organisational action
is both symbolic and substantive.
The evidence from the case data strongly indicate a bidirectional
relationship between leadership and context. Leadership shapes context
but context also shapes leadership. In this longitudinal study of four
organisational life histories it was evident,time and again,that
different situations presented different challenges and offered
different oportunities to different leaders. The classification of the
leaders studied in this research as BUILDERS,REVITALISERS,TURNAROTJNDERS
and INHERITORS was a reflectionnot only of individual attributes,but
also of organisational history and situational context. For example,Tom
Walsh of AFT was the builder of that organisation. When he was appointed
as the new institute's first director there was clearly a building task
to be accomplished. Furthermore,there was a supportive situational
context at the time for the initial expansion and growth of this
agricultural research institute,because investment in agricultural
research was seen as productive investment of the type that was
encouraged in the programmes for economic expansion. However,it was
clear to long serving executives of AFT,interviewed in this study,that
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the pace and extent of the growth and development of AFT was strongly
influenced by Walsh's personal attributes. Tom Walsh was a builder,not
just by dint of the historical task that he was chosen to perform for
AFT but also by personal disposition,ability and performance. In
contrast,the historical task that his successor,Pierce Ryan,was
challenged with was the transformation of the organisation within a
threatening situational context of increasing public scrutiny, critical
cost/benefit evaluation and contracting resources. Ryan will not be
remembered as a builder. This will not be because he was found to lack
some essential personal attributes for suca a toLe.i cL't att'.
could indeed be identified. Rather it will largely be because the
historical task which was presented to him on his inheritance of the AFT
leadership offered him little oportunity to build. In fact,the IDG case
provided an example of the same leader playing two different roles in
the distilling industry over his career to date. Richard Burrows
played a revitalising role in Old Busbmills before taking on the role of
inheritor of the O'Reilly/Mc Court strategic legacy in IDG.
Yet,this is not to say that leadership is totally determined by
historical task,for the data show that this is clearly not so.
For exainple,two chief executives had the oportunity to build Golden
Vale and had very modest success before Dave O'Loughlin took over the
leadership.O'Loughlin matched his personal motivation and talents with
the oportunity presented to him at a formative point in Golden Vale's
history when the whole dairy industry was on prolonged phase of
expansion. With a person of lesser talent at the helm Golden Vale would
never have become one of the six major growth centres around which the
industry consolidated in the early 70's. The point is that leadership
behaviour,and its influence on organisational action,can only be truly
understood when studied in interaction with its context.
Most of the research on leadership to date has tended to emphasise two
aspects of leadership,personal attributes and leadership style(see Bass,
1980 for a comprehensive survey). Much effort went into the attempt to
identify the distinguishing traits of the leader type personality. The
types of traits that were thought to be of most interest and relevance
to the task of isolating the leader type were characteristics like
intelligence,ability,personality, task motivation and performance,and
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social competence. The results of this research indicated that the
traits and abilities required of a leader tend to vary from one
situation to another. This led to a second major stream of research,the
situational-contingency stream,that sought to relate leadership style to
situational variation. Leadership style was typically characterised
along the dimensions of directive-authoritarian and participative-
democratic,where a given leader's preferred style tended to be seen a a
relatively enduring and inflexible aspect of his personality(Fiedler,
1976).
However,it seems clear from this present research that traits and styles
measured along universalistic and acontextual dimensions can provide
only very limited insight into the phenomenon of leadership and its role
in strategy formation. How,for example,can the leadership of Tom Walsh
be fully understood without a knowledge of the formative influences that
contributed to his personality and personal values, his deep
nationalism forged into his personality by family background and by the
great historical events that surrounded his early upbringing; his
passionate belief in the power of science to unleash Irish agriculture
from the bounds of tradition so that the natural wealth of Ireland,
the "mine at the top of the land",might be fully harnessed for
the benefit of the Irish people; and his sense of personal and
organisational calling to give a national lead in this endeavour at a
time when Sean Lemass challenged the entire nation with the historic
task of securing the economic independence of the country. How can the
contrasting leadership of General Costello and Tony O'Reilly of CSET be
fully understood without reference to the wider transition in the
leadership of Irish political,social and economic affairs from the
revolutionary generation of nation builders,with their primary emphasis
on economic patriotism, to the post-revolutionary generation of career
professionals with their emphasis on personal professional growth
and material welfare, in addition to the individual differences in
personal attributes,skills,professional experience and competences that
characterised the two men. Their contrasting concepts of CSET's major
diversification into the food business reflected major differences
in the formative influences and values that moved these two leaders and
reflected also the transition in influences and values of the
situational context in which they both operated.
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It is clear from the data also that the same leader can have different
levels of effectiveness in different situational contexts and at
different times,even within the same organisation. For example,
General Costello revitalised CSET in the 1945-60 period and secured
the future of the Irish sugar industry after its post-war exhaustion.
He did this with remarkable conviction,skill,commitment and vision. He
then led CSET into the food processing business in 1960 with great
confidence and high aspirations. This was his organisation's bold
response to the great national challenge of the time to generate
economic growth through export-led development. He envisaged a national
food Industry on a scale that would be "larger than any industrial
activity (then) carried on in Ireland". Whether this vision was
essentially flawed or not is still a matter for debate. What is
certain is that the General and his executive totally underestimated the
level of marketing investment and effort that would have been needed to
make this vision a reality and the level of the risk that was associated
with a full direct marketing strategy for the targeted UK market. It was
not just this underestimation of the marketing requirements of his
strategy that ultimately led to the General's premature resignation from
CSET. The situational context was changing fast and by the mid-60's was
no longer supportive of General's developmental approach to the
project,to the scale that he envisioned or to the timeframe that he
needed in which to break-even.
The case of Tony Curtin and Golden Vale provides some further insight
into the bidirectional relationship between context and leadership.
Curtin's financial,analytical and management skills were widely
recognised to have played a major part in leading the company so quickly
out its financial crisis in the mid-70's. This important contribution
was ultimately rewarded in 1980,when he was chosen to succeed Mick
Lenihan as general manager. However,within months of his succession the
situational context had changed dramatically and posed new,and more
challenging,requirements for success and survival. Curtin's personal
strengths were not well matched to these new requirements. His inability
to retain the confidence of his suppliers and to protect his milk pooi
from the predatory attacks of the expansionist Kerry organisation
set Golden Vale on vicious downward spiral which brought the company
Into serious financial difficulties and undermined Curtin's leadership.
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Curtin's plight contrasts sharply with that of his predecessor.
Lenihan's leadership survived the financial crisis of the mid-70's
because the situational context allowed the company to 'grow out of its
difficulties' once it strengthened its capital structure and tightened
its financial procedures. The basic O'Loughlin expansionary strategy,
which Lenihan had inherited,proved to be essentially right for Golden
Vale through to the end of the decade. Though Mick Lenihan's best years
in the dairy industry were already over by the time that he succeeded to
the leadership Golden Vale,he managed to lead the company through a
period of growth and profitability over the 1976-79 period. Tony Curtin
was young,energetic and businesslike in his approach to the leadership.
He drove through some tough rationalisation programmes that were the
logical extension of the amalgamation and which Lenihan had avoided
confronting in more munificient times. The challenges posed by the
situational context for Lenihan and Curtin were very different.Lenihan
succeeded in a context in which it was very difficult to fail; Curtin
failed in a context in which it was very difficult to succeed.
The overall perspective on leadership that has emerged in this study is
summarised in figure 11.5 below.
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Figure 11.5 - Perspective on leadership.
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In this perspective the phenomenon of leadership is located,not in the
person of the leader,but in the INTERACTION between the ACTOR,his
ORGANISATION'S HISTORY and its SITUATIONAL CONTEXT. This view of
leadership recognises its position as a central focus for study in what
Mills(197O;l59) has called the classic tradition of Social Science,the
tradition that sees Social Science as essentially concerned "with
problems of biography,of history and of their intersections within
social structures". Studying leadership in context is a tradition that
is firmly established in the fields of politics and history. For
example,Richard Nixon(1982;2),in his own personal reflections on the
subject of leadership in the public arena,pointed out,at the outset,the
futility of trying to couipar leaders,or to xammne leadership,out of
context:
"One of the questions I have most often been asked during my years in
public life has been 'Who is the greatest leader you have known?'.
There is no single answer. Each leader belongs to a particular
combination of time,place and circumstances;leaders and countries are
not interchangeable. Great as Winston Churchill was,it would be
difficult to imagine him playing so successfully the role that
Konrad Adenauer did in postwar Germany.But neither could Adenauer
have rallied Britain in its hour of greatest peril as Churchill did".
Nixon went on to argue that the formula for "placing a leader among
the greats has three elements: a great man, a great country, and a great
issue" and quoted a remark of Churchill's that Lord Rosebury,a
nineteenth century British Prime Minister,had the misfortune of living
at a time of 'great men and small events'.
For leadership to be fully understood,then,it must be situated in the
context of the time and events in which it is exercised. This is
particularly true for the study of leadership as a key element in the
process of strategy formation. Yet such an approach is still very rare
in organisational studies. There are at least two reasons for this.
Firstly,as noted earlier,the field of organisational studies emerged as
in its own right at a time when functional positivism was dominant in
social studies, deductive variance theory was the preferred route for
theory building, and empirical work was concpntrated on theory testing,
with cross-sectional methodologies,using the techniques of statistical
inference,the preferred methods for testing theory. Cross-sectional
503
studies do not facilitate the contextual study of leadership in action.
Secondly, it has traditionally been difficult to gain the type of access
and information needed to conduct longitudinal studies of leadership in
action,in context,in the case of organisational leaders,unlike their
counterparts in the public arena. However,there are strong indications
that organisational leaders themselves believe that leadership can only
be fully appreciated in context. This is very evident in the recent
tendency for recognised industrial leaders to publish their
autobiographies and personal case histories and it represents a new,and
very valuable,addition to the literature on leadership in organisations.
The first notable characteristic of these auto-biographies and personal
case histories is the detailed attention given to the formative
influence of situational context in shaping the values,motives,beliefs
and aims of these leaders.Secondly,they are at pains to present the
process of leadership in full context as the interaction between
leaders,their organisations and the key historical issues and
oportunities which have been presented to them by organisational history
in an ever-evolving situational context(see Edwardes,l983; Iacocca,1984;
and Morita,1987; for examples of the genre from three different
continents and cultures).
The perspective on leadership that has emerged in this study strongly
indicates the need for a radical redirection in emphasis and approach to
the study of the phenomenon than that which has dominated in the past.
Bass(1981),as we noted earlier,reviewed more than 5000 references on
leadership in his attempt to provide a systematic,thematised summary on
the state of the field. In spite of this enormous volume of research
there have been many concerns over the last decade,and more,about the
relatively poor yield from this cumulative effort.In fact Miner(l975,5),
in his own review of the leadership field in 1975 reflected on
this poor yield and in some desparation he went so far as to suggest
that future researchers might be best advised to "abandon it in favour
of some more fruitful way of cutting up the theoretical pie". A few
years later,McCall and Lombardo(1978),in their distillation of the main
conclusions from a specially convened conference in search of future
directions for leadership research,concluded that ,future studies
should be more longitudinal,situational,and holistic,and that more
attention should be given to the study of corporate leaders rather than
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to the study of middle managers and supervisors that had tended to
dominate in previous empirical research. Since the late 70's the
interest in leadership studies has grown rather than abated. More
attention has been given to the phenomenon of corporate leadership yet
the satisfaction level with the overall yield remains low. As late as
1985 Bennis and Nanus(1985,4),could still characterise the state of the
leadership field as they found it with the remark that "never have so
many labored so long to say so little". Yet,many of the more recent
studies on leadership,including their own much acclaimed and eagerly
awaited contribution to the field,remaln overly focused on the person
of the leader and on the search for urui'eisa11stic personal attributes
and behaviours that will provide the key to leadership effectiveness in
all organisational situations and contexts. While research like that of
Bennis and Nanus(l985),Kotter(l982) and others have provided some
fresh insight into the personal characteristics and behaviour patterns
of leaders,the danger is that this latest wave of interest in leadership
is largely bringing to the study of leaders at the corporate level
much the same kind of objectives and approaches that have provided such
a low yield in the past,when applied to the supervisor and middle
manager levels. Leadership research appears to be still overly
pre-occupied with those aspects of leadership that are 'storable' in the
personal attributes and behaviour repertoires of the leader and are
'universal' in all leaders. It also remains firmly grounded in an
over-voluntarist view of organisational action,which underestimates the
importance of history and context in the determination of organisational
outcomes.
The empirical evidence in this study,and the perspective on leadership
that has been developed here,highlight the need for new ways of
theorising on leadership,and new methodologies for studying it, if our
understanding of this important phenomenon is to be enriched and
extended beyond the traditional focus on universal and storable personal
attributes with its implicitly over-voluntarist perspective on
organisational action. Such new approaches will have to be able to
facilitate the systematic study of the relationship between situational
context and organisational leadership,since it is clear tht what
leaders like Tom Walsh of AFT and General Costello of CSET did and how
they went about doing it,as leaders of their organisations,reflected
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fully the formative influences of their situational contexts on their
values,motives,beliefs and ambitions. Their leadership cannot be fully
understood without full recognition of these influences. Such new
approaches must also take account,not only of the formative influence of
context on leadership,but also of the way in which leaders are affected
by their ongoing interaction with their organisation's history and its
situational context. To take but one example and one aspect of this
interaction,the development of the food diversification strategy in CSET
under General Costello,and the way in which he set about implementing
it,reflected the situational context of an earlier time that formed his
value system and the situational context at the time of the Lemass
Programme for Economic Expansion which presented the challenge to the
General and his organisation. In short,new approaches are be needed to
systematically examine such questions as how leaders are formed by,and
form,context; why and how leadership effectiveness can vary with context
and history; and how the contribution of leaders to organisational
development is related to the historic challenges presented by
situational context and organisational history. Such new approaches to
the study of strategic leadership need to be longitudinal,in order to
examine this ongoing interaction of the leader,his organisation and its
situational context. They need to focus more centrally on the process of
leadership,as Pettigrew(1987b;650) has recently advocated,where the
person of the leader should be seen as just one element in the process.
Comparative research on organisational leadership along the lines of the
longitudinal,contextual approach developed by Pettigrew(1985;35) for his
empirical study of strategic change in ICI,but focused on the leadership
of organisations over their whole life histories and not just on
discrete episodes,appears to offer the most promising way forward. This
research has helped to underline the need for new departures in
leadership research and has made an early contribution in this
direction.
The second way in which this present study contributes to our
understanding of the phenomenon of organisational leadership is by
allowing the dual nature of the role of organisational leader,
its symbolic and substantive character,to be empirically examined and
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elaborated. In particular,Pfeffer & Salancik(l978,16-20) have raised the
issue of just how substantive the leadership role is in organisations,
and they have argued that,in reality,it is much more symbolic that
substantive.
The importance of the symbolic character of organisation leadership
has been recognised by Mintzberg(1975) and others for some time.
Since the late 70's interest has grown in the whole area of corporate
culture(Pettigrew,1979). This development has widened,and intensified,
the interest in the symbolic role of organisational leaders(Deal
& Kennedy,1982;chp 8,for example). Pfeffer & Salancik(1978;16-20) were
among the first to examine the duality of leadership in terms of both
its symbolic and substantive character. They argued that organisational
action is largely constrained and determined by context which led them
to assert that organisational leadership is much more symbolic,and much
less substantive,than had previously been recognised.
One of the major themes emerging from this present study,however,is
that organisational leadership is a major substantive determinant of
organisational action,and the empirical evidence to support this claim
was reviewed and analysed at some length in chapter 10. The
organisational leadership roles of builders , revitalisers , turnarounders
and inheritors were all found be highly substantive in their effects on
strategy formation in the organisations under study. The central issue
raised by Pfeffer & Salancik is not,however,the question do
organisational leaders generate organisational action,but rather is
this action so pre-determined by situational context that it is
mainly externally-directed,and that in this way organisational
leadership is therefore more symbolic than substantive.
The empirical evidence in this research,already discussed earlier in the
chapter,strongly indicates that the degree to which situational context
determines organisational action is highly variable across organisations
and within organisations over time.Some contexts were found to be more
constraining than others and some organisational actors were found to be
more able to play with the requirements of the situational context,ançi
to find the scope for discretionary action,than others. In the last
section it was argued that the phenomenon of organisational leadership
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is properly located in the interaction of the actor,his organisation and
its situational context. Organisational history and evolving situational
context do determine to a significant degree the challenges and
oportunities that are presented to a given leader at a given point in
time. But to be given the oportunity to build is not to build,to be
given the oportunity to revitalise is not to revitalise,to be given the
oportunity to turnaround is not to turnaround and to be given the
oportunity to transform is not to transform. Leaders are very variable
in their capacity to perform these historic tasks,or even in their
ability to recognise the true nature and full potential of their
historic challenges and oportunities. The empirical evidence on the
organisation-context interaction emerging from this study is closer to
the conceptual positions of Crozier & Friedberg(1980) and
Pettigrew(l985),than to that of Pfeffer & Salancik(1978). The evidence
suggest that organisational leadership is both substantive and
symbolic,and much more substantive that Pfeffer and Salaricik have seemed
to indicate.
The study does,however,provide evidence of the importance of the
symbolic nature of the leadership role in organisation-context
interaction. In this regard it lends supports to Pfeffer &
Salancik's(1978;18) claim that this important aspect of leadership
deserves much more empirical attention than it has traditionally
received in organisational studies to date.
The symbolic role of leadership is most evident in this study in
case of leadership succession. Generally external succession signalled
change,and internal succession continuity,in organisational strategy.
The most dramatic examples were the cases of the turnarounders,O'Reilly
of CSET and O'Mahony of Golden Vale. O'Reilly and O'Mahony were hired
in to affect the turnaround of a critical situation in their respective
organistions. Their very arrival signalled change. Their ability to
effect substantive change was helped by manner of their appointments,
which clearly signalled to all involved parties that the situation
called for dramatic change and that dramatic change was to be expected.
The arrival of O'Reilly to CSET clearly signalled a new marketing and
commercial orientation for the Food Project. The dramatic manner of his
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appointment only served to underline the expectation that a major change
in strategy was imminent. Costello had,in his person,epitomised the
developmental ideology and had publicly identified himself strongly with
the interests of the producers,the small farmers,and with the viability
of their small local rural economies. O'Reilly was publicly identified
with high profile international marketing activities and with a
tough-minded commercial management philosophy. The sudden imposition of
O'Reilly on the unprepared board,management and staff of CSET clearly
signalled that the "shareholder's" expected timefraine for a dramatic
change in strategy in relation to the Food Project was extremely short.
The succession to O'Reilly was equally significant,if less dramatic.
When O'Reilly left CSET unexpectedly,after less than three years to take
up a senior position with the Heinz UK operation,the "shareholder"
withdrew to arm's length and left the board and management of CSET to
handle the succession themselves. This signalled the beginning of the
decline of the great food industry dream in CSET.
The case of Golden Vale provides some further insight. In late 1985
Golden Vale was in the throes of a vicious downward cycle that
threatened the organisation's survival. Failure to maintain the
confidence of its suppliers meant that the company was losing milk
supply; the loss of milk supply was depressing profits in its high fixed
cost operation; and loss of profits was eroding supplier confidence,
thus regenerating the cycle. Golden Vale had been beset with problems
when the general situation in the dairy industry became difficult in the
early 80's. Many of these problems were not of Tony Curtin's making. He
inherited the loss-making Engineering activity from his predecessors,
though the Castlemahon debacle happened under his own leadership. He
had the mis-fortune to be a very convenient geographical target for
Kerry Coop. ,when it broke the industry norm and decided to actively
compete for milk supply,though he missed out on the oportunity to stop
the milk war almost before it had started in earnest. He took decisive
action on Engineering and Castlemahon,and drove through a tough
rationalisation programme,all designed to improve operating margins and
strengthen the balance sheet. By 1985 he had streamlined the Golden Vale
Vale operation to a degree which held out realistic prospects for a
quick return to healthy profitability. However,in this traditional
'sound man' business belief in the person of the leader is a key element
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in securing supply and the farmer-suppliers no longer believed in
Curtin. His tough rationalisation measures were not enough to stem the
loss of milk supply. By late 1985 it was clear to the Golden Vale
chairman and his board that nothing short of a change of leadership
would restore supplier confidence quickly enough to save the company.
The change in leadership at Golden Vale in late 1985 was to no small
extent,therefore,a symbolic action taken to have the critical
substantive strategic effect of galvanising the suppliers and securing
the milk pool. The Golden Vale Board brought in Jim O'Mahony to 'save'
the company and carefully built up his profile with the suppliers in a
way designed to create the belief that he was the man to turn the
company around. This belief was sufficient to break the vicious cycle
for long enough to allow O'Mahony the time to effect the turn-around.
Ironically,much of the short term improvement in Golden Vale's
performance was anchored in the rationalisation programme that Curtin
had implemented before his departure. O'Mahony,as the new man,could
distance himself from the problems of the past and ask for time to put
them right,whereas Curtin could not. Curtin's pre-Inature departure
clearly signified crisis and the need for dramatic changes. O'Mahony's
arrival signified the hope of salvation,provided that the crisis was
clearly recognised and the need for dramatic change accepted. The
significance of the leadership change,and the manner in which it
happened, provided O'Mahony with an organisational context that
expected an acceleration in the pace of change,and that consequently
facilitated it. The symbolism in the change of leadership generated
initial conditions that were favourable to O'Mahony in confronting the
great challenge that faced him. Jim O'Mahony had then to make his own
substantive contribution to achieving an actual turnaround at Golden
Vale.
Pfeffer & Salancik(l978,16-19),in their description of the duality of
leadership,tended to examine the symbolic and substantive roles of
leadership in their separate aspects. The more interesting theme that
recurs in this study is way in which the symbolic and substantive
elements of leadership interact to generate organisational action of
strategic significance. For instance,in the example just reviewed,the
clear signal given to the farmer-suppliers by the change of leadership
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in Golden Vale,that problems were departing and salvation was arriving,
had the substantive strategic effect of convincing waivering suppliers
to hold on for long enough to allow the new leader to break the vicious
cycle that threatened the company's survival. Stenuning the loss of milk
supply in the short term was a necessary precondition for the
achievement of turnaround. We have seen also that in both cases of
turnaround the signals in the change of leadership facilitated the
implementation of subsequent dramatic changes in strategy. While these
instances of leadership change and turnaround are,perhaps,the most
dramatic illustrations of the interaction between the symbolic and
substantive elements of leadership in the generation of organisational
action,the cases are replete with other examples. The appointment of
Kevin Mc Court as managing director of IDG,a move that was generally not
forseen at the time of the merger,was found to be symbolically and
substantively necessary if the full economic benefits of the merger were
to be realised. His appointment signalled the transition from family
capitalism to managerial capitalism in the strategic management of Irish
distilling. The refusal of Golden Vale Chairman,Martin Flanagan,to bend
to the pressure to fire his chief executive,when the company plunged
into financial crisis in 1975, was a clear signal to his board and
shareholders that the problems of the company lay firmly at their own
doorstep and that the board itself would have to develop a more
businesslike and corporate approach to the Golden Vale if their company
was to have a secure future.
This interaction between the symbolic and the substantive elements
of leadership in the generation of organisational action of strategic
consequence is worthy of more study in its own right. It would seem,
from the empirical evidence presented here,to offer a promising
oportunity for future research into leadership in context. Empirical
research into this type of interaction between systems of signification
and systems of authority in the generation of substantive organisational
action is still rare(Pettigrew,1985).
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THEME 2. Continuity and Change in Strategy Formation
Conceptualising the process of strategy formation in terms of patterns
in organisational action and non-action emphasises its essential
historical character(Mintzberg,l977). The first of the two central
themes enabled us to explore,empirically,the nature of the historical
forces that shape strategy and to examine the shifting balance of these
forces between the organisation and its situational context. The second
central theme,continuity and change in strategy formation,provides a
powerful analytical means for exploring the character and rhythm of
historical movement in strategy formation,which has been used to great
effect,as an organising theme,by historians(Thompson,l966) and
organisation theorists alike(Pettigrew,1985). The empirical evidence in
this study suggests that strategy has a relatively enduring nature at
its highest level but that it is a has a multi-level character. It also
provides some insight into the agents of continuity and change in
strategy formation and into the nature of strategic change itself.
(i) Strategy Formation - a multi-level process
The empirical evidence from this research suggests that strategy,at the
highest level of aggregation in the firm,is a relatively enduring
phenomenon. For example,the O'Reilly/McCourt strategy for Irish
Distillers in the post-merger period has endured for over 20 years,right
up to the recent take-over by Pernod Ricard. Its major elements have
been consolidation of Irish whiskey as a generic product within one
organisation,international cost competitiveness, home market dominance
and export-led growth. CSET's strategy to develop beet production and
beet processing capacity in order to ensure continuity of supply to meet
the entire needs of the home market remained the primary strategic
thrust of the company from 1934 to 1960. Food-led growth,mainly
supported by funds flow from the sugar business,remained the primary
strategic thrust from 1960 to 1972. From 1972-1987 the primary thrust
was to rationalise and modernise the sugar business in order to secure
the future viability of the company's core activity under EEC
competitive conditions. Golden Vale's main strategic thrust over the
1956-79 period was to develop as one of the country's major processing
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centres for the rapidly expanding dairy industry. AFT's major strategic
thrust over the 1958-79 period was to grow through the expansion of
sector-supported production research into the strategic commodities of
mainly meat and milk,and to a lesser extent of tillage crops and
horticultural products.
However,the data also reveal the multi-level nature of strategy.
Within this relatively enduring coarse-grained pattern of organisational
action there are less aggregate,finer-grained patterns of action which
are nevertheless strategic in level,as this concept is generally
understood in the management literature(see Flickson et al,1986;27-8).
Change is more endemic at this less aggregate level. Take the case of
Irish Distillers for example. Though the major strategic thrust
remained unchanged for over twenty years there was a succession of
significant strategic changes at the more fine-grained level,all
consistent with primary elements of the major strategic thrust. The move
to bypass the wholesalers and to sell a distillery bottled products
direct to the retailers; the centralisation of distilling in a large
ultra-modern distilling complex; the acquisition of Bushinills; the
rationalisation of the bottling and distribution operations; the
integration forward into the cash and carry area; and the two-brand
export strategy were all important strategic moves in their own
right,yet all were basically consistent with the broad strategic thrust
developed by O'Reilly and Mc Court for the post-merger company.
The early move to bypass the wholesalers and the later moves to
integrate forward into the cash and carry business and to rationalise
the transportation operations were all moves to secure the company's
dominant competitive position and profitability on the domestic market.
The move to close down the traditional distilleries and to centralise
distilling in one modern complex and the move to rationalise and
modernise the bottling operations were made to improve the international
competitiveness of the company's operations. The move to acquire a
controlling interest in Old Bushmills was made to secure control over
the production of all Irish whiskey in order to concentrate the major
export effort on the promotion of Irish Whiskey as a generic product.
The change to the two-brand export strategy was made to improve the
company's penetration rate in key export markets. All were strategic and
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all were consistent with the enduring broad strategic thrust.
Yet,most of these finer-grained strategic moves were not anticipated at
the time the coarse-grained strategic thrust was laid down. Each of
these moves was evaluated as a major strategic commitment in its own
right,involving strategic choice processses(Mintzberg et al,1976:
Hickson et al,1986) for the organisation. Some,like the moves to
centralise distilling and to rationalise downstream operations were
probably already seen in broad outline by the more far-sighted
promoters of the merger,as a logical extension,if the full economic
benefits of the merger were to realised. Even in this case the
determination of the form,the location and the timing of rationalisation
remained complex strategic issues, with substantial political and
economic rationalities that involved complex choice processes. In the
round,over the 1966-86 period,the rationalisation programme in Irish
Distillers was a strategy formation process that fitted closely with the
logical incrementalism model described in Quinn's(1980) model of
strategy choice processes. The acquisitions of Bushmills and of BWG
(for its cash and carry business) were oportunistic moves. These were
strategic moves where the problems and the solutions independently
pre-existed the choice process,but where time had to pass and situations
had to change before problem and solution could get together; these
strategy formation processes fit most closely with the garbage-can model
model of process developed by Cohen et al(l972). The major revision in
the strategic approach to export marketing from the shotgun to the rifle
approach took years of trial and error to develop and reflected an
essentially complex organisational learning(Argyris,l976; Argyris&Schon,
1978)process of strategy transformation.
A central debate in the strategy literature is whether the process of
strategy formation is largely a synoptic process or an incremental
process(see Camillus,l982; for a review of this debate). Is strategy
formation conceived holistically at chief executive level in
the organisation in a synoptic manner,as much of the normative
literature on strategy has presented it(Ansoff,1965; Andrews,197l);
or is it an incremental process,in which "strategies. .tend to
(evolve) step by step from an iterative process in which the
organisation probes the future,experiments,and learns from a series of
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partial(incremental) commitments rather than through global formulations
of total strategies"(Quinn,l980;58). This research presents a partial
synthesis of this synoptic-incremental debate,for medium-sized
organisations at least(see figure 11,6). The data strongly suggest that
in these organisations strategy formation is a multi-level process which
is primarily synoptic at the highest coarse-grained level of strategy,
but which also involves logically-incremental,garbage-can and adaptive-
learning,incrementalist processes at a finer-grained strategic level.
Level of Strategy 	 Type of Process	 Timeframe
Long term
COARSE GRAINED	 Synoptic	
(15-20 years)
Logical incremental	
Medium term
FINE GRAINED
	
Garbage can	
(3-5 years)
Adaptive learning
Figure 11.6 - Strategy formation as a multi-level process
(ii) Deliberate or Emergent - Is Organisational Context the key?
A question very closely related to the synoptic-v-logical incrementalism
debate is whether strategy formation is largely a deliberate or an
emergent process(Mintzberg,1978; Mintzberg & Waters,1985). The empirical
evidence in this study,taken in isolation,strongly supports the
findings of Hickson et al(1986;236),in their large-scale study of 150
top decisions,from which they concluded that the "great majority of
decisions of this order arise from deliberate managerial stategies,as
moves on a course along which management is steering". This study
also suggests that strategy formation is largely a deliberate process 	 A
which is driven from the top of the organisation,even where the
strategic moves are in response to pressing environmental imperatives.
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Situational context and organisational leadership were found to be the
main influences on strategy formation,with organisational context
playing a lesser role. Organisational history,with its accumulation of
resource capability and constraint,was the most important determinant of
the influence of organisational context on strategy formation in this
study. There was little evidence of organisational context having a
major effect on the shape and outcome of the strategy formation process
through dispersing, fragmentating or otherwise socially,or politically,
complicating the process itself.
This finding contrasts with the empirical studies of Bower(1970),
Quinn(1980),and Burgleman(l983a) on this issue. These researchers have
emphasised the emergent nature of strategy formation in large complex
organisations. Bower,for example,in his now classic study of the
resource allocation process,found that organisational context largely
determined the content of the overall resource allocation pattern. This
pattern emerged from the semi-autonomous strategic behaviour of major
sub-units and top management acted mainly in an evaluating and approving
mode,controlling and integrating the aggregate shape of the resource
allocation pattern. The Burgieman and Quinn models of strategy formation
are based on a similiar view of process. Quinn(l980;16 and 52) suggested
that corporate strategy "tended to emerge from a series of strategic
formulation subsystems" where "top managers deal with the logic of
each subsystem of strategy formulation largely on its own merits
and usually with a different subset of people". Meanwhile,
Burgleman(l983b;66),in a similar vein,saw overall company strategy
forming in an emergent way as the result of the selective effects of
corporate context on the stream of strategic behaviours at operational
levels". The shared perspective of these theorists is a process view of
strategy formation in which top management manage the emergent content
of strategy indirectly through managing the organisational context and
process of its formation.
The empirical evidence for both views is strong enough to suggest that
they are both valid partial views of the strategy formation process.
The mediating variable would clearly seem to be organisational context.
Whether strategy formation is largely deliberate or emergent would
appear to be dependent on the degree of elaboration in the
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organisational context. The studies of Bower,Quinn and Burgieman all
involved large diversified organisations with many semi-autonomous
profit or investment centres. Three related features associated with
this type of organisational context would seem to predispose it to
strategy formation processes of a highly emergent character. Firstly,
they all contained a number of distinct and commercially independent
strategic business segments from which autonomous strategic behaviour
might be expected. Secondly,these were sufficiently numerous and diverse
as to defy the cognitive limits of any single company strategist to
comprehend them at once in any kind of synoptic view of corporate
strategy. Thirdly,each strategic business segment developed its own
claims on organisational resources in accordance with its own logic.
Each then advocated these claims,in accordance with its own power base,
in an allocation process where all claims could not be simultaneously
met from limited corporate resources,yet where no clear synoptic view of
strategy could be invoked in the rationing process. These conditions
were largely absent in the organisations in this current study. An
interesting exception was the case of AFT. This organisation had six
distinct strategic segments and the resolution of corporate strategic
thrust was to some significant extent dependent on emergent, autonomous
strategic behaviour. However,the number of units was sufficiently small
and related that the director of the organisation was able to personally
control their development to a large degree in a deliberate,if mainly
intuitive ,way.
Deliberate/emergent and synoptic/incremental are different dimensions.
For example,strategy formation in IDC was deliberate-synoptic at its
highest level but deliberate-incremental at the finer-grained level.
The logical-incremental rationalisation programnie,the garbage-can
aquisitions,and the adaptive-learning export marketing programme were
all "deliberate. .moves on a course along which management (was)
steering",in the words of Hickson et al(l986;236). Strategy formation in
the cases described by Bowers,Quinn and Burgieman was largely emergent-
incremental in character at its highest level. The foregoing suggests a
possible typology of strategy formation processes around these two
dimensions with organisational context as the major determinant of type.
This typology is illustrated in figure 11.7 below.
SYNOPTIC
INCREMENTAL
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DELIBERATE	 EMERGENT
ORG.	 Small/medium	 Large multi-div.
CONTEXT	 organisations	 organisations
STRATEGIC	 Coarse grained	 Org. context-
LEVEL/BEH.	 strategy	 induced strategy
EMPIRICAL	 * Hickson et al	 * Burgleman
RESEARCH	 * Leavy
ORG.	 Small/medium	 Large multi-div
CONTEXT	 organisations	 organisations
STRATEGIC	 Fine grained	 Autonomous
LEVEL/BEH.	 strategy	 strategic
behaviour
EMPIRICAL	 * Hickson et al
	 * Bower
RESEARCH	 * Leavy	 * Quinn
* Burgieman
Figure 11.7 - Typology of strategy formation processes
Strategy formation processes can be classified as deliberate-synoptic,
deliberate-incremental ,and emergent-incremental and empirical examples
can readily be found to fit these three types. The fourth combination,
emergent-synoptic,is more difficult to imagine empirically. Yet
Burgleman(l983b;66) has indicated that in complex organisational
contexts a concept of corporate strategy can emerge which "represents
the more or less explicit articulation of the firm's theory about its
past concrete achievements (and that) this theory defines the identity
of the firm at any moment of time" which can give rise to induced,
emergent strategic behaviour. This indicates the empirical existence of
an emergent-synoptic type of process.
The typology illustrated in figure 11.7 above could provide the
basis for a useful classification of strategy formation processes.
Further research is needed however to identify and to examine more
rigorously the specific dimensions of organisational context that are
most salient in the determination of type of process. A research design
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that provides the requisite variation in organisational context would be
needed for this purpose. If size and diversity are the salient
variables,as seems to be the case,then the type of strategy formation
process at its highest level in the firm,will tend to vary with the
evolutionary development of the organisation. A key question for future
research is under what conditions does direct control of the content
strategy pass from the top strategist to the organisational context?
Moreover,the empirical evidence reviewed in this section also indicated
that there are different levels of the strategy formation process in the
sane organisation and that there are different process types at
these different levels. In IDG,as we saw earlier,strategy formation
appears to have been a deliberate-synoptic process at the highest
level of conception and a deliberate-incremental process at the more
fine-grained level. In the large diversified organisations studied by
Bower,Quinn and Burgleman it seems probable that the autonomous
strategic behaviour found at the strategic segment level by the last
mentioned was more deliberate and synoptic in character than strategy
formation at the highest level of process in these organisations. A
further question of interest for future researchers into strategy
formation processes is how do the strategy formation processes in the
strategic segments of large diversified organisations differ in type and
character with those in smaller corporate entities that are similiar in
size and product-market scope to these segments. This would help to
provide yet further insight into the relationship between organisational
context and the process of strategy formation.
From the analysis and discussion in this chapter so far we can return to
the basic model and identify the three main elements in the determination
of strategy. These are SITUATIONAL CONTEXT, ORCANISATIONAL LEADERS and
ORGANISATION HISTORY. The potential importance of organisational context
in the determination of strategy formation,through determining the basic
character of the process,is recognised but it is now subsumed under the
more general category of organisational history. Organisational history
is seen to affect strategy formation through the accumulation of
resource capabilities and constraints,and through the social,political
and cultural effects of human organisation. The effect of social
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organisation on the process itself is mainly related to the degree of
internal elaboration that the organisation has developed,which is itself
a product of its historical evolution. The main three determinants of
the formation of strategy are illustrated in figure 11.8 below.
SITUATIONAL CONTEXT
ORCANISATIONAL LEADER(S)	 STRATEGY
FORMATION
ORCANI SATIONAL HI STORY
the nature of the historic challenge.
(building,revitalising etc.)
the basic character of the process
(either deliberate or emergent.)
Figure 11.8 - The three main determinants of strategy formation
(iii) Situational Context and the process of Strategy Formation
The major influences on the content of strategy for the organisations in
this study have been found to be the situational context,organisational
leadership amd organisational history. While it has long been accepted
in organisational studies that situational context is an important
determinant of organisational action less attention has been given to
elaborating on situational context to identify its salient features
and dimensions. An important feature of this study is its elaboration
of situational context and its identification and examination of five
major contextual influences which shape strategy formation. A second
aspect of the situational context - organisational action relationship
that has been comparatively neglected in organisational studies,as
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Pfeffer & Salancik(l978;71) have pointed out,is the question of how the
situational context comes to affect organisational action. The empirical
data in this study provide some useful insight into the modes of this
process which helps to illuminate,and to elaborate on,existing theory.
The reason why the question of how the situational context interacts
with organisational action has been comparatively neglected is because
the early conceptions of the enviroriment-organisation relationship in
organisational studies were characterised by a unilateral determinism.
In contingency theory,for long the dominant paradigm within which this
relationship was examined,and later in population ecology theory,
interest was almost totally centred on the structural characteristics
of the isomorphic fit between the organisation and its environment. It
was implicitly assumed that this fit would,sooner or later,have to be
achieved if continued effectiveness and survival of the organisation was
to be assured. There was very little interest in the process since the
outcome was assumed to be largely pre-determined,independent of process.
As Pfeffer & Salancik(1978;226) have said it was "as if a Mr Environment
came into the organisation,giving orders to change organisational
structures and activities". The conceptual position taken in this
research,and strongly supported in the data as we have seen,is close to
those of Crozier & Friedberg(l980), Porter(1980),Pettigrew(1985) and
others who reject any unilateral conception of environiuent-organisation
interaction "which neglects or ignores the fact that the organisation
can 'play' with the 'requirements' and constraints imposed by the
environment,and even manipulate them in its turri"(Crozier &
Friedberg,1980;76).
The major elements of situational context,as revealed in the earlier
empirical analysis of the five contextual forces that were found to
be most salient in shaping organisational action,were technologies,
materials, suppliers,customers,conipetitors ,national economies and their
management,international trading flows,patterns and guiding economic
doctrines,societal norms,values,beliefs and transformation,and the like.
Some of these elements of situational context are 'natural' objects but
most are social 'objects' which become objectivated in the production
and reproduction of social action(Berger & Luckmann,l966: Ciddens,1984).
The situational contexts of the organisations in the study were not
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unified,homogeneous and clearly bound. They were heterogeneous,
fragmentary contexts largely composed of other social actors,individuals
and organisations,einbedded in wider social systems. This view of
organisational environments is clearly at odds with the more residual,
unified and homogeneous characterisation that is to be found in much of
the research in organisational analysis carried out within the open
systems paradigm(see Crazier & Friedberg,1980;chp4, for a critical
review).
How then does such a heterogeneous,fragmentary and diverse situational
context comes to influence organisational action. The empirical data
suggest that the ways in which situational context shapes organisational
action are complex and multi-modal.
For example,when CSET chose to enter the convenience food industry in
the 60's it chose to elaborate its situational context to include new
structuring elements that provided it with new oportunities and
constraints; when Golden Vale entered the engineering business and IDC
entered the cash and carry business they chose likewise. When Golden
Vale later divested from the engineering business,and CSET descaled
its food interests,they changed the pattern of their relationship with
their situational contexts. In a very real sense,to begin with,these
organisations SELECTED and reselected their situational contexts over
their life histories,and in so doing they changed the pattern of
potential external influence on their actions over time. Selected
situational context influenced organisational action in a variety of
modes. Organisations also ANTICIPATED developments in their situational
contexts and took action on the basis of their beliefs about the
oportunities and threats presented by these anticipated developments.
For exainple,in the late 60's Dave O'Loughlin committed Golden Vale to as
major physical expansion programme in anticipation of substantial growth
in the national milk supply. In the late 70's the company set up a milk
development fund to try to maintain the growth in their milk supply,
through shoring up supplier margins over a difficult economic period.
The influence of situational context was also at times FELT more
directly as certain pressures infused into the organisation. For
example,the spiraling cost inflation that followed on from the two oil
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crises was felt by all the organisations in the study and it induced
various rationalisation and cost reduction actions. The dramatic
slowdown in sales volume that IDG experienced in the early 80's was felt
in terms of rising inventories and falling revenues. The fall in
national milk production was felt by Golden Vale in terms of a decline
in milk supply and a consequent decline in processing output,which
caused a drop in utilisation and depressed profits. At other times
important elements in the situational context were DIRECTIVE in their
influence on organisational action,as for example when the Government
curtailed the export of Irish whiskey during the war years; or when the
banks forced rationalisation on Golden Vale in the mid-70's; or when the
Lemass Government applied direct pressure on the dairy industry to
consolidate and rationalise in the mid-60's.
Finally,elements of situational context influenced organisational action
through being INTERNALISED in the norms,values,beliefs and shared
ideation systems of the industry,of the organisation and of the wider
social context,and in the culturally determined personal value systems
of the chief strategists. For example,over its long history the Irish
dairy industry developed a norm of not competing directly for milk
supply but of confining competition to products alone. This norm was
based on the belief that unrestrained competition for supply would
sacrifice the longterm interests of all in the industry for the spurious
short term gain of some participants. In the case of Irish Distillers
the traditions of the industry,forged during the historical conflict
over whether column-stilled blended whisky was real whiskey or not,
precluded for too long the development of a range of blended Irish
whiskies,until the evidence was overwhelming that blended whiskies were
the clear preference in the major whiskey markets of the world. The
Lemass challenge in the economic expansion drive was picked up in AFT
and CSET largely through the shared ideation system of Sean Lemass,Tom
Walsh and General Costello. The nationalism and empiricism of Tom Walsh
and the pragmatic economic patriotism of the General impelled these two
men to seek out ways in which their organisations could best respond to
the historic task which Lemass had set before their generation; the task
of securing the economic independence of the country.
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This complex,multi-modal nature of context-organisation interaction
clearly involves different types of processes,some of which have been
more fully explored,empirically and analytically,in the literature on
organisations than others. There are the SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL processes
of shared cognition and perception in which organisations
enact(Weick,1977) their own situational contexts through selective
attention to particular elements in their overall environment. The mode
of anticipation was largely a social-psycholgical process. There are
processes of SOCIAL EXCHANGE(Levine&White,196l) in which organisations
are seen to largely define their own situational contexts in their
initial choice of domain,through which they "simultaneously determine
determine (their) pattern of interdependence with elements of the
environment"(Miles et al,1974;250),and in their various extensions and
retractions of domain throughout their life histories. In so doing they
choose to become part of a particular social configuration or
set(Evan,1966) of social systems within whose structures and 'rules of
the game' their scope and capacity for future action will be
bound(Thompson,l967;148: Crozier & Friedberg,1980;8l). Processes of
social exchange were involved in the select,felt and directive modes
that were evident in the empirical data.
One of the most developed paradigms that attempts to explain the motor
of organisation action at the organisational level of analysis,the
power dependence paradigm,is clearly rooted conceptually in the social
exchange view of organisation-context interaction. Developed initially
by Emerson(l962)as a perspective within which to examine interpersonal
behaviour,this paradigm has since come to assume a central position
in the literature on organisation-context interaction(Thompson,1967:
Pfeffer & Salancik,l978: Porter,.l98O). This power-dependence,or
resource-dependence,perspective is essentially a political-economy
theory of process. In this perspective organisations are seen to act to
increase their power,and to reduce their dependence,in relation to their
overall situational contexts. This perspective does help to explain much
of what organisations do. Take the case of IDG for example. One of the
main reasons for the 1966 merger was the desire of the three main Irish
distilling companies to strengthen their position in the industry and to
prevent the threatened entry of a large British brewing concern which
would have seriously weakened their collective hold on the industry.
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Then in the late 60's the newly merged entity integrated forward into
direct sales and distribution. This was done to eliminate the firm's
dependence on the wholesale trade. This last example illustrates that
a firm like IDG is typically involved in more than just a diverse set
of dyadic social exchange relationships. It has a direct stake in dyadic
transactions that are upstream and downstream in an interorganisational
network(Van de Ven & Ferry,1980;298). Vertical integration moves,like
the one just described,are taken to strengthen the organisation's
position in the entire network.
Powerful as the social exchange and power dependence perspectives are,
these political-economy theories of process still provide only partial
insight into the interrelationship between situational context and
organisational action. These paradigms view the situational context
of an organisation primarily in terms of other social actors,individuals
and organisations,and their exchange relationships. Situational context
tends to be analysed mainly as an extrinsic influence on organisational
behaviour. In this perspective organisational action is to be
explained mainly in terms of behavours that are aimed at avoidance
of uncertainty(Thompson,1967) and at reduction of dependence(Pfeffer &
Salancik,l978). While much that is to be observed in organisational
action can indeed be explained in terms of social exchange and power
dependence theories,such theories do not address the more intrinsic mode
of interaction by which significant elements in the situational context
come to influence organisational action through processes of CULTURAL
TRANSMISSION and internalisation. These theories do not address the
ways in which organisational action comes to be influenced by the norms,
beliefs,and shared ideation systems of the industry,the organisation
and the wider social setting, and through the culturally formed,and
contextually linked,personal value systems of the organisations' chief
strategists.
The process of interaction between situational context and
organisational action is,as we have just seen,multi-modal and
multi-dimensional. The five modes of influence by which the situational
context comes to influence organisational action and the three modes of
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process through which this occurs are summarised in figure 11.8. The
process can only be fully understood through a perspective that links
social psychological,political economy and cultural modes of analysis
with each other.
Modes of influence	 Types of process
1. SELECTED-context
A. SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
2. ANTICIPATED-context
3. FELT-context	 B. SOCIAL-EXCHANGE
4. DIRECTIVE-context
C. CULTURAL TRANSMISSION
5. INTERNALISED-context
Figure 11.9 - How situational context influences strategy.
Empirical research into the dynamics of the process of situational
context - organisational action interaction that attempts to link all of
these modes of analysis,or that even includes the cultural mode,are
still very rare in organisational studies; though Pettigrew(1985) has
recently given an timely lead in this area.
Theories of action that are primarily dependent on avoidance of
uncertainty or on reduction of dependence as the primary motors of
organisational behaviour would appear to be particularly inadequate in
understanding processes of growth,innovation and entreprise in
organisations. Organisational action that is governed by avoidance of
uncertainty will tend to seek stability and stable equilibrium with the
situational context. However, Schumpeter(l934;64-65) has cogently argued
that economic development is a distinct phenomenon from the tendency
towards economic equilibrium. Stability seeking behaviour is
conservative and adaptive. It is not innovative,entrepreneurial or
developmental. Reduction of dependence is similarly defensive and
conservative in orientation. In the latter case one of the consequences
of growth is increasing interdependence in a forever widening and
interlocking set of interrelationships with more and more elements of
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situational context. It would seem to follow,therefore,that
organisations acting primarily in accordance with a reduction of
dependency rationality would be largely growth-avoiding rather than
growth-seeking. In the limit,it seems to this researcher,that neither
rationality can provide a satisfactory answer to the question of why
organisations come into being in the first place; neither rationale
would explain why social actors come together to initiate organised
activity.
Organisational action,then,cannot be adequately explained in terms of
rationalities of uncertainty avoidance or reduction of dependency alone.
Neither,however,is organisational action to be explained mainly "as the
lengthened shadow of one or a few men"(Thompson,1967;l). The cultural
mode of analysis is a vital element in explaining innovation and growth
in organisations. In this study the motors for growth,innovation and
entreprise were seen to be strongly embedded in the shared ideational
systems that link the organisation with its wider context. The values
motivating social agencies,both individuals and organisations,in the
pursuit of economic development,innovation and material progress were
values that were created and sustained through the wider national and
international cultural settings. This was seen at its most explicit
in the Lemass drive for economic development when the family captalist
controlled distilling industry,the cooperative controlled dairy industry
and the state controlled sugar industry were all harnessed to the urgent
task of economic expansion through the loose authoritative coupling of
national indicative planning. The authoritative coupling may have been
weak,given the democratic setting,but the cultural and ideational
coupling was strong. Moreover,the cultural mode of analysis is important
in fully understanding the role of organisational leadership which was
found to be a vital substantive and symbolic element in the explanation
of organisational action. The personal motivations of men like Walsh and
Costello,could not be readily understood without reference to their
contextual and cultural settings. Attempts to explain innovative and
entrepreneurial strategic behaviour in terms of some acultural
attributes or personality pre-dispositions alone would seem doomed to
failure.
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(iv) Strategic Change Processes
In an earlier section it was found that strategy,at the highest level of
aggregation,was a relatively enduring phenomenon though change appeared
to more endemic at the finer-grained level of strategy formation. Major
strategic choices are made during the initial development of any
organisation,choices of domain and technology that form its basic
character. After this initial phase,however,an issue of special interest
in the future formation of strategy is how and why the existing pattern
of commitments and activities at Tn comes to change, since strategy at
Tn+l does not normally involve any massive re-initialisation of this
pattern. While most of the early attention in the field of strategy
research was focused on the issue of strategic choice,more recently
there has been a growing interest in the question of how strategy comes
to change(Kanter,l983: Pennings,1985: Pettigrew,1985,1987a)
The empirical data in this study allow us to identify and examine
some important modes of initiation of strategic change and to explore
the character of strategic change processes through the processual
analysis of a major change episode.
Initiation of Strategic Change
The empirical data reveal that strategic change was initiated in a
number of different modes. There was CONTEXT-induced change. Context-
induced change is driven by pressures arising in the context of the
organisation with varying degrees of imperative. The most imperative
situation is one of crisis,where the future survival of the organisation
is imminently threatened. In such a situation the context is in the
driving seat and the organisation can only regain some control over its
destiny by a dramatic change in strategy. The 1985 crisis in Golden Vale
is the most dramatic example from the data. This crisis led to a change
of leadership and to an immediate refocusing of strategic priorities.
It evoked a basic change in competitive strategy in relation to securing
and protecting the milk supply. It also led to the development of a
stronger marketing activity,to a new emphasis on product and market
development,and to an acceleration in the rationalisation of the milk
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assembly system. The dramatic symbolism in the change of leadership
served to heighten and widen the internal preception of crisis and of
the need for dramatic change. This helped to create the conditions that
allowed a determined new leader to implement drastic changes with speed
in order to regain control over the organisation's future.
Clearly,however,there were varying types and degrees of imperative. For
example, AFT is currently undergoing a dramatic context-induced change
that is unique in the organisation's 30 year history. The source of this
change was in the growing crisis in the state of the nation's public
finances. After years of progressively tighter and tighter allocations
AFT found itself,in 1987,forced by government to merge with the advisory
services. The newly merged entity is currently being rationalised.
This merger and its downstream effects are significantly changing AFT's
former scope and character. In IDC,in recent times,there has also been
dramatic context-induced change which culminated in the friend
takeover of the company. For six months the future of IDG as a business
entity hung in the balance as black knight,CC&C, and white knight,Pernod
Ricard,fought for control of IDG's future destiny.In the case of IDC the
sense of impending crisis itself,up to the time of the takeover bid,was
sufficient to induce major strategic change as the company galvanised
itself to try preserve its future independence. In the post-1979 period
IDG experienced its most challenging and difficult situational context
since the 1966 merger that formed the company. More receritly,however,the
stock-market began to show signs of increasing impatience with the
company. The company's stock consistently under performed the market
between mid-1986 and end-1987,after many years of being a leading share.
IDG's acquisition of BWG for its cash and carry business in 1984 was a
turning point. The market was critical of a strategic investment in the
static home market and began to lose confidence in the company's will
and ability to exploit the full export potential for Irish whiskey as a
generic premium product. The company was perceived,both internally and
externally,as having become more and more vulnerable to take-over. In
this context of impending crisis the company carried out the first major
revision of its export-marketing strategy since the merger. It further
carried through a £lOm rationalisation to iiiprove its operating profit
flow by £3m per annum. When a credible black knight appeared on the
horizon with a 20% block of company stock in late 1987,the IDC board
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and management made a determined bid to keep the institutional investors
on their side by presenting them with their revised marketing strategies
and convincing them to give their reformulated and more focused approach
to export development a chance to succeed. Ironically,it now seems clear
that the company's rationalisation efforts and revised marketing
strategy,which did lead to increased stock market confidence and a
significant improvement in company earnings,only increased the
attractiveness of the firm as a takeover target to larger companies
in the declining global spirits industry.
While CRISIS-induced change is particularly imperative and dramatic, the
evidence from this study suggests that full crisis situations, with an
imminent risk of organisational failure are rare. There were only two
such crises recorded in the combined histories of the organisations in
the study,covering in all 147 organisation-years. Both of these were in
Golden Vale and both involved imminent insolvency. It would seem from
both that crisis is a product of context and organisational action and
that the genesis of crisis can be in either. The 1985 crisis in Golden
Vale had its genesis in the dramatic change in the situational context
of the dairy industry in the early 80's. To this extent it was context-
induced to begin with. However,to a significant extent the organisation
worked itself into crisis through inappropriate and ineffective handling
of the difficulties that the dramatic change in situational context
had presented. In contrast the 1975 crisis had its genesis within the
organisation,in the preemptive capacity expansion strategy of the
company and in the cavalier approach to the financing of that strategy.
When the situational context did not unfold quite as expected the
company became exposed to impending insolvency. Once crisis point is
reached,however,by whatever process route,change then becomes
context - dictated.
The empirical data show evidence of at least two other modes of
strategic change,CONTEXT-stimulated change and LEADER-stimulated change.
Context stimulated change is to be distinguished here from context
induced change. Induced change is threat-centred and the mode of
organisational action is defensive. Stimulated change is oportunity-
centred and the mode of action is prospective. The Lemass programme for
economic expansion provides,perhaps,the clearest example of context
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stimulated change. Directly through the medium of social exchange,and
indirectly through the medium of ideational and value transmission,the
Lemass leadership and its programme stimulated CSET to diversify into
food processing,the first major development in CSET beyond its
traditional core business. The Lemass leadership,and the ideology in the
Programme for Economic Expansion,also stimulated the dairy industry in
Ireland to undergo a radical restructuring in order to concentrate its
capital for further development. A special type of context-stimulated
change has been TECHNOLOGY-stimulated change. This was seen at Its most
dramatic in the cases of dairying and distilling. The development
of the mechanical churn stimulated the dairy Industry to change from a
farm-based to a creamery-based structure. The mechanical and chemical
revolutions on the farm,in the 50's and 60's,stimulated a long wave
wave of expansion and diversification in the dairy processing sector.
The development of the continuous column still in the distilling
industry stimulated the development of blended whiskies which
dramatically changed the course of the entire industry.
They are many examples throughout the cases of LEADER-stimulated change.
These changes were initiated for both prospective and defensive reasons.
In the case of IDG the concentration of distilling in a single modern
complex,and the acquisition of Bushmills,and the development of the
export-led growth strategy were all initiated by the company leadership
to promote the prospective development of the company. The acquisition
of BWG for its cash and carry business was a defensive strategic move
initiated by the company leadership to defend IDG's home market share
and profit positions. O'Loughlin's diversification of Golden Vale into
engineering and later into milk powders were prospective moves. The
modernisation of the sugar factories and the change to a three plant
configuration were anticipatory moves initiated by the CSET leadership
to strengthen the competitiveness of its core business. A characteristic
of leader-stimulated change,even when it is defensive,is that the
primary proximate pressure for change comes from within the
organisation. Moreover,leadership clearly plays a major role in the
implementation of change,even when the change has been context-
stimulated or context-induced. Costello's development f the CSET food
diversification strategy, Burrows' reformulation of the IDG export-
marketing strategy, and Ryan's major review of AFT's entire research
535
programme are some cases in point. In the extreme, new leaders
have been brought in to implement the changes in strategy induced
by context in crisis situations. The arrival of Jim 0 'Mahony
at Golden Vale in early 1986 provides the clearest example of this.
In a case such as this one the hiring of the new leader was itself a
crisis-induced change,but the process and content of strategic change
had still to be developed under the new leader's active agency.
The five modes of initiation of strategic change,that emerged from the
empirical data in this study,are summarised in figure 11.9 below.
Modes of strategic change
1. CONTEXT-induced change
2. CRISIS-induced change
3. CONTEXT-stimulated change
4. TECHNOLOGY- stimulated
5. LEADER-stimulated change
Figure 11.10 - Modes of initiation of strategic change
Most of these modes of initiation are well recognised in the literature.
Starbuck et al(1978), Miller & Friesen(1980), Miller(1982) and
Brunsson(1982) are among the many who have relied,at least partially,on
crisis theory in their studies of change. Kanter(1983) has been very
prominent among those who have studied leader-stimulated change while
Tushman & Anderson(1987) have been to the fore in examining the
relationship between technological discontinuity and strategic change at
industry and organisational level. The situational-contingency
theorists(see Kast & Rosenzweig,1981 for a synthesis) and contextual
researchers(Pfeffer & Salancik,1978: Pettigrew,l985) both emphasise and
examine context-induced change though their underlying models of
process,implicit or explicit,fundamentally differ. The empirical
evidence from this research indicates that crisis-induced change is
rarer than the crisis-theory literature would suggest. It indicates that
technological discontinuity is also rare in many organisations, though
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its effect tends to be dramatic and far-reaching at both industry and
organisational levels. A major theme of this research,developed at
length earlier,is that leader initiation of strategy and strategic
change has been under-emphasised in organisational analysis at the
expense of the context-induced mode. Finally,one important mode of
change which has received comparatively little attention up to now is
the context-stimulated mode. Change that is stimulated by the volition
and strategic action of actors operating at the national and industrial
levels of analysis is rarely exainined,yet appears in this research as an
important mode in the initiation of strategic change at the
organisational level. The episode that has been selected for a more
fine-grained processual analysis of strategic change was chosen,among
other reasons,to help redress this comparative neglect.
The amalgamation episode at Golden Vale - processual analysis
The primary focus of this study has been on the interrelationship of
situational context and organisational action over whole organisational
life histories. In doing this we have,for the most part,kept our
research lens at a relatively low level of resolution in order to
capture the broad movements that typically characterise significant
contextual changes and their implications for organisational action.
In this section we move to a somewhat higher level of resolution
and try to examine the process of strategic change at closer range
using the strategic episode as the unit of analysis. The change
episode chosen for this purpose is the amalgamation at Golden Vale. This
episode had relatively clearly defined start and end points so that it
can be analytically isolated froni the continuous flux of history and its
genesis,career and conclusion can be examined in context. Processual
analysis of this episode contributes process insight,not only into
strategic change at the organisational level of analysis but also into
the process of industry evolution. The analysis of the process that
follows relies heavily on the description of this episode contained in
the Golden Vale case narrative that was presented in chapter eight of
the dissertation.
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This 1958-74 amalgamation episode in the Irish dairy industry provides,
in its own right,valuable insight into strategic change processes
that link the national economy,industry and firm levels of strategic
analysis in a free entreprise economy. Research on strategic choice and
change processes that is analytically this broad is still very unusual
in organisational studies(Pettigrew,l987a;6). In particular,this episode
offers a rare empirical insight into the complex processes that link
strategic intent and strategic outcome across these three levels of
analysis. In this it is different,yet complenientary,to much of the
empirical research on strategic choice and change in which the analysis
of the 'why' of choice and change often extends to multiple levels of
context but the analysis of the 'how' has generally tended to confine
itself to intraorganisational processes(see Mintzberg,1978: Quinn,1980:
Burgleman,1983b: Kanter,1983: Pettigrew,l985: and Hickson et al,1986 for
recent prominent examples). Rarely,if ever,in organisational analysis
have processes of change been examined where the initial strategic
intent is located in the situational context and not in the organisation
and where the 'how' ,as well as the 'why' ,is a multi-level phenomenon.
The amalgamation episode was a process that linked strategic intent to
strategic outcome over three levels of social structure, national
economy,industry and individual entreprise. The three levels were linked
by loose authoritative coupling. These loose authoritative linkages
reflected the nation's dominant ideological orientation to free
entreprise,and this was a basic cultural and political element in
determining the overall character of the process. Among the questions
of interest in analytically examining the process of strategic change in
this amalgamation episode are; how did strategic intent at one level
come to influence strategic action at lower levels of context without
strong authoritative linkages? ,why did the whole process take so long?,
and how,and why,did the eventual outcome fall short of the original
intention?
The process took so long because there was strong initial resistance to
the consolidation strategy at the industry and individual entreprise
levels and the outcome fell short of intentions because the process of
overcoming that resistance was incomplete. But why was there this
resistance,which ranged from conservatism in the face of change to open
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opposition? There were DIFFERENT RATIONALITIES,PRESSURES and LEVELS OF
STRATEGIC CONCEPTION operating at the different levels of social
structure. These differences account to a large degree for the length
and incompleteness of the process. Yet,paradoxically,these same
differences played a valuable role in enabling the process to move along
in a voluntary mode,as we will see later on.
At the national economy. level the main concern was with the overall
growth and development of the whole Irish economy. The level of
strategic conception was at its most aggregate and the language of
strategic rationality was at its most abstract,at this level. At this
level the language and imagery of strategy were expressed in terms of
the 'historic task of securing the economic independence of the State',
the need for the 'dairy industry' to be a engine of 'export-led
growth', the need for the 'dairy industry' to have a 'level of capital
concentration' comparable with the best in the 'industry
internationally' in order to secure its 'growth,efficiency and overall
competitiveness' in a tfreer trade environment internationally' , the
need to expand the 'national herd', and the like. The pressures for
change at this level were felt and expressed at an equally high level of
aggregation,the need to develop and moderriise the economy, to increase
exports,to increase the nation's standard of living,to stem the tide of
emigration, to maintain the country' s international competitiveness ,and
so on.
In contrast,the rationality at the level of the processors and producers
was different,less aggregate and more concrete. At this level the more
abstract conception of increasing 'the level of capital concentration'
in the 'industry' came down to the more concrete issues of which
processors were going to amalgamated with which? ,would some of the
individual parties to consolidation benefit more than others? ,would some
be worse off than before?,did the economic benefits of amalgamation
outweigh the social and political costs to individuals,individual
processors and their immediate rural hinterlands,entailed in the
structural upheaval associated with consolidation? In short,it might
have been economically beneficial to the country and the industry in the
aggregate,but not to all the individual parties involved in the
industry. There was going to be social and political upheaval involved
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in the breakup of the existing parish structure and the political,and
social costs were likely to outweigh the uncertain economic benefits for
many of those involved in the industry at the level of the individual
entreprise. The pressures for change at this level were most sharply
felt at the level of what other individuals and processors were doing
and the worry of missing out or being left behind relative to other
participants in the industry.
In between was the industry level. Here the main consideration was the
question of reconciling the national economy level of rationality with
the rationalities operating at the level of the individual units. At
this level a primary rationality was the development of the industry to
its fullest potential for its participants and in the national interest.
Related to this was the concern to maintain control of the industry's
development in the hands of the industry,and more specifically in the
hands of the cooperative movement, while at the same time maintaining
and increasing the pre-eminence of the industry's position in the
national economy. To maintain its pivotal position in the industry the
cooperative movement had to secure and maintain the confidence of
national policy makers and individual industry participants alike.
The process by which strategic intent at the national level came to
influence strategic action at the level of the individual participant
did not follow a pre-defined path. In this respect the process of
strategic change was,not only an essential element in the determination
of strategic outcome,but was itself problematic and therefore the object
of strategic action. The essential problem was one of how to get the
individual participants in the industry to come together to create a
a greater level of resource concentration. The initial decision by the
national policy policy makers to try to secure this on a voluntary
basis,and the differences in the rationalities,pressures and strategic
conceptions of the different levels of structure involved,together
determined the basic nature of the problem of process in this episode.
The process was initiated by Lemass and his Government in the late 50's.
They were concerned that the industry was not ready for EEC entry.
Since the dairy industry was a strategic element in their plan for
national economic expansion through export-led growth,this was their
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motivation for intervention. They already held the view that the
industry was in need of structural change to begin with. The Survey Team
Report confirmed this view in 1963. It also had two other effects in
moving the process along. The presence of an independent expert on the
team provided some wider legitimacy for the Government's view. It also
provided an issue with which to put pressure on the cooperative
movement. The report had questioned the capacity of the lAOS to provide
the kind of leadership needed to fully develop the industry in the
national interest. The report had suggested the setting up by the
Government of a superstructure,with mandatory powers if necessary,
implement the restructuring. Lemass and his government decided at
this point to support,rather than to bypass,the cooperative movement
for political reasons. Direct intervention before the cooperative
movement had been given a chance to provide the required leadership
would have risked the provocation of widespread opposition and would
have complicated the issue. Nevertheless, the presence of the
recommendation in the widely circulated Survey Team Report provided a
credible threat of direct intervention at some later stage should the
cooperative movement not deliver.
The national policy makers commissioned a second study within months.
The Knapp Report had two effects. It helped to further legitimise the
need for change. The Survey Team report was seen in some quarters as the
Department's report,in spite of the presence of the independent expert.
Now a famous international expert on the cooperative movement confirmed
the need for structural change and this widened the legitimacy of this
need within the industry and within the cooperative movement. Knapp also
confirmed the political wisdom of the Government's decision to allow the
industry to restructure itself voluntarily. Knapp provided additional
legitimacy for change and recommended that the IAOS,the cooperative
corporate body,be given full responsibility for leading the industry
through the change. The Survey Team and Knapp reports,taken together,
provided strong legitimacy for the need for change but they also
provided the political issue with which the Government was able to get
the lAOS publicly committed to leading the change,the issue of who will
control the industry's future. This was an important step in moving the
process along.
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The Government then publicly tied the need for structural change
in the Irish dairy industry to the national interest in the Second
Programme for Economic Expansion. The issue was now not only legitimised
on rational-economic grounds but was also legitimised on cultural
grounds as an integral and pivotal element in the historic task of
economic development. Through its indicative planning process the
national policy makers were publicly challenging the dairy industry,
along with the other sectors of the economy,to play its full part in the
historic drive to expand the economy. Furthermore the Government went on
record in the Second Programme as both supporting the leadership
position of the cooperative movement in the dairy industry while at the
same time publicly chartering it with the historic task of leading the
restructuring of the industry. Thus carrot and stick were both used
simultaneously to pressure the lAOS into driving the change process at
industry level.
The combined effects of the Survey Team Report,the Knapp Report and the
Second Programme for Economic Expansion,and their wide circulation
throughout the social structure,helped to make the restructuring of the
dairy industry a national issue. This objectivated the need for change
in the wider social system and leveraged the Government's own efforts
to bring about change in the industry with powerful systemic pressure.
The lAOS were,by l964,under pressure to produce an operational blueprint
for the consolidation of the industry. Up to this point the issue had
been debated mainly at national and industry levels and had been
conducted at a fairy high level of abstraction. Pressure was building up
in the wider social system for the 'consolidation' of the 'dairy
industry' in order to make it 'more competitive' in 'international'
terms. The lAOS was publicly committed to the need for change at this
level of rationality and had to be seen to lead the industry through
this change if it was to preserve its pre-eminence. The difficulty was
that the economic and cultural rationalities at this level were not
sufficient in themselves to bring about change at the participant level,
where the issues and rationalities were different and more concrete.
The lAOS took two years to publish its blueprint,and even then it
was not without great difficulty. Trying to come up with a actual
blueprint for consolidation sharpened the focus onto the political,
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economic and social difficulties involved at the individual participant
level of rationality,where the forces for continuity and conservatism
at first far outweighed the pressure for change. The initial rejection
in 1963 of Ireland's first application to join the EEC weakened the
economic imperative considerably and allowed the industry more time to
equivocate. The Coverriment,however,maintained its pressure on the lAOS
through direct informal contact and through keeping the issue alive
in the wider social context. Under the credible threat of direct
intervention it eventually pressured the lAOS into publishing a set of
proposals for the restructuring of the industry. This was an important
bridgehead for the forces of change within the industry. The lAOS was
now more publicly committed than before. It was more unequivocally
aligned with the need for consolidation and with amalgamation as the
preferred mechanism for bringing it about.
The actual publishing of the proposals had the effect of widening
the debate and heightening the awareness of the pressure for change
in the industry. The issues raised in the actual blueprint had more
immediacy for its participants. They involved not only the question
of whether or not major consolidation was necessary and good for the
industry but also whether this should be by amalgamation or federation
and what actual groupings should be involved. Key opinion leaders within
industry,like the farmer and creamery manager representative
organisations, were split over these issues. This reflected into the
positions of the individual participants in this 'sound man' industry,
where opinion leadership was particularly influential. Then in 1967
the Government reactivated Ireland's application to the EEC and this
increased the economic imperative once more. The Government,at this
point,commissioned a further study to further strengthen the forces for
change. The Cook and Sprague Report was produced by two experts that
were seen to be independent of the both the Government and the lAOS.
They stressed the urgency of the need to restructure and came down
firmly in favour of amalgamation as the preferred means. This report
added nothing new in substance but its source and timing were important.
It conferred added legitimacy to the forces for change and injected
added urgency into the process.
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In late 1967 the process entered a new stage. It had become clear to
some key industry leaders by this time that the pressures for change
were going to increase,if anything,and were clearly not going to abate.
Dave O'Loughlin,who at first opposed consolidation and amalganiation,now
came to see it as inevitable. He decided therefore to take a lead at
ground level. In this he was being both oportunistic and defensive. He
wanted his organisation to develop into one of the main growth centres
in the industry and he did not want to be left behind. He was moved
to act more by local rationality than national rationality. The major
stakes that he was playing for were more autonomy in the future
management of Golden Vale than the federal system of ownership had
allowed him and a pre-eminent position for his organisation in the
industry's future structural evolution and development. He tied his
strategy for the physical expansion of Golden Vale to the amalgamation
process and pursued both simultaneously. These two elements of his
strategy became closely interlinked. Pre-emptive physical development
helped him to legitimate his claim to be marked out in any industry
level proposals as a growth centre with an economic rationale that said
why duplicate capacity that is already there. It also served to help
convince some of the targeted creamery societies to amalgamate because
the processing capacity to take their milk was already in tow. In
pursuing a strategy of pre-emptive capacity expansion he was,however,
committing himself up-front to amalgamation and creating a largely
irreversible pressure on himself to bring it about.
This autonomous movement at participant level was a vital breakthrough
in bringing the amalgamation process to concrete conclusion. The forces
of conservatism and opposition were at their most intense at the level
at which O'Loughlin had to operate. He approached the lAOS for executive
help in managing the process of amalgamation at Golden Vale. The lAOS
presence helped him to legitimise his intentions to those at ground
level in the cooperative movement who had to be won over. He in turn
provided the lAOS with a vital bridgehead into the industry at
processor and producer level,where the change process had to finally
materialise. O'Loughlin and his team,which included a fuiltime lADS
executive,spent three years working with their targeted creamery
societies before the formal moves on amalgamation were finally taken.
This was a highly political and cultural process as they sought to win
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over opinion leaders,and through them their societies. At this level
also the strategy involved convincing key opininon leaders ,both
individuals and groups,and getting them publicly committed to the
amalgamation process. O'Loughlin and his team went to over 500 meetings
and lost no opportunity to advance the cause. They worked on individuals
and their committees,trying to get agreement in principle to begin with,
and never forced the issue to a vote if there was a chance it might go
against them. They did not make the formal moves on amalgamation until
they felt sure of success.
The early moves on amalgamation by Golden Vale and one or two other
processors were themselves important catalysts for change in this final
stage of the process. The pressures exerted on the industry by the
Government,the IAOS,and the general systemic pressures engendered
through legitimacy-conferring studies and public debate,all had a
cumulative 'softening up' effect on the industry at participant level.
The industry was becoming progressively more conditioned to the fact of
change,if not always yet convinced of its merits. Once this pressure and
social conditioning got Dave O'Loughlin and one or two others to move
on amalgamation the rules of the game began to change such that local
rationality in many cases now began to work in the direction of change.
Regardless of their previous position at the more aggregate and abstract
levels of the amalgamation debate,once processors and participants saw
other movement on the ground they came to see change as inevitable.
Issues of grand principle,which had been important in the initial
generation of the momentum for change,now became less important in
sustaining it. Processors and producers began to jockey for their future
competitive positions and their future cash flow. Once he movement
began on the ground it generated its own systemic dynamic. The earlier
debate,and general conditioning process,had meant that many of the
smaller processors had held back on reinvesting in their creameries
because of the general air of uncertainty created by the amalgamation
issue. Now as the early moves began to be made many of these smaller
processors found themselves under pressure from their suppliers whose
expanding needs they were no longer able to satisfy. The smaller
processors began to be both pressured towards and wooedby the larger
processors with ambitions to be the future growth centres. In this way
the amalgamation process began to have tangible results.
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The process was underway at processor level by 1970 but with,as yet,
little actual consolidation. EEC membership was now imminent and the
Government renewed its pressure on the lAOS to get results on the
ground. The lAOS published a new set of amalgamation proposals in 1972.
These new proposals reflected the fact that the industry had expanded
considerably since 1966. This set of proposals became the final
blueprint for the amalgamation process in the industry. It reflected the
work already done by Golden Vale and other processors on the ground and
conferred post-facto legitimacy on it. Golden Vale's future position as
a growth centre for the industry was strengthened by these proposals.
The plan,however,provided an indicative blueprint towards the final form
of the amalgamation but the actual outcome of the process reflected the
individual strategies of the larger and smaller processors who sought
amalgamation and shopped around for the most favourable arrangement.
In consequence the final groupings often did not fully reflect the
economic rationality of geography. In the case of Golden Vale,only
24 of the 36 societies that had been allocated to it in the 1972 plan
finally amalgamated with it in the end. By 1974 the total process was
well on the way towards completion.
This episodic analysis of the amalgamation process at Golden Vale
contributes to our understanding of both industry evolution and
strategic change.
The current literature on industry evolution in organisation studies
falls into two main perspectives.The first is the population ecology
paradigm(Hannan & Freenian,1977,for example). The underlying model
of process in this paradigm is the social organisation equivalent to
natural selection. The second perspective is industry analysis, the
offspring of the recent marriage between the strategy and industry
organisation paradigms effected by Caves(l980) and Porter(1980,l981).
The underlying model of process in this perspective is a form of
power-dependence,resource-dependence theory. The industry analysis model
is more voluntarist than the population ecology model at the level of
the individual firm but both have similiar underlying models of the
process of industry evolution at the level of the industry. Both
eniphasise the role of competition in resource constrained environments
as the primary determinant of structural change. Consolidation happens
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over time because the strong organisations develop at the expense of
the weak. Weak organisations eventually get shaken out or taken over.
Both processes lead to higher levels of concentration in an industry.
Where they differ is mainly in their perspective on how organisations
come to be strong or weak,with the ecology model much more deterministic
on this issue. Weak organisations in the population ecology perspective
are those whose inherent inertial forces seriously impair their capacity
to adapt to the changing imperatives of their environment. Weak
organisations in industry analysis are those which are least able to
strategically manage the dynamic power-dependence relationship between
them and their environment in their own favour.
Neither of these perspectives provides a theory of process which is
adequate enough to explain how the structure of the Irish dairy industry
evolved during the amalgamation episode that was analysed above. Both
perspectives have two major limitations. Firstly,as models of process
they are what Mohr(1982;14) would call underdeveloped in the sense that
they tend to conceptualise the stages in the process but offer
inadequate descriptive or analytical insight into how the process moves
from one stage to another. Industry analysis is more developed than
ecology theory in this regard because it does attempt "to look
underneath the process to see what really drives it" and identifies a
number of "evolutionary processes" that "create incentives or pressures
for change"(Porter,1980;l62). However,both offer little descriptive or
analytical insight into how industry structural evolution actually
happens empirically. Secondly,both perspectives tend to present the
contextual evolutionary forces at the organisational level of analysis
in terms of an impersonal superordinate or systemic logic. For example,
in the ecology inodel(Hannan & Freeman,1977;940),the structural evolution
of an organisational population proceeds in accordance with an
impersonal "environmental rationality" which is superordinate to the
individual firm. In the less deterministic and more elaborated industry
analysis model industry structure evolves through the dynamic interplay
between firm volition and the systemic structuring effects of the
evolving underlying economics of the industry(Porter,l980;157).
Processual analysis of the amalgamation episode at Golden Vale
extends our understanding of industry evolution in two ways.
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Firstly it shows that volition and strategic action at higher levels of
social structure are sometimes the major force in industry evolution,
and that the higher level of rationality attributed to an impersonal
environment in the ecology model can actually be the strategic
rationality of actors operating at a higher level of social order.The
amalgamation episode is not the only example of this in the study.
National and industrial statesmanship were key forces in all the key
stages of the structural evolutional of the dairy industry. Horace
Plunkett's leadership at national and industry level was a key force in
moving the industry from a farm-based to a creamery-based system in the
late nineteenth century. The technological development of the mechanical
churn was key to enabling this structural change to take place but this
impersonal contextual development did not in itself automatically
induce the structural change that it made possible. The second major
structural change in the dairy industry was the rationalisation process
of 1927. In this episode the Secretary of the IAOS,Dr Henry Kennedy,
persuaded the Minister For Agricultural to intervene in the industry in
order to prevent the impersonal evolutionary pressures operating at the
time from destroying it. A state company was set up and state funds were
used to buy up and rationalise the smaller units in order to preserve
and strengthen the overall profitability of the industry and to secure
its future development. Firm level rationality alone was tearing the
industry apart and a higher level of national and industry level
rationality was strategically imposed on the industry by a higher level
of personal volition and strategic conception in order to save and
secure it. In the distilling industry the empirical description given of
Frank O'Reilly as an 'architect' of the 1966 merger reflects the higher
level of rationality and volition that also operated in that case.
The second way in which the foregoing processual analysis of the
amalgamation episode contributes our understanding of industry
evolution is in the descriptive and analytical insight that it gives
into the processual dynamics of evolution itself;-how it starts,what
drives it forward,how it proceeds,how long it takes,and so forth.
In this episode the process was started by the national policy makers
and largely driven by their will and strategic action. They were moved
to act by strong economic,political and ideological rationalities at the
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level of national policy making. Their desire to generate economic
take-off in the under-developed Irish economy was the prime factor.
Their decision to try to bring about structural change at industry and
firm levels without recourse to direct authoritative mechanisms was a
major element in enacting the character of the process. The problem of
process for the national policy makers was how to bring about strategic
action at the level of the individual firm. The full process took
almost 16 years to complete,which was much longer than intended.
Progress was uneven. The rate of progress was affected by the
strategic actions of many agencies,individuals and groups,at different
levels of social order,but was never under the full control of any of
them. Neither did the outcome fully accord with any of their intentions.
The process was hierarchically progressive in that the momentum for
change started at the national level and progressively extended down
through the industry level to the firm level. There were different
levels of rationality,pressure and strategic conception operant at the
three levels so that strategic intention at one level did not easily
transmit into the hoped for action at the next level down. Forces for
change at the higher levels were initially met with considerable forces
for continuity at the next lower level due to these differences.
Overcoming the forces of inertia and opposition that arose from these
differences demanded more than the ideational transmission of the higher
rationality down through the social system. Strategic action that was
primarily political and cultural in nature also proved to be vital in
the transmission of a change momentum in this situation. The political
activities of building and publicly committing the support of key
opinion leaders,individuals and organisations,through variety of
pressures and inducements at their own levels of rationality,proved to
be vital in this respect at both the industry and firm levels. The wider
process of culturally integrating a dynamic for change and of
objectivating it throughout the social system through the processes of
legitimation and issue creation helped to generate and maintain a
systemic pressure for change. This systemic pressure augmented the
political pressure through ideological transmission of the pressure for
change at its most effective. It also did this through simply social
conditioning,in that many who still did not internalise the ideational
or ideological rationalities for change nevertheless came to be
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influenced by the growing belief that it was inevitable.
Finally,two further features of the character of the process are worthy
of note. Firstly,while the momentum for change was dependent on the
personal involvement of key strategic actors at the beginning,it
ultimately developed its own objectivated dynamic which transcended the
personal involvement of any particular strategist. For example,Sean
Lemass was the key national strategist that set the process in motion
but he retired from his position as Taoiseach in l966,eight years
before the process was complete. Moreover,in all four different
Ministers for Agriculture were involved at at national policy level
over the full life of the process. This phenomenon was not confined to
any single level,it could be seen right across the board. Dave
O'Loughlin of Golden Vale was a key actor in initiating the amalgamtion,
not only within his own organisation but within the industry at the
level of the firm. He died prematurely in the summer of 1971 before
Golden Vale had begun any formal amalgamation moves. Yet,his early
strategic action had set in train a process at both firm and industry
level which transcended his untimely death.
The second feature is related to the first. In attempting to generate
change across the different levels of social order it was only necessary
for the higher level strategists to make a critical breakthrough across
these different levels. Once the momentum for change had achieved a
certain critical mass the fact of change itself set in motion its own
dynamic at the lower level of rationality. The ultimate outcome was
determined by strategic action at the firm level of analysis consistent
with the rationalities,pressures and strategic conceptions at that level
once the change process had gotten sufficiently underway. In short,the
process of change became itself the object for strategic action,both
defensive and prospective,for actors at all levels of the social system,
acting largely in accordance with their own levels rationality.
This processual analysis of the amalgamation episode at Golden Vale also
contributes to our understanding of strategic change processes. It
extends the literature on strategic change to change processes across
multiple levels of social order. The process strategic change across
these multiple levels of analysis reflects many of the characteristics
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of strategic choice and change processes that have been found in the
literature on choice and change at the organisational level of analysis.
The process was circuitous,unprogramnied and uneven(Mintzberg et
al,1976). The change outcome was non-optimal from the point of view of
any of the major strategic agencies involved in the process. This was a
reflection,among other things,of the complexity of the change and of
the political cleavages(Astley et al,l982) that it generated. These
in turn reflected the different rationalites involved and the bounds on
those rationalities(March,1978). The process of change itself was
problematic and was continually the object of strategic action at
multiple levels of social order. As a result the process was non-linear.
It did not follow any pre-formulated path to solution,nor was it ever
totally under the control of any single strategic agency. It was
a social creation that arose from the ensemble des jeux(Crozier &
Friedberg,1980) of the different strategic agencies at the national,
industry and firm ].evels,each acting in accordance with their own goals,
rationalities,pressures and strategic conceptions.
The context and process of change,thenwere both active elements in the
determination of the outcome. The strategic action at the level of the
firm could not have been fully understood by confining the processual
analysis of the change episode to this level. The context of change at
the firm level was not simply something that the firm 'took on board'
through its endogeneous environmental planning and scanning processes.
The firm's strategic action in this episode cannot be adequately
accounted for through a behaviourist perspective which attempts to
explain organisational action mainly in terms of a response to some set
of impersonal exogeneus stimulii,which somehow or other comes to the
attention of the organisation and its strategists. The inadequacies of
this perspective,which characterises much of the open systems approach
(see Kast & Rosenzweig,1981;566),become very apparent when the change
episode is analysed at multiple levels of context and process.
Context affected the strategic action of people like Dave O'Loughlin or
the lAOS executive in terms of its meaning within their own
rationalities,pressures and strategic conceptions. Within this more
social actionist perspective(Silverman,1970) a key issue in processual
analysis is the issue of how meaning gets transferred from context to
organisation. In the processual analysis of the amalgamation episode we
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saw that meaning was transferred across the different levels of social
order through ideational,political and cultural transmission that were
all vital to the generation of cross level action. Economic analysis
needs therefore to be supported with political and cultural analysis
if the process of strategic change is to be fully understood.
On the evidence of the amalgamation episode,strategic change at firm
level can only be fully understood through a contextualist perspective
that regards the context and the process of change as active elements in
the determination of change outcomes. Such a perspective has been
developed only recently by Pettigrew(l985;35). Processual analysis
itself is still rare in organisational analysis,according to Mohr(l982;
215) who argues that "the kind of description that would seem to have
the greatest potential in social science is description of processes".
Even in the relatively little process research that does take place
there has been a tendency for process scholars to focus on the process-
organisational context linkage at the expense of due attention to
situational context and its effects on process and outcome(Pettigrew,
l987a;6).
The processual analysis of the amalgamation episode carried out
here strongly supports the Pettigrew position that strategic change
processes cannot be adequately understood without due attention to
situational context and the way in which it is processually linked to
strategic change at firm level. However,it goes further. The early work
in the contextualist mode of research has so far concentrated strategic
changes processes within organisations. It has not yet extended its
focus to strategic change processes that link strategic action and
volition across multiple levels of context and process. Processual
analysis of the amalgamation episode has indicated that there are
situations of strategic significance where the need for change is first
seen at levels of rationality higher than the firm and where firm level
rationality,if left largely to its own devices,will change at a degree
and rate that will be sub-optimal for the industry and for the country.
Research that can yield descriptive and prescriptive insight into such
change processes is clearly,therefore,an important area for further
substantive study in its own right. It is important also In that any
attempt to develop a process theory of strategic change which does not
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account for strategic action and volition across multiple levels of
social order will,on the evidence of this research,be incomplete.
The processual analysis of the amalgamation episode presented earlier
has attempted to make a modest beginning in this area,at the level of
descriptive quasi-theory(Mohr, 1982).
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CHAPTER TWELVE
ORGANISATIONAL CAREER - Towards an existential view of
organisational development.
A central theme throughout this research has been that strategy
formation in organisations is a historical process. In previous chapters
we identified and analytically examined the historical forces that were
found to have shaped strategy formation in the organisations under
study. These forces were found to be located both within the
organisation and in its situational context. We explored the historical
variation in the locus of influence over strategy formation as it moved
from organisation to situational context and back again over time. And
we empirically and analytically examined strategy formation in terms of
processes of choice and change to extend our insight,beyond the forces
and locus of influence,into the nature of strategy formation processes
themselves. In this last respect,we revealed the multi-level nature of
the strategy formation process,we explored the ways in which the
situational context comes to actually influence strategy formation,we
identified the modes of intiation of strategic change and lastly we
analytically examined,in some fine detail,a major strategic change
episode in order to get closer to the actual processual dynamics of
strategy formation.
In this chapter we turn our attention,once more,to the whole life
histories of the organisations under study. The central question of
interest here is what can we, learn from this study about the historical
process of organisational development. Two aspects of the life histories
of the organisations in the study are empirically analysed as a prelude
to developing the existentialist view of organisational development that
seems to be emerging from this research. • These two aspects are the
interaction of strategic issues and strategic biographies over the life
histories of the organisations,and the historical nature of the origins
of the organisations themselves. Then an attempt is made to synthesise
what has emerged throughout his work about strategy forination,and by
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extension about organisational development,into a more formal
theoretical position on the development of organisations. An
existentialist perspective is advanced based on the conceptual notion of
ORGANISATIONAL CAREER. This conceptual position is then discussed in
relation to the major historical perspectives on the development of
organisations than already exist in organisation studies.
(i) The intersection of strategic issues and biographies
An empirical theme that strongly emerges from this study is that
organisations develop through the historical intersection of strategic
issues and individual biographies. The biographies are those of the
organisational leaders. The strategic issues are the historical
challenges presented by situational context and organisational history.
This theme has already been empirically and analytically examined in
our discussion of the phenmenon of organisational leadership in the
previous chapter. Organisational development is the result of the
interaction between leaders,their organisation's histories and their
situational contexts extended across the biographies of one or more
leaders. Like the phenomenon of strategic leadership itself,and for
the same reasons that were advanced in the earlier discussion of this
phenomenon, organisational development should also be studied
through a contextual perspective which takes the leader,his
organisation's history and their situational context as its three
coordinate points.
When we examine this intersection of leaders and strategic issues more
closely, we see that in some cases individual biographies spanned issues
and in other cases certain issues spanned individual biographies.
Take the case of CSET for example. The first historic issue which
which faced the General was the revitalisation of the sugar industry in
the wake of its post-war state of exhaustion. Over the 1945-59 period
the General worked to secure and to expand the supply of sugar beet to
CSET. He initiated R&D activities Lnto soil testing and disease control.
He pursued a strategy of related diversification into limestone
quarrying and agricultural engineering activities,all undertaken
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to meet the challenges of the time,the crop disease,the lime deficiency
in the soil and the need to mechanise the harvesting of the beet. By the
late 50's he had secured the supply side on a strong footing and
his organisation was supplying all of the country's needs for sugar,both
for downstream industry and for the general consumer.
By 1960 CSET had nowhere to go with the sugar business. The structure of
the international sugar industry was such that it offered little or no
oportunity for growth through exports. Responding to the historic
challenge thrown down by Lemass,in the drive for economic development,
the General led his orgartisation into food processing. His dream was to
develop a food activity at CSET which would flower into a national food
processing industry,that would eventually be larger in scale "than any
industrial activity (then) carried on in Ireland". The General continued
to lead CSET in this endeavour until his resignation in 1966.
The General was one of a number of the leaders in this study whose
tenure as leader spanned a number of major strategic issues. The
'Doe' in AFT and Dave O'Loughlin in Golden Vale are further
examples. All had long tenures at the top. The General led CSET for 21
years,the Doc led AFT for 21 years and Dave O'Loughlin led Golden Vale
for 15 years,until his untimely death in 1971.
Since strategic issues are relatively enduring there were many examples
in the study of issues that spanned the personal tenures of individual
leaders. For instance,the rise and decline of the food strategy in CSET
spanned the leadership tenures of the General,Tony O'Reilly and Bart
Daly. Similarly the Tuam Closure issue in the same company spanned the
tenures of Maurice Sheehy and Chris Comerford,as did the CSET grand
strategy of modernisation and rationalisation which covered the 1974-87
period. The two plant configuration strategy which is still a live issue
in CSET is a further extension of these earlier strategic developments.
Further examples are the amalgamation issue at Golden Vale which spanned
the leadership tenures of Dave 0 Loughlin and Mick Lenihan, the
export-led growth strategy of IDG which has spanned the tenures of
Kevin Mc Court and Richard Burrows and the strategic merging of the
agricultural research and advisory services which has spanned the
tenures of Tom Walsh and Pierce Ryan in AFT. The spanning of strategic
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issues across the personal biographies of the strategists that initiate
them means that these issues come to take on a life of their own and to
become institutionalised within the life of the organisation. As such
they become objectivated and transmitted through time to form part of
the strategic inheritance that is passed on from one leader to the next.
(ii) The origins of the four organisations
The four organisations in this study are representative of the major
types of organisation that are to be found in the Irish mixed economy.
There is a public limited company,a producer cooperative,a state-owned
entreprise and a state agency. These organisations represent a spread of
ownership forms,with different types of accountability and different
priorities. A striking theme that emerged in the chapter on the national
context was that these ownership forms were the result of what
Thompson(1966;16) would call "particular temporal conjunctions of
material circumstance and human will". In other words,organisational
form emerged largely through historical chance and choice rather than
as the pre-determined outcome of some 'natural' optimum relationship
between ownership form and function. Not only was the ownership form a
matter of historical circumstance but so also were the timing and
reasons for creating these organisations.
In the dairy industry,for example,the development of the mechanical
cream separator provided the technical basis for the structural
evolution of the dairy processing from a farm-based to a creamery-based
industry. However,the cream separator and the cooperative form of
organisation had both been in existence for many years but neither had
made much impact in Irish dairying until Sir Horace Plunkett became
personally involved. Plunkett was the first industrial statesman of
Irish dairying. He spearheaded the structural transformation of Irish
dairying and promoted the widespread adoption of the creamery form of
processing through the cooperative form of organisation,to which he
had become ideologically committed. Largely through Plunkett's efforts
the cooperative form of organisation came to develop a major presence
in Irish dairying. Nevertheless private capitalists developed and
maintained substantial interests in the industry until the late 20's.
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At that time the industry had come perilously close to self-
destruction because of stagnant demand, overcapacity and excessive
competition. In 1927 Dr Henry Kennedy persuaded the then government to
intervene in the industry to save it and secure it for the cooperative
movement. Since then the cooperative movement has dominated it. In
recent months,for the first time in 60 years,private capital has once
more entered the industry through the acquisition of an ailing
cooperative. The recent choice by the shareholders of Baileborough
cooperative to merge with Goodman Industries rather than with the
Killeshandra Cooperative Society may yet prove to be an important
watershed in the structural evolution of Irish dairy processing.
The origins,evolution and organisational forms of the other industries
and organisations in the study can be equally traced to historical
circumstance. CSET was set up as a state-owned entreprise in 1934 to
save the failing indigeneous embryonic sugar industry,which at the time
was be run by private interests. Sean Leniass,the national figure
most prominently associated with Ireland's industrial development
from the foundation of the State right up to the mid 60's and beyond,
often pointed out that state entreprises in Ireland,such as CSET,were
created largely for pragmatic,rather than for ideological,reasons:
"In contrast to many countries where similar State-sponsored
organisations have been created as part of a deliberate policy of
State socialism,they developed in this country in a more haphazard way
to meet particular needs and oportunities as they arose,when no other
course appeared to be practicable. Industrial development in Ireland
is based on private entreprise and the profit motive: State financed
industries have set up only where considerations of national policy
were involved or where the projects were beyond the scope of,or
unlikely to be undertaken by,private entreprise".
(excerpt from a speech by Lemass at the IPA,Dublin,2-Mar-59).
The early industrialisation of the new state came to depend considerably
on state capital as private interests remained unwilling or unable to
develop the fledgling economy at a rate which came anywhere near to
its full potential.
State investment played a major role in the economic expansion drive of
the late 50's and early 60's,the era of 'Ireland Inc.' under Lemass's
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'corporate' economic management. It was in this era that AFT finally got
underway. The concept of an institute dedicated to agricultural research
and education was first mooted through the European Recovery programme,
when it became clear that Irish agriculture was grossly underdeveloped.
The sector itself was ripe for development through a concentrated
critical mass of research effort yet it was structurally too fragmented,
economically and politically,to be able to organise and sustain this
effort itself. The Government stepped in and set up AFT as a state
agency to provide this function in the interests of Irish agriculture
and the economy as a whole. In fact,it was protracted controversy over
state involvement,and the extent of that involvement that delayed the
setting up of the Institute for nearly a decade. In the end,university
and church interests prevented the new institute from having
responsibility for agricultural education as well as research.
The distilling industry developed from the first in the hands of private
interests. It remained essentially a cottage industry up to the end of
the 18th century when there were over 2000 family-owned whiskey stills
in the country. The authorities were intimately involved in the industry
from as early as 1635 when the first statute governing the sale of
intoxicating liquor in Ireland was enacted. The authorities faced a
continuing dilemma in their approach to the development of the industry.
They were interested in controlling the production,sale and consumption
of intoxicants in the interests of public order and welfare. At the same
time the excise duty on the production of whiskey distillates remained a
valuable source revenue for the public purse. When the industry began to
take off in the late 1700's,the output of Irish whiskey doubling from 2
to 4 million proof gallons over the 1780-95 period,the Government forced
the industry to rationalise,through legislation, in order to facilitate
its own supervisory and revenue collecting activities. By the simple
expedient of raising the legal minimum size for a licensed still it
made the cottage sized operation no longer legally viable. By 1823 the
number of legally licensed stills operating in the country had fallen
from 2000 to 40. It was in these circumstances that great family
capitalist dynasties of the Powers,the Jamesons and the like,came to
emerge as the major force in the future organisation and dpvelopment of
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the industry. By the time the cooperative and state-owned forms of
entreprise became major organisational forms in Irish economic
activity the distilling industry had already reached a high degree of
consolidation and was firmly under the dominance of family capitalism.
In sum,the origins and dominant forms of organisation in the industries
and organisations represented in this research were,to a large degree,
products of historical choice and chance,rather than the structural
imperatives derived from some notion of environmentally-determined
functional optimisation.
It is not inconceivable,for example,that the cooperative movement might
have played a significant part in the organisation of the distilling
industry had the cooperative ideals emerged and taken root in Ireland a
century earlier or had the Government not forced rationalisation on the
industry until much later. If the producer cooperatives have come to
play a large role in the development of the French wine industry,as they
have,then it is not unreasonable to suppose that they might have been a
force in the Irish distilling industry had historical circumstances been
different. Equally,the possibility of state entreprise been involved in
distilling has always been real even if it has remained remote. It was
real enough to be the subject of repeated debates in Dail Eireann
throughout the 50's when the Scotch industry's exports began to soar and
Irish whiskey exports palled into insignificance by comparison. This
poor export performance by the industry became the subject of a private
member's measure in which it was proposed that "steps should be taken
to promote exports,if necessary by setting up a state-sponsored company
to produce a suitably blended Irish whiskey"(Magee,l980;89).
Similarly there is nothing pre-determined about the forms of
organisation that currently dominate the dairying or sugar industries.
Private interests and state entreprise have been involved side by side
with the cooperative movement at various times throughout the history of
the Irish dairy industry. In fact,Ireland has an inordinately high level
of cooperative dominance in the organisation of its dairy industry
relative to some of its world class competitors,like the Dutch for
example. By dint of different historical circumstances private capital
has played a much more prominent role,side by side with cooperators,in
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the development of the Dutch dairy industry. The sugar beet industry
seems,on the face of it,like one which could easily have been organised
along cooperative lines,had historical circumstances been different.
The close economic interdependence between producer and processor,that
are a key structural feature in dairying,are also an important feature
in the sugar beet industry. Now in the late 80's the issue of the
possible privatisation of the industry is gathering momentum. There
is already a growing body of support,both within CSET and in the wider
national context,for such a move.
(iii) Organisational career - towards a more existential view
of organisational development
A recurrent theme that emerges from our empirical analysis of strategy
formation is that organisational development was never at any stage
pre-determined in any of the cases under study. In all cases it was the
result of historical choice and chance. That is not to suggest,however,
that it was always patterniess and unpredictable. Rather it is to say
that such pattern and predictability as did exist had only temporal
significance and were not found to flow from any eternal causes nor
were they expected to proceed to infinity(to adapt a phrase from
Thompson, 1966 ; 17)
The origins and strategic development of the organisations in this study
were found to be fully understandable only when viewed in terms of the
ongoing interaction between historical actors,organisational histories
and situational contexts. When we examined the locus of influence over
strategy formation, for example,we found that it varied between the
organisation and its situational context,with some contexts more
structuring than others and some organisational leaders able to
manipulate the requirements of context better than others. We also
found that that the organisational leader's room for action in these
circumstances was often constrained by his organisation's history. In
other words,the strategic options open to actors at time Tn+1 were
often constrained by the strategic choices made by themselves or their
predecessors at time Tn. We saw how some strategic issues became
institutionalised and came to span the biographies of two or more
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strategists. And we came to see the historic challenges that faced a
given leader as emerging from the ongoing interrelationship between
situational context and organisational history. Yet,notwithstanding
the structuring tendencies of situational context and organisational
history,we also found that the autonomous action of far-sighted leaders
often proved to be the decisive element in determining the pace of
organisational development and the direction that it took.
A conceptualisation of organisational development,consistent with the
empirical data in this research,and with the foregoing analysis of that
data in this and previous chapters,is now advanced. Its central theme is
that strategy formation,arid by extension organisational development,is
essentially a historical process. Its view of history is that it does
not follow any timeless pre-determined pattern; yet organisational
development is not purely haphazard and formless anymore than is the
wider social system within which it takes place. History connects
strategic actors,organisations and situational contexts in temporal
conjunction and from this flows the development of organisations.
The patterning logic of organisation is in the production and
reproduction of social systems through time. The patterning logic of
history is in the temporal logic of sequence and consequence.
Organisational development is patterned by the consequences of
historical choices made by,or for,the organisation at an earlier time
and by historical choice,sequence and consequence taking place within
the wider situational context with which it is in continuing
relationship.
One way to conceptualise organisational development that is consistent
with this perspective is to consider organisations as careering through
a context that is changing in time. The concept of ORGANISATIONAL CAREER
is a more inclusive concept than strategy because it involves a higher
level of temporal aggregation. An organisational career spans the
life of individual strategies and strategists to incorporate the
institutionalisation of organisation-context relationships through time
and their objectivation as they are transmitted beyond the biographies
of the pioneers that enacted thern(Berger&Luckmann,1966: Giddens,1984).
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Career as a concept conveys an active role for the organisation in
shaping,as well as being shaped,by its situational context. It provides
for a conceptual blending of the voluntarist and determinist
perspectives on organisational action that is consistent with the
type of contextualist perspective(Crozier & Friedberg,1980:
Pettigrew,1985) within which this study has been carried out.
An organisational career starts with the origin of the organisation.
Organisations are socially contrived phenomena rather than 'natural'
objects. When viewed in the full perspective of history they arise
spontaneously from particular temporal conjunctions of human will and
of social and material circumstances. This was evident in our earlier
discussion of the origins of four organisations studied here. Once
formed,however,an organisation takes on a social life of its own which
often,if not always,transcends the biographies of its originators.
Organisations are purposive and set up to provide benefits to certain
beneficiaries. The right to these benefits can be exchanged or otherwise
transmitted through social space and time. It is this which allows the
organisation as a social entity in itself to transcend the biographies
of individuals. Organisations deploy resources to provide these benefits
and must maintain a viable coalition of resource providers to stay in
existence(see March,1962 for the seminal elaboration of this view).
Organisations develop through time. They may grow, elaborate, change,
retrench, disintegrate and so on,yet not in accordance with any
pre-determined pattern dictated by some external superordthate
imperative or rationality. Neither is their development totally under
the control of any single voluntary agency so that their developement is
not the predictable unfolding of some internal master plan. A central
theme that has emerged throughout this study is that strategy formation,
and by extension the development of organisations,is shaped by forces
both external and internal to the organisation and by the organisation's
own history. Organisational careers are not therefore normally
predictable apriori.
On the other hand an organisational career is not a totally haphazzard
phenomenon defying all prediction and displaying no logic or pattern.
A fundamental characteristic in the notion of organisational career is
that present choices affect future options,thus introducing the
563
historical logic of sequence and consequence. A key element in the
concept of career is that organisations can only satisfy their
beneficiaries through the strategic commitment of resources to selected
activities. It is in their development of special competences,through
the application of their resources to these selected activities,that
they are able to secure and maintain their viability in the wider
economic and social order. These strategic commitments represent choices
with longterm consequences. The position being developed here is that
these choices are career choices analagous to the career choices of
individuals in their professional lives. The existential character of
these choices is that they represent both oportunities and oportunities
forgone,at one and the same time. Future organisational action is then
patterned by the consequences of earlier career choices. Career choices
by their nature are not easily changed without major cost. There is an
organisatiorial equivalent to the cost to the shoemaker of not 'sticking
to his last' (see Peters & Waterman,1982;292-305). At the same time it is
important to point out that organisational career choices,like those of
individuals,can be changed even if the change is costly so that the
consequences of past choices constrain future action by choice rather
than imperative. This existential character of organisational career is
a central element in the concept.
The basic career choices of organisations are usually made right from
their origin. Organisations to a large extent enact their
environments(Weickl969) and the formative period of an organisation's
career usually establishes its basic character. For many organisations
the strategic commitment to technology,the initial choice of domain and
the historical form of ownership(cooperative,capitalist or state etc)
will be the major enactments of the organisation's career(Miles et
al,l974). An organisation's future career is then significantly
patterned by these major enactments. Future oportunities are being
continually evaluated through the ever-extending logic of past choice.
A typical organisational career spans the biographies of many
strategists and each strategic leader has the responsibility for
guiding the career of his organisation during his tenure at the top.
He is both enabled and constrained in this regard by the organisation's
career development to date and by the oportunities that are presented in
the unfolding interaction between the organisation and its situational
564
context. The total career development of an organisation is a cumulative
phenomenon and it depends on the abilities of the strategists that were
historically charged with guiding it,the historical challenges that
situational context and organisational career-to-date presented them
with,and the historical strategic options that they pursued or forewent.
Organisational career and existing theories of organisational
development
Organisational analysis has been dominated,from its earliest beginnings,
with the search for patterned variations across different organisational
types. Such variations have been the basis for much of the conceptual
development that now constitutes organisation theory and for much of the
so-derived prescriptive insight offered to practitioners. The central
message was that there were few universal prescriptions upon which to
based a general theory of management that had validity across all types
of organisation.
By comparison much less theoretical and empirical effort has gone into
the search for possible patterned variations within organisations over
their life histories as an alternative and equally fruitful route
to theory development. Many of those that have preferred this route have
sought parallel insight through the use of biological metaphors. One
such metaphor with a long and notable tradition in the management
literature is the life cycle concept. The life cycle metaphor has
been applied with skill and enthusiasm to products(Levitt,l965) and to
industries(Porter,1980). Not surprisingly it has also been applied to
organisational development(see Kimberley,1980 for a prominent recent
example). The power of the concept of organisational life cycle is that
it presents a stage theory of organisational development and this in
turn directs descriptive and prescriptive theory onto the contingencies
presented by these different stages. The basic message here is that
prescriptive theory does not apply universally over time even within the
same organisation.In other words there are contingencies of stage of
development as well as contingencies of type of organisation.
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As a stage typology the life cycle metaphor is useful in that we can,at
any point in time classify many organisations into analogous equivalents
of the stages of life; birth, growth, maturity and decline.
Useful descriptive and prescriptive theory has be developed for
organisations in these different stages. For example,there is a growing
body of literature concerned with organisational decline(Levine,1978,
1979). However,as a process model of organisational development the life
cycle analogy is limited. Kimberley(l980,7),himself,is fully aware of
these limitations. He freely acknowledges that unlike biological life
"death is not an inevitable feature of organisational life" and that
"there is no inevitable linear sequence of stages in organisational
life". From Penrose(1952) to Van de Ven(1979) and right up to the
present the use of such biological metaphors has been roundly
criticised. Even as the basis for a stage typology the metaphor is not
necessary. If growth is taken to mean the trend in revenues (or in
allocations,in not-for-profits) then there are only three possible
conditions for an ongoing concern and these would yield the same
typology; growth ,zero-growth arid decline. As a model of process the
life cycle metaphor is over-deterministic,and this is perhaps its most
serious limitation.
The concept of organisational career being presented here does recognise
three stages of organisational development; origin,formative career, and
full career. The major career choices for the organisation are generally
made during the origin and formative career periods. These career
choices are the strategic conunitments,or major enactments of
technology,domain and form of ownership,that form the basic character of
the organisation. In full career the organisation has divergent
possibilities open to it which are,however,not fully under its own
control. The career trajectory that any organistion may take in full
career will depend on the continuing interplay between organisational
strategists,organisational history and situational context. In full
career the same organisation may experience periods of growth,stability,
stagnation,decline,revitalisation,renewal,crisis,turnaround and so on,
as was very evident in the cases of the four organisations in this
study. There is no inevitable pattern or linear sequence in a full
career trajectory and none was evident in the empirical data. Moreover,
since organisations are socially contrived,and not natural,phenomena
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they can disintegrate at any time,so that career lengths across
different organisations may vary enormously and termination is not
inevitable as long as there are people alive to organise. CSET,for
example is now over 50 years in existence. The family distilling firms
of Power and Jameson,riow merged into IDG,are almost 200 years old.
The organisational career perspective on organisational development is
closer,therefore,to the less deterministic and now classic perspectives
of Chandler(1962) and Greiner(1972). However,both the Chandler and
Greiner models are linear-sequenced growth models and both are over-
voluntaristic. A major point of convergence between these two models
and the conceptualisation of organisational career presented here is the
emphasis on the importance of organisational history(Greiner,1972;37-8)
and the historic pattern of investment in human skills and in
physical assets(Chandler,1962;384) on the future growth and
development of the organisation. Their major limitation is that they
underplay the importance of situational context in the structuring of
organisational career trajectories. Neither forsaw the possibility of
low-growth or zero-growth in the macro-economic environment. When
situated in the context of their development as niodels,the 1962-72
period,this is understandable. Few economic or social commentators at
that time could ever forsee a return to general economic depression on a
scale and of a duration comparable with the Great Depression of the
30's. Yet,the situational context in low-growth 1980's has had an major
effect on the career patterns of all of the organisations in this study.
Finally,the concept of organisational career highlights a central
dilemma in the ongoing development of organisations. The basic element
in career choice is the strategic commitment of certain specialised
skills and assets to certain selected activities. Strategic commitments
of this sort are necessary in order to develop the distinctive
competences and cumulative experience on which to secure the future of
the organisation. Yet these strategic commitments are also,by their
nature,a potential source of rigidity and inflexibility and are not
always easily reversed or transferred to other activities. Major
career departures are, therefore difficult,rare and risky as was
reflected in the data in this study.
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In the case of CSET,for example,the organisation's diversification into
food processing in the 60s was the one major career departure in its 50
year history. It was a heroic failure that,in the end,fell far short of
hopes and expectations of all concerned. CSET survived this,learned from
it and went on to renew and reaffirm its basic career commitment to its
core business. Sometimes an organisation is pressured into a basic
career transformation through developments in its situational context.
This has been the case in AFT since 1979. The early career of AFT was
strongly based on production research. By the late 70's the
organisation had accumulated considerable experience and achieved an
outstanding competence in this area through the development,over 20
years,of highly specialised human skills and material assets. The
organisation has since had to try to transform itself in a basic career
reorientation that involves the development of more competence and
the application of more resources to process research to bring it
into line with the changing values and requirements in its situational
context. This transformation has been going on for years now and is
still not complete. The most difficult career departures to make are
those which involve the strategic commitment of new assets and new
skills to totally new activities,or those which involve the radical
transformation of existing assets and skills to new meet totally new
requirements. The inherent difficulties involved in making such
major career departures would seem to account for the infrequency of
revolutionary change or radical transformation in organisational
development that has been the consistent theme of a number of
recent studies on strategy and strategic change processes(Miller &
& Friesen,1980; Miller,1982; Tushman & Romanelli,1983; Pettigrew,1985).
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
A SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS.
In this,the final,chapter of the dissertation the main findings of the
study are reviewed and their implications for future research and
practice assessed. The chapter begins by synthesising the main
conceptual findings of the study into an overall relational model of
strategy formation. The main findings are then reviewed and the utility
of the relational model is assessed. This is followed by a brief summary
of the other major themes that were developed from the empirical
analysis. The chapter,and the dissertation,close with an assessment
of the implications of this study for future research and for the
future practice of strategic management.
Strategy formation and organisational career - an emergent
model of organisational development.
Two main themes have emerged from this research that can be brought
together into an integrated model of strategy formation as illustrated
in figure 13.1.
MAIN	 THE	 POINT IN	 CUMULATIVE
ELEMENTS	 PROCESS	 TIME OUTCOME OUTCOME
SITUATIONAL CONTEXT
Technology
Industry Evolution
International Trading
Env. Evolution
.National Public Policy
and Leadership
.Social and Cultural
Transformation
ORGANISATIONAL
LEADER(S)
ORGAN I SATI ONAL
HISTORY
(Org. Career
to date)
STRATEGY '	 STRATEGIC \ ORGANISAT-
FORMATION	 COMMITMENT ). j IONAL
PATTERNING! CAREER
.Origin
Formative
Career
.Full
Career
---
Figure 13.1 - A relational model of strategy formation
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This research has identified that strategy formation is best understood
in terms of the interaction of SITUATIONAL CONTEXT,ORCANISATIONAL
LEADERS and ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY. It has also identified and examined
five major elements in the situational contexts of organisations that
appear to be the most important in the shaping of strategy,though
their relative importance would seem to vary with the size and nature
of the national context. This was the first major theme to emerge from
the project. The second theme emerged when the researcher turned to
address the issue of strategy formation over the life histories of
organisations. Existing models of organisational development over time
were found to be inadequate to explain the empirical findings and the
concept of ORGANISATIONAL CAREER was introduced and developed as a more
appropriate model. This concept is based on an analogy with the career
of the individual.
Bringing these two major themes together provides the basis for a more
integrated,emergent model of strategy formation and organisational
development,as presented in figure 13.1.
The full model portrays strategy formation as a continuing process in
the life histories of organisations. The main interactive elements in
the process are those of SITUATIONAL CONTEXT,ORGANISATIONAL LEADERS and
ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY. The interaction of these elements produces point
in time outcomes in the patterning of strategic commitments. These
strategic commitments then become the major element in the
organisational history input into future strategy formation. Their
aggregation and accumulation over time forms the basis for the
patterning of an organisation's career.In other words,it is this ongoing
formation,reformation and transformation of strategic commitments that
provides the process of ongoing organisational development with its
historical patterning of sequence and consequence.
Two important sub-themes have also emerged in this research which
underpin the model described above. The first of these themes was the
elaboration of organisational leadership as a phenomenon that is
proper1y located in the historical interaction of the leader,his
organisation's history and its situational context. The historical
challenges and oportunities facing the organisational leader were seen
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to vary at different phases of an organisation's career. The nature of
the historic challenge,and the leader's personal capacity to meet this
challenge,together,yielded the analytical distinction which emerged in
this study between builders,revitalisers,turnarounders and inheritors.
The other major sub-theme that emerged was that the dominant element in
the organisational context affecting strategy formation in the
organisations in this study was the organisation's history. The
constraints of history were the main structuring elements of the
organisational context on the process of strategy formation,and they
were more important than the dispersive effects of complex social
structure on organisational processes that students of larger,more
complex organisations have found to be most significant. It was this
second sub-theme which prompted the inclusion of the feedback loop in
the above conceptual model.
Having summarised the relational model In overview we will now go on to
review in some detail three major elements in the model before returning
to evaluate its overall utility. These three elements are the concept of
organisational career, the perspective on organisational leadership
which is inherent in the model,and the model's elaboration of
situational context.
The utility of the career analogy
As Mintzberg(l979;584) has stated "all theories are false,because all
abstract from data and simplify the world they purport to describe" so
that "our choice,then,is not between true and false theories so much as
between more and less useful theories". Mintzberg's point applies to all
the sciences and is well illustrated by a famous example from the
physical sciences. One of the most famous models in physics is the "Bohr
atom". In this model physicist,Nils Bohr,advanced a model of the atom
analogous to the motion of the planets. This analogy was very useful and
had significant explanatory and predictive value when applied to the
aggregate behaviour of large populations of atoms. The analogy,however,
broke down when the unit of analysis was the behaviour of the individual
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atom and it had to be supplanted at this level by the more sophisticated
and intricate statistical modelling of quantum mechanics. The planetary
analogy was not 'true' for all atomic phenomena but it was 'useful' for
a wide range of such phenomena.
The question for us in this research is therefore,not whether
organisations have or do not have careers, but rather whether or not the
career analogy is a useful addition to the models of strategy formation
and organisational development already in use. In particular,is this
analogy of career philosophically justified and is it empirically
useful? In attempting to answer these questions frequent comparisons
will be made with the organisational life cycle model. This is because
the view taken here is that organisational career is a more appropriate
analogy than that of organisational life cycle for examining
organisational strategy formation and transformation over time.
At the theoretical level the career analogy offers a number of
advantages. It forms an analytical bridge between the voluntarist and
determinist extremes that have polarised much of the literature in
organisational analysis,as was seen in chapter two. At the heart of the
career analogy is the notion of who or what is in the driving seat in
the process of strategy formation at any point in time. The career
analogy accomodates variation in the locus of influence of strategy
formation over time. The career direction of an organisation may at some
times be largely determined by the voluntarist actions of the
organisation's strategists,at other times by the pressures in the
situational context. In particular,the career analogy is less
deterministic than the life cycle analogy. The life cycle analogy
suggests that all organisations follow the same inevitable linear
pattern over their life historieà and that their decline is inevitable.
The analogy of organisational career accomodates the life cycle pattern
and sequence as only one of a divergent and varied set of possible
career patterns. It also acknowledges the ever-changing patterning of
history and allows for the possibility of new career patterns emerging
as the future unfolds,that are not yet empirically observable in today's
organisationsat this point in social history. This possibility is
precluded from the life cycle analogy where individual life cycle
patterns,in contrast to individual career patterns,are historically
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unchanging. The career analogy is closer to the less deterministic
Chandler and Greiner models of organisational development. It shares
with these models the recognition of the role played by organisational
history on the organisation's future pattern of development. Yet it
avoids the linearity and over-voluntarism inherent in these models
because it is affords more weight to the importance of the situational
context in the structuring of organisational career trajectories through
historical time. Furthermore,the inherent recognition in the model of
the dynamic shifting of the driving force from organisation to
situational context and back again highlights the multi-level nature of
strategy formation and organisational development and facilitates ,within
the model,multiple levels of analysis. In contrast,the life cycle model
is addressed almost exclusively at the organisational level of analysis,
with situational context largely receding into the background.
Finally,a major conceptual utility that is claimed for the life-cycle
analogy is that it provides a stage theory of organisational
development. This stage theory is useful because it directs management
theory and practice to focus on the contingent requirements of the
different stages.The career analogy preserves this conceptual utility
but also extends it. The life cycle analogy identifies only four stages
in strict linear sequence. The career analogy is a more existential
one,which emphasises the divergent possibilities for organisations in
full career. The career framework can be used to identify and to explore
the contingent requirements of such phase developments as growth,
elaboration, stagnation, revitalisation, diversification, transformation,
retrenchment, turnaround,clecline,disintegration,and so forth. In other
words the career framework directs the attention of researchers and
managers onto a more discriminant and varied set of distinct career
stages,along with their own contingent implications for theory and
practice, than does the life-cycle model.
The career analogy is also useful empirically and seems to be in closer
accord with empirical reality than the life cycle model. The life cycle
analogy implies that all organisations ultimately pass from a growth
phase towards phases of maturity and decline in linear sequence. This
implies that all organisations eventually experience a slowing down in
their maturity. It also implies that after the growth phase the 'lives'
and life potentials of all organisations are similiar. These
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implications are implicit in the biological analogy,if the analogy is to
remain largely faithful to its source. The use of career,rather than
biological life-cycle,as an analogy avoids these implicit implications
and accomodates,within the analogy,more of the empirical reality of
organisational development. Organisations like individuals are seen
empirically to have varied and multi-faceted careers. Early career,for
organisations and individuals alike,is a time when basic resources are
assembled and basic skills built up. This period involves some basic
choices around what type of resources to acquire,what type of skills or
special competences to build up and what kinds of activities to apply
them to. There is much more cross-individual and cross-organisational
variety in the observable patterning involved in formative career than
is implied in the physical growth analogy of life cycle. After
their formative period organisational careers,like the careers of
individuals, can follow very different and divergent patterns.
Some careers become more spectacular and multi-facted than others,
reflecting the variability in resources and in goals that
characterise individuals and organisations alike. This was clearly
reflected in this study in the multifarious careers of the six major
organisations in the Irish dairy industry. Furthermore,organisations
like iridividuals,cannot apply themselves to every possible career
oportunity. They must make basic career choices that will affect their
future actions. They continually seek to build up special competences
with a growing economic value and they are always trying to find the
best match between their special competences and the oportunities to
apply them to in their situational contexts.
Organisational career is a social,rather than a biological,analogy
and is a more realistic analogy for the development of organisations,
which are basically social rather than natural objects. The career
analogy is inherently contextual. The concept of career is meaningless
unless taken in context. For example,we cannot meaningfully visualise,
or begin to evaluate,a tennis career without seeing it in the context of
the specialised equipinent,the rules of the game,the nature of the
arena and the competition,and the measurement of progression. The career
analogy is also inherently historical. A career is built on,and is
constrained by,past choices and past actions. Career competence is
historically cumulative and there are inherent,and often escalating,
switching costs involved in changing to new career paths If the existing
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resource and skill base offers little in the way of transfer synergy for
new and different applications. Finally,the career prospects of
of organisations,like those of individuals,depends on the contextual
demand for their special competences,and this tends to vary over time.
Some skills can be developed and built on and can form the basis for new
departures and the creation of new values. Others can become redundant
with a changing context and pass into history. Ongoing career prospects
for organisations and individuals alike depend on the active management
of context,and of its constraints and oportunities. In short,the career
development of the individual is a more varied phenomenon,less
sequentially determined and with ever more divergent existential
possibility,than is the case with his biological development. As such
the career analogy is much closer to the empirical reality of
organisational development patterns than the biological,life-cycle,
counterpart.
The perspective on leadership
The perspective on organisational leadership that is integral to the
relational model on strategy formation being presented here locates the
phenomenon of strategic leadership in the historic interaction between
the organisational leader,his organisation's history and its situational
context,as noted earlier. The view that strategic leadership cannot be
meaningfully understood and evaluated acontextually or ahistorically was
was a theme which emerged very strongly from the empirical data in this
study. Yet,the vast literature on leadership in organisational analysis
can be generally characterised as over-voluntarist,acontextual and
ahistorical. This vast literatu±e has been little concerned with
strategy and strategic action per Se. it has tended to grow out of a
primary focus in small group dynamics and a primary interest in the
interpersonal leadership skills that are observable in these small group
situations. In this it has tended to focus empirically mainly on middle
managers and supervisors and has paid relatively little attention to the
phenomenon of corporate leadership.
In much of the literature on sttategy,and on organisational behaviour
more, generally,the phenomenon of leadership is often implicit
and taken for granted. At one extreme leaders are implicitly assumed to
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be omniscient and omnipotent commanders of flexible organisational
resources. The central issue in strategy formation in this view is one
of optimising rational forward planning. Leaders are simply seen as
good or bad, universally effective or ineffective,and the good leaders
are those with the personal attributes and management skills to lead any
entreprise or undertaking at any stage in its development. At the other
extreme the organisation is reified and the role of leader is reduced to
that of adaptive navigator. The first position characterises much of the
normative strategy literature and the second position reflects much of
the literature based on the open systems paradigm. This research
strongly supports the small,but growing,stream of literature that
sees the phenomenon of leadership as a substantive,problematic,and
contextually sensitive variable in strategy formation. It is one that
cannot be taken for granted but should be included explicitly in any
conceptual model of strategy formation.
The influence of leaders on strategy formation was seen to depend not
only on the personal attributes of the leader but on the match between
these attributes and the nature of the historical challenge facing the
organisation at any particular time. The temporal conjunction of
situational context and organisational history was seen to be the source
of the historical challenges and oportunities presented to the
organisational leader. To adapt a famous aphorism from Karl Marx;
organisational leaders do form strategy but often not in circumstances
of their own choosing. Leaders are pivotal active agencies in strategy
formation but their actions are both constrained and enabled by
situational context and organisational history. This is the essence of
the contextualist perspective on leadership supported by the empirical
findings of this research. The historical challenge was seen to present
the stage for leadership but not to be simply equated with it. The
classification of the leaders in this study as builders,revitalisers,
turnarounders and inheritors/transformers,did reflect the challenges of
history. Yet to be given the historic oportunity to build is not to
build, to be given the oportunity to revitalise is not to revitalise,to
be given the oportunity to turn around or to transform is not to
actually accomplish these things. Leaders are variable in their
capacities to perform these	 tasks or even to recognise the
true nature and full potential of the historical challenges and
oportunities presented to them.
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Furthermore,the personal attributes needed for successful leadership
vary with the nature of these historic challenges and are themselves
contextually defined. The empirical and conceptual position on
leadership emerging from this study directs the attention of leadership
scholars beyond consideration of such acontextual personal attributes
such as cognitive capability and political skill and onto,for example,
the importance of contextually relevant substantive knowledge and of
personal political networks of relationships,attributes which can
vary over time and context. For instance,the chief executive of Golden
Vale had the substantive knowledge and personal political credibility
with the banks to play a major part,as the then financial controller,in
bringing the company quickly out of its financial difficulties in 1975.
The crisis of the mid-80's was different in its contextual imperatives
and the same executive's lack of substantive knowledge of dairying and
of the politics of dairy farming,and the poor state of his political
relationships with his neighbouring competitor,were major considerations
in the strategic difficulties that the company experienced at that time.
The substantive influence of leaders on strategy formation is,therefore,
to be fully understood only when studied in interaction with
organisational history and situational context over time. Linking this
contextual and historical perspective on leadership with the concept of
organisational career provides a conceptual framework within which to
study the phenomenon of leadership and raises some interesting issues
for inquiry. Strategic leadership can be conceived of in this framework
as the historical task of managing an organisational career over a
certain period of time. Placing the phenomenon of leadership
analytically within the framework of organisational career focuses
attention on the strategic importance,not only of leadership
performance,but also of leadership selection and replacement. With
organisational career as the unit of analysis the question of how
organisational leaders substantively develop and change the careers of
organisations is accomodated. However,career as the unit of analysis
also focuses attention on the equally important and interesting question
of how organisational career transitions often necessitate and lead
to a change in strategic leadership. In other words,career as the unit
of analysis allows us to see leadership in context in bi-directional
relationship with strategy formation. The historical and contextual
perspective inherent in the model removes us from the position,taken in
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much of the normative literature on strategy at the organisational
level of analysis,of identifying implicitly with the strategic leader
and seeing strategy formation as essentially his problem. In our
perspective the problem is not external to the leader,rather the leader
is seen as an inherent part of the problem.
The elaboration of situational context - the five factors
One of the major contributions of this study is its elaboration of the
situational context of organisations,through its analytical isolation
and empirical examination of the five contextual factors that were most
important in the formation of strategy in the organisations under study.
The analytical isolation and elaboration of these factors was made
possible by the use of a multi-level approach to the empirical
examination of situational context in this research. The multi-level
approach taken in this study involved the inclusion of a separate
historical narrative on the common national context,researched and
described at national level of analysis,along with the individual case
narratives which contain historical description of situational context,
not only at the organisational level of analysis but also at the
industry level as well. This type of multi-level approach is still
extremely rare in organisational analysis(Pettigrew,l987a;4-6)
The term situational context was deliberately chosen at the outset
because it connoted more immediacy than the broader concept of the
environment. In organisational studies there has been a tendency to be
either acontextual and over-reductionist in the characterisation of the
environments of organisations,as is the case with most research carried
out within the dominant contingency paradigm in organisational analysis,
or to treat the environment as idiosyncratic and residual as research
within the classic Andrew's paradigm in strategy studies tends to do.
By adopting a multi-level contextualist approach this research has been
able to avoid these extremes of reductionism and residualism in its
treatment of the situational contexts of organisations and was able,frorn
the empirical inquiry,to identify five predominant contextual forces
that shape strategy formation at the level of the organisation.
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The five contextual forces that were found to have the most influence on
the formation of strategy in the organisations under study were
(i)TECHNOLOGY, (ii)INDUSTRY EVOLUTION, (iii)INTERNATIONAL TRADINC
ENVIRONMENT, (iv)NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND LEADERSHIP,and (v)SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION. Porter's(1980) framework for industry analysis
is the most widely recognised treatment in the strategy literature to
date of the contextual forces that shape strategy. It emerged through a
powerful analytical blending of the Industry Organisation tradition in
economics and the classic Andrew's concept of strategy in the business
policy field. This study has followed in the Porter tradition of seeking
to isolate and elaborate on the main contextual forces that shape the
formation of strategy in organisations. It did empirically
affirm the importance of industry structure and structural evolution
as a major contextual force shaping strategy formation in the
organisations under study. However,the empirical analysis assigned
importance in its own right to technology,a contextual force which is
subsumed under industry structure in the Porter model,and also
highlighted the importance of three further contextual forces not
included in Porter's framework. Porter's framework alone would have been
an inadequate model with which to explain the empirical data on the
influence of situational context on strategy formation to be found in
this research.
As well as isolating these five contextual forces the empirical analysis
also provided some indication of how they affect strategy formation,
and how they are interrelated,which will be useful in future research
and theory generation within the overall framework being presented here,
and summarised in figure 13.1. For example,technological breakthrough,
or discontinuous technological change,was found to be a major force
affecting the structural evolution of whole industries,often enabling
and catalysing the transition to new forms of industry organisation and
providing an important impetus towards new levels of industry growth
and concentration. Technological constraint in upstream producer
industries was found to be an important impediment to the growth of
downstream processors. Discontinuous technological change in the former
was found to be a key factor in releasing a new impetus for further
growth and structural evolution in the latter. Competitie forces within
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the industry,nationally and internationally, and the desire of the
organisations to secure and strengthen their competitive positions,
were found to influence the movement towards increasing levels of
concentration of capital,of concentration of capacity,of investment,and
of vertical integration among the organisations in the study.
Strategy formation in the industries and organisations under study was
found to be affected by the structural evolution of the international
trading environment,the historical rate of expansion and contraction in
the general level of international trade,and the changing ideologies and
'rules of the game' governing the management of the international
economy. It was also affected by national public policy and leadership
which sometimes mediated the effects of changes in the conduct and
pattern of international trade,with price supports and protectionist
policies and at other times actively harnessed the 'natural' forces in
the international trading context to pursue positive policies of
economic development with direct implications for strategy formation in
the industries and organisations in the study. Social and cultural
transformation in the wider society also affected strategy formation at
organisational level. The transition from traditionalism to empiricism
in the wider society affected fundamental attitudes to innovation and
structural change at industry and organisation level. The transition
in the leadership of national society from the revolutionary generation
of nation builders to the post-revolutionary generation of career
professionals was mirrored in many of the nation's industries and
organisations and reflected in the strategies pursued by the different
generations of leaders.
These contextual forces,while analytically separable were often found to
interact in their effects on strategy formation at the organisatiorial
level. For example,in the fundamental transition from cottage industry
to factory organisation discontinuous technological breakthrough played
a major role in the dairy industry while government policy was the major
force that accelerated this transition in the distilling industry. These
interactive effects were seen perhaps at their most interactive in this
study in the case of the structural evolution of the dairy industry
in the 1960's. In this case national leadership,as a matter of public
policy,actively endeavoured to bring about a higher level of
concentration in the national dairy industry to strengthen its
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international competitiveness and its to improve its prospects for
growth in an international trading environment characterised by general
expansion and liberalisation in world trade. This structural evolution
in dairying in the 60's was both affected by,and contributed to,the
transition gathering pace in Ireland during that decade from a
rural,traditional and insular society to one which was rapidly becoming
more urban,modern and outward-looking.
Finally,these five contextual forces are not to be simply seen as
'impersonal' forces,because the empirical data showed again and again
that this is not the case. Much of the research carried out at the
organisational level of analysis only has tended to portray the
environment outside the organisation as homogeneous and impersonal. It
has also tended to focus on the scanning and selective perception of
internal decision-makers as the primary mechanism by which the
environment comes to affect organisational action. The texture of the
situational context of organisations that emerged in this multi-level
empirical study was one of overlapping and interleaving social action
in context,and of interlinking processes of volition,at multiple levels
of social structure.
The process by which situational context was found to affect
organisational action was the outcome of the historical conjunction of
personalities,issues and structures at many levels of the social
system,including the organisational level itself,and of their
interaction through time. Recall for example the pioneering
contribution of Sir Horace Plunkett in the organisation of the Irish
dairy industry,his foundation of the Cooperative Movement in Ireland to
secure the benefits of the new form of creamery organisation,made
possible by the development of the mechanical separator,for the primary
producers. Recall also how the influence of J.M.Keynes was harnessed by
first Fianna Fail government to help legitimate their policy of economic
self-sufficiency in the 1930's,a policy which had major implications
for the development of Irish organisations for over two decades.
Recall further how university and farming interests harnessed the
influence of the Catholic Social Movement in the 50's in their
opposition to the establishment of AFT, and in the curtailment of it
charter. Recall lastly how Lemass stimulated CSET's major
diversification through the challenge thrown down by him in his
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indicative programme for national economic expansion and how he,and
his ministers,actively worked to bring about the restructuring of the
Irish dairy industry to strengthen its international competitiveness.
The processes by which the situational context of the organisations
in the study came to be reflected in the formation of strategy were
found to involve multi-level processes of SOCIAL EXCHANGE and CULTURAL
TRANSMISSION as well as organisational level SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
processes of shared cognition and selective attention. The empirical
examination of the situational context - organisation interaction
was found to require a combination of rational-economic,political
and cultural modes of analysis in order to be fully understood.
The utility of the relational model of strategy formation
Taken in its entirety the relational model suimnarised in fig 13.1
presents a workable,testable,coherent and multi-level model of strategy
formation which is theoretically justifiable and empirically sound.
Its main features have been carefully derived largely from empirical
evidence and the model has been elaborated,sharpened and levelled
through close interaction with the empirical data.
The model provides a framework within which to study strategy formation.
The framework captures the complexity of the strategy formation process
and its essential multi-level character. It locates the strategy
formation process in the dynamic interplay between situational context
and organisational action and provides a conceptual framework within
which to carry out systematic empirical research into the character of
this interplay. It provides a tool for analysis. The main strength
of the model is in its empirical isolation and identification of three
main elements in strategy formation as SITUATIONAL CONTEXT,
ORGANISATIONAL HISTORY and the ORGANISATIONAL LEADER,all in dynamic
interrelationship. A further major strength of the model is in its
empirical isolation of five main contextual factors which shape strategy
formation. In this regard it elaborates the situational context of
organisations,which much of the strategy literature and the open systems
literature has tended to treat in residual and global terms. It directs
the attention of practitioners and future researchers alike onto
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specific factors in situational context that seem to have the greatest
influence on strategy formation and organisational development. Taken as
a whole,the model presents a powerful set of analytical categories to
practitioners and researchers alike,within which to carry out both
normative and descriptive investigations into strategy formation.
A striking feature of this study,and of the framework which has emerged
from it,is the way in which the utility of a number of different
perpectives on strategy and strategy formation have been demonstrated
empirically. Not surprisingly,therefore,the analytical consistency of
these multiple perspectives is strongly reflected in the relational
model. For example, the model presented in Fig 13.1. accomodates the
now classic Andrews model of strategy formation but also extends it
historically and temporally. The main normative prescription of the
Andrews model,the carrying out of the oportunitites/threats and
strengths/weaknesses analysis prior to making major strategic
commitments is consistent with the type of normative prescriptions that
might be addressed to organisational leaders from a model that locates
the phenomenon of strategic leadership in the interaction of the leader,
his organisation's history and its situational context. The Andrew's
model could be seen,therefore,as a special case of the more general
framework offered here. Andrews offers a limited point-in-time
perspective on this interaction and identifies with the strategist,
viewing the problem solely through a management perspective. The
relational model in this study extends this perspective on strategy
formation to the ongoing management of organisational careers over time.
It directs attention onto the search for longitudinal and vertical
patterning in the interplay between strategists,organisational histories
and situational contexts and onto the organisational strategist as a
variable in strategy formation in his own right.
The relational model incorporates the Porter framework for industry
analysis as an integral element and extends it to multiple levels of
analysis.It also elaborates on the contextual forces that shape strategy
across national economic contexts. Moreover,it provides an analytical
bridge between the content-process division which is often used to
separate the divergent approaches to research in the strategy field.
Content theories such as Porter's framework for industry analysis and
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the BCG portfolio matrix,and categorisations based on the process models
of such theorists as Mintzberg(deliberate/emergent) and Quinn(synoptic/
incremental) have all been found to be useful in describing and
analysing the process of strategy formation in this study. The
analytical linking of the context,process and content of strategy
formation is a central theme in the contextual perspectives of such
organisational theorists as Pettigrew and Crosier & Friedberg. The
relational model of strategy formation presented here,incorporating the
concept of organisational career,is firmly rooted in this emergent
contextualist tradition and extends it towards a contextualist framework
for organisational development. This contextualist framework preserves
and improves on the theoretical utility of the life-cycle analogy to
provide a more empirically sound model of organisational development.
Furtherinore,it is also conceptually highly consistent with the
stream of theory on the growth of the firm in the industrial
economics tradition that abandons the theoretical notion of an economic
optimum size as empirically unsound. This tradition seeks instead to
explain variations in the growth rates of firms in terms of the dynamic
restraints imposed by the historical pattern of resource development and
deployment,along with the managerial capability to perceive and manage
the future productive oportunities for those resources(Penrose,
l959:1980),and also in terms of those restraints imposed by the overall
competitive context of the firm(Downey,1958).
The relational model of strategy formation presented here seems,
therefore,to answer Penning's(l985) call for eclectic and
multi-disciplinary approaches to the development of theory in the
complex field of strategy studies. Furthermore,the multi-level nature of
the model recognises the multiple levels of normative and analytical
interest in strategy formation at the level of the firm. For example,it
recognises and analytically accomodates the active interest of public
policy makers and corporate industry entities in the formation of
strategy at firm level. The five contextual forces identified in the
model are not conceived and presented in the model as unidirectional,
impersonal,contextual forces. Rather the model recognises the multiple
levels of social volition, action and interaction involved in strategy
formation at the level of the firm and in the ultimate historical
trajectories of organisational careers. The empirical analysis of the
amalgamation episode in the Irish dairy industry,carried out within this
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emergent perspective,demonstrated the empirical and analytical utility
of the model as a conceptual framework within which to carry out
multi-level processual analysis. It also demonstrated the descriptive
and prescriptive utility of such multi-level processual analyses. It
highlighted the processual difficulties in harmonising and interleaving
multiple levels of strategic intent in the overall socio-economic
structure and provided an analytical bridge between concern at the
national level of analysis with overall economic and industrial
development and concern at industry and firm levels with industrial and
organizational development. The model is useful,therefore,to students
of strategy formation at firm level that identify with the
national,industry or firm levels as their primary level of interest.
One further notable feature of the framework presented here is the
way in which it provides an analytical bridge between the voluntarism
and determinism dichotomy that has tended to polarise much of the
research in organisational studies that takes the organisation as the
primary level of analysis. This analytical bridge is provided in the
historical or longitudinal perspective and in the multi-level nature of
the model. The longitudinal perspective of the model focuses attention
of organisations as continuing systems and the voluntarism-determinism
dichotomy becomes replaced by a voluntarism-determinism dynamic.
The issue of whether strategy formation at the level of the firm is
primarily endogeneously or exogeneously driven is viewed in the model
as variable with situational context and over time. Voluntarism and
determinism are seen as two 'ideal type' extremes of the same dynamic
continuum rather than as mutually exclusive alternative world views.
Moreover,the multi-level nature of the model provides for an analytical
blending of voluntarist and determinist world views through the dynamic
linkages in social action and structuration processes,implicit in the
model,across the different levels of social structure. Volition at one
level of social structure is seen to provide a structuring of the
context for action at other levels,but again in dynamic interaction
which varies in degree across contexts and over time.
The alternative world views of voluntarism and determinism have tended
to reflect what researchers were theorising about. Management theorists
have tended to be voluntarist in world view. They have sought
traditionally to establish timeless universal,or at least contingent,
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principles of management. One implicit assumption is that management
is the primary determinant of organisational performance. A second is
that the essential 'game' of management is historically constant so that
time independent theory is possible and should address the issue of how
to play the game more effectively. On the other hand there is a strong
pre-disposition in organisation theory towards determinism. This is
rooted in the essence of what organisation theorists are theorising
about. The mainstream of organisation theory has sought timeless
universal,or at least contingent,principles of organisational behaviour.
For many in this tradition a theory of organisational behaviour,if it is
not to be simply equated to a theory of the aggregate behaviour of
individuals within organisations and consequently to be
indistinguishable from management theory,rests on the belief that
organisational effectiveness is determined primarily by exogeneous
factors. Furthermore,like management theory,the mainstream of
organisation theory has tended to be ahistorical and to implicitly
assume that the primary 'rules' the organisation-environment matching
game are timeless.
The framework presented here can help to generate theory on
organisational action which conceptually avoids the over-determinism of
mainstream organisation theorists and the over-voluntarism of management
theorists by taking organisational career as the unit of analysis. The
central question for explanatory theory then becomes one of how to
describe and explain variations in organisational career patterns.
Theorising about organisational career patterns involves seeking
patterns in the historical interaction of leaders,their organisational
histories and their situational contexts. Organisational career,as the
unit of analysis from which to generate useful theory on the action of
organisations in context,is neither determinist nor voluntarist in
its implicit world view. Future explanatory theory of organisational
career patterns should provide a more empirically sound and conceptually
useful basis from which to advance a theory of the management of
organisations than either management theory or organisation theory,
and one which is always historically relevant.
Finally,while the relational model presented here was as far as possible
grounded in the empirical data and allowed to emerge from that data,no
researcher goes into the field with a blank mind. Pure inductive and
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empirically grounded theory is itself an ideal type which is imaginable
conceptually but impossible to realise in practice. The reality involved
the constant interaction between the researcher,his emerging data and
the ideas and influences of other researchers and theorists in the
search for new insight. Linearity is forced on the researcher as part of
the process of writing up the research report and gives a deceptive view
of the research process itself. For example the organising principles
presented in chapter two of this report were not fully developed prior
to the field work though they are presented to the reader before the
data themselves. This is done largely to facilitate communication with
the reader and to make the whole report more intelligible and easy to
read. In fact the organising principles contain the embryo of the
relational model in this final chapter and were themselves developed and
refined in interaction with the data. The ongoing search for further
insight involved induction and deduction,and emerging categories and
relationships,generated from the data in this fashion,were reflected
back against the data for further empirical evaluation.
The ideas of many others influenced the researcher in his search for
synthesis and insight as this heavily referenced research report fully
attests. However,it only becomes possible at the end of a project such
as this to be able,though retrospective reflection,to isolate the more
dominant influences on the researcher's thought and on his practice of
the craft,which have undoubtedly come to be strongly reflected in the
output of this study. These were the major works of those theorists and
intellectual craftsmen to whom the researcher kept returning again and
again during this project in search of fresh inspiration. Knowing who
and what these influences were will help to illuminate the relational
model presented here and to locate it for the reader within the wider
stream of research on organisations. The philosphical underpinning
of this work,i.e. the 'world view' explicit or implicit in it,owes
its main intellectual debts to Pettigrew's development and elaboration
contextualism in "The Awakening Giant" and elsewhere, the view of
social systems and structures offered by Berger & Luckman in "The Social
Construction of Reality"; the perspective on individual action within
social systems offered by Crosier & Friedberg in "Actors and Systems";
Silverman's action perspective as developed in "The Theory of
Organisations";the perspective on the primary objectives of sociological
inquiry,and the elaboration of the three major coordinates points in the
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classic tradition of sociology,offered by Mill's in "The Sociological
Imagination"; and Thompson's view of the historical process as described
by him in the preface to "Europe Since Napoleon" and more fully
developed by him throughout the work itelf. Mintzberg's insightful
distinction of strategy formation as a more inclusive concept than
strategy formulation,and his own empirical and theoretical work with
this concept,described in his 1978 and later articles,were very
influential conceptually. So also was Porter's work on the relationship
between industry structural evolution and company strategy,as developed
in "Competitive Strategy".
The main influences on the methodology and on the approach taken to the
analysis of the empirical data were Mintzberg's strategy of 'direct
research' as developed in his 1979 article; Pettigrew's approach to
the study of organisations longitidinally as continuing systems,as
developed in his 1979 article,and his contextualist methodology for
examining the relationship between the context,process and outcome of
organisational action,combining economic,political and cultural modes of
analysis,as described and illustrated in "The Awakening Giant" and
elsewhere; and Thompson's approach to comparative historical analysis as
developed and used by him in his book "Europe Since Napoleon". Lastly,
there were two further major influences on the approach to the analysis
of the descriptive data in this study. One of these was the classic work
of Allison on the essence of the decision process in the Cuban Missile
Crisis. The decision to analyse the data independently and in parallel
first through a primarily deterministic perspective and then through a
primarily voluntarist perspective was inspired by Allison's study. The
use of these multiple perspectives facilitated and enriched the later
effort at synthesis and theory generation. The second of these
further influences on the approach to the data analysis was the recent
work of Hickson, Butler,Cray,Mallory and Wilson on strategic decisions,
as described in "Top Decisions". The researcher was particularly
influenced by the way in which this group went about trying build up
insight through their multiple and varied approaches to the analysis
of their descriptive data.
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Other themes developed in this study - a brief summary
Along with the four themes discussed in connection with the relational
model of strategy formation presented above there were a number of other
interesting themes developed in this study which are summarised briefly
here before going on to finally review the implications of the study
for future research and practice. Most of these themes underpin,and were
explored through,the broader framework represented in the relational
model and are themelves illustrative of how the complex process of
strategy formation can be productively examined,empirically and
analytically,through this multi-level contextualist perspective.
1. As well as identifying five contextual factors that shape
strategy the researcher also attempted to develop,from the data,
a model of strategy formation which showed the directional linkages
between three of these factors for the case of the indigeneous
organisations of a small,open,and mixed national economy. This model
was developed in chapter 11 and is illustrated in figure 11.3.
2. A tableau was presented for each of the organisations in the study
which demonstrated how the locus of influence over strategy formation
tends to shift dynamically between the organisation and its
situational context over time,both within and between organisations.
These tableaus were developed in chapter 11 and are presented in
tables 11-1 to 11-4.
3. A 'prism effect' was isolated and highlighted. This was the 'prism
effect of a dramatic phase change in the situational context of all
of the organisations in the one industry. This phase change resulted
in a more pronounced distinction,or separation,in the strategies and
rates of development of the six largest organisations in the industry
after the phase change than before. This prism effect,and its
possible implications,were fully discussed in chapter 11 and
illustrated in figure 11.4.
4. Strategy formation was revealed,empirically,to be a multi-level
phenomenon. This allowed the researcher to develop a typology that
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linked level of strategy(coarse-grained or fine-grained) with type of
process( synoptic or logical-incremental/garbage can/adaptive
learning). This typology was developed in chapter 11 and is presented
in figure 11.6.
5. The empirical data also pointed to the possibility of a
typology of strategy formation processes along the two dimensions of
synoptic-incremental and deliberate-emergent and allowed the
researcher to indicate the probable organisational characteristics
associated with each of the four types in this typology. The typology
was developed in chapter 11 and the characteristics of each type are
summarised in figure 11.7.
6. The analysis of strategy formation processes in this research allowed
the researcher to identify 5 modes by how situational context comes
processually to influence strategy formation and 3 types of processes
associated with these modes,not all of which have been fully
recognised in the literature. These modes were discussed in chapter
11 and are summarised in figure 11.9.
7. The analysis of strategic change within the four organisations in the
study allowed the researcher to identify 5 modes of initiation of
changenot all of which have been fully recognised in the literature.
These modes were discussed in chapter 11 and are summarised in figure
11.10.
8. The data afforded a rare oportunity to analyse strategy formation
through a processual analysis of a strategic episode at multiple
levels of process. This revealed the importance of interlevel
differences in RATIONALITIES,levels of STRATEGIC CONCEPTION and FELT
PRESSURES for change,in determining the pace and outcome of strategic
change efforts across multiple levels of the social structure. It
also highlighted the functionality of economic,political and cultural
processes in the management of strategic change across these multiple
levels,and illustrated the importance of combining and integrating
integrating economic,political and cultural modes of analysis in the
contextual study of strategic change processes. This processual
analysis was carried out in chapter 11.
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Implications for future research
The implications for future research of the overall relational model
of strategy formation,incorporating the concept of organisational
career,have already been assessed earlier in this chapter. It was shown
there that the model offered a powerful framework and set of analytical
categories to researchers,within which to carry out both future
normative and empirical inquiry into the phenonmena of strategy
formation and organisational development,that was theoretically
consistent and empirically sound.
This current study,as well as providing a useful framework for future
research,has raised a number of specific issues and oportunities,for
further study,many of which were highlighted already in chapter 11 and
are now reviewed briefly below.
(i) Future research is needed to test the general applicability of
the relational model of strategy formation presented here. For
example,are there more than five primary contextual forces that
shape strategy? If so,how many are there and what are they? Do
the relative influences of these five(or more) factors vary
systematically across national contexts or within national
contexts through time? Are the directional relationships
between some of factors suggested in figure 11.3 valid across
different national contexts. There is a need here,and an
oportunity,for comparative cross-national research into the
contextual forces that shape strategy formation. Though such
research would be difficult to carry out the indications from this
study are that they could .provide further important insight into
the nature of the complex inter-relationship between situational
context and the formation of strategy in organisations,which could
be of predictive and normative value.
(ii) The empirical analysis of the structural evolution of the
international trading environment in this study raised at least
two interesting issues for further study. Firstly,what is
the nature and direction of the relationship between the
structural evolution of the international trading environment,the
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structural evolution of the industry globally, public policy and
leadership nationally,the structural evolution of the industry
nationally and organisational strategy. Is it as suggested in
figure 11.3 and does it vary systematically across national
contexts or types of national economies? Again a reserch design
of a comparative cross-national character would be needed to
further examine these relationships.
The second issue is can the Porter type approach to industry
analysis be fruitfully extended and applied to the structural
analysis of the international trading environment? Just two
observations arising out of our analysis of this variable here
suggest the relevance and potential of such an approach. The
international trading environment has,since the post-war period,
undergone a transition from a structure which was dominated by
one major player,with all others living under its 'umbrella',to
one where there are now a number of major trading blocks with
comparative economic power. Furthermore the growth rate in global
output and demand has slowed down dramatically in the 1980's.
Similar conditions at industry level would,according to Porter's
model,lead to an intensification of competitive pressure within
the industry and possibly to new consolidations and a new
distribution of economic power as players jockey for position and
attempt to stay in the game. Something similar to what the Porter
approach would predict at industry level appears to be happening
to the evolution of the structure of the global economy.
International competition has intensified and there is a greater
questioning in the 1980's than ever before of 'competitiveness'
of national economies. Th intensification of international
competition is moving the structure of global trade towards
a greater level of consolidation as many nations come to realise
that they can no longer be world class competitive economies on
their own. The recent acceleration in the pace of European
economic integration towards a truly 'common' market by 1992 is a
manifestation of this trend and is indicative of the parallel
between firm behaviour and industry structural evolution on the
one hand and the behaviour of national economies and the
structural evolution of the global economy on the other.
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(iii) Taking both (1) and (ii) together, there is a need,and a major
oportunity in the strategy field to build on the work of Porter
and those like him that have enriched strategy studies through
their analytical blending of the industrial economics and the
business policy traditions. There is a need and an oportunity,in
particular,to better understand the relationship between industry
structural evolution and national economic structure and policy.
The contribution of industry analysis to the strategy field can
be strengthened by further normative and empirical study of this
relationship.
(iv) The 'prism effect' that was identified in the empirical analysis
of the Irish dairy industry raises some interesting issues for
further study. In particular,is this a more general phenomenon?
Do certain phase changes in overall situational context have the
effect of separating the strategies and performances of the
participants in the same industry (somewhat analogous to the way
that experienced examiners find certain questions to be more
effective in discriminating student performances than others). If
so what are the characteristics of these phase changes and what
are the most important determinants of differential performance in
the face of these phase changes? Longitudinal comparative studies
at the industry level of analysis would be needed to further
examine this phenomenon,a fuller understanding of which could have
value in predicting the structural evolution of industries and
normative value for organisational strategy in such phase change
conditions.
(v) More generally,this research highlighted how the locus of control
and impetus over strategy formation varies dynamically between the
organisation and its situational context. Some contexts were found
to be more imperative than others for every organisation over
time. Furthermore,some contexts were more imperative for
certain organisations than for others,even in the same industry.
How do contexts become more imperative and how do some
organisatiois manage to maintain more scope for action than others
in such situations?
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Furthermore,at industry level certain contexts were found to be
more 'fluid' than others. For example the future of the dairy
industry was to a certain degree 'up for grabs' during the
whole amalgamation episode from 1964-74. By 1974 the structure
of the industry had hardened and a group of six processors emerged
to dominate the more concentrated industry structure. Those six
processors still dominate the industry 14 years later,though their
relative positions in the top six have changed. It seems then that
there may be certain decisive episodes in the historical evolution
of industry structures when future positions in the industry are
determined for a long period to come. Is this a more general
phenomenon? If so what are the characteristic features of such
decisive periods and how can they be predicted? What are the
normative implications for strategy at the level of the firm?
Further research at the industry and firm levels which is
comparative and intensively focused on the dynamics of industry
evolution during major contextual phase changes would appear to
offer the best prospect for achieving more insight into the
questions posed above.
(vi) One of the major themes to emerge from this study was that
for the phenomenon of organisational leadership to be fully
understood it must be properly situated in the context of the time
and events in which it is exercised. The empirical analysis in
this study has prompted a call for a major redirection in the main
stream of leadership research.
Mainstream leadership research has been preoccupied with the
study of attributes and styles and with the study of
leader-follower dynamics in small group situations. Most of this
work has been acontextual and focused on leadership at supervisor
and middle management levels. However,it is clear from the
empirical evidence in this study that attributes and styles,
measured along universalistic and acontextual dimensions
provide only very 1 limited insight into the phenomenon of
leadership and its role in strategy formation. This study has
empirically highlighted the need for different ways of theorising
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about leadership and different methodologies for studying the
phenomenon from those which have been dominant in the past. It
was argued from the empirical analysis that the phenomenon of
leadership is properly located,not in the person of the leader,but
in the dynamic interaction between the leader,his organisation
and its situational context.
Future empirical research on leadership should concentrate more on
the 'exercise of leadership' in context as the primary variable
and unit of analysis and treat the 'person of the leader' as one
element of this phenomenon rather than the central issue for
study. Only in this way will the effect of this complex phenomenon
on organisational outcomes be more fully understood. We need to
understand more about the 'kinetics' of leadership in its
exercise, rather than concentrate our efforts almost exclusively
in trying to identify the 'potential' for leadership in the
individual person,the reliable measurement of which has proved
to be so elusive in spite of the enormous research effort that has
been poured into it in the past. In regard to the systematic study
of the exercise of leadership ,comparative research on
organisational leadership in context along the lines of the
longitudinal,contextua.l approach advocated by Pettigrew(1985;35:
l987b;650),and very influential on the design of this research,
would appear to offer a very promising way forward.
Comparative studies of organisational leadership carried out
in such a contextualist mode could help to provide further
insight a number of paiticular issues that have arisen in the
empirical analysis in this study that relate to leaders and the
exercise of leadership. For example,how are the motives,goals
and strategic approaches of leaders formed by antecedent context
and continue to be affected by contextual influences during the
exercise of their leadership? How and in what way are
the strategic actions of leaders shaped by the traditional values
of their particular contexts as well as by the more universal
'rational' choice procdures normatively offered by management
studies,especially by management science? How and to what extent
is organisational action shaped through the internalisation by the
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organisational leader of contextual influences? (see chp 10 for
examples in this study). Contextual studies of the formation of
the personalities of leaders and of their growth and development
through the exercise of leadership will help us to advance our
understanding of the link between the persona of the leader
and the exercise of leadership beyond that which can be gleaned
through such acontextual and ahistorical motivation theories as
those of Maslow,Hertzberg,McClelland.
Furthermore,this study has offered a categorisation of leadership
based on the historical challenge presented to the leader by the
temporal conjunction of organisational history and situational
context. Leaders were classed in this study as BUILDERS,
REVITALISERS , TURNAROUNDERS and INHERITORS (including TRANSFORMERS).
Such a classification can help to shift the analytical focus onto
the exercise of leadership. If the classes are sufficiently
distinct analytically then this type of classification offers a
a basis for carrying out future comparative,contextual studies
with 'the exercise of leadership' as the unit of analysis and the
'person of the leader' as just one of the independent variables.
Future research could more rigourously examine the classification
scheme offered here for analytical distinctiveness and elaborate
it. For example the category of inheritors could be probably be
further refined into a more useful set of classes i.e.
TRANSFORMERS etc. A more rigourously established classification
scheme along these lines could then be used to develop,through
comparative analysis,the distinctive features of each class, i.e.
the distinctive structural characteristics of each type of
historic challenge type and the distinctive process features of
each type of leadership exercise. Such studies could offer
valuable new descriptive,explanatory and prescriptive insight
into the exercise of leadership for these different historical
contingencies.
Finally,future contextualist research that takes organisational
career as the unit of analysis can offer further insight into
the phenomenon of leadership as a variable in strategy formation
and organisationa.l development. In particular it can more closely
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investigate and explain a number of interesting and important
issues that emerged from the empirical analysis in this study. For
example,two empirical observations in this research were firstly
that leadership effectiveness can vary over different contexts,
even when the variation in context is in the same organisation
over time, and secondly that leadership change can itself be a
pre-requisite to effecting strategic change in certain situations.
The first observation raises the following questions for more
systematic study.Why does leadership effectiveness vary with
context over time? More specifically why do some leaders who were
effective in an earlier context become ineffective in a later
context? One thing that this study clearly indicated was that the
answer is not to be simply found in identifying a mis-match
between the personality of leader and the 'imperatives' of the new
context.Leaders lose their sureness of touch and their credibility
in certain situations(like golfers and tennis players - some gaines
just flow away from them ,at other times they get the 'breaks' and
their confidence and sureness of touch is enhanced) .There is a
dynamic interplay between leader and context that affects the
ongoing process of the exercise of leadership. This needs more
systematic study. In particular these questions of how leaders
come to lose(or gain) substantial touch with the demands of
context and come to lose(or gain) support for substantive action
from context could be a fruitful focus for further systematic
comparative study of leadership in action.
Secondly,the empirical evidence in this research suggests that it
is time to move forward from the inconclusive and somewhat sterile
debate as to whether organisational leadership is more symbolic
than substantive or vice versa. The example of the leadership
changes in CSET and Golden Vale indicated that these are not
opposites but rather two important aspects of leadership that can
interact to produce substantive outcomes. In both cases the potent
symbolism evoked in the leadership change facilitated the new
leader in the implementation of substantive change. This
interaction between the substantive and symbolic aspects of
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leadership is itself worthy of more specific and systematic
research attention in the future which can surely contribute
significantly towards our fuller understanding of the kinetics of
leadership.
(vii) This research highlighted and empirically examined the multi-level
nature of strategy formation in organisations. This empirical
analysis led the researcher to advance a plausible typology for
strategy formation processes that was based on,and provided a
partial synthesis of, the synoptic-incremental and deliberate-
emergent debates in the strategy literature(see figure 11.6).
The analysis strongly indicated that the key to explaining
variation across the four types of strategy formation process
represented in the typology was to be found in the variation in
the character and texture of organisational contexts. Further
research is needed to identify and to examine more rigourously
the specific dimensions of organisational context that are most
salient in the determination of the type of process.
In particular,the empirical analysis indicated that the deliberate
or emergent character of strategy formation at the highest level
of process was directly related to organisational size and
diversity. A key question for future research therefore is under
what conditions and at what stage in an organisation's development
does direct control of the content of strategy pass from the top
strategist to the organisational context? A further question for
future research is how do the strategy formation processes in
the strategic segments of large diversified organisations differ
in type and character with those in smaller corporate entities
that are similar in size and product-market scope to these
segments? Systematic comparative study designed to focus on these
questions will significantly extend our understanding of the
relationship between organisational context and the process of
strategy formation.
(viii)This study empirically examined the way in which the situational
contexts of organisations come to influence organisational action
and outcomes.The 5 modes and 3 types of process identified in this
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research need to be subjected to further more focused systematic
and rigourous examination. In particular future research might
try to ascertain whether there are more that 5 modes and 3 types
of process. It might further try to examine and isolate the key
distinctive characteristics of each mode and type,however many
there are,and try to examine more fully the relationships between
these modes and types.
(ix) Future research might,likewise,focus on the 5 modes of initiation
of strategic change,highlighted in this study,and subject them
also to more systematic and concentrated inquiry. Are there more
than 5 modes? What are their distinguishing characteristics
however many of them their might be? Are there specific contextual
antecedents ,situational and/or organisational ,associated with
specific modes?
(x) The empirical data in this study provided an oportunity to study
strategy formation at multiple levels of process. Such studies are
still very rare. The episodic analysis strongly indicated that
interlevel differences in RATIONALITIES,levels of STRATEGIC
CONCEPTION and FELT PRESSURES for change were the main
determinants affecting the pace and outcome of strategic change
efforts across multiple levels of social structure. This offered
a modest beginning to a much larger research challenge, the
development of a process theory of strategic change which
incorporates and accounts for strategic action and volition at
multiple levels of process. In order to move forward towards the
development of a more elaborate theory of process,which will be
more conceptually and empirically useful,future research should
compare the processes of strategic change that involve multiple
levels of strategic action and volition in the cases of different
organisations in different situational contexts. In particular,
for example,such comparative research can examine whether the
categories revealed in the single episodic analysis in this
research can provide the basis for a more general theory of
process. Furthermore,it can examine the interplay of these
determinants in different contexts and provide a fuller insight
into their dynamic relationship than was possible with a single
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case.The contextual variation provided in a comparative research
design should reveal some corresponding variation in the
patterning of process. Empirical examination of such variation
should offer deeper insight into process and offer the basis for
a more comprehensive model of process than that provided in this
study through the analysis of a single episode.
Implications for management practice
The research reported in this study has a number of important
implications for management practice. Its major contribution to
practitioners is the overall relational model of strategy formation,
incorporating the concept of organisational career. This model provides
practising strategists,at national,industry and firm levels,with a
powerful analytical framework within which to analyse the strategic
behaviour of organisations and through which to actively manage
the process of strategy formation at the level of the organisation.
This overall framework focuses practitioner attention on the
multi-level nature of strategy formation processes and on the need to
maintain a multi-level perspective in their attempt to actively manage
the process. It also helps to guide the practitioner to develop a
personal theory-in-use which neither over- nor under-estimates the
capacity for voluntarist action in the strategic management of
organisations.
Practising strategists are often prey to one of two opposite tendencies
in their development of a theory-in-use for the strategic management of
their organisations. Some tend to think that they are,or are expected
to be,the all-knowing and all-powerful commanders of their
organisations. They believe that their scope for strategic action is
limited primarily by their own personal attributes and capacities.
This theory-in-use is a reflection of the over voluntarit
perspective that has been pre-dominant in much of the normative
literature on strategy to date. Others tend to feel that their
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capacity for strategic action is so externally circumscribed that they
are largely just 'adaptive navagators' who must respond appropriately
to the dictates of their external environment,or perish. This theory-in-
use reflects an over deterministic view of organisational action such as
that to be found in much of the literature in organisation theory based
on the pre-dominant open systems paradigm. The relational model in this
study offers a conceptual foundation to the strategist,from which to
develop his personal theory-in-use,that avoids these two extremes and is
more in accord with his empirical reality.
The relational model presents the strategist with a self-conception as
active agency in strategy formation whose scope for personal action is
both enabled and constrained by his organisation's history and its
situational context. Contextual forces and the historical pattern of the
organisation's strategic commitments provide the strategist with his
resources and bases for strategic action. His strategic actions are not
only made by context and history,they make context and history. He is
influenced by technological change but can also harness it and influence
its direction. He recognises the evolutionary forces in his industry but
can try to shift the balance of those forces in his favour. He is
influenced by national aspirations and policy but as the leader of a
major organ of society he can influence these aspirations and policies
and he is essentially involved in their realisation. The concept of
organisational career emphasises to the strategist that strategy
formation is a long-linked process stretching out in time with important
antecedents and consequences often transcending the personal biographies
of individual strategists. This process,therefore,should always be
managed with a well developed and pervading sense of context and
history.
At a more specific level the empirical analysis and description in this
research offer many specific insights to practising managers and others
interested in the active management of strategy formation at the level
of the organisation. Some of the more important of these are
highlighted below:
(i) This study has identified five specific contextual factors that
are the most important contextual influences in strategy
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formation. Therefore,not only does it direct strategists to
manage with a more pervading sense of context and history than
much of the normative literature on strategy to date,but it also
directs their attention to the specific contextual factors on
which they should concentrate.These factors were (i) TECHNOLOGY;
(ii)INDUSTRY EVOLUTION; (iii)INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT;
(iv)NATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY AND LEADERSHIP; and (v)SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION. The data chapters(Chps 4-8) and the
empirical analysis of these factors,carried out in chapter 9,
provide detailed historical insight into the general character of
these factors and the way in which they tend to influence strategy
formation and this insight was summarised earlier in this
chapter.
Some important normative implications for strategists can be
distilled out of the detailed empirical examination of these five
contextual factors in this study. Prescriptively what the study
seems to be saying to strategists,inter alia,is the following:
Recognise the importance of these factors as the five primary
contextual factors which shape strategy in organisations. Develop
an understanding of their underlying pattern and operation as
historical forces,how they interrelate,how they tend to enable and
structure organisational action,how they can be harnessed,
deflected and directed. Do not over rely on universalistic
environmental sensing techniques or prescriptions alone,however
rationally or intuitively appealing. Try to develop an
understanding of the meaning of historical change in the overall
context in which you operate.
Be aware,for example,that discontinuous technological change in
the core industry itself or in upstream or downstream production
system can all have a major effect on the structural evolution
of the core industry. Be aware that industries have national
as well as global structures and national patterns of structural
evolution as well as global patterns. Be aware,too,that the
relationship between national and global industries is linked tQ
the relationship between the national and global economies as
reflected in the evolving structure and pattern of world trade. Be
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aware also that these structural evolutions are governed not only
by changes in relative economic power and power-dependence
relations among national economies but also by prevailing economic
doctrines and shared ideation systems that govern the political
regulation of economic forces at national and international
levels. Be aware that the ownership structure that comes to
dominate an industry in a mixed economy can often be more a matter
of historical pragmatism rather than of ideological conviction,a
distinction with important implications for the future evolution
of such industries. Be aware that the point of realisation of
social change,the point at which the conflict between the forces
for continuity and change in the wider social system often
converges,is in change processes at the level of the organisation.
Expect the forces of historical change to challenge,not only the
economic effectiveness of your organisation,but the meaning and
legitimacy of its aspirations and their connectedness with the
changing aspirations and expectations of the wider social system
in which it operates.
(ii) The model locates the phenomenon of leadership in the historical
intersection between the individual leader,his organisation's
history(career-to-date) and its situational context. The last two
present the leader with his historic challenge and oportunity.
The framework presents the leader as one of three main elements
in the formation of strategy,the other two being his organisation
and its situational context.
The view of leadership presented here has a number of important
implications for practice,particularly for the selection,
evaluation and replacement of leaders. Those whose responsibility
it is to select and evaluate leaders should be fully aware that
what leaders can accomplish is a function of the historical
challenge presented by organisational history and situational
context as well as of the personal capacity of the leader to meet
this challenge. These historical challenges present different
types of demands and some leaders are potentially better suited to
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certain historical challenges than to others. Some may be
inherently better equipped to build than to transform and
vice-versa. Those responsible for the strategic selection of
leaders need to be able to perceive and understand the nature of
the historical challenge facing the new leader and make their
selection with this firmly in mind.
But this research has emphasised that leadership effectiveness is
not just about potential,it is about performance. The problem of
leadership in strategy formation is not just a problem of
selecting the person who is potentially best suited,ante-hoc,to
meet the demands of a particular historical challenge. This study
has illustrated how leaders of ability can dynamically lose touch
with the demands of a changing context,lose their own sureness of
touch,lose the confidence of key supporters,and render their
future leadership position in a particular organisation,in a
particular context,untenable. In other words,a leader of ability
can sometimes perform inadequately by chosing the wrong options
or simply find that the contextual conditions for performance
change so that they no longer suit his strengths and in fact
expose his weaknesses. Furthermore,this study has shown how
the powerful symbolism involved in the replacement of a
leader can itself be important,and in some cases a necessary,
condition in order to resolve a crisis and/or to accomplish a
major transformation or turn-around.
By conceptualising strategy formation in such a way that the
person of the leader is seen as just one of the three major
elements this study offers. a theoretical framework within which to
understand and manage the difficult reality that leaders of
ability must sometimes be replaced for their own sake as well as
for the sake of their organisation. It provides a theoretical
explanation for why this is so. It predicts that such situations
are likely to arise because strategy formation is not a
determinate process whose performance requirements can be
perfectly predicted in advance and because leaders,however
able,are not infinitely resourceful and adaptable to all
situations nor are they perfectly consistent in applying their
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abilities.
Empirically it is widely recognised that leaders are replaced
for the reasons mentioned earlier. However,without a proper
conceptual underpinning these decisions often happen later than
they should,they are accompanied by a sense of shock and trauma
within the organisation which may generate some creative energy
but which is generally unnecessarily dissipative and disruptive,
and they leave the replaced leader with a damaged reputation and a
stigma of failure in his own eyes and in those of his former
associates. These responses,I believe,are based on an inadequate
and incomplete conceptualisation of leadership and its role in
strategy formation and organisational effectiveness. In particular
they are rooted in a perspective that sees the mate ability of
the leader as the primary explanatory variable in organisationa].
effectiveness. Once this perspective is widened to one which sees
the innate ability of the leader as only one of three major
elements,as in the framework presented here it becomes possible to
forsee and understand how able leaders can be ineffective,or
become ineffective,in certain contexts and that ineffectiveness is
situational and not to be equated simply with personal
incompetence. Greater acceptance of this by leaders themselves,by
those who are responsible for appointing and replacing them,those
who believe in them and follow them, and those who commentate
professionally on organisational matters will help to make these
strategic replacement decisions,quicker and easier to make and
less dissipative in their consequences on the individual leaders
and on their organisations.
Furthermore,this study has highlighted how some contexts can be
difficult to succeed in even for the most able leaders,whereas
in other contexts it is almost impossible for a leader of any
ability to fail. Furthermore,the it has also illustrated how the
strategic actions,and indeed inactions,of current leaders become
a major part of the historical legacy of future leaders. This
legacy can in some cases enhance and in other cases constrain the
scope for action and the effectiveness of the future leader.
The fuller insight into these complicated linkages between
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situational context,organisational history and the personal
effectiveness of the individual leader,offered in both the
empirical analysis and in the emergent relational model in this
study,should provide those whose responsibility it is to evaluate
and reward the performance of leaders with an improved framework
within which to approach this problem. Clearly simple bottom-line
measures of current business health are an inadequate standard
against which to measure the personal contribution of leaders.
Relying on such metrics alone will over-reward leaders that face
benign contextual challenges while under-rewarding those that face
more difficult contextual and historical conditions. In
particular, the nature of historical challenge facing the leader
and the historical legacy that he/she passes on should be two
primary considerations in the evaluation and reward of strategic
leaders. The question of how to evaluate leaders systematically in
accordance with these two primary considerations has not been
addressed in this study and must await further research of a more
problem-oriented and applied nature.
Lastly,this study has provided some fresh insight to practitioners
concerning the motivation of leaders. In partricular it has
highlighted how the mainsprings of leader motivation are
themselves linked to context and history. Leaders are motivated
not just by physiological and pyschological needs which are
universal in the human species. lfniversalistic need theories of
motivation such as those of Maslow,McClelland,Herzberg and others
are a useful,but inadequate,conceptual foundation on which to base
an understanding of what will move leaders to perform and inspire
performance in others. The motivational mainsprings of the leaders
in this study were seen to be formed through context and history
and to be nutured through ongoing interaction with context and
history. For example,the 'Doc' was the inspirational builder of
AFT,not simply because he wanted to build an organisation in order
to actualise his own full potential. He was deeply moved by his
nationalism and his belief in the developmental power of science
and his inspirational leadership was clearly based on these values
and beliefs. Management training and practice has been built on
a conceptual basis which is overly concerned with rationality and
606
behaviourism. This research highlights the importance of such
factors as tradition,passion and dedication to deeply held
absolute values in achieving a fuller understanding of motivation.
The implication for those responsible for the selection,motivation
and development of leaders is that they will need,themselves,to
have a basis for identifying basic values and beliefs and for
assessing their potential implications for particular leadership
challenges in particular contextual and historical situations.
This study has highlighted a practical need in this regard and
has provided a conceptual underpinning for addressing this need.
(iii) The relational model of strategy formation presented in this study
has some overall normative implications for those concerned with
the strategic management of organisations.
The model has posited three main elements in the formation of
strategy,the leader,his organisation's history and its situational
context. The model directs attention to these three main
variables,any or all of which can be manipulated on order to
improve the effectiveness or strengthen the competitiveness of the
organisation,in any given situation at any given point in time.
Contexts can be changed in order to try to shift the balance of
the contextual forces shaping strategy in the organisation's
favour and to shift the locus of control away from the context and
towards the organisation. The legacy of history,as reflected in
the existing pattern of strategic cornmitments,can be changed in
order to provide the organisation with greater scope for manoeuver
to exploit its context. Finally,the tactics of individual leaders
or the individual leaders themselves can be changed in order to
bring new approaches,new abilities,new inspiration and new
signification to bear on certain historical challenges.
(iv) This research highlighted the way in which the locus of control
over strategy formation and organisational action can vary between
the organisation and its situational context over time. It
highlighted how contexts evolve. In particular it showed how there
can be certain phases in the historical evolution of industries
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which will largely determine the future structure of that
industry,and the relative positions of organisations within it,far
into the future. In other words,there are decisive moments of
historical oportunity when the wider system is in flux. Such a
moments,for example,were the 1968-72 period in the Irish dairy
industry and the mid-60's in the Irish distilling industry.
Strategic managers need to be aware that the fluidity and
malleability of the situational contexts of their organisations
varies over time. They need to try to understand the underlying
logic of the structural evolution of the wider social system in
which their organisations are situated. They need to be able to
recognise the moments of historic oportunity when the future
structure of these wider social system are in structural flux and
future positions within that structure are to be won or lost for
some considerable time to come.
There is a time for the bold initiative,the pre-emptive strategic
commitment,the imaginative and visionary strategic departure.
There are further times for building,in a logical-incremental
fashion,on the strategic base established by these bold
departures. This seems to be the normative message for strategic
management arising from foregoing. Logical-incrementalism alone
is an inadequate and over-cautious normative approach on which
base strategic management practice. It is an accurate description
of reality but only part of the time. This research,in developing
some point of synthesis between the synoptic and the logical-
incremental theories of process from empirical analysis,has
presented a more useful c .nceptual foundation on which to base
strategic management practice than either theory alone,and one
that accords more closely with empirical reality.
Prescriptively what this synthesis seems to be saying to strategic
managers is this: Develop a synoptic vision at the hig,est level
of conception of strategy,proceed in logical-incremental £as'rtton
to fulfill that vision,learning and adjusting to the oportunities
and constraints of situational context and organisational 'histoty
as you proceed. However be continually alert to the fact that
608
there are decisive moments of historical oportunity that only
bold,imaginative synoptic strategic departures will fully exploit.
Be ready to seize these oportunities or be reconciled to minor
player status in the future evolution of your industry. In order
to recognise these moments of historical oportunity try develop an
understanding of how the context of your organisation is evolving
historically. You can do this by examining how the five main
contextual forces,that have been isolated in this study,have
affected and continue to affect the formation of strategy in your
organisation and the evolution of the wider social system of which
your organisation has been,and continues to be,an integral part.
(v) This study has provided valuable insight into the process
of strategic change involving strategic action and volition across
multiple levels of social structure. This processual insight is of
practical value to strategists at national and industry level that
wish to bring about strategic change at the level of the
individual organisation through largely voluntary action. This
insight was gained through the processual analysis of the
amalgamation episode in the Irish dairy industry in the 60's and
early 70's. This episode was representative of a more general
class of probleni,the problem of how to get strategic change
implemented across multiple levels of social structure through
only loose authoritative coupling. More substantively,it was
illustrative of the problem of how national strategists can
influence industry evolution and firm behaviour in a democratic
society.
Three main conceptual instghts emerged from this processual
analysis with practical,as well as theoretical,implications. The
first insight was the recognition that the PACE and OUTCOME of the
strategic change efforts across multiple levels of social
structure appear to be determined mainly by interlevel differences
in RATIONALITIES,levels of STRATEGIC CONCEPTION and FELT PRESSURES
for change. The second insight is that in such situations the use
POLITICAL and CULTURAL strategems and pressures for change are at
least highly functional,if not indispensible,adjuncts to rational
argument for the successful transmission of a change impetus
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across the different levels of social structure. A third insight
is that the process itself is non-linear,with a trajectory and an
outcome which are unlikely to be predictable at the outset. The
implications for higher level strategists seeking to implement
similar strategic change across multiple levels of social
structure are therefore three-fold. First recognise the importance
of interlevel differences in rationality,strategic conception and
felt pressures for change in determining the pace and outcome of
the process and develop the capacity to be able to analyse and
understand the significance of these differences. Secondly,be
prepared to supplement rational(often economic) argument with
with political pressure(using power and influence to get
movement,getting key opinion leaders publicly committed to change
change etc) and cultural pressure(seeking to legitimise the need
for change and delegitimise the opposition to change through the
harnessing of potent cultural norms,values and beliefs) in order
to transmit the change impetus down through the social structure.
Thirdly,be prepared to manage the process oportunistically and in
a continuous problem-solving mode. Pay due attention to the
dynamic unfolding of context,the progression of process and the
oportunities and constraints that continually arise from them.
Finally,and more generally,the overall relational model has major
normative implications for the education of leaders. The overall
admonition to strategists to manage with a pervading sense of context
and history raises the issue of how best to develop this sense. In
placing leadership along with situational context and organisational
history as the three coordinate points of strategy formation the model
recognises the uniqueness of the ,
 leader's role and the nature of his
challenge. It is unique in the sense that it demands a much wider
appreciation of context and history than any lower position in the
managerial hierarchy. There is,from this,a sense in which the job of
organisational leader is different,not only in degree but also in kind,
from other management positions.
Vocational management training,based largely on the acontextual and
ahistorical models and constructs of the decision and behavioural
sciences,serves fairly well many of the professional needs of those
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that operate below the apex of the organisation. Such training offers
valuable professional knowledge and technique to develop work standards
and budgetary controls,to appraise and select employees,to design and
carry out market research,to assess the financial health of the
organisation and so on. However,the task of connecting an organisation
with its own history and with the historical evolution of the wider
social system in which it operates,the capacity to confront reason with
tradition and to reconcile them,the capacity to relate organisational
aspirations to the wider aims of society,to define what the organisation
stands for,its core values and beliefs,these tasks are much more value
laden and less problem-directed than those of lower level functionaries.
This existential view of the leadership role is inherent and central to
the relational model of strategy formation and to the concept of
organisational career presented in this study. Leaders do not primarily
solve problems so much as face options with value-laden dilemmas. The
two negations which,according to Aron(l967;197),inspire Weberian
sociology with its "kind of existential philosophy",namely that "no
science can ever tell men how they should live" and that "no science
can ever tell humanity what its future is",illustrate that the issues
facing the organisational leader are of a kind with,and integral to,
the wider issues that face society. No science can ultimately tell
organisations what they should do or what their future is.
Vocational training can provide organisational leaders with valuable
management technology but the job demands more than technique. Context
and history cannot be adequately addressed with universalistic
checklists,decision procedures and the like. The fundamental
questions of what the organisation stands for,what basic values and
beliefs guide its strategic actions,what is its future potential and
what kind of society does it want to help create are not to be left
to others. At least the leaders that were studied in this research were
not prepared to leave them to others. Organisations are moved by the
passionate adherence to certain values,traditions and aesthetics to a
degree that is significant in the determination of sustained economic
performance. This was clearly evident in this research and is perhaps
the major insight from the cultural anthropology perspected that has
recently,if belatedly,been imported into organisational studies.
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The important aspects of the leadership task not adequately catered for
by vocational training,including the typical MBA programme,are largely
the subject matter of what has come to be known in the West as a liberal
education. Developing the sense of history and context that leaders need
can only be acquired over a period of years and should be visualised as
an open-ended,continuing,process rather than a discrete project. In
fact,the classical approach to education for leadership was a liberal
education. Leaders were then assumed to acquire the techniques of their
vocation on the job. Since the second half of the 20th century the
emphasis has changed significantly. The ideal profile for the formal
education of today's business leader is a professional training in
engineering,finance or law,followed by an MBA. This is a reflection of
rapid growth in the sophistication of management technology over the
last three decades. However,this research strongly indicates that
organisational leaders need much more than this sophisticated
vocational fare. It indicates a need to restore a strong emphasis on
liberal education back into the formal education of today's and
tommorrow' s leaders.
The question of how is a large one. It presents a formidable challenge
to leaders and educators alike and is outside the scope of this study.
It must address the post-experience needs of leaders as well as their
preparatory education. One thing that seems clear from the perspective
on leadership that has emerged here is that simply grafting some liberal
courses as add-ons to the current professional and/or MBA curricula is
not likely to give the liberal element its proper place.In the hierarchy
of knowledge and understanding for the leadership role a liberal
education should be the integrative element,providing leaders with
insight and ways of thinking about the full nature and meaning of the
historical challenges and choices presented to them by their
organisation's history and its situational context.
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